

Plato's Parmenides

Plek'd Edition

With Balboa's Translation (*9 Feb 2017 revision*),
H. N. Fowler Translation & Greek texts in parallel.

Cephalus.....126A

Zeno.....127B

Parmenides.....130B

1.....137C

2.....142B

3.....155E

4.....< 157B

5.....159B

6.....< 160B

7.....< 163B

8.....< 164B

9.....165E

*Note from Brumbaugh on Theorem 1 first hypotheses: "*Theorem I: Parts and Whole* 1.2 (137c5)

So neither can it have a part, nor can it be a whole. Ar: How is that? This is marked as a theorem by the response, which is a question whenever a theorem or a subordinate proof within a theorem is introduced.

When we came from our home at Clazomenae to [Athens](#), we met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the market-place. Adeimantus took me by the hand and said,

“Welcome, Cephalus if there is anything we can do for you here, let us know.”

“Why,” said I, “that is just why I am here, to ask a favour of you.”

“Tell us,” said he, “what it is.”

Cephalos: ¹ Immediately after we arrived at Athens from Clazomenaea, the place of our abode,

^{126A} Επειδη αφικομεθα Αθηναζε εκ Κλαζομενων οικοθεν
we happened to meet with Adeimantos and Glaucon at the place of assembly (the agora);

ενετυχομεν Αδειμαντω τε και Γλαυκωνι, κατ' αγοραν:
and Adeimantos, taking me by the hand said ...

και ο Αδειμαντος λαβομενος μου της χειρος εφη

Adeimantos: Welcome, O Cephalos, and if there is anything you need, of those things that

χειρ, ω Κεφαλε, και ει του δεει των

we have here, of which we are able to provide, please ask.

τηδε, ων ημεις δυνατοι, φραζε.

Cephalos: Then on the one hand, I am certainly here indeed, for this very purpose,

Αλλα μεν δη παρειμι γε επ' τουτο **αυτο**

as being in need of your help.

δεησομενος υμων.

Adeimantos: Please tell us, your need.

αν λεγοις, την δεησιν.

Κέφαλος ἐπειδὴ Ἀθήναζε οἴκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἀφικόμεθα, κατ' ἀγορὰν ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδεϊμάντῳ τε καὶ Γλαύκωνι: καὶ μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ὁ Ἀδεϊμαντος, Χαῖρ', ἔφη, ὦ Κέφαλε,

καὶ εἵ του δέη τῶν τῇδε ὧν ἡμεῖς δυνατοί, φράζε.

ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, εἶπον ἐγώ, πάρειμί γε ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν.

λέγοις ἂν, ἔφη, τὴν δέησιν.

[126b] And I said, "What was your half-brother's name? I don't remember. He was only a boy when I came here from Clazomenae before and that is now a long time ago. His father's name, I believe, was Pyrilampes."

"Yes," said he.

"And what is his own name?"

"Antiphon. Why do you ask?"

Cephalos: What was your maternal brother's name? For I do not remember.

126B τι ἦν υἱῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τῷ ἀδελφῷ ὄνομα; γὰρ οὐ μνημονεύω.

For at that time he was just a child when I came here before to the assembly from

δε τοῦ ἦν πάλαι ὅτε δεῦρο πρότερον ἐπεδήμησα ἐκ Κλαζομένων:

but since that time, a great length of time has already taken place.

δε ἐξ ἐκείνου, πολὺς χρόνος ἤδη .

But, his father's name was, Pyrilampes, I believe.

γὰρ μὲν τῷ πατρὶ ὄνομα, Πυριλάμπεος, δοκῶ.

Adeimantos: Quite so. (Πάνυ γε.)

Cephalos: To be sure, but what was his name?

γε δε αὐτῷ ;

Adeimantos: Antiphon. But what is it that you need most to enquire after?

Ἀντιφῶν. ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνει;

καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον: τῷ ἀδελφῷ υἱῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ μνημονεύω. παῖς δὲ
 πάλαι ἦν, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησα δεῦρο ἐκ Κλαζομένων: πολὺς δὲ ἤδη χρόνος ἐξ
 ἐκείνου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρὶ, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπεος ὄνομα.

πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

αὐτῷ δέ γε;

Ἀντιφῶν. ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνει;

“These gentlemen,” I said, “are fellow-citizens of mine, who are very fond of philosophy. They have heard that this Antiphon had a good deal to do with a friend of [Zeno](#)'s named Pythodorus, that Pythodorus often repeated to him the conversation [126c] which [Socrates](#), [Zeno](#), and Parmenides once had together, and that he remembers it.”

“That is true,” said he.

“Well,” I said, “we should like to hear it.”

“There is no difficulty about that,” said he “for when he was a youth he studied it with great care though now he devotes most of his time to horses, like his grandfather Antiphon. If that is what you want, let us go to him. He has just gone home from here, and he lives close by in Melite.”

Cephalos: You are aware, that these fellow-citizens of mine, are quite philosophical,

Οἶδ', τ' πολῖται ἐμοὶ εἰσι μάλα φιλοσοφοί,

and have heard that this very Antiphon, was frequently present with one Pythodoros,

τε ἀκηκόασι οὗτος ὁ Ἀντιφῶν πολλά ἐντετύχηκε τινὶ Πυθοδώρῳ

the companion of Zeno, and that he treasured in his memory **The Discourses/Logos** which

126C εταίρῳ Ζήνωνος, καὶ ἀπομνημονεύει τοὺς λόγους οὓς

Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other at that time, having been often heard

Σωκράτης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν ποτε, πολλάκις ἀκούσας

from Pythodoros.

τοῦ Πυθοδώρου.

Adeimantos: You speak the truth. (λέγεις Ἀληθῆ.)

Cephalos: Accordingly then, we are in need of hearing these discourses.

τοίνυν δεόμεθα διακούσαι, τούτων .

Adeimantos: But this is no difficult matter to accomplish: for the young man has made **Them**

Ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν, γὰρ μαιράκιον ὦν αὐτοὺς

the subject of quite focused attention; and indeed after that, he now applies himself very

εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν, γε ἐπεὶ νῦν διατρίβει πολλά

closely to equestrian affairs with his grandfather who also has the same name. Then if we must,

πρὸς τὰ ἵππικῃ κατὰ τὸν πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον. ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ,

let us go to **him**; for he just now went home from here; for he lives very near, in Melita.

ἴωμεν παρ' αὐτόν: γὰρ ἄρτι οἴχεται οἰκαδὲ ἐνθένδε, δε οἰκεῖ ἐγγὺς ἐν Μελίτῃ.

οἶδε, εἶπον ἐγὼ, πολῖται τ' ἐμοὶ εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκόασί τε ὅτι οὗτος ὁ Ἀντιφῶν Πυθοδώρῳ τινὶ Ζήνωνος ἐταίρῳ πολλά ἐντετύχηκε, καὶ τοὺς λόγους, οὓς ποτε Σωκράτης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθοδώρου ἀπομνημονεύει.

ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

τούτων τοίνυν, εἶπον, δεόμεθα διακοῦσαι.

ἀλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν, ἔφη: μαιράκιον γὰρ ὦν αὐτοὺς εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν, ἐπεὶ νῦν γε κατὰ τὸν πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον πρὸς ἵππικῇ τὰ πολλά διατρίβει. ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ, ἴωμεν παρ' αὐτόν: ἄρτι γὰρ ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται, οἰκεῖ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν Μελίτῃ.

[127a] Thereupon we started, and we found Antiphon at home, giving a smith an order to make a bridle. When he had got rid of the smith and his brother told him what we were there for, he remembered me from my former visit and greeted me cordially, and when we asked him to repeat the conversation, he was at first unwilling—for he said it was a good deal of trouble—but afterwards he did so. Antiphon, then, said that Pythodorus told him

Cephalos: After we had thus spoke, we proceeded to the house of Antiphon; and we found him

127A Ταῦτα εἰποντες ἐβαδίζομεν τὸν Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ κατελάβομεν

at home, handing a bridle to a coppersmith to be prepared in a certain way; but as soon as

οἱκοὶ ἐκδιδόντα χαλινὸν χαλκεὶ σκευάσαι τινὰ : δὲ ἐπειδὴ

the smith was gone, and his brother had told him the reason for which we had arrived, he also

ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη τε οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ἕνεκα ὧν παρείμεν, τε

recognized me, in consequence of my former journey to this place, and he greeted us kindly;

ἀνεγνώρισεν με, ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καὶ ἡσπάζετο,

and upon our pleading with him to relate **The Discourses/Logos**, at first, he hesitated

καὶ ἡμῶν δεομένων διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὥκνει(ὠκνεῶ)

—for he said it was a great deal of work— but afterwards, he most certainly set it out in detail.

—γὰρ εἶπε εἶναι πολὺ ἔργον— ἔπειτα μέντοι διηγείτο .

Therefore, Antiphon said indeed, that Pythodoros spoke to say ...

δὲ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν εἶπε δὴ ὅτι τὸν Πυθόδωρον λέγειν...

ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν, καὶ κατελάβομεν τὸν Ἀντιφῶντα οἴκοι, χαλινὸν τινὰ χαλκεὶ ἐκδιδόντα σκευάσαι: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἱ τε ἀδελφοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὧν ἕνεκα παρείμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέν τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καὶ με ἡσπάζετο, καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὥκνει—πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι— ἔπειτα μέντοι διηγείτο. ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν Πυθόδωρον ὅτι ἀφίκοντό ποτε εἰς Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα

[127b] that [Zeno](#) and Parmenides once came to the Great Panathenaea; that Parmenides was already quite elderly, about sixty-five years old, very white-haired, and of handsome and noble countenance; [Zeno](#) was at that time about forty years of age; he was tall and good-looking, and there was a story that Parmenides had been in love with him.

Antiphon: At that time, Zeno and Parmenides arrived to celebrate The Great Panathenaea.

127B ποτε Ζήνων τε και Παρμενίδης αφικοιντο εις τα μεγαλα Παναθηναια.

Thus, on the one hand, Parmenides was already quite well advanced in years, very gray-haired,
 ουν μεν Παρμενίδην ειναι ηδη μαλα ευ πρεσβυτην, σφοδρα τον πολιον,

but of a beautiful and good appearance, most nearly about sixty-five years of age; but that on
 δε καλον καγαθον την οψιν, μαλιστα περι εξηκοντα και πεντε ετη: δε

other hand, at that time, Zeno was nearly forty years old, but very tall and
 τοτε Ζήνωνα ειναι εγγυς τετταρακοντα ετων, δε ευμηκη και

graceful to see; and **he** was said to have come to be the dear friend of Parmenides.

χαριεντα ιδειν: και **αυτον** λεγεσθαι γεγονεναι παιδικα του Παρμενιδου:

Ζήνων τε καὶ Παρμενίδης. τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα ἤδη πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολίον,
 καλὸν δὲ κάγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἐξήκοντα: Ζήνωνα δὲ ἐγγὺς τῶν τετταράκοντα
 τότε εἶναι, εὐμήκη δὲ καὶ χαρίεντα ἰδεῖν, καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικὰ τοῦ Παρμενίδου γεγονέναι.

He said that they lodged with Pythodorus outside of the wall, in Cerameicus, and that [Socrates](#) and many others with him went there because they wanted to hear [Zeno](#)'s writings, which had been brought to [Athens](#) for the first time by them. [Socrates](#) was then very young. So [Zeno](#) himself read aloud to them, and Parmenides was not in the house.

Then Pythodoros said that **they**
 δε Πυθοδώρω εφη **αυτους**

lodged with him, in the Ceramicus, outside the walls; where indeed Socrates also arrived,
127C καταλυειν παρα τω, εν Κεραμεικω εκτος τειχους: οι δη τον Σωκρατη και αφικεσθαι
 and many certain others with him, who had set their heart upon hearing the written discourses
 τε και πολλους τινας αλλους μετ' αυτου, επιθυμουντας ακουσαι των γραμματων
 of Zeno; for at that time, **they** first began to pay attention to his writings; since Socrates was
 του Ζηνωνος: γαρ τοτε **αυτα** πρωτον κομισθηναι υπ' εκεινων: δε Σωκρατη ειναι
 very young at that time. Therefore, Zeno himself read to **themselves**, while Parmenides
 σφοδρα νεον τοτε. ουν τον Ζηωνα αυτον αναγιγνωσκειν **αυτοις**, δε τον Παρμενιδην
 happened to be outside;
 τυχειν οντα εξω:

καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔφη παρὰ τῷ Πυθοδώρῳ ἐκτὸς τείχους ἐν Κεραμεικῷ: οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι τὸν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλούς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος γραμμάτων—τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνων κομισθῆναι—Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον. ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν Ζήωνα αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ Παρμενίδην τυχεῖν ἔξω ὄντα:

[127d] Pythodorus said the reading of the treatises was nearly finished when he came in himself with Parmenides and Aristoteles (the one who was afterwards one of the thirty), so they heard only a little that remained of the written works. He himself, however, had heard [Zeno](#) read them before.

[Socrates](#) listened to the end, and then asked that the first thesis of the first treatise be read again. When this had been done, he said:

so that only a small part of **the discourses** still remained to be read,
 και ειναι πανυ βραχυ **των λογων** ετι λοιπον αναγιγνωσκομενων,
 when Pythodoros **himself**, together with Parmenides came in from outside, and also
 127D ηνικα ο Πυθοδωρος **αυτος** τε μετ' τον Παρμενιδην επεισελθειν εξωθεν και
 Aristotle who he **himself** said became one of the thirty tyrants. So that they still had to hear
 Αριστοτελες **αυτου** εφη γενομενον τον των τριακοντα, και ετι επακουσαι
 some small part of the discourses; not however Pythodoros **himself**, since he had indeed heard
 αττα σμικρ' των γραμματων: ου μην **αυτος** αλλα γε ακηκοεναι
 the discourses of Zeno before.
 του Ζηνωνος προτερον.

2 Therefore, Socrates having listened, he then urged him to read again the first hypothesis
 ουν Τον Σωκρατη ακουσαντα τε κελευσαι αναγνωναι παλιν την πρωτον υποθεσιν
 of the first **Logos**, and having been read; Socrates said ...
 του πρωτου **λογου**, και αναγνωσθεισης: φαναι

καί εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων, ἥνικα αὐτός τε ἐπεισελθεῖν ἔφη ὁ
 Πυθόδωρος ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ
 σμίκρ' ἄττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων: οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ
 Ζήνωνος.
 τὸν οὖν Σωκράτης ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεῦσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι,
 καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης,

[127e] “Zeno, what do you mean by this? That if existences are many, they must be both like and unlike, which is impossible; for the unlike cannot be like, nor the like unlike? Is not that your meaning?”

“Yes,” said Zeno.

“Then if it is impossible for the unlike to be like and the like unlike, it is impossible for existences to be many; for if they were to be many, they would experience the impossible. Is that the purpose of your treatises, to maintain against all arguments that existences are not many? And you think each of your treatises is a proof of this very thing, and therefore you believe that the proofs you offer that existences are not many are as many as the treatises you have written? Is that your meaning, [128a] or have I misunderstood?”

Socrates: In what way do you mean this, O Zeno? If **The Beings** are Many, is it then

127E Πως λεις τουτο, ω Ζηνων; ει τα οντα εστι πολλα, αρα necessary that **They** be both **Like** and **Unlike**? But this is certainly impossible.

δει ως αυτα ειναι τε ομοια και ανομοια, δε τουτο δη αδυνατον:

For it is not possible for **The Unlike** to be **Like** nor for **The Like** to be **Unlike**?
γαρ ουτε ειναι οιον τε τα ανομοια ομοια ουτε τα ομοια ανομοια;

You do not mean it in this way, do you?

ουχ λεις ουτω ; (For Socrates thinks that The Ideas are Separate

Zeno: Yes, in this way. from Each Other and are not “Woven-together”)

Ουτω.

Socrates: Is it not the case then, that if it is indeed impossible that both **The Unlike** be **Like**

Ουκουν ει δη αδυνατον τε τα ανομοια ειναι ομοια

and **The Like** be **Unlike**, it is certainly impossible that **many** should also exist. For if **many** και τα ομοια ανομοια, δη αδυνατον πολλα και ειναι: γαρ ει πολλα

were to exist, then **they** would undergo impossibilities. Is this then, the intention of your

ειη, αν πασχοι τα αδυνατα. εστιν τουτο αρα ο βουλονται σου

Discourses, and no other one, than to struggle through all arguments, to show that **many** οι λογοι, ουκ αλλο τι, η διαμαχεσθαι παρα παντα τα λεγομενα, ως πολλα

do not exist? And do you consider each of your **Discourses** to be a positive proof

ου εστι; και οiei εκαστων σοι των λογων ειναι τεκμηριον

in support of your hypothesis; so that you are also led to think that you have produced as many

αυτου τουτου, ωστε και ηγει παρεχεσθαι τοσαυτα

positive proofs, as you have composed **Discourses**, to show that **many** do not exist?

τεκμηρια οσουστερ γεγραφας λογους, ως πολλα ουκ εστι;

Do you mean it in this way, or do I not **understand** you correctly?

128A λεις ουτω, η εγω ουκ καταμανθανω ορθως;

πώς, φάναι, ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα, ὥς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὁμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια οὔτε τὰ ὁμοια ἀνόμοια οἶόν τε εἶναι; οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; οὕτω, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα.

οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τὰ τε ἀνόμοια ὁμοια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὁμοια ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι; εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἶη, πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα. ἄρα τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὥς οὐ πολλὰ ἐστι; καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ οἶει σοι τεκμήριον εἶναι ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων, ὥστε καὶ ἡγῆ τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι, ὅσουστερ λόγους γέγραφας, ὥς οὐκ ἔστι πολλά; οὕτω λέγεις, ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω;

“No,” said Zeno, “you have grasped perfectly the general intent of the work.”

“I see, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “that Zeno here wishes to be very close to you not only in his friendship, but also in his writing. For he has written much the same thing as you, but by reversing the process he tries to cheat us into the belief that he is saying something new. For you, in your poems, say that the all is one, [128b] and you furnish proofs of this in fine and excellent fashion;

Zeno: No other way. You *have understood* quite well *the intent* of the whole work.

Ουκ ἀλλὰ, *συνήκας* καλῶς ο βούλεται τὸ ὅλον γράμμα.

Socrates: I understand, O Parmenides, that Zeno does not only wish to be situated

Μανθάνω, ὦ Παρμενίδες, ὅτι Ζήνων οὐ μόνον βούλεται ὠκειῶσθαι

in the other close bonds of friendship with you, but also *to agree* with you in the following

τῇ ἄλλῃ φιλίᾳ σου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁδε

writings. For he has written in the very same direction as you, although, by changing

τῷ *συγγραμμάτι*. γὰρ γέγραφε ὅπερ *ταυτόν* τρόπον σύ, δὲ μεταβάλλων

certain particulars, he endeavors to *deceive* us that he asserts something other. For on the one

τινὰ πειράται ἐξαπατῶν ἡμᾶς ὡς λέγων τι ἕτερον. γὰρ μὲν

hand, you assert in your poems that **The All** is **One**, and you produce sound proofs

128B σύ φησὶ ἐν τοῖς ποιήσαν τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν, καὶ παρέχει τεκμήρια

in a beautiful and good way in support of these hypotheses:

καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ τούτων:

οὐκ, ἀλλὰ, φάναι τὸν Ζήγωνα, καλῶς συνήκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται.

μανθάνω, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὅτι Ζήνων ὁδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ βούλεται ὠκειῶσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγραμμάτι. ταῦτόν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὅπερ σύ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειράται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἕτερόν τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν φῆς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχει καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ:

and he, on the other hand, says it is not many, and he also furnishes very numerous and weighty proofs. That one of you says it is one, and the other that it is not many, and that each of you expresses himself so that although you say much the same you seem not to have said the same things at all, appears to the rest of us a feat of expression quite beyond our power.”

“Yes, [Socrates](#),” said [Zeno](#), “but you have not perceived all aspects of the truth about my writings. You follow the arguments with a scent [128c] as keen as a Laconian hound's,

but on the other hand, he says

δε φησιν

in turn, the following: that **many** is not, and then he produced very-many and very-mighty

αυ οδε πολλά ειναι ου, και δε **αυτος** παρεχεται παμπολλα και παμμεγεθη

positive proofs. Therefore, on the one hand, you affirm that **The All** is **One**, but on the other

τεκμηρια. ουν μεν φαναι το τον εν δε

hand, he denies that **The All** is **many**; and in this way, almost saying the same thing, each one

μη τον πολλά, και ουτως σχεδον λεγοντας **ταυτα** τι, εκαστον

speaks, so as to appear not to have said the same things. Thus the latter **discourses** are revealed

λεγειν ωστε δοκειν μηδεν ειρηκεναι **των αυτων**, τους αλλους φαινεται

to us to be said in a way that is **above and beyond our way** of speaking/understanding.

υμιν ειρησθαι υπερ ημας τα ειρημενα.

Zeno: Yes, O Socrates. So it is, but you **have not** perfectly perceived **The Truth** of my words;

Ναι, ω Σωκρατες. ουν δ' συ ου πανταχου ησθησαι την αληθειαν του γραμματος.

although, just as Spartan hounds, you **have** indeed well pursued and tracked their **intent**.

128C καιτοι ωσπερ αι Λακαιναι σκυλακες γε ευ μεταθεις τε και ιχνευεις τα λεχθεντα.

ὁδε δὲ αὐτὸ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι, τεκμήρια δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς πάμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέχεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἔν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὕτως ἑκάτερον λέγειν ὥστε μὴδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταῦτά, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρήσθαι.

ναί, φάναι τὸν Ζήγωνα, ὦ Σώκρατες, σὺ δ' οὖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γραμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ ἥσθησαι. καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναι σκύλακες εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα:

but you do not observe that my treatise is not by any means so pretentious that it could have been written with the intention you ascribe to it, of disguising itself as a great performance in the eyes of men. What you mentioned is a mere accident, but in truth these writings are meant to support the argument of Parmenides against those who attempt to jeer at him and assert that

But in the first place, this, remains *unnoticed* by you, that the written words are *not*

αλλά πρωτον μὲν τοῦτο λανθάνει σε, ὅτι τὸ γράμμα οὐ

in every respect so venerable, so that it was composed, as you say then, with the intention

παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται, ὥστε γραφῆναι ἅπερ σὺ λέγεις δὲ διανοηθὲν

of *concealing* from men, as if I was doing something of great importance; but on the one hand,

ἐπικρυπτομένον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὥς διαπραττόμενον τι μέγα: ἀλλὰ μὲν

you have spoken something of those things which happen to be the case, but on the other hand,

σὺ εἶπες τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων, δὲ

The Truth of the matter is indeed that these writings were composed for the purpose of

τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα

a certain *assistance* to **The Logos** of Parmenides, against those who try their hand at

τις βοήθεια τῷ λόγῳ Παρμενίδου πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας

ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὥστε ἅπερ σὺ λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφῆναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὥς τι μέγα διαπραττόμενον: ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἔστι δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας

[128d] if the all is one many absurd results follow which contradict his theory. Now this treatise opposes the advocates of the many and gives them back their ridicule with interest, for its purpose is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if properly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one.

comically-representing **The Self**; by asserting that if **One Is**, many ridiculous and opposite
 κωμ-128D –ωδειν αυτον ως ει εν εστι, πολλα και γελοια και εναντια συμβαινει
 results happen to **The Self Logos**.
 πασχειν τω αυτω λογω.

Truly then, this writing, contradicts the advocates of **the many**, and
 δη ουν τουτο το γραμμα αντιλεγει τους λεγοντας προς τα πολλα, και
 opposes this and many other **such opinions**; by being willing to make clear that the hypothesis
 ανταποδιδωσι τουτο και πλειω **ταυτα**, βουλομενον δηλουν ως η υποθεσις
 that asserts that **many** is, will undergo/suffer **even more** absurd consequences, than that
 ει πολλα εστιν, αν πασχοι ετι γελοιοτερα η η
 which asserts that **The One Is**; if anyone **of them** is sufficiently gone through in detail.
 του εν ειναι, ει τις **αυτων** ικανως επεξιοι (επεξειμι).

αὐτὸν κωμῶδειν ὥς εἴ ἐν ἐστὶ, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὐτῷ. ἀντιλέγει
 δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο
 βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὥς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλὰ ἐστὶν, ἢ ἢ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι, εἴ
 τις ἰκανῶς ἐπεξίει.

It was in such a spirit of controversy that I wrote it when I was young, [128e] and when it was written some one stole it, so that I could not even consider whether it should be published or not. So, [Socrates](#), you are not aware of this and you think that the cause of its composition was not the controversial spirit of a young man, but the ambition of an old one. In other respects, as I said, you guessed its meaning pretty well.”

Therefore, it has *escaped your notice*, O Socrates, that *this discourse*, which was composed by
 128E οὐν λανθάνει σε , ὦ Σωκράτες, ὅτι ταύτη, γεγραφθαι
 me when I was a youth, through such a thing indeed as the *love* of *contention*, and the writing
 ἐμοῦ ὑπὸ ὄντος νέου, διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονεικίαν, καὶ γραφέν
 itself was stolen by someone, so that I was not able to consult whether *Self should* be brought
 αὐτὸ ἐκλεψέ (κλεπτῶ) τις, ὥστε οὐδὲ βουλευσασθαι εἴτ' αὐτὸ ἐξοιστεον
 out or *Led* into *The Light* or not. It has *escaped your notice*, I say, that it was not composed
 ἐξεγένετο εἰς τὸ φῶς εἴτε μὴ. οἶει ὅτι οὐχ
 through that *Love* of *Honor*, which belongs to a more advanced period of life, but through
 ὑπο φιλοτιμίας πρεσβυτέρου, ἀλλ' ὑπο
 a juvenile *love* of *contention*; although, just as I have said indeed, you do not conjecture amiss.
 νέου φιλονεικίας; ἐπει, ὅπερ εἶπον γ', οὐ ἀπεικασας κακῶς.

διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καὶ τις αὐτὸ ἐκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ
 βουλευσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἴτ' ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἴτε μὴ. ταύτη οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σωκράτες,
 ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονικίας οἶει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας: ἐπεὶ, ὅπερ γ' εἶπον,
 οὐ κακῶς ἀπήκασας.

“I see,” said [Socrates](#), “and I accept your explanation. But tell me, do you not believe there is an idea of likeness in the abstract, [129a] and another idea of unlikeness, the opposite of the first, and that you and I and all things which we call many partake of these two? And that those which partake of likeness become like, and those which partake of unlikeness become unlike, and those which partake of both become both like and unlike, all in the manner and degree of their participation? And even if all things partake of both opposites,

Socrates: 3 I admit it then, and I am **Led** to believe that the case is just as you have stated it.

αποδεχομαι Αλλ', και ηγουμαι ως εχειν λεγεις.

But explain to me about the following particulars: Do you not consider that there is a certain

δε ειπε μοι τοδε : ου νομιζεις ειναι τι

Idea/Species of **Likeness**, **Self** According to **Self**, and another one such as this but opposite,

129A ειδος ομοιοτητος αυτο καθ' αυτο, και τω αλλο τι τοιουτω εναντιον,

that is in turn, an **Unlike Idea/Species**. But that **you** and **me**, and **all the other things**

εστιν αυ ανομοιον ο : δε σε και εμε και ταλλα

which we surely call **many**, have a **Share** of **These Two Beings**? And that on the one hand,

α δη καλουμεν πολλα μεταλαμβάνειν τούτων δυοιν οντων; και μεν

things that **Share** of **Likeness** become **like**, and according that the degree that **such things** may

τα μεταλαμβάνοντα της ομοιοτητος γινεσθαι ομοια, και κατα οσον τοσουτον αν

Share in **This**; but **those** that **Share** of **Unlikeness** become **unlike**; but that **those that Share**

μεταλαμβάνη ταυτη, δε τα της ανομοιοτητος ανομοια, δε τα

of **Both** become **both**?

Therefore, if **all things** also **Share** of both opposite **Beings**,

αμφοτερων αμφοτερα; δε ει παντα και μεταλαμβάνει αμφοτερων εναντιων οντων,

ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν. τόδε δέ μοι εἶπέ: οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶδος τι ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὐτὸ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον: τούτων δὲ δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν μεταλαμβάνειν; καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια γίνεσθαι ταύτῃ τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει,

and are enabled by their participation to be both like and unlike themselves, [129b] what is there wonderful about that? For if anyone showed that the absolute like becomes unlike, or the unlike like, that would, in my opinion, be a wonder; but if he shows that things which partake of both become both like and unlike, that seems to me, [Zeno](#), not at all strange, not even if he shows that all things are one by participation in unity and that the same are also many by participation in multitude; but if he shows that absolute unity is also many and the absolute many again are one, then I shall be amazed.

and are both **like** and **unlike** **their Selves** by **Participating** in **both**; then, what is wonderful?

129B και εστι ομοια τε και ανομοια αυτοις αυτα τω μετεχειν αμφοιν, τι θαυμαστον;

For if, on the one hand, anyone brings to **Light** that **The Like Selves** become **Unlike**,

γαρ ει μεν τις απεφαιnen τα ομοια αυτα γιγνομενα ανομοια

or **The Unlike Selves** become **Like**, then I think, that it would be monstrously absurd; but if

η τα ανομοια ομοια, οιμαι, αν ην, τερας : ει

on the other hand, someone were to bring to **Light** that **such things** that **Participate** of **Both**

δε αποφαινει τα μετεχοντα αμφοτερων

of **These Ideas**, undergo both of these **conditions**, then as far as I'm concerned, O Zeno,

τουτων πεπονθοτα αμφοτερα, εμοιγε , ω Ζηνων,

it does not appear to be out of **the ordinary**; nor indeed, if anyone would show that **all things**

ουδεν δοκει ειναι αποπον, ουδε γε ει τις αποφαινει απαντα

are one, through their **Participation** of **The One**, and that **these Same Selves** are **many**, in turn,

εν τω μετεχειν του ενος και ταυτα ταυτα πολλα αυ

through their **Participation** of **Plurality**. But if someone were to show, that **This Self** which

τω μετεχειν πληθους: αλλ' ει αποδειξει τουτο αυτο ο

Is One, is **many**, and in turn that **the many** are indeed **One**; I shall immediately wonder at this.

εστιν εν πολλα και αυ τα πολλα δη εν, ηδη θαυμασομαι τουτο.

καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν ὁμοία τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοία τις ἀπέφαιnen ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια, τέρας ἂν οἶμαι ἦν: εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ, οὐδέ γε εἰ ἔν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους αὐ μετέχειν. ἀλλ' εἰ ὃ ἔστιν ἓν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ ἀποδείξει καὶ αὐ τὰ πολλὰ δη ἓν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι.

[129c] The same applies to all other things. If he shows that the kinds and ideas in and by themselves possess these opposite qualities, it is marvellous but if he shows that I am both one and many, what marvel is there in that? He will say, when he wishes to show that I am many, that there are my right parts and my left parts, my front parts and my back parts, likewise upper and lower, all different; for I do, I suppose, partake of multitude;

And similarly in **All the other cases**; if on the one hand, someone could bring to **Light** an

129C και ὡσαυτῶς περὶ ἀπάντων τῶν ἄλλων: εἰ μὲν ἀποφαίνοι

argument worthy of admiration; by showing that both the **Generic** and **Ideal Selves** undergo

ἀξιὸν θαυμάζειν, τε τὰ γένη καὶ εἶδη αὐτὰ πάσχοντα

these opposite **experiences** **Them Selves**. But if on the other hand, someone demonstrates that

ταῦτα τὰναντία παθήεν αὐτοῖς: εἰ δ' τις ἀποδείξει

I am both *one* and *many*, what would be wondrous about this? And demonstrate this assertion,

ἐμὲ ὄντα ἐν καὶ πολλὰ, τί θαυμαστόν,

by saying, on the one hand, that when he wishes to bring to **Light** that I am **many**, that the parts

λέγων, μὲν ὅταν βούληται ἀποφαίνειν πολλὰ, ὥς μὲν τὰ

on the right side of me are other, from those parts on the left, and that the front parts are other,

ἐπὶ δεξιά μου ἐστὶν ἕτερα, δὲ τὰ ἕτερα ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν ἕτερα,

from the back parts, and in like manner, the upper from the lower parts; for I think that

δὲ τὰ ὀπίσθεν ἕτερα, καὶ ὡσαυτῶς ἄνω καὶ κάτω : γὰρ οἶμαι

I participate of **Plurality**.

129D μετέχω πλήθους:

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὡσαύτως: εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἶδη ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀποφαίνοι τὰναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν: εἰ δ' ἐμὲ ἔν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλὰ, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων, ὅταν μὲν βούληται πολλὰ ἀποφῆναι, ὥς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μου ἐστὶν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ ἕτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ὀπίσθεν, καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως—πλήθους γὰρ οἶμαι μετέχω

[129d] and when he wishes to show that I am one, he will say that we here are seven persons, of whom I am one, a man, partaking also of unity and so he shows that both assertions are true. If anyone then undertakes to show that the same things are both many and one—I mean such things as stones, sticks, and the like—we shall say that he shows that they are many and one, but not that the one is many or the many one; he says nothing wonderful, but only what we should all accept.

But on the other hand, when he brings to **Light** that I am **one**,

δε οταν εν

he should say that since there are **Seven** of us, I am **one** man and **Participate** of **The One**,

ερει ως οντων επτα ημων εγω ειμι εις ανθρωπος και μετεχων του ενος

so that in this way he would bring to **Light The Truth** of both these assertions. Thus if anyone,

ωστε αποφαινει αληθη αμφοτερα . ουν εαν τις

should **try** to bring to **Light** that stones and wood and such particulars, are both **many** and **one**,

επιχειρη αποφαινειν λιθους και ξυλα και τα τοιαυτα, πολλα και εν,

we would say that **he** exhibits to our view such things as are **many** and **one**, but that he does not

αν φησομεν αυτον αποδεικνυναι ταυτα τοιαυτα πολλα και εν, ου

show that **The One** is **Many**, nor **The Many, One**; nor speak of anything wonderful, but we

το εν πολλα ουδε τα πολλα εν, ουδε λεγειν τι θαυμαστον, αλλ'

would agree to that which is affirmed by all.

ομολογοιμεν απερ παντες.

—ὅταν δὲ ἓν, ἔρει ὡς ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἷς ἐγὼ εἰμι ἄνθρωπος μετέχων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός: ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. ἐὰν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρῇ πολλὰ καὶ ἓν ταῦτόν ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὶ φήσομεν αὐτόν πολλὰ καὶ ἓν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ πολλὰ ἓν, οὐδέ τι θαυμαστόν λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἅπερ ἂν πάντες ὁμολογοῖμεν:

If, however, as I was saying just now, he first distinguishes the abstract ideas, such as likeness and unlikeness, [129e] multitude and unity, rest and motion, and the like, and then shows that they can be mingled and separated, I should,” said he, “be filled with amazement, [Zeno](#). Now I think this has been very manfully discussed by you; but I should, as I say, be more amazed if anyone could show in the abstract ideas, which are intellectual conceptions, [130a] this same multifarious and perplexing entanglement which you described in visible objects.”

But if on the one hand, anyone would first

δε εαν μεν τις πρωτον

divide/separate **The Ideas** apart/separate, **Those** of which I have just now been speaking, **The**

129E διαιρηται τα ειδη χωρις, ο εγω δη νυν ελεγον,

Selves according to **Selves**, such as **In Likeness** and **Unlikeness** and **Plurality** and **The One**,

αυτα καθ' αυτα, οιον ομοιοτητα τε και ανομοιοτητα και πληθος και το εν

Rest and **Motion** and all such as **These**, then reveal himself as being able to **Blend-together** and

και στασιν και κινήσιν και παντα τα τοιαυτα, ειτα αποφαινη δυναμενα συγκεραννυσθαι και

Separate-Apart Selves In Them Selves, then *I will indeed* be in wondrous admiration, O Zeno.

διακρινεσθαι ταυτα εν εαυτοις, εγωγ' αν θαυμαστος αγαίμην, ω Ζήνων.

Thus on the one hand, I am **Led** to think that we should strenuously labor in the investigation of

δε μεν ηγουμαι πανυ ανδρειως πεπραγματευσθαι

these particulars; but yet on the other hand, it would be deserving of much more admiration,

ταυτα: μεντ' αν πολυ μαλλον, αγασθειν,

if anyone could solve the following puzzle, as I said, about **This (Ousia) Self** that is woven-

ει τις αν εχοι ωδε αποριαν, ως λεγω, την ταυτην αυτην πλεκο-

-together **Into The Ideal Selves**, in-a-manifold-way; just as you demonstrated in detail about

130A –μενην εν τοις ειδεσι αυτοις παντωδαπως, ωσπερ επιδειξαι διηλθετε

objects we see by the faculty of sight, if you could also in the same way, demonstrate in detail

τοις ορωμενοις [Republic 508A–1], και ουτως εν

about **The Ideas** which we grasp by **The Activity** of **The Logos**.

λαμβανομενοις λογισμω .

ἐὰν δέ τις ὦν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, οἷον ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλήθος καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, θαυμαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πάνυ ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι: πολὺ μὲντ' ἂν ὥδε μᾶλλον, ὥς λέγω, ἀγασθεῖν εἴ τις ἔχοι τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἶδεσι παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὀρωμένοις διήλθετε, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῶ λαμβανομένοις ἐπιδείξαι.

Pythodorus said that he thought at every word, while [Socrates](#) was saying this, Parmenides and [Zeno](#) would be angry, but they paid close attention to him and frequently looked at each other and smiled, as if in admiration of [Socrates](#), and when he stopped speaking Parmenides expressed their approval.

Antiphon: 4 Pythodorus said, that on the one hand, when Socrates had said these particulars,
ο Πυθοδωρος εφη, μεν δη του Σωκρατους Λεγοντος **ταυτα**
he believed that, both Parmenides and Zeno would be annoyed at each one of them, whereas on
αυτος οϊεσθαι τε τον Παρμενιδην και τον Ζηνωνα αν αχθесθαι εφ' εκαστου
the other hand, They Themselves **Offered-up Their Mind** entirely to what he said,
δε (Sym **174D-210E-217B**, Rep **432B**) **προσεχειν τον νουν** πανυ τους **αυτω**
and frequently looked at each other, smiling, as if in admiration of Socrates.
τε και θαμα βλεποντας εις αλληλους μειδιαν ως αγαμενους τον Σωκρατη.
And that once Socrates ceased to speak, Parmenides then spoke, saying...
και οπερ αυτου παυσαμενου ειπειν τον Παρμενιδην ουν φαναι

λέγοντος δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος, τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν ἂν οἶεσθαι ἐφ' ἑκάστου ἄχθесθαι τὸν
τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ τε αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλήλους
βλέποντας μειδιᾷν ὡς ἀγαμένους τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ παυσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν
Παρμενίδην:

“Socrates,” [130b] he said, “what an admirable talent for argument you have! Tell me, did you invent this distinction yourself, which separates abstract ideas from the things which partake of them? And do you think there is such a thing as abstract likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and abstract one and many, and the other abstractions of which you heard Zeno speaking just now?”

0.1

“Yes, I do,” said Socrates.

“And also,” said Parmenides, “abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good, and all such conceptions?”

0.2

“Yes,” he replied. [130c]

Parmenides: O Socrates, how worthy of admiration *is Your Impulse* in *Your Pursuit* of

130B ω Σωκράτες, ως αξιος αγασθαι ει (ειμι-Pres-Act) της ορμης επι της

The Logos! And tell me, have *You Your Self* thus *Separated* certain *Ideas apart* from *Selves*,

τους λογους. και ειπε μοι, συ αυτος ουτω διηρησαι αττα ειδη χωρις αυτα

as you say, on the one hand, and in turn on the other hand, in the same way, *Set apart*

ως λεγεις μεν , αυ δε ουτω χωρις

those that Participate of *These*? And does there appear to you, to be a *certain likeness* that is

τα μετεχοντα τουτων; και δοκει σοι ειναι τι ομοιοτητος

Separate from *Self Likeness*, and indeed a *certain One/Unity* and *Many/Plurality* and all other

χωρις αυτη ομοιοτητος και δη εν και πολλα και παντα

such particulars, which we *possess*, and *of which*, you have just now heard of from Zeno?

οσα ης ημεις εχομεν, δη νυν ηκουες Ζηνωνος;

Socrates: It does to me indeed. (Εμοιγε.)

Parmenides: And how about the following ones; is there a *Certain Idea*, like that of *Justice*,

Η και τα τοιαδε, τι ειδος οιον δικαιου

(*Eternally*)*Self by Self*, and also of *Beauty* and of *Good* and all such *Ideas (by Them-*

αυτο καθ' αυτο και αυ καλου και αγαθου και παντων τοιουτων;

Socrates: Yes. (Ναι.)

ὦ Σώκράτες, φάναι, ὡς ἄξιος εἶ ἄγασθαι τῆς ὀρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους. καὶ μοι εἶπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ ἅττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐ μετέχοντα; καὶ τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτῇ ὁμοιότης χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἔν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νυνδὴ Ζήνωνος ἤκουες;

ἔμοιγε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οἷον δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὐ τῶν τοιούτων;

ναί, φάναι.

“And is there an abstract idea of man, apart from us and all others such as we are, or of fire or water?” 0.3

“I have often,” he replied, “been very much troubled, Parmenides, to decide whether there are ideas of such things, or not.”

“And are you undecided about certain other things, which you might think rather ridiculous, such as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else particularly vile and worthless? Would you say that there is an idea of each of these distinct and different from the things [130d] with which we have to do, or not?” 0.4

Parmenides: What next then? Is there also an **Idea** of Man and of All the Elements such as
 130C Τι δ’; εἶδος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῶν πάντων οἱοί

we are composed of; and a certain **Ideal** Human **Self** and **One** of Fire and **One** of Water
 ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν, καὶ τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου αὐτοῦ ἡ πυρὸς ἡ ὕδατος

that is **Separate** from us? (χωρὶς ἡμῶν;)

Socrates: I have certainly often been in *dire-straits/puzzled/at-a-loss*, O Parmenides,
 δη πολλακίς γεγόνα ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, ὦ Παρμενίδη,

concerning whether it is necessary to speak of **Selves**, just as we did about **Those Ideas**,
 περὶ ποτέρον χρή φάναι αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων

or in another way.

ἢ ἄλλως.

Parmenides: And are you also *at-a-loss/puzzled*, about the following particulars, O Socrates?
 Ἡ καὶ ἀπορεῖς περὶ τῶνδε ὦ Σωκράτες,

Whether it is necessary to affirm that there is a **Separate Idea/Species** of **each one of these**
 εἴτε χρή φάναι εἶναι χωρὶς εἶδος ἐκάστου τούτων

which may also appear to be ridiculous, such as of **hair** and **clay** and **dust**, or of anything else
 ἅ ἂν καὶ δοξείεν εἶναι γελοῖα, οἷον θρίξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ρυπὸς ἢ τι ἄλλο

which may also appear to be quite **without** honor and most **worthless**, by **Being Other** in turn,
 ἀτιμωτάτον τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ὃν ἄλλο αὐ

of **those particulars** with which we are familiar, or **whether it is not necessary?**

130D τῶν ὧν ἡμεῖς μεταχειρίζομεθα, εἴτε καὶ μὴ ;

τί δ’, ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἰοί ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ
 καὶ ὕδατος;

ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, φάναι, πολλακίς δὴ, ὦ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα χρή φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ
 ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως.

ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θρίξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο τι
 ἀτιμωτάτον τε καὶ φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρή φάναι καὶ τούτων ἐκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρὶς, ὃν ἄλλο
 αὐτὸ ἢ ὧν τι ἡμεῖς μεταχειρίζομεθα, εἴτε καὶ μή;

“By no means,” said [Socrates](#). “No, I think these things are such as they appear to us, and it would be quite absurd to believe that there is an idea of them; and yet I am sometimes disturbed by the thought that perhaps what is true of one thing is true of all. Then when I have taken up this position, I run away for fear of falling into some abyss of nonsense and perishing; so when I come to those things which we were just saying do have ideas, I stay and busy myself with them.”

Socrates: On the one hand, I do not affirm that **these** exist *in any other way* from **these** which
 μεν ταυτα ειναι Ουδαμως αλλα απερ ταυτα

we do indeed also **see**; whereas on the other hand, is it not the height of absurdity, insofar as
 γε και ορωμεν: δε μη λιν αποπον η

one imagines that there is a **certain Idea** of **these selves**? Nevertheless at times it also actually
 οιηθηναι ειναι τι ειδος αυτων. μεντοι ποτε και ηδη

troubles me; in regards to *whether or not* the very same thing, *can be* affirmed of **everything**.
 εθραξε με περι μη ταυτον τι η παντων:

But thereafter, having been fixed in *this* opinion, I then run-away fleeing, in **fear** of falling
 μη επειτα οταν στω ταυτη , οιχομαι φευγων, δεισας εμπεσων

at that time, into a certain **abyss of nonsense**, and **utterly perish**. But then, **I reach up** from

ποτε εις τινα βυθον φλυαριας διαφθαρω. δ' ουν αφικομενος
 those considerations, and again **I seriously apply myself** to those considerations, concerning
 εκεισε , πραγματευομενος διατριβω εις εκεινα περι

which, we have just now asserted, whether **such Ideas/Forms/Species have** to exist.

α δη νυν ελεγομεν ειδη εχειν .

οὐδαμῶς, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν γε ἅπερ ὀρώμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι: εἶδος δὲ τι αὐτῶν
 οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λιν ἢ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μὲντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε μὴ τι ἢ περὶ πάντων ταῦτόν: ἔπειτα ὅταν
 ταύτῃ στώ, φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσας μὴ ποτε εἶς τινα βυθὸν φλυαρίας ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ: ἐκεῖσε δ' οὖν
 ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εἶδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω.

[130e] “Yes, for you are still young,” said Parmenides, “and philosophy has not yet taken hold upon you, [Socrates](#), as I think it will later. Then you will not despise them; but now you still consider people's opinions, on account of your youth. Well, tell me do you think that, as you say, there are ideas, and that these other things which partake of them are named from them, [131a] as, for instance, those that partake of likeness become like, those that partake of greatness great, those that partake of beauty and justice just and beautiful?”

partake

0.5

“Certainly,” said [Socrates](#).

“Well then, does each participant object partake of the whole idea, or of a part of it? Or could there be some other third kind of participation?” 0.6

“How could there be?” said he.

“Do you think the whole idea, being one, is in each of the many participants, or what?” 0.7

“Yes, for what prevents it from being in them, Parmenides?” said [Socrates](#).

Parmenides: Now surely, is it not the case then, that **each thing** which has a **Share**, either
 ητοι Ουκουν εκαστον το μεταλαμβανον
 has a **Share** of **The Whole** (**Genera**) **Idea** or of only a **Part** (**Species**) of **It**? Or, can there be
 μεταλαμβανει του ολου ειδους η μερους ; η αν γενοιτο
some other way of **Participation**/Transference/Succession apart from these **Two** ways?
 τις αλλη μεταληψις χωρις τουτων;

Socrates: And how could there be? (Και πως αν;)

Parmenides: Therefore, does it appear to you, that **The Whole Idea, Being One**, exists
 ουν ποτερον δοκει σοι το ολον ειδος ον εν ειναι
 in **each** of **the many**, or in what way?
 εκαστω των πολλων, η πως;

Socrates: What is there to prevent **The Whole Idea**, O Parmenides, to exist in **each** of **them**?
 Τι γαρ κωλυει , ω Παρμενιδη, ενειναι ;

οὐκοῦν ἦτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἶδους ἢ μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον μεταλαμβάνει; ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν
 μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο;

καὶ πῶς ἂν; εἶπεν.

πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ᾧ, ἢ πῶς;

τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ἐν εἶναι;

[131b] “Then while it is one and the same, the whole of it would be in many separate individuals at once, and thus it would itself be separate from itself.”

0.8

“No,” he replied, “for it might be like day, which is one and the same, is in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself; so each idea, though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once.”

“That,” said he, “is very neat, [Socrates](#) you make one to be in many places at once, just as if you should spread a sail over many persons and then should say it was one and all of it was over many. [131c] Is not that about what you mean?”

0.9

“Perhaps it is,” said [Socrates](#).

Parmenides: Accordingly then, by **Being One** and **The Same** in many separate existents, then
 131B ἄρα ὅν Ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὐσιν

The Whole is in each at the same time, and in this way **Self will be separate** from **Self**.

ὅλον ἐνεστὶ ἀμα, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ἀν εἴη χωρὶς αὐτοῦ.

Socrates: It cannot be in this way; but if **This Idea** were indeed such as **The Self** is to **Daytime**,
 ἀν Οὐκ, εἰ γε οἷον ἡ αὕτη ἡμέρα

by **Being One**, **It** is at-once present in many places and yet **Self** is in no way more separate
 οὐσα μία ἐστὶν ἀμα ἐστὶ πολλαχού καὶ αὕτη οὐδὲν μᾶλλον χωρὶς

from **Self**; if then in this way, every **Idea** may also be At-Once **One** and **The Same** in all.

αὐτῆς, εἰ οὕτω ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ εἴη ἀμα ἐν ταυτὸν ἐν πάσιν.

Parmenides: You have made, O Socrates, **One** and **The Same** aspect present at **The Same time**,
 ποιεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταυτὸν ἀμα

in many places, in a very pleasant way; *just as if* you covered-over many humans with a sail.

πολλαχού, γε ἡδέως, οἷον εἰ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἱστῶ

Thus you say, that there is **One Whole**, over many.

φαίης, εἶναι ἐν ὅλον ἐπὶ πολλοῖς.

Or is it not something such as this that you are **Led** to say?

131C ἡ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγείλεσθαι;

Socrates: Perhaps. (Ἰσως.)

ἐν ἄρα ὃν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὐσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη.
 οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε, φάναι, οἷον εἰ ἡμέρα εἴη μία καὶ ἡ αὕτη οὐσα πολλαχού ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ
 αὐτῆς χωρὶς ἐστίν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν ἐν πάσιν ἅμα ταὐτὸν εἴη.

ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταὐτὸν ἅμα πολλαχού ποιεῖς, οἷον εἰ ἱστῶ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς
 ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἐν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον: ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγῆε λέγειν;

ἴσως, φάναι.

“Would the whole sail be over each person, or a particular part over each?” 0.10

“A part over each.”

“Then,” said he, “the ideas themselves, [Socrates](#), are divisible into parts, and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each idea.” 0.11

“So it appears.”

“Are you, then, [Socrates](#), willing to assert that the one idea is really divided and will still be one?” 0.12

“By no means,” he replied.

Parmenides: Then either, will **the whole sail** exist over **each individual**,

οὐν ἢ ἂν ὁ ὅλον ἱστῖον εἴη ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ

or will **another part** of **the whole self** exist over **each individual**?

ἢ ἄλλο μέρος **αὐτοῦ** ἐπ' ἄλλῳ;

Socrates: The part. (Μερος.)

Parmenides: Accordingly then, O Socrates, “**these ideal selves**” are **divisible**,

ἀρα, ὦ Σωκράτης, τὰ εἶδη **αὐτὰ** ἐστὶν Μερίστα

and **those that participate** can only participate of “**parts of selves**”; and hence there will

καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα ἂν μετέχῃ μέρους **αὐτῶν**, καὶ ἂν

no longer be **one whole** in **each individual**, but only **one part** of each.

οὐκέτι εἴη ὅλον ἐν ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἐκάστου.

Socrates: It has come to **Light** in this way indeed.

Φαίνεται οὕτω γε.

Parmenides: Or are you willing then, O Socrates, to affirm to us **The Truth**, that **One** “**idea**”

ἢ ἐθέλησεις οὐν, ὦ Σωκράτης, φάναι ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τὸ ἐν εἶδος

is susceptible of being **divided**, and yet “**it**” will still be **One**?

μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι εἶναι ἓν;

Socrates: By no means. (Οὐδαμῶς.)

ἢ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τὸ ἱστῖον εἴη ἂν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ;
μέρος.

μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὦ Σωκράτης, ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ εἶδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχῃ, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἐκάστου ἂν εἴη.

φαίνεται οὕτω γε.

ἢ οὖν ἐθέλῃς, ὦ Σωκράτης, φάναι τὸ ἐν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἔσται;
οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν.

“No,” said Parmenides, “for if you divide absolute greatness, [131d] 0.13
and each of the many great things is great by a part of greatness
smaller than absolute greatness, is not that unreasonable?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“Or again, will anything by taking away a particular small part of 0.14
equality possess something by means of which, when it is less than
absolute equality, its possessor will be equal to anything else?”

“That is impossible.”

“Or let one of us have a part of the small; the small will be greater 0.15
than this, since this is a part of it, and therefore the absolute small
will be greater; but that to which the part of the small is added will
be smaller, [131e] not greater, than before.”

“That,” said he, “is impossible.”

Parmenides: For See, that if you attempt to **divide The Great Self**, then in that case

131D γαρ Ὅρα εἰ μεριεῖς τὸ μέγεθος αὐτο ἀρα
would it not be shown to be **irrational**, and that each of **The Many** that are **Great**, will then be
 οὐκ φανείται ἀλογον, καὶ ἑκάστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων ἐσται
great/big by a “**part**” (like **The Day/sail**) of “**greatness**” that is **less** than **The Greatness of Self?**
 μεγα μερεῖ μεγαθους σμικροτερω του μεγαθους αὐτου;

Socrates: Most **irrational** indeed. (Πάνυ γ’.)

Parmenides: What then? **Will each thing**, by possessing some “small **part**” of “**equality**”

 Τι δε; ἐσται ἑκάστον τῷ ἔξει τι σμικρον μέρος του ἴσου
which is **less** than **The Equality of Self**, **be equal** to another **thing** by having the **part** received?
ὦντι ἐλάττονι του ἴσου αὐτου ἴσον τῷ ἔχον ἀπολαβον;

Socrates: Impossible. (Ἀδύνατον.)

Parmenides: Then if **one of us** has a “**part of the small**”, then in that case **The Small of Self**

 Ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν ἔξει μέρος του σμικρου, δε τὸ σμικρον αὐτου
will be “**bigger**” than **this**, since **it** is a **part of Itself**, and thus **The Small Self** will then be
ἐσται μείζον τουτου, ἅτε ὄντος μέρους εαυτου καὶ οὕτω τὸ σμικρον αὐτο δὴ ἐσται
that which is “**bigger**”; but then on the other hand, **this** to which the **part of The Small** will be
 μείζον : δ’ τουτο ὦν ἂν
added and then subtracted, **will be smaller**, but not **greater**, than before.

131E προστεθῇ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐσται σμικροτερον ἀλλ’ οὐ μείζον ἢ πρίν.

Socrates: This most certainly cannot come to pass.

 τουτο γε ἂν Οὐκ γένοιτο.

ὄρα γάρ, φάναι: εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μερεῖ
σμικροτέρῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανεῖται;

πάνυ γ’, ἔφη.

τί δέ; τοῦ ἴσου μέρος ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβὸν τι ἔξει ᾧ ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου τὸ ἔχον ἴσον τῷ
ἔσται;

ἀδύνατον.

ἀλλὰ τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἔξει, τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μείζον ἔσται ἅτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ
ὄντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μείζον ἔσται: ᾧ δ’ ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον
ἔσται ἀλλ’ οὐ μείζον ἢ πρίν.

οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, φάναι, τοῦτό γε.

“How, then, [Socrates](#), will other things partake of those ideas of yours, if they cannot partake of them either as parts or as wholes?” - *parts whole* 0.16

“By Zeus,” he replied, “I think that is a very hard question to determine.”

“Well, what do you think of this?” 0.17

“Of what?”

Parmenides: To you then, O Socrates, in what way are the other existents *able* to have a **Share** σοι ουν, ω Σωκράτες, Τίνα τροπον τα αλλα δυναμενα μεταλαμβανειν of **The Ideas**, since they are *unable* to do so according to **Parts**, nor according to **Wholes**? των ειδων, μητε κατα μερη μητε κατα ολα;

Socrates: No by Zeus, it does not *appear* to me to be in any way an easy matter to *define* Ου μα τον Δια, ου δοκει μοι, ειναι ουδαμως ευκολον διορισασθαι something such as this. το τοιουτον.

Parmenides: What next then? What do you say to this? Τι δη δε; πως εχεις προς τοδε;

Socrates: To what? (Το ποιον;)

τίνα οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήφεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα;
οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὗ μοι δοκεῖ εὐκόλον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.
τί δὲ δῆ; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις;
τὸ ποῖον;

[132a] “I fancy your reason for believing that each idea is one is something like this; when there is a number of things which seem to you to be great, you may think, as you look at them all, that there is one and the same idea in them, and hence you think the great is one.”

0.18

“That is true,” he said.

“But if with your mind's eye you regard the absolute great and these many great things in the same way, will not another great appear beyond, by which all these must appear to be great?”

0.19

“So it seems.”

Parmenides: I suspect that your reason for believing that each **Idea** is **One** arises from something

132A Οἰμαι σε οἶεσθαι ἑκάστων εἶδος ἐν εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ
such as this. When a **multitude of particulars appear** to you to be **great**, you may think, that by

τοιούδε: ὅταν πολλ' ἅττα δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεγάλα, δόξῃ
looking at all of **them**, **One Certain (Common) Ideal Self** is found to be **Equally in their case**,
ιδόντι πάντα μία τις ἡ ἰδέα αὕτη εἶναι ἰσῶς ἐπὶ

from whence you are **Led** to believe that **The Great/Big** is **One**. (Inferred **concept**, not **Idea**. PG)
οθεν ἡγεῖτο μέγα εἶναι ἐν.

Socrates: You speak **The Truth**.

λέγεις Ἀληθῆ.

Parmenides: What then if when you **See** with **The Soul, The Great Self, and All**

Τι δ' εἰάν τις ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ καὶ πάντα

The Other Ideas that are **Great in a similar way**. Then in turn, will not a **Certain Great One**,

τὰ ἀλλὰ μεγάλα ὡσαύτως, αὐτοὺς οὐχὶ τίς μέγα ἐν

necessarily come to **Light**, through which, **All These come to Light as Great/Big?**

ἀναγκὴ φανείται, ὧς πάντα ταῦτα φαίνεσθαι μεγάλα;

Socrates: It seems so. (Εοικεν.)

οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιούδε ἐν ἑκάστων εἶδος οἶεσθαι εἶναι: ὅταν πολλ' ἅττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ιδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τὸ μέγα ἡγεῖται εἶναι.

ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.

τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς, οὐχὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μέγα φανεῖται, ὧς ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι;

εοικεν.

“That is, another idea of greatness will appear, in addition to absolute greatness and the objects which partake of it; [132b] and another again in addition to these, by reason of which they are all great; and each of your ideas will no longer be one, but their number will be infinite.”

infinite

0.20

“But, Parmenides,” said Socrates, “each of these ideas may be only a thought, which can exist only in our minds then each might be one, without being exposed to the consequences you have just mentioned.”

“But,” he said, “is each thought one, but a thought of nothing?”

0.21

“That is impossible,” he replied.

“But of something?”

0.22

“Yes.”

Parmenides: Accordingly then, *another* offspring idea of *Greatness* will appear, besides

αὐτὰρ ἄλλο γεγονός εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ’

The Great Self, *and also* of those that partake of **The Self**: and besides *all these*, yet *another*

τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ: καὶ ἐπὶ πασὶν τοῦτοις ἕτερον

in turn, through which, all these will appear to be great/big. And surely then, each of

132B αὐτὸ ὧ πάντα ταῦτα ἐστὶ μεγάλα: καὶ δὴ ἑκάστον

your “ideas”, will no longer be *One*, but an *infinite multitude*.

σοὶ τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκέτι ἐστὶ ἐν, ἀλλ’ τὸ ἀπειρα πλῆθος.

~~~Socrates *the empiricist!*?!~~~

**Socrates:** 6 Then, O Parmenides, each one of *these ideas* is *nothing more than* a *conception*,

Ἀλλὰ, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ἑκάστον τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν μὴ ἢ νόημα,

and will *not subsist in any place other than* in the proper **Self** in **Souls**; for in this way, each

καὶ ἐγγίγνεσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν προσηκῇ αὐτῷ ψυχαῖς: γὰρ οὕτω ἑκάστον

will indeed be one; and that which was just now mentioned will not still happen.

ἂν γένηται ἐν καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ νῦν ἐλέγετο ἂν οὐκ ἔτι πάσχοι.

**Parmenides:** What then? Is *each* of these conceptions *One*,

Τί οὖν; ἐστὶ ἑκάστον τῶν νοημάτων ἐν

but on the other hand, a conception of *nothing*?

δὲ νόημα οὐδενός;

**Socrates:** But this is impossible. (Ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον.)

**Parmenides:** Hence, it is a conception of *something*? (Ἀλλὰ τίνος;)

**Socrates:** Yes. (Ναί.)

ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ’ αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ: καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ὧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται: καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἐν ἑκαστὸν σοὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ ἀπειρα τὸ πλῆθος.

ἀλλὰ, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἑκάστον ἢ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἔν γε ἑκάστον εἶη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσχοι ἂ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο.

τί οὖν; φάναι, ἐν ἑκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός;

ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν.

ἀλλὰ τίνος;

ναί.

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |                            |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| [132c] “Of something that is, or that is not?”                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | 0.23                       |
| “Of something that is.”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                            |
| “A thought of some single element which that thought thinks of as appertaining to all and as being one idea?”                                                                                                                                                           | 0.24                       |
| “Yes.”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                            |
| “Then will not this single element, which is thought of as one and as always the same in all, be an idea?”                                                                                                                                                              | 0.25                       |
| “That, again, seems inevitable.”                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                            |
| “Well then,” said Parmenides, “does not the necessity which compels you to say that all other things partake of ideas, oblige you also to believe either that everything is made of thoughts, and all things think, or that, being thoughts, they are without thought?” | <i>being thoughts</i> 0.26 |

**Parmenides:** Of **Being** or of non-being?

132C                    Οντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος;

**Socrates:** Of being. (Ὀντος.)

**Parmenides:** Will it not be of **One Certain Entity**, which that conception **Intellects**

Οὐχ ἑνός τινος ἐπὶ, οὐδὲν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νοήμα νοεῖ

in the case of all things, as **Being One Certain Idea**?

ἐπὶ πᾶσιν οὐσαν μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν;

**Socrates:** Yes. (Ναί.)

**Parmenides:** Then will not **This Idea** that is **Being Intellected** be **One**,

Εἴτα ἐστὶ οὐκ τοῦτο εἶδος τὸ νοούμενον εἶναι ἓν,

by **Always Being The Self in every case**?

αἰεὶ ὄν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;

**Socrates:** This again, has come to **Light** as **Necessary**.

αὐτὸ φαίνεται Ἀνάγκη.

**Parmenides:** But what then? Or does it not appear **Necessary**, for you to say that inasmuch

ὅτι τί δή; ἢ οὐκ δοκεῖ ἀνάγκη σοὶ φησὶ ἢ

as **other things Participate** of **The Ideas/Species**, that each one of **Them** must be composed of

τάλλα μετέχειν τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον εἶναι ἐκ

**Thoughts/Intellections** and that **All** of **Them** in turn, must be **Able** to **Intellect/Think**?

νοημάτων καὶ πάντα νοεῖν,

Or will you say that although by **Being Intellections**, yet **They** are **without Intelligence/Mind**?

ἢ ὄντα νοήματα εἶναι ἀνοήτα;

ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος;

ὄντος.

οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὶ νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὐσαν ἰδέαν;

ναί.

εἴτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἓν εἶναι, αἰεὶ ὄν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;

ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ φαίνεται.

τί δὲ δή; εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἢ τὰλλα φησὶ τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν ἢ δοκεῖ σοὶ ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι;

“That is quite unreasonable, too,” he said, [132d] “but Parmenides, I think the most likely view is, that these ideas exist in nature as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of them; their participation in ideas is assimilation to them, that and nothing else.”

“Then if anything,” he said, “resembles the idea, can that idea avoid being like the thing which resembles it, in so far as the thing has been made to resemble it; or is there any possibility that the like be unlike its like?”

0.27

“No, there is none.”



**Socrates:** But this has to be *in no way* Rational. But, O Parmenides, it seems to me indeed,

132D Ἀλλ' τουτο εχει ουδε λογον, ἀλλ, ὦ Παρμενιδῃ, ἐμοιγε  
to be clearly seen especially, as follows: On the one hand, **These Ideas/Species** are **Set-Up**

καταφαινεται μάλιστα ὧδε: μὲν ταυτα τὰ εἶδη εἶσθαι  
in **Their Very Nature**, just as **Paradigms/Models**, whereas on the other hand, **the others** are  
ἐν τῇ φύσει ὥσπερ παραδείγματα, δε τὰ ἄλλα

**Assimilated** to **These Models**, and are **Their likenesses**; and **The Self Participation**, by **the**  
εοικέναι τούτοις καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα: καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ μεθεξὶς τοῖς  
**other things**, is nothing else than to become **Assimilated** to **The Selves** of **The Ideas/Species**.  
ἄλλοις οὐκ τις ἄλλη ἡ γίνεσθαι εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς τῶν εἰδῶν .

**Parmenides:** Therefore, if **anything** becomes **Like The Idea/Species**, *can it be possible that*  
οὐν εἰ τι εοικε τῷ εἶδει, οἶον

**The Idea** not be **Like that** which becomes **assimilated**, and by as much as **the assimilated**  
τὸ εἶδος μὴ εἶναι ὁμοῖον ἐκεῖνο τῷ εἰκασθέντι, τε ὅσον ἀφωμοιώθη  
**nature** is rendered **Like The Self**? Or *is there any reason why*, **the like** not be **like The Like**?

καθ' αὐτῷ; ἡ ἐστὶ τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὁμοῖον μὴ εἶναι ὁμοῖον ὁμοίῳ;

**Socrates:** There is not.

ἐστὶ Οὐκ.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον, ἀλλ', ὦ Παρμενίδῃ, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν: τὰ μὲν  
εἶδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις εοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα,  
καὶ ἡ μεθεξὶς αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς.

εἰ οὖν τι, ἔφη, εοικεν τῷ εἶδει, οἷόν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὁμοῖον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ' ὅσον αὐτῷ  
ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἐστὶ τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὁμοῖον μὴ ὁμοίῳ ὁμοῖον εἶναι;  
οὐκ ἔστι.

“And must not necessarily the like partake of [132e] the same idea as its like?” 0.28

“It must.”

“That by participation in which like things are made like, will be the absolute idea, will it not?” 0.29

“Certainly.”

“Then it is impossible that anything be like the idea, or the idea like anything; for if they are alike, some further idea, in addition to the first, will always appear, and if that is like anything, still another, [133a] and a new idea will always be arising, if the idea is like that which partakes of it.” 0.30

“Very true.”

**Parmenides:** Accordingly then, is there not a **Great Necessity**, that **The Relationship**

αρ' δε ου μεγαλη αναγκη Το

of **like** to **Like** should **Participate** of **One Idea/Species/Paradigm** of **The Self**?

132E ομοιον τω ομοιω μετεχειν ενος ειδους του αυτου;

**Socrates:** Necessarily. (Αναγκη.)

**Parmenides:** But will not **That**, through **The Participation** of which, **likes** are **like**

δ' ουκ εκεινο μετεχοντα Ου τα ομοια η ομοια

be **The Ideal Self**?

το ειδος αυτο;

**Socrates:** Yes, entirely so.

μεν Πανταπασι ουν.

**Parmenides:** Hence, neither can a (**partible**) **thing Be Like The (Impartible) Idea**, nor

αρα τε Ουκ οιον τι ειναι ομοιον τω ειδει, ουδε

**The Species Be Like the thing**. For if this were not the case, another **species** will always appear

το ειδος αλλω. δε ει μη , αλλο ειδος αι αναφανησεται

besides that **species**; and that **species** will again become **like** another; and so a new **species** 133A

παρα εκεινο αν αυ η ομοιον τω ετερον, και καινον ειδος

would never cease to always come to be, as long as any **species becomes like its participant**.

και ουδεποτε παυσεται αι γιγνομενον, εαν το ειδος γιγνηται ομοιον τω εαυτου μετεχοντι.

**Socrates:** You speak most truly. (λεγεις Αληθεστατα.)

τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἂρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶδους μετέχειν;

ἀνάγκη.

οὐ δ' ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾗ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος;

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἶδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλω: εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό τῷ ὅμοιον ᾗ, ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται αἰεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται.

ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

“Then it is not by likeness that other things partake of ideas we must seek some other method of participation.” - *likeness* 0.31

“So it seems.”

“Do you see, then, [Socrates](#), how great the difficulty is, if we maintain that ideas are separate, independent entities?” 0.32

“Yes, certainly.”

“You may be sure,” he said, “that you do not yet, if I may say so, [133b] grasp the greatness of the difficulty involved in your assumption that each idea is one and is something distinct from concrete things.” 0.33

“How is that?” said he.

**Parmenides:** So if the other things *do not* have a **Share** of **The Ideas** through Likeness;  
 αρα ταλλα Ουκ μεταλαμβάνει των ειδων ομοιοτητι,  
 then it is necessary to seek after something else *through which* they may have a **Share**.  
 αλλα δει ζητειν τι αλλο ω μεταλαμβάνει.

**Socrates:** So it seems. (Εοικεν.)

**Parmenides:** Do you see then, O Socrates, *how great* a doubt *arises*,  
 Ορας ουν, ω Σωκρατες, *οση* η απορια

if any one *defines/delimits/separates* **The Ideas**, as **Being** Selves according to Selves?  
 εαν τις διοριζεται ειδη ως οντα αυτα καθ' αυτα;

**Socrates:** I do, very much so. (Και μαλα.)

**Parmenides:** Accordingly then, know well that you do not yet grasp how great is the difficulty  
 τοινυν ισθι Ευ οτι ουδεπω απτει οση η απορια

of **Self**, as the saying goes, if you should place **Each One Idea** of **The Real Beings**

**133B** αυτης ως επος ειτειν ει θησεις εκαστον εν ειδος των οντων  
 as always being *something* that is *separate/set-apart*.  
 αι τι αφοριζομενος.

**Socrates:** What do you mean then? (Πως δη;)

οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τᾶλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει.  
 ἔοικεν.

ὁρᾷς οὖν, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅση ἡ ἀπορία ἐάν τις ὥς εἶδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διορίζηται;  
 καὶ μάλα.

εἴ τοίνυν ἴσθι, φάναι, ὅτι ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἄπτη αὐτῆς ὅση ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, εἰ ἐν εἶδος ἕκαστον  
 τῶν ὄντων ἀεί τι ἀφορίζομενος θήσεις.

πῶς δὴ; εἰπεῖν.

“There are many reasons,” he said, “but the greatest is this; if anyone should say that the ideas cannot even be known *if* they are *such* as we say they must be, no one could prove to him that he was wrong, unless he who argued that they could be known were a man of wide education and ability and were willing to follow the proof through many long and elaborate details; [133c] he who maintains that they cannot be known would be unconvinced.”

0.34

0.5

“Why is that, Parmenides?” said [Socrates](#).

**Parmenides:** On the one hand, there are many other doubts indeed, but on the other hand,  
 μεν Πολλα αλλα και δε

the following one, is the greatest. If anyone should say that **The Ideal Selves** cannot even  
 τοδε μεγιστον. ει τις φαιη τα ειδη αυτη μηδε

be properly known, being **Such as** we have said **They Must Be**. It could not even be proven  
 προσηκειν γινωσκεσθαι οντα τοιαυτα οια φαμεν δειν ειναι, αν ουκ εχοι ενδειξασθαι

to anyone, that he is mistaken, if it were not the case, on the one hand, that he who argues that  
 τις οτι ψευδεται, ει μη μεν ο αμφισβητων

it *could* be proven, happened to be **experienced/practiced** in a multitude of particulars and who  
 του ενδεικνυμενου τυχοι εμπειρος πολλων και ων

is not without **natural talent**, and on the other hand, he should also **be willing to follow** the  
 μη αφυης δε εθελοι επεσθαι

through many long and elaborate details; but even then, he who contends that  
 πολλα πανυ και πορρωθεν πραγματευομενου, αλλ' ο αναγκαζων

**The Ideal Selves** are unknowable, may still remain un-persuaded.

**133C** αυτα ειναι αγνωστα ειη απιθανος.

**Socrates:** **In what way** then, O Parmenides? (Πη δη, ω Παρμενιδη;)

πολλα μεν και αλλα, φαναι, μεγιστον δε τοδε. ει τις φαιη μηδε προσηκειν αυτα γινωσκεσθαι οντα  
 τοιαυτα οια φαμεν δειν ειναι τα ειδη, τω ταυτα λεγοντι ουκ αν εχοι τις ενδειξασθαι οτι ψευδεται, ει μη  
 πολλων μεν τυχοι εμπειρος ων ο αμφισβητων και μη αφυης, εθελοι δε πανυ πολλα και πορρωθεν  
 πραγματευομενου του ενδεικνυμενου επεσθαι, αλλ' απιθανος ειη ο αγνωστα αναγκαζων αυτα ειναι.

πη δη, ω Παρμενιδη; φαναι τον Σωκράτη.

“Because, [Socrates](#), I think that you or anyone else who claims that there is an absolute idea of each thing would agree in the first place that none of them exists in us.” 0.35

“No, for if it did, it would no longer be absolute,” said [Socrates](#).

“You are right,” he said. “Then those absolute ideas which are relative to one another have their own nature in relation to themselves, and not in relation to the likenesses, 0.36



**Parmenides:** In a way that I think both you and any other person, O Socrates, who would  
 τινα Οτι οἶμαι καὶ σε καὶ ἄλλον, ὦ Σωκράτες, ὅστις ἀν  
 set-up **The Ousia** of each **Idea** as **Subsisting Herself** by **Herself**; *you must agree*  
 τίθεται οὐσίαν ἑκάστου εἶναι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν, ἀν ὁμολογήσαι  
 in the first place, that *None* of **The Ideal Selves**, **Exist in us**.  
 πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν.

**Socrates:** For if **They** did, then how could **Their Ousia** still **Subsist Herself** by **Herself**?  
 γὰρ Πῶς ἀν εἴη αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν;

**Parmenides:** You speak **Well**. Is it not also the case, that of **The Ideas** that exist in **relation** to  
 λέγεις Καλῶς. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν εἰσὶν πρὸς

**Each Other**, however many **They** Are, **They Maintain Their Own Ousia** in relation to **Their**  
 ἀλλήλας αἰ ὅσαι εἰσιν, ἔχουσιν αὐταὶ τὴν οὐσίαν πρὸς

**Selves**, but *not in relation to those existing among us*; whether *in relation to some likeness*,  
 133D αὐτάς,

ὅτι, ὦ Σωκράτες, οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σε καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτὴν τινα καθ' αὐτὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι,  
 ὁμολογήσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν.

πῶς γὰρ ἀν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἱ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὐτάς τὴν  
 οὐσίαν

[133d] or whatever we choose to call them, which are amongst us, and from which we receive certain names as we participate in them. And these concrete things, which have the same names with the ideas, are likewise relative only to themselves, not to the ideas, and, belong to themselves, not to the like-named ideas.”

“What do you mean?” said [Socrates](#).

but **not** in relation to **those** existing among us; whether in relation to some likeness,

αλλ' ου προς τα ημιν ειτε ομοιωματα

or in whatever way one may then set **selves** up; and we do **Participate** of each relationship, to

ειτε οπη τις δη αυτα τιθεται, ημεις ειναι μετεχοντες εκαστα

**which** we apply by some particular name; but on the other hand, that **those** relations that exist

ων επονομαζομεθα : δε τα οντα

among us bear the same name as **Those**, and again our **selves** also exist in relation to our

παρ' ημιν ταυτα ομωνυμα αυ αυτα εστιν προς αυτα

but not in relation to **Those Ideas**; and again **selves** exist in relation to **them selves**, but not

αλλ' ου προς εκεινους τα ειδη, αυ εαυτων, αλλ' ουκ

in relation to **Those** with whom they thus **only Share Their Name**.

εκεινων οσα ουτως ονομαζεται.

**Socrates:** How do you mean this? (Πως λεγεις;)

**The LORD-Master-tyrant-δεσποτης / SERVANT-Student-slave-δουλος-Relationship**

(Or the **lack** of **It**)

**Stewardship: Lordship:: Good-Steward: Good King Relationship**

:: **Adapt-Student: Able-Master Relationship**

Compared to a **deficient copy**:: **slave** : **tyrant**

**LORD: SERVANT:: APOLLO: SOCRATES**

Master: Student:: Diotima: Socrates

**tyrant: slave :: non-lover: victim**

ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπη δὴ τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα: τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἶδη, καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως.

πὼς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

“For instance,” said Parmenides, “if one of us is master or slave of anyone, he is not the slave of master in the abstract, [133e] nor is the master the master of slave in the abstract; each is a man and is master or slave of a man but mastership in the abstract is mastership of slavery in the abstract, and likewise slavery in the abstract is slavery to mastership in the abstract, but our slaves and masters are not relative to them, nor they to us;

**Parmenides:** Such as, if one of us were **The Lord** or **the servant** of any one; then, the one who  
 133E Οιον, ει τις ημων εστιν δεσποτης η δουλος του, ο

is a **servant**, is certainly not in any way, **the servant** of **That Selfhood** of **The Lordship** of **The**  
 εστι δουλος, εστιν δη ουκ που δουλος εκεινου αυτου δεσποτης

**Lord**, nor is **The One** who is **Lord**, **The Lord** of **The Selfhood** of **the servant**; whereas by  
 δεσποτου ουδε ο εστι δεσποτης, ο δεσποτης αυτου δουλου, αλλ'  
 being **human**, they **Share** in both these **human relations**. On the other hand, **Self Mastership**  
 ων ανθρωπος εστιν αμφερα ταυτα ανθρωπου, δε αυτης δεσποτεια  
 is **That** which **It Is**, from **Its Relation** to **Self Stewardship**; and **Self Stewardship**,  
 εστιν ο εστι, αυτη δουλεις και αυτη δουλεια

in the same way, is **Stewardship in Relation to Lordship**. Thus the relationships in us

ωσαυτως δουλεια δεσποτειας, αλλ' τα εν ημιν  
 exercise none of **Their Power** in relation to **Those Ideas** nor **Those** in relation to us.

134A εχει ου την δυναμιν εκεινα ουδε εκεινα προς ημας,

οιον, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, εἴ τις ἡμῶν τοῦ δεσπότης ἢ δοῦλός ἐστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότης δῆπου, ὃ  
 ἔστι δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δοῦλός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δούλου, ὃ ἔστι δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλ'  
 ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστὶν ὃ ἐστὶ, καὶ  
 δουλεία ὡσαύτως αὐτὴ δουλεία αὐτῆς δεσποτείας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ  
 ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς,

[134a] they, as I say, belong to themselves and are relative to themselves and likewise our slaves and masters are relative to themselves. You understand what I mean, do you not?"

"Certainly," said [Socrates](#), "I understand."

"Then knowledge also, if abstract or absolute, would be knowledge of abstract or absolute truth?" 0.38

"Certainly."

"And likewise each kind of absolute knowledge would be knowledge of each kind of absolute being, would it not?" 0.39

"Yes."

Thus

αλλ’

I say that **They both Subsist by Them Selves** and also **Selves in Relation to Selves**; and in a

ο λεγω εκεινα τε εστι αυτων και αυτα προς αυτα, και

similar way, **Those in us in relation to Them Selves**. Or do you not understand what I say?

ωσαυτως τα παρ’ημιν προς εαυτα . η ου μανθανεις ο λεγω;

**Socrates:** I understand quite well indeed.

μανθανω Πανυ γ’.

Mastership: Stewardship:: **Self** Mastership: **Self** Stewardship

**Parmenides:** 7 On the one hand, is it not also the case, that if **Self Knowledge** is

μεν και Ουκουν αυτη επιστημη εστιν

**The Knowledge** of **That which Is True**, then **Knowledge** would be of **That Self**?

επιστημη ο εστιν αληθεια επιστημη αν ειη της εκεινης αυτης;

**Socrates:** Perfectly so. (Πανυ γε.)

**Parmenides:** But on the other hand, will every **Knowledge**, which **Is**, then in turn,

δε αν η Εκάστη των επιστημων, ο εστιν, αυ,

**Be The Knowledge** of **Each-one** of **The Real Beings** that **Exist**; or not?

ειη επιστημη εκαστου των οντων εστιν: η ου;

**Socrates:** Yes, it will. (Ναι.)

ἀλλ’, ὃ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως πρὸς αὐτά. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω;

πάνυ γ’, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, μανθάνω.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστι ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη;

πάνυ γε.

ἐκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἢ ἔστιν, ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἴη ἂν ἐπιστήμη: ἢ οὐ;

ναί.

“And would not the knowledge that exists among us be the knowledge of the truth that exists among us, and each kind of our knowledge [134b] be the knowledge of each kind of truth that exists among us?” 0.40

“Yes, that is inevitable.”

0.35 0.36 “But the ideas themselves, as you, agree, we *have not*, neither can they be *among us*.” 0.41

“No, they cannot.”

“And the various classes of ideas are known by the absolute idea of knowledge?” 0.42

“Yes.”

“Which we do not possess.” 0.43

“No, we do not.”

“Then none of the ideas is known by us, since we do not partake of absolute knowledge.” 0.44

“Apparently not.”



**Parmenides:** But will not **The Knowledge** among us, be **The Truth** which exists among us?

δε αν ου Η επιστημη παρ' ημιν ειη της αληθειας παρ' ημιν,  
And in turn, would not **Each Knowledge** among us, be a **Knowledge** of **Each** of **Those**  
134B και αυ αν εκαστου η επιστημη παρ' ημιν ειναι επιστημη εκαστου των  
**Beings/Reason Principles/Relationships** that happen to exist among us?  
οντων συμβαινοι παρ' ημιν?

**Socrates:** Necessarily so. (Αναγκη.)

**Parmenides:** But certainly, **The Ideal Selves**, as you indeed agree, we neither possess,  
Αλλα μην, τα ειδη αυτα, ως γε ομολογεις, ουτε εχομεν  
nor can **They** exist **As Such** among us.

ουτε τε ειναι οιον παρ' ημιν.

**Socrates:** Certainly not then. (Ου γαρ ουν.)

**Parmenides:** But **Every Genus/Class/Whole** of **Self** is *somehow* **Recognized to be /Known to**  
δε τα εκαστα γενη αυτη που Γινωσκεται

**That** which **It Is indeed, by means of The Idea** of **The Knowledge** of **The Self**?

α εστιν γε, υπ' του ειδους της επιστημης του αυτου;

**Socrates:** Yes. (Ναι.)

**Parmenides:** Which **Ideal Real Being**, we do not *indeed* possess.

Ο ημεις ουκ γε εχομεν.

**Socrates:** We do not. (Ου γαρ.)

**Parmenides:** Accordingly then, not a **Single One** of **The Ideas** are **Recognized/Known** by us,  
αρα Ουκ γε ουδεν των ειδων γινωσκεται υπο ημων,

seeing that we do not **Participate** of **Self Knowledge**!

επειδη ου μετεχομεν αυτης επιστημης.

**Socrates:** It does not seem likely. (Ουκ εοικεν.)

ή δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη, καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκάστη ἢ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν  
παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι;

ἀνάγκη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὰ γε τὰ εἶδη, ὥς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ' ἡμῖν οἶόν τε εἶναι.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

γινώσκεται δὲ γέ που ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶδους τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἔστιν ἕκαστα;

ναί.

ὅ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐκ ἄρα ὑπὸ γε ἡμῶν γινώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

“Then the absolute good and the beautiful and all [134c] which we *unknown to us* 0.45  
conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.”

“I am afraid they are.”

“Now we come to a still more fearful consequence.” 0.46

“What is it?”

“You would say, no doubt, that if there is an absolute kind of 0.47  
knowledge, it is far more accurate than our knowledge, and the  
same of beauty and all the rest?”

“Yes.”

“And if anything partakes of absolute knowledge, you would say 0.48  
that there is no one more likely than God to possess this most  
accurate knowledge?”

“Of course.”

**Parmenides:** Therefore, **The Beautiful Self**, which is also **The Good Self** and **All The Selves**  
 ἀρα το καλον αυτο ο εστι και το αγαθον και παντα αυτας

which we have surely taken-up as **Being Ideas**, are also **Un-Known** by us?

134C α δη υπολαμβανομεν ως ουσας ιδεας εστι και Αγνωστον ημιν.

**Socrates:** I am **afraid** they are. (Κινδυνευει.)

**Parmenides:** Behold then, this *even more* **fearful** consequence.

Ορα δη τουτου επι δεινότερον τοδε.

**Socrates:** What is it? (Το ποιον;)

**Parmenides:** You will say perhaps, that if indeed there is a **Certain Class** of **Knowledge**,

αν Φαιης που ειπερ εστιν τι γενος επιστημης

then **It Is much more-Perfect** than the **knowledge** which exists among us; and the same goes

αυτο ειναι πολυ ακριβεστερον η την επιστημην παρ' ημιν, ουτως

for **Beauty**, and all the other **Genera/Classes/Kinds/Wholes**.

και καλλος και παντα ταλλα.

**Socrates:** Yes. (Ναι.)

**Parmenides:** Is it not the case, that if indeed *anyone else* **Partakes** of **Self Knowledge**,

Ουκουν ειπερ τι αλλο μετεχει αυτης επιστημης,

then you will *not* affirm that *anyone* **Possesses That Most Perfect Knowledge more** than **God?**

αν ουκ φαιης τινα εχειν την ακριβεστατην επιστημην μαλλον η θεον;

**Socrates:** Necessarily not. (Αναγκη.)

ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὐσας  
 ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

κινδυνεύει.

ὄρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον τόδε.

τὸ ποῖον;

φαίης ἂν που, εἴπερ ἔστιν αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν  
 ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κάλλος καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἂν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην  
 ἐπιστήμην;

ἀνάγκη.

[134d] “Then will it be possible for God to know human things, if he has absolute knowledge?” 0.49

“Why not?”

0.41 “Because,” said Parmenides, “we have agreed that those ideas are *not relative* to our world, nor our world to them, but each only to themselves.” 0.50

“Yes, we have agreed to that.”

**Parmenides:** Take notice then; is it possible in turn, that **God**, can **Know** of our affairs,  
 134D                    Ἀρ' οὐν                    ἐσται οἷος αὐ    τε ὁ θεὸς    γινώσκειν παρ' ἡμῖν τὰ  
 by **Possessing Self Knowledge?** (ἔχων αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην;)

**Socrates:** Why not? (Τί γὰρ οὐ;)

**Parmenides:** Since it has been agreed by us, O Socrates, that neither do **Those Ideas Have**  
                                  Ὅτι    ὠμολογῆται    ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες,    μὴτ'    ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἶδη ἔχειν  
**The Power** which **They Possess**, in relation to those among us, nor those among us, in relation  
 τὴν δύναμιν ἣν                    ἔχει                    πρὸς    τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν, μὴτε τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν    πρὸς  
 to **Those**; but that **Selves** exist in relation to **Selves** in each realm.  
 ἐκεῖνα,    ἀλλ'    αὐτὰ                    πρὸς    αὐτὰ    ἑκάτερα.

**Socrates:** It was so agreed. (γὰρ ὠμολογῆται.)

ἄρ' οὖν οἷός τε αὐ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν γινώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων;  
 τί γὰρ οὐ;

ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὠμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴτε ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἶδη πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν τὴν  
 δύναμιν ἔχειν ἣν ἔχει, μὴτε τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἑκάτερα.  
 ὠμολόγηται γάρ.

“Then if this most perfect mastership and this most accurate knowledge are with God, his mastership can never rule us, [134e] nor his knowledge know us or anything of our world; we do not rule the gods with our authority, nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge, and by the same reasoning, they likewise, being gods, are not our masters and have no knowledge of human affairs.”

- *divine human* 0.51

“But surely this,” said he, “is a most amazing argument, if it makes us deprive God of knowledge.”

**Parmenides:** Is it not so, that if there is **The Most Perfect Mastership** among **Divinity**, and  
 Ουκουν ει εστιν η ακριβεστατη δεσποτεια παρα τω θεω και  
**The Most Perfect Self Knowledge**, then neither will **The Mastership** of **Those Gods Rule**  
 η ακριβεστατη αυτη επιστημη, ουτ' αν η δεσποτεια εκεινων δεσποσειεν  
 over us at any time, nor will **Their Knowledge Know** of us, nor of any other of our concerns,  
 134E αν ημων ποτε, ουτ' αν η επιστημη γνοιη ημας ουδε τι αλλο παρ' ημιν των,  
 and in a similar way, we cannot **rule** over **Them** by our **rule**, nor can we **Know/Recognize**  
 αλλα ομοιως, ημεις ουκ αρχομεν τ' εκεινων παρ ημιν τη αρχη ουδε γινωσκομεν  
**That which Is Divine**, in any way, *through the assistance of our knowledge*. And again,  
 του θειου ουδεν τη ημετερα επιστημη, αυ  
 according to **The Self/Same Logos**, **They** will neither, be our (**Immediate**-JFB, Sym 202e-203a )  
 κατα τον αυτον λογον εκεινοι τε ουτε εισιν ημων

**Rulers** (**Apology 31a**, **Phaedo 62b**) nor have any **Cognition** of human affairs (by Self-Knowledge).  
 δεσποται ουτε οντες γινωσκουσι τα ανθρωπεια πραγματα.

**Socrates:** But then would not **The Logos**, be wondrous in the extreme,  
 Αλλα μη ο λογος Αλλα θαυμαστος λιβαν  
 insofar as one were to **deprive Divinity** of **knowing**?  
 η τις ει αποστερησει τον θεον του ειδεναι.

οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὐτ' ἂν  
 ἡ δεσποτεία ἢ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὐτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίῃ οὐδὲ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ'  
 ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τε ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γινώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν  
 τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπότηται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γινώσκουσι  
 τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες.

ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἔφη, ἢ θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος, εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσει τοῦ εἰδέναι.

“And yet, [Socrates](#),” said Parmenides, [135a] “these difficulties and many more besides are inseparable from the ideas, if these ideas of things exist and we declare that each of them is an absolute idea. Therefore he who hears such assertions is confused in his mind and argues that the ideas do not exist, and even if they do exist cannot by any possibility be known by man; and he thinks that what he says is reasonable, and, as I was saying just now, he is amazingly hard to convince. Only a man of very great natural gifts will be able to understand that everything has a class and absolute essence,

0.52



**Parmenides:** Nevertheless, O Socrates, these and very many other consequences besides these,

135A μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, **Ταῦτα** καὶ πάνυ πολλὰ ἀλλὰ ἐτι τοῦτοις  
must be so **in relation to The Ideas**, if **The Ideal Selves** of **The Real Beings Exist**, and if one  
ἀναγκαιὸν ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ εἶδη, εἰ αἱ ἰδεαὶ **αὐταὶ** τῶν ὄντων εἰσιν καὶ τις  
**determines** that **Each One** is a **Certain Ideal Self**; so that one who hears these words is puzzled  
ὀριεῖται ἕκαστον τι εἶδος **αὐτοῦ**: ὥστε τὸν ἀκούοντα ἀπορεῖν  
and questions whether **Selves** do **exist**; or if **They** do **Exist**, that **They Exist** in **The Highest**  
τε καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς **ταῦτα** οὔτε ἐστὶ, τε εἰ ὅτι εἴη μάλιστα

**Degree**, so that it appears abundantly necessary that **Selves** must be unknown by human nature.  
πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ **αὐτὰ** εἶναι ἀγνώστα τῇ ἀνθρώπινῃ φύσει:

And whosoever speaks in this way, may appear to say something important; and, which  
καὶ λέγοντα **ταῦτα** δοκεῖν λέγειν τε τι, καὶ, ὅ

we just now said, may be thought of as being an extraordinary statement, by remaining **unable**  
ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, εἶναι θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσ-

to be persuaded. And yet on the one hand, as it **falls to The Ability** of an **Individual** of a **Very**  
-ἀναπείστον. καὶ μὲν ὡς **δυνήσομενον** τοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ

**Good Natural Disposition**, to be able to learn that there is a **certain Genus** of **Each Idea**, and  
εὐφροῦς (**Phi32B**, **Rep399C**) μαθεῖν ἐστὶ τι γένος ἑκάστου καὶ

**That** of **The Self** of **Ousia** by **Her Self**,

135B αὕτη οὐσία καθ' αὐτήν,

ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν  
τὰ εἶδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὐταὶ αἱ ἰδεαὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὀριεῖται τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος: ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε τὸν  
ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὔτε ἐστὶ ταῦτα, εἴ τε ὅτι μάλιστα εἴη, πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ  
ἀνθρώπινῃ φύσει ἀγνώστα, καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τι λέγειν καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς  
δυσανάπείστον εἶναι. καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφροῦς τοῦ δυνήσομένου μαθεῖν ὡς ἐστὶ γένος τι ἑκάστου  
καὶ οὐσία αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν,

[135b] and only a still more wonderful man can find out all these facts and teach anyone else to analyze them properly and understand them.”

“I agree with you, Parmenides,” said [Socrates](#), “for what you say is very much to my mind.”

“But on the other hand,” said Parmenides, “if anyone, with his mind fixed on all these objections and others like them, denies the existence of ideas of things, and does not assume an idea under which each individual thing is classed, he will be quite at a loss,

0.53

so on the other hand, they will deserve - even

δε του θαυμασ- ετι

greater admiration, who having made this **discovery**, shall be able to **teach** yet another person

-τοτερου ευρησοντος δυνησομενου διδασαι και αλλον

how to **thoroughly-well-distinguish** all these particulars, in a **Sufficiently-Efficient Way**.

διευκρινησαμενον παντα ταυτα ικανως .

**Socrates:** I agree with you entirely, O Parmenides, for you speak **According** to my **Mind**.

Συγχωρω σοι πανυ, ω Παρμενιδη, γαρ λεγεις κατα μοι νουν.

**Parmenides:** But nevertheless in turn, O Socrates, if anyone indeed, does not permit **The**

Αλλα μεντοι αυ, ω Σωκρατες, ει τις γε μη εασει

**Ideas** of **Real-Beings** to be, by not **Keeping** their **Mind Fixed** upon all these recent objections

ειδη των οντων ειναι, αποβλεψας εις παντα δη νυν τα

and others like them, and does not **Define One** of **Each Particular Idea/Genus/Paradigm**,

και αλλα τοιαυτα, μηδε οριειται ενος εκαστου τι ειδος

surely then, they will have **no where** to turn their **understanding**,

δη χει ουδε οπη τρεψει την διανοιαν

ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὐρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξει ταῦτα πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον.

συγχωρῶ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὁ Σωκράτης: πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοὸν λέγεις.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ τις δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτὸ μὴ ἐάσει εἶδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδὲ τι ὀριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἐκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέφει τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξει,

[135c] since he denies that the idea of each thing is always the same, and in this way he will utterly destroy the power of carrying on discussion. You seem to have been well aware of this.”

“Quite true,” he said.

“Then what will become of philosophy? To what can you turn, if these things are unknown?”

0.54

“I do not see at all, at least not at present.”

while they *do not* allow that  
μη εων

**The Idea** of **Each One** of **The Real Beings Is Always** of **The Self**, and *in this way*,

135C ιδεαν εκαστου των οντων ειναι αι την αυτην, και ουτως  
entirely destroy **The Power of Dialectics**.  
πανταπασι διαφθερει την δυναμιν του διαλεγεσθαι.

Therefore, in such a way, you *also* appear to perceive much **According** to my **Mind**.  
ουν του τοιουτου και δοκεις ησθησθαι μαλλον μοι .

**Socrates:** You speak **The Truth**.  
λεγεις Αληθη.

**Parmenides:** 8 What then will you do in **relation** to **Philosophy**?

Τι ουν ποιησεις περι φιλοσιφιας;

In what way will you **Turn** your **Mind**, if you are **ignorant** of these **Particular Ideas**?

πη τρεψει (3<sup>rd</sup> per.sin.) αγνοουμενων τουτων ;

**Socrates:** At the present time, I do indeed appear, *not* to see in what way at all.  
εν τω παροντι μοι γε δοκω Ου καθοραν πανυ .

μη εων ιδεαν των οντων εκαστου την αυτην αι ειναι, και ουτως την του διαλεγεσθαι δυναμιν  
πανταπασι διαφθερει. του τοιουτου μεν ουν μοι δοκεις και μαλλον ησθησθαι.

αληθη λεγεις, φαναι.

τι ουν ποιησεις φιλοσοφιας περι; η τρεψη αγνοουμενων τουτων;

οδ πανυ μοι δοκω καθοραν εν γε τω παροντι.

“No, [Socrates](#),” he said, “for you try too soon, before you are properly trained, to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and all the other ideas. [135d] You see I noticed it when I heard you talking yesterday with Aristoteles here. Your impulse towards dialectic is noble and divine, you may be assured of that; but exercise and train yourself while you are still young in an art which seems to be useless and is called by most people mere loquacity; otherwise the truth will escape you.”

0.55

“What, then, Parmenides,” he said, “is the method of training?”

**Parmenides:** That is because, you exercise yourself *too early* in this manner, O Socrates.

γάρ                      γυμνασθῆναι                      Πρῶτον, ὦ Σώκρατες,

You should endeavor beforehand **to Define** what is **Beautiful** and **Just** and **Good**, and **Each**

ἐπιχειρεῖς                      πρὶν ὀρίζεσθαι τί τε καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕκαστον

**One** of **The Ideas**. For I also just recently mentally noted this, while hearing you discoursing

135D ἐν τῶν εἰδῶν. γὰρ καὶ πρῶτην ἐνενόησα τῷδε ἀκούων σου διαλεγόμενου

with Aristotle here. Thus on the one hand, that **Impulse**, by which you are impelled

Ἀριστοτέλει ἐνθάδε. οὐν μὲν ἡ ὁρμῆς ἡν ὁρμῇ

towards **The Logos**, is **Beautiful** and **Divine** -you may be sure of that- but on the other hand,

ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους καλὴ καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι : καὶ δε

**You Must Collect Thy Self Together, by exercising** more in *that way*; which appears to be

ἐλκυσσὼν σαυτὸν διὰ γυμνασθῆναι μᾶλλον τῆς δοκούσης εἶναι

useless to the multitude, and is called by them empty talk; while you are still young,

ἀχρήστου τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νεός;

for if you do not, **The Truth** will utterly-elude Thee.

δε εἰ μή, ἡ ἀλήθεια διαφεύξεται σε.

**Socrates:** What then, O Parmenides, is *this manner* of exercise?

Τίς οὖν, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὁ τρόπος τῆς γυμνασίας;

πρῶτον γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλὸν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν. ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρῶτην σου ἀκούων διαλεγόμενου ἐνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμῇ ἢ ὁρμῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους; ἐλκυσσὼν δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ; εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια.

τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας;

“That which you heard [Zeno](#) practising,” said he. [135e] “However, even when you were speaking to him I was pleased with you, because you would not discuss the doubtful question in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to what we conceive most entirely by the intellect and may call ideas.”

0.56

“Yes,” he said, “that is because I think that in that way it is quite easy to show that things experience likeness or unlikeness or anything else.”

“Quite right,” said he, “but if you wish to get better training, you must do something more than that;

0.57





[136a] you must consider not only what happens if a particular hypothesis is true, but also what happens if it is not true.”

“What do you mean?” he said.

“Take, for instance,” he replied, “that hypothesis of [Zeno's](#) if the many exist, you should inquire what will happen to the many themselves in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and to the many, and also what will happen to the one and the many in relation to themselves and to each other, if the many do not exist.

0.58

you should still also

ετι και

suppose the following; to consider *not only* the consequences resulting from the hypothesis,  
ποιειν τοδε, σκοπειν μη μονον τα συμβαινοντα εκ της υποθεσεως,

whether **Each Ideal-Self** being hypothesized *exists*, *but also* the consequences resulting from

136A ει εκαστον υποτιθεμενον εστιν, αλλα και

hypothesizing if **This Ideal-Self** does *not exist*, if you wish to be more *exercised in this way*.

υποτιθεσθαι ει τουτο το αυτο μη εστι, ει βουλει μαλλον γυμνασθηναι .

**Socrates:** *In what way* do you mean? (Πως λεγεις;)

**Parmenides:** *Such as*, if you should wish to *exercise Your Self* in this same hypotheses, which

Οιον, ει βουλει περι ταυτης της υποθεσεως ην

**Zeno** hypothesized; (1) that if **Many (Beings 127e) Exist**, what must result both to **The Many**

Ζηνων υπεθετο, ει πολλα εστι, τι χρη συμβαινειν και τοις πολλοις

**Selves** in *relation* to **The Selves** and in *relation* to **The One**, and again if **Many (Beings) Exist**,

αυτοις προς αυτα και προς το εν και

what must result for **The One** in *relation* to **The Self** and in *relation* to **The Many**; and in turn,

τω ενι προς αυτο και προς τα πολλα: και αυ

if **The Many do not Exist**, to consider in turn, what will result both in *relation* to **The One**

ει πολλα μη εστι, σκοπειν παλιν, τι ξυμβησεται και τω ενι

and to **The Many**, both in *relation* to **The Selves** and in *relation* to **Each-Other**.

136B και τοις πολλοις και προς αυτα και προς αλληλα:

ποιεῖν, μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι.

πῶς λέγεις; φάναι.

οἶον, ἔφη, εἰ βούλει, περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἣν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλὰ ἐστι, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ πρὸς τε αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλὰ: καὶ αὖ εἰ μὴ ἔστι πολλὰ, πάλιν σκοπεῖν τί συμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα:

[136b] And likewise if you suppose the existence or non-existence of likeness, what will happen to the things supposed and to other things in relation to themselves and to each other under each of the two hypotheses. The same applies to unlikeness and to motion and rest, creation and destruction, and even to being and not being. In brief, whatever the subject of your hypothesis, if you suppose that it is or is not, or that it experiences any other affection, you must consider what happens to it and to any other particular things you may choose, and to a greater number and to all in the same way;

And again in turn (2), one should hypothesize, if **Likeness Exists**, or if **It** does *not* exist,  
 και αυθις αυ, εαν υποθη, ει ομοιοτης εστιν η ει μη εστι,  
 what will result for each of the hypothesis, both to **The Selves** that are being hypothesized  
 τι ξυμβεσεται εφ' εκατερας της υποθεσεως και τοις αυτοις υποτεθεισι  
 and to **The Others**, both in relation to **The Selves** and to **Each-Other**.  
 και τοις αλλοις και προς αυτα και προς αλληλα.

And (3) **The Self/Same Logos** must also be applied to **The Unlike**, to **Motion** and **Rest**,  
 και ο αυτος λογος και περι ανομοιου περι κινησεως και στασεως  
 to **Generation** and **Dissolution** and to **The Self** that **Is** and to **The Self** that **Is not**, and in **One**  
 περι γενεσεως και φθορας και περι του αυτου ειναι και του ειναι μη; και ενι  
**Logos**, concerning **That** which should be hypothesized as **Always-Being** and as *not-Being* and  
 λογω (Pro-Tim 168e), περι ου αν υποθη ως αιοντος και ως ουκ οντος και  
 anything else that **undergoes** any **experience** whatsoever, one must consider the consequences  
 αλλο πασχοντος παθος οτιουν, δει σκοπειν τα ξυμβαινοντα  
 in relation to **The Self** and in relation to each one of **The Others** being considered, which  
 may set-up for this purpose, and in relation to **Many**, and similarly in relation to **Everything**.  
 αν προελη, και προς πλειω και ωσαυτως προς ξυμπαντα:

καὶ αὐθις αὐ εἰ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβήσεται καὶ  
 αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσιν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα. καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος  
 καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ περὶ στάσεως καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ  
 εἶναι: καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ οὗ ἂν αἰεὶ ὑποθῇ ὥς ὄντος καὶ ὥς οὐκ ὄντος καὶ ὅτιον ἄλλο πάθος  
 πασχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἕν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ἂν προέλῃ, καὶ  
 πρὸς πλείω καὶ πρὸς σύμπαντα ὡσαύτως:

[136c] and you must consider other things in relation to themselves and to anything else you may choose in any instance, whether you suppose that the subject of your hypothesis exists or does not exist, if you are to train yourself completely to see the truth perfectly.”

“Parmenides,” he said, “it is a stupendous amount of study which you propose, and I do not understand very well. Why do you not yourself frame an hypothesis and discuss it, to make me understand better?”

And in turn (4), how **The Others** are **related** to **The Selves** and to any **Other** which one  
 και αυ ταλλα προς αυτα τε και προς τι αλλο ο  
 may select, whether you hypothesize as the subject of your hypothesis **That** which **Always Is**,  
 αν προαιρη, εαντε υποθη ως υπετιθεσο ο αι ον  
 or as *that* which **Is-not**; if you care about *being Perfectly exercised* to **Thoroughly-Behold**  
 εαντε ως ον μη, ει μέλλεις τελεως υμνασάμενος διοψεσθαι  
**The Truth**, in a **Masterful Way**.  
 το αληθες κυριως .

**Socrates:** You speak, O Parmenides, of an extraordinary undertaking, and I do not  
 λεις, ω Παρμενιδη, Αμηχανον πραγματειαν, και ου  
 quite understand. But why not hypothesize in detail a **Certain/Definite Self** for me,  
 σφοδρα μανθανω. αλλα τι ου υποθεμενος διηλθες τι αυτος μοι,  
 in order that I may be more able to understand?  
 ινα μαλλον καταμαθω;

και ταλλα αυ προς αυτα τε και προς αλλο οτι αν προαιρη αιει, εαντε ως ον υποθη ο υπετιθεσο, αντε ως  
 μη ον, ει μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές.  
 ἀμήχανόν γ' ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Παρμενίδη, πραγματείαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω. ἀλλά μοι τί οὐ διήλθες  
 αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός τι, ἵνα μάλλον καταμάθω;

[136d] “That is a great task, [Socrates](#),” he said, “to impose upon a man of my age.”

0.59

“But you, [Zeno](#),” said [Socrates](#), “why do not you do it for us?”

Pythodorus said that [Zeno](#) answered with a smile:

“Let us ask it of Parmenides himself, [Socrates](#); for there is a great deal in what he says, and perhaps you do not see how heavy a task you are imposing upon him. If there were more of us, it would not be fair to ask it of him; for it is not suitable for him to speak on such subjects before many, especially at his age;

0.60



**Parmenides:** You assign, O Socrates, much work, for one as old as me.

**136D** προσταττεις, ω Σωκρατες, πολυ εργον, ως τηλικωδε.

**Socrates:** Then in that case, Zeno, why don't *you* unfold it in detail for us?

Αλλα, Ζηνων, τι ου συ διηλθες (διερχομαι) ημιν;

**Antiphon:** Then Zeno, laughing, said: (Και τον Ζηγωνα γελασαντα φαναι:)

**Zeno:** We must ask Parmenides himself, O Socrates. For, as it has been said, it is indeed, no  
δεωμεθα Παρμενιδου αυτου, ω Σωκρατες. γαρ η ο λεγει μη ου

trifling matter. Or do you not see the *magnitude* of the work you are assigning? If, then,  
φ αυλον . η ουχ ορας οσον εργον προσταττεις ; ει ουν

on the one hand, more of us were present, it would not be appropriate to make such a request;  
μεν πλειους ημεν ην, αν ουκ αξιον δεισθαι:

for it is unsuitable, and especially for a man of his age, to speak of matters such as these

γαρ απρεπη τε και αλλως τηλικουτω λεγειν τα τοιαυτα

in the presence of many people.

**136E** εναντιον πολλων:

πολὺ ἔργον, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῶδε.

ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, Ζήνων, τί οὐ διήλθες ἡμῖν;

καὶ τὸν Ζήγωνα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι: αὐτοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου: μὴ γάρ οὐ φαδλον ἦ ὃ λέγει. ἦ οὐχ ὀρᾷς ὅσον ἔργον προστάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι: ἀπρεπὴ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ:

[136e] for the many do not know that except by this devious passage through all things the mind cannot attain to the truth. So I, Parmenides join [Socrates](#) in his request, that I myself may hear the method, which I have not heard for a long time.”

Antiphon said that Pythodorus told him that when [Zeno](#) said this he himself and Antisthenes and the rest begged Parmenides to show his meaning by an example and not to refuse.

For the many are ignorant that, without **This Discursive**  
 γαρ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ὅτι . . . ἀνευ ταύτης διεξ-

**Procession** and **Wandering** through **All** Beings/Cities (Poem-**Frag1**), it happens to be **impossible**  
 -οδοῦ τε καὶ πλάνης δια πάντων ἐντυχόντα ἀδύνατον

for **The Mind** to hold-on to **The Truth**. Therefore, O Parmenides, I ask in conjunction with  
 νοῦν σχεῖν τῷ ἀληθεῖ. μὲν οὖν, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ἐγὼ συνδέομαι

Socrates, that you yourself undertake the discussion, in order that I may also hear to the end,  
 Σωκράτει, αὐτὸς ἵνα καὶ διακούσω

that which I heard some time ago.

δια χρόνου.

**Antiphon: 9** Then when Zeno asked this, Pythodorus said, that he also, and Aristotle, and  
 δη Ζήνωνος τοῦ εἰπόντος Ταῦτα, τὸν Πυθόδωρον φάναι αὐτὸν τε καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη  
 the others asked Parmenides, to demonstrate that which he spoke of and not do otherwise.  
 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου, ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἄλλως.

ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα  
 τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ  
 χρόνου.

ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον, αὐτὸν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ  
 Παρμενίδου καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν.

And Parmenides said: “I must perforce do as you ask. [137a] And yet I feel very much like the horse in the poem of Ibycus—an old race-horse who was entered for a chariot race and was trembling with fear of what was before him, because he knew it by experience. Ibycus says he is compelled to fall in love against his will in his old age, and compares himself to the horse. So I am filled with terror when I remember through what a fearful ocean of words I must swim, old man that I am.

**Parmenides:** It is necessary to comply with your request. And yet, I appear to my **self** to

**137A**                    ἀνάγκη    πειθεσθαι                    .    και    τοι    δοκῶ    μοι  
sympathize with the fate of **the horse** of Ibycus, which being a race-horse, and being advanced  
πεπονθεναι            το    του **ἵππου** Ἰβυκείου, ὡς ὄντι ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητὴ καὶ    πρεσ-  
in years, when being about to contend in the **chariot** races, and by knowing the experience,  
βυτέρω,    μέλλοντι ὑφ' ἀγωνιεῖσθαι    **ἄρματι**            καὶ    δι'            ἐμπειρίαν  
trembled with fear at the forthcoming event, and to whom, Ibycus, comparing him **self**, said  
τρέμοντι                    το μέλλον    ,                    ἀπεικάζων **ἑαυτόν** ἔφη

- *And My Self being so old is Involuntarily Compelled to Return to The Object of My Love* -  
καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν οὕτω πρεσβύτης ἄκων ἀναγκάζεσθαι    ἵεναι εἰς    τὸν    **ἔρωτα**:

And I also, being as old as I am appear to my **self** to exceedingly dread the present undertaking,  
καγὼ    ὄντα τηλικόνδε    δοκῶ    μοι            μάλα φοβείσθαι  
remembering in what way it is required to swim through such and so great a sea of discourse.  
μεμνημένος    πῶς                    χρή    διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτον τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων:

τὸν οὖν Παρμενίδην: ἀνάγκη, φάναι, πείθεσθαι. καίτοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι, ὃς  
ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητὴ ὄντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρω, ὑφ' ἄρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι' ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ  
μέλλον, ἑαυτόν ἀπεικάζων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω πρεσβύτης ὢν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἵεναι:  
κάγώ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι πῶς χρή τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ  
τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων:

However, I will do it, for I must be obliging, especially since we are, as [Zeno](#) says, alone. [137b] Well, how shall we begin? What shall be our first hypothesis? Or, since you are determined that I must engage in a laborious pastime, shall I begin with myself, taking my own hypothesis and discussing the consequences of the supposition that the one exists or that it does not exist?"

"By all means," said [Zeno](#).

"Who then," said he, "to answer my questions? Shall we say the youngest? He would be least likely to be over-curious and most likely to say what he thinks and moreover his replies would give me a chance to rest." [137c]

0.62

"I am ready, Parmenides, to do that," said Aristoteles, "for I am the youngest, so you mean me. Ask your questions and I will answer."

Ω

For thus it is necessary to take this task in hand, seeing that, it is at the request of Zeno,

137B γὰρ δὲ δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ, ὁ λέγει Ζήνων,

and in any case, we are by our **selves**.

καὶ ὁμῶς ἐσμεν **αὐτοί**.

Therefore, from whence then, shall we begin, and what shall we hypothesize first?

οὐκ ποθεν δὴ ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τί υποθεσόμεθα πρῶτον;

Or are you willing, seeing that it certainly appears that we must play a very laborious game, I

ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδὴ περ δοκεῖ παιζειν πραγματειώδη παιδίαν,

must begin from **my Self** and the hypothesis of **my Self**; by hypothesizing about **The One Self**,

ἀρξώμαι ἀπ' **ἐμαυτοῦ** καὶ τῆς υποθέσεως **ἐμαυτοῦ**, υποθεμένος περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς **αὐτοῦ**,

whether **One Is**, or whether **One is not**, what must the result be?

εἴτε ἐν ἔστιν εἴτε ἐν μὴ, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν;

**Zeno**: By all means.

Πάνυ μὲν οὐκ.

**Parmenides**: Who then, will answer to me? Or will it be the youngest among you?

Τίς οὐκ ἀποκρίνεται μοι; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος ;

For the **labor** will be very much less, should he answer what he thinks; and his answer,

γὰρ ἂν μάλιστ' πολυπραγμονοίῃ ἥκιστα ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἀποκρίσις

at the same time, will afford me a time for resting from that arduous investigation.

ἅμα ἂν εἴη ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλα ἐκείνου ἢ .

**Aristotle**: I will attend to you in this, O Parmenides, for you may call upon me

137C ἔτοιμος σοὶ τοῦτο, ὦ Παρμενίδη, γὰρ λέγεις ἐμὲ

as calling upon the youngest. Ask me, then, as one who will answer you.

λέγων τὸν νεώτατον: ἐρώτα ἀλλ' ὥς ἀποκρινουμένου.

ὁμῶς δὲ δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ, ὁ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν. πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τί πρῶτον υποθεσόμεθα; ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδὴ περ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδίαν παίζειν, ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἀρξώμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ υποθέσεως, περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ υποθέμενος, εἴτε ἐν ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἐν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, φάναι τὸν Ζήνονα.

τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοι ἀποκρίνεται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; ἥκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοί, καὶ ἃ οἶται μάλιστα ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο: καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις.

ἔτοιμός σοι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη: ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων. ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα ὥς ἀποκρινουμένου.

|                                                        |                |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| - <i>many</i>                                          | 1.1            |
| Theorem I                                              | 1.2            |
| <i>parts whole</i>                                     | 1.5            |
| <i>many</i>                                            | 1.6            |
| - <i>whole parts</i>                                   | 1.8            |
| - <i>beginning middle end</i>                          | 1.9            |
| <i>unlimited</i>                                       | 1.11           |
| Theorem II                                             | 1.12           |
| <i>form</i>                                            | 1.15           |
| - <i>straight round</i>                                | 1.16           |
| Theorem III                                            | 1.17           |
| <i>active passive</i>                                  | 1.20           |
| - <i>in itself something</i>                           | 1.21           |
| Theorem IV                                             | 1.22           |
| - <i>in anything</i>                                   | 1.21 1.30      |
| - <i>motion</i>                                        | 1.36           |
| - <i>in anything</i>                                   | 1.21 1.37      |
| - <i>in itself anything</i>                            | 1.21 1.40      |
| - <i>motionless rest</i>                               | 1.42           |
| - <i>motion rest</i>                                   | 1.43           |
| Theorem V                                              | 1.44           |
| - <i>same another other itself</i>                     | 1.47           |
| - <i>other other same itself</i>                       | 1.56           |
| - <i>other same itself other</i>                       | 1.57           |
| Theorem VI                                             | 1.58           |
| <i>same</i>                                            | 1.52 1.55 1.60 |
| - <i>like another itself</i>                           | 1.63           |
| - <i>unlike itself other</i>                           | 1.66           |
| - <i>like unlike other itself</i>                      | 1.67           |
| Theorem VII                                            | 1.68           |
| - <i>equal</i>                                         | 1.73           |
| - <i>equal</i>                                         | 1.73 1.75      |
| - <i>equal greater less itself other</i>               | 1.76           |
| Theorem VIII                                           | 1.77           |
| - <i>likeness equality</i>                             | 1.62 1.76 1.78 |
| - <i>unlikeness inequality</i>                         | 1.66 1.76 1.79 |
| - <i>younger older same age</i>                        | 1.81           |
| <i>grows older younger</i>                             | 1.84           |
| <i>time</i>                                            | 1.89           |
| - <i>affections</i>                                    | 1.81 1.90      |
| - <i>time</i>                                          | 1.91           |
| - <i>become be past present future</i>                 | 1.95           |
| - <i>share</i>                                         | 1.97           |
| <i>is not</i>                                          | 1.98           |
| - <i>is one</i>                                        | 1.99           |
| <i>belonging</i>                                       | 1.100          |
| - <i>name description knowledge perception opinion</i> | 1.101          |
| - <i>named described thought known perceive</i>        | 1.102          |



**IBYCUS**

6<sup>th</sup> Century B.C.

Eros,  
Even now  
Looks at me,  
From Under Dark Eyelids  
With Tenderness  
And Casts me  
Spellbound  
Into Aphrodite's Nets  
Where I lie  
Inextricably Caught,

For I Swear  
His Mere Approach  
Makes me tremble

EROS: Ibycus

: [Like](#):

Race: Chariot-horse

An Old Champion Chariot Horse  
As he draws  
A swift cart/chariot  
*Unwillingly*  
To The Race.

1st

“Well then,” said he, “if the one exists, the one cannot be many, can it?” *- many* 1.1

“No, of course not.”

---

“Then there can be no parts of it, nor can it be a whole.” *Theorem I* 1.2

“How is that?”

“The part surely is part of a whole.” 1.3

“Yes.”

“And what is the whole? Is not a whole that of which no part is wanting?” [137d] 1.4

“Certainly.”

*parts whole*

“Then in both cases the one would consist of parts, being a whole and having parts.” 1.5

“Inevitably.”

### The First Hypothesis

**Parmenides:** 10 Well then, if **One Is**, could not **The One Be Many** in **Some Other Way**?

Εἰεν δὴ, εἰ ἐν ἐστίν, ἀν οὐκ τὸ ἐν εἴη πολλὰ τι ἄλλο;

**Aristotle:** How could it be many? (πῶς ἀν γάρ;)

**Par:** Accordingly then, neither **Can** any **Part Belong** to **Self** nor **Can Self Be** a **Whole**.

ἀρα οὐτε δεῖ μέρος αὐτοῦ οὐτε αὐτὸ εἶναι ὅλον.

**Ari:** Why not then? (τί δὴ;)

**Par:** Because **The Part Is** in some way a **Part** of a **Whole**.

τὸ μέρος ἐστίν που μέρος ὅλου.

**Ari:** Yes. (Ναί.)

**Par:** What then about **The Whole**? Would not **That** from which **no Part Is absent Be Whole**?

Τί δε τὸ ὅλον; ἀν οὐχὶ οὐ μὴδὲν μέρος ἀν ἀπὴ εἴη ὅλον;

**Ari:** Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, from **both** these consequences **The One** would **Be Composed** of **Parts**,

ἀρα ἀμφοτέρως τὸ ἐν ἀν εἴη ἐκ μερῶν,

by **Being** a **Whole** and by **Possessing Parts**.

ὄν ὅλον τε καὶ ἔχον μέρη.

**Ari:** Necessarily. (ἀναγκη.)

εἶεν δὴ, φάναι: εἰ ἐν ἐστίν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἐν;

πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι.

τί δὴ;

τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος ἐστίν.

ναί.

τί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὐ ἂν μέρος μὴδὲν ἀπὴ ὅλον ἂν εἴη;

πάνυ γε.

ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄρα οὕτως τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἴη ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν.

ἀληθῆ.

|             |                                                                                                        |                                           |      |
|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------|
| <i>many</i> | “Then in both cases the one would be many, not one.”                                                   |                                           | 1.6  |
|             | “True.”                                                                                                |                                           |      |
|             | “Yet it must be not many, but one.”                                                                    |                                           | 1.7  |
|             | “Yes.”                                                                                                 |                                           |      |
|             | “Then the one, if it is to be one, will not be a whole and will not have parts.”                       | - <i>whole parts</i>                      | 1.8  |
|             | “No.”                                                                                                  |                                           |      |
|             | “And if it has no parts, it can have no beginning, or middle, or end, for those would be parts of it?” | - <i>beginning</i><br>- <i>middle end</i> | 1.9  |
|             | “Quite right.”                                                                                         |                                           |      |
|             | “Beginning and end are, however, the limits of everything.”                                            |                                           | 1.10 |
|             | “Of course.”                                                                                           |                                           |      |
|             | “Then the one, if it has neither beginning nor end, is unlimited.”                                     | <i>unlimited</i>                          | 1.11 |
|             | “Yes, it is unlimited.”                                                                                |                                           |      |

**Par:** Accordingly then, in both ways, **The One** will **Be Many**, but **Not-One**.

**137D** αρα αμφοτερωσ το εν αν ειη πολλα, αλλ' ουχ εν.

**Ari:** True. (αληθη.)

**Par:** But **It Must** indeed, **not Be Many**, but **One Self**. (See **142A**)

δε Δει γε μη ειναι πολλα αλλ' εν αυτο.

**Ari:** It must. (δει.)

**Par:** Hence **It** will neither **Be** a **Whole**, nor **Possess Parts**, if **The One** “**Is to Be**” **One**.

αρα ουτε εσται ολον ουτε εξει μερη, ει το εν εσται εν.

**Ari:** It will not. (ου γαρ.)

**Par:** Is it not the case then, that if **It Can have No Part**, then neither **Can It have** a **Beginning**

Ουκουν ει εχει μηδεν μερος, ουτ' αν εχοι αρχην

nor **Middle** nor **End**; for those such as these would already **Be Parts** of **Self**?

ουτε μεσον ουτε τελευτην: γαρ τα τοιαυτα αν ηδη ειη μερη αυτου.

**Ari:** Rightly so. (ορθως.)

**Par:** And certainly **The Beginning** and **End Are** indeed **The Limit** of **Each Part**?

και μην αρχη και τελευτη γε περας εκαστου.

**Ari:** How could they not? (πως δ' ου;)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The One** is **Unlimited**, if **It has** either **Beginning** or **End**?

αρα το εν απειρον, ει εχει μητε αρχην μητε τελευτην.

**Ari:** Unlimited. (απειρον.)

ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον τε ὄν καὶ μέρη ἔχον.

ἀνάγκη.

δεῖ δέ γε μὴ πολλα ἄλλ' ἐν αὐτὸ εἶναι.

δεῖ.

οὔτ' ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἔξει, εἰ ἐν ἔσται τὸ ἐν.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτ' ἂν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι: μέρη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη.

ὀρθῶς.

καὶ μὴν τελευτὴ γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἐκάστου.

πῶς δ' οὔ;

ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἐν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει.

ἄπειρον.

---

|             |                                                                                                         |            |      |
|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------|
|             | “And it is without form, [137e] for it partakes neither of the round nor of the straight.”              | Theorem II | 1.12 |
|             | “How so?”                                                                                               |            |      |
|             | “The round, of course, is that of which the extremes are everywhere equally distant from the center.”   |            | 1.13 |
|             | “Yes.”                                                                                                  |            |      |
|             | “And the straight, again, is that of which the middle is in the nearest line between the two extremes.” |            | 1.14 |
|             | “It is.”                                                                                                |            |      |
| <i>form</i> | “Then the one would have parts and would be many, whether it partook of straight or of round form.”     |            | 1.15 |
|             | “Certainly.”                                                                                            |            |      |

Par: Accordingly then, **It Must** also “Be” without **Figure/Form/Shape**,  
 αρα και ανευ σχηματος:

for **It Can** neither **Participate** of **The Circular** nor of **The Straight/Rectilinear**.

137E γαρ αν ουτε μετεχει στρογγυλου ουτε ευθεος.

Ari: How is this the case? (πως;)

Par: For **The Circular Is** indeed that in which **The Extremities Must Be**  
 στρογγυλον εστι γε τουτο ου τα εσχατα αν

in every way **Equally** distant from **The Middle**.

πανταχη που ισον απεχη απο του μεσου.

Ari: Yes. (Ναι.)

Par: And **The Straight Is** indeed that in which **The Middle**  
 και ευθυ γε μην η ου το μεσον

**Is** situated in line with both **The Extremes**?

πιπροσθεν αμφοιν τοιν εσχατοιιν.

Ari: It is so. (ουτως.)

Par: It is not the case then, that **The One** will then **Possess Parts** and **Be Many**,  
 ουκουν το εν αν εχει μερη και αν ειη πολλ’,

by **Participating** of either a **Straight** or of a **Round Figure**?

μετεχοι ειτε ευθεος ειτε περιφερους σχηματος.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

και ανευ σχηματος αρα: ουτε γαρ στρογγυλου ουτε ευθεος μετεχει.

πως;

στρογγυλον γε που εστι τουτο ου αν τα εσχατα πανταχη απο του μεσου ισον απεχη.

ναί.

και μην ευθυ γε, ου αν το μεσον αμφοιν τοιν εσχατοιιν επιπροσθεν η.

ουτως.

ουκοδν μερη αν εχει το εν και πολλα αν ειη, ειτε ευθεος σχηματος ειτε περιφεροδς μετεχοι.

πανυ μεν ουν.

“Then it is neither straight nor round, since it has no parts.” [138a] *- straight round* 1.16

“Right.”

---

“Moreover, being of such a nature, it cannot be anywhere, for it Theorem III 1.17  
could not be either in anything else or in itself.”

“How is that?”

“If it were in something else, it would be encircled by that in which 1.18  
it would be and would be touched in many places by many parts of  
it; but that which is one and without parts and does not partake of  
the circular nature cannot be touched by a circle in many places.”

“No, it cannot.”



**Par:** Accordingly then, **It** is neither **Straight** nor **Round**, seeing that **It has No Part**.

**138A**            αρα            εστιν ουτε ευθυ ουτε περιφερεις, επειπερ εχει ουδε μερη.

**Ari:** Rightly so. (ορθως.)

**Par:** And certainly, by “Being” **Such**, **It** will indeed *exist in-no-way-whatsoever*,

Και μην            ον τοιουτον            αν            γε            ειη            ουδαμου:

for **It** will neither **exist In-Another**, nor **In-It-Self**.

γαρ αν ουτε ειη αν αλλω ουτε εν εαυτω.

**Ari:** How so? (πως δη; )

**Par:** For on the one hand, by **Being In-Another**, **It** would somehow **Be Circularly**

γαρ            μεν            ον            εν αλλω            αν            που            κυκλω

**Comprehended** by **That in which It Is**, and would **Be** touched by **Self** in many places.

περιεχοιτο υπ’ εκεινου εν ω ενειη, και αν απτοιτο αυτου πολλοις πολλαχου:

Thus on the other hand, it is also **Impossible**, that **The One** which “Is” also **Partless**, and

δε            και αδυνατον            του ενος            τε και αμερους            και

which does *not Participate* of **The Circle**, to **Be** touched in a circular way, in many places.

μη            μετεχοντος            κυκλου            απτεσθαι            κυκλω            πολλαχη.

**Ari:** Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

οὔτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε περιφερές ἐστιν, ἐπείπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει.

ὀρθῶς.

καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὃν οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εἴη: οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη.

πῶς δῆ;

ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὃν κύκλῳ που ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπ’ ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἐνείη, καὶ πολλαχοῦ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο πολλοῖς: τοῦ δὲ ἐνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῇ κύκλῳ ἄπτεσθαι.

ἀδύνατον.

“But, furthermore, being in itself it would also be surrounding with itself naught other than itself, [138b] if it were in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not surround it.” 1.19

“No, it cannot.”

*active passive*

“Then that which surrounds would be other than that which is surrounded; for a whole cannot be both active and passive in the same action; and thus one would be no longer one, but two.” 1.20

“True.”

“Then the one is not anywhere, neither in itself nor in something else.” *- in itself* *- in something* 1.21

“No, it is not.”

---

“This being the case, see whether it can be either at rest or in motion.” Theorem IV 1.22

“Why not?”

**Par:** But surely, if **Self** were indeed **In-It-Self**, then **Self** would also **Contain**

**138B** ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ εἴη γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ περιέχον

**It-Self**, and if indeed, by **Being** no other than **Self**, **Self** would **Be In-It-Self**;

ἐαυτῷ καὶ εἴπερ οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἴη ἐν ἑαυτῷ:

for it **is Impossible** that *anything not* be **Contained** by **That in which it is**.

γὰρ ἀδύνατον τι μὴ περιέχοντι τῷ ἐν εἶναι.

**Ari:** For it is impossible. (γὰρ ἀδύνατον.)

**Par:** Is it not so then, that on the one hand, **The Self** that **Contains Is One Certain Aspect**,

ἀν οὐκ οὐν μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ περιέχον εἴη ἕτερον τι,

while on the other hand, **That** which is **Being Contained** is **Another**? For **The Same Whole**

δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον ἕτερον: γὰρ ταῦτον ὅλον

can indeed not, be both **acted upon (Passive)** and also be **The Creative Principle (Active)**,

γε οὐ ἀμφω πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει

and in this way, **The One** would no longer be **One**, but **Two At-Once**.

καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν ἂν εἴη ἐν ἀλλὰ δύο ἀμὰ.

**Ari:** For then it would not. (γὰρ οὐν οὐ.)

**Par:** Accordingly, **The One Is Not Anywhere**, by **Being Neither In-It-Self** nor **In-Another**.

ἀρα τὸ ἐν ἐστὶν οὐκ οὐ μὴτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ μὴτε ἐν ἄλλῳ.

**Ari:** It is not. (οὐκ ἐστὶν.)

**Parmenides:** **11** **Observe** then, if **It Has** to **Be Understood** in such a way as this;

Ὅρα δὴ εἰ ἔχον οἷον οὕτως

then **It Is** either **Remaining-Stationary** or **Being-Moved**.

ἐστὶν τε ἐστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι.

**Aristotle:** Why then could it not? (τι δὴ γὰρ οὐ;)

ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν καὶ ἑαυτῷ εἶη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὐτό, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶη: ἐν τῷ γὰρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον.

ἀδύνατον γάρ.

οὐκοῦν ἕτερον μὲν ἂν τι εἶη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον: οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταῦτόν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει: καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἔτι ἐν ἀλλὰ δύο.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν οὐ τὸ ἐν, μὴτε ἐν αὐτῷ μὴτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν.

οὐκ ἔστιν.

ὅρα δὴ, οὕτως ἔχον εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστὶν ἐστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι.

τί δὴ γὰρ οὐ;

[138c] “Because if in motion it would be either moving in place or changing; for those are the only kinds of motion.” 1.23

“Yes.”

“But the one, if changing to something other than itself, cannot any longer be one.” 1.24

“It cannot.”

“Then it is not in motion by the method of change.” 1.25

“Apparently not.”

“But by moving in place?” 1.26

“Perhaps.”

“But if the one moved in place, it would either revolve in the same spot or pass from one place to another.” 1.27

“Yes, it must do so.”

“And that which revolves must rest upon a center and have other parts which turn about the center; 1.28

**Par:** Because indeed **That** which is **Moving**, will either **Move-in-place** or  
 138C οτι γε κινουμενον αν η φεροιτο η  
**change-from-place-to-place**; for these alone, are the types of **Motion**.  
 αλλοιοιτο : γαρ αυται μοναι κινησεις.

**Ari:** Yes. (ναι.)

**Par:** But if **The One** were to in any way **undergo alteration of-or-from-It-Self**,  
 δε το εν που αλλοιουμενον εαυτου  
 it is **Impossible** that **It** could still **Remain One**.  
 αδυνατον ετι εν.

**Ari:** Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **It** will indeed not **Be Moved** according to **alteration**.  
 αρα γε ουκ κινειται κατ' αλλοιωσιν.

**Ari:** It has come to **Light** that it will not. (φαινεται ου.)

**Par:** But will **It** then **Be Moved in-place**?  
 αλλ' αρα φερεσθαι τω;

**Ari:** Perhaps. (ισως.)

**Par:** But certainly, if **The One Is Moved in-place**, then **Self** will either  
 και μην ει το εν φεροιτο, αυτω αν ητοι  
**Be Carried around in-a-circle**, or **It will Change from-one-place-to-another**.  
 περιφεροιτο εν τω κυκλω η μεταλλαττοι εξ ετεραν χωραν ετερας.

**Ari:** Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

**Par:** So then on the one hand, **That** which is **Being Carried around in-a-circle**, must  
 ουκουν μεν περιφερομενον κυκλω αναγκη  
**Stand-firm** in **The Middle**, and **have** the other **Parts** of **It-Self Carried around The Middle**.  
 βεβηκεναι επι μεσου, και εχειν τα αλλα μερη εαυτου φερομενα το μεσον.

ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἄν: αὐταὶ γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις.  
 ναί.

ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἐν ἔτι εἶναι.

ἀδύνατον.

οὐκ ἄρα κατ' ἀλλοιώσιν γε κινεῖται.

οὐ φαίνεται.

ἀλλ' ἄρα τῷ φέρεσθαι;

ἴσως.

καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἐν, ἦτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας.)  
 ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκεῖναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα)  
 μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ:

[138d] but what possible way is there for that which has no center and parts to revolve upon a center?"

"There is none."

"But does it change its place by coming into one place at one time and another at another, and move in that way?" 1.29

"Yes, if it moves at all."

1.21 "Did we not find that it could not be *in anything*?" 1.30

"Yes."

"And is it not still more impossible for it to come into anything?" 1.31

"I do not understand why."

"If anything comes into anything, it must be not yet in it, while it is still coming in, nor still entirely outside of it, if it is already coming in, must it not?" 1.32

"It must."

But on the other hand, by what device would it **Be** fitting for **That** which **has** neither **Middle**

138D δε τις μηχανη προσηκει τουτο ω μητε μεσου  
nor **Parts** to ever **Be Carried in-a-circle** about **The Middle?**

μητε μερων ποτ' ενεχθηναι κυκλω επι του μεσου;

**Ari:** By none at all. (ουδεμια.)

**Par:** But surely then, by **changing** place, **It** would become situated elsewhere,

αλλα δη αμειβον χωραν γιγνεται αλλοτ' αλλοθι  
and thus **Be Moved?** (και ουτω κινειται;)

**Ari:** In this case it would most certainly indeed. (ειπερ γε δη.)

**Par:** Is it not the case then, that it has been declared **Impossible**, on the one hand,

ουκουν εφανη αδυνατον μεν  
for **Self**, to **Be, in-anything** at all (138B)?

αυτω ειναι εν τινι που;

**Ari:** Yes. (ναι.)

**Par:** Take notice then, is it not still **even more Impossible** that **It become in-anything?**

Αρ' ουν ετι αδυνατωτερον γιγνεσθαι ;

**Ari:** I do not grasp in what way, you mean this. (ουκ εννοω οπη.)

**Par:** If anything **comes to Be in-anything**, is it not **Necessary**

ει τι γιγνεται εν τω, ουκ αναγκη

that it should neither yet **Be in-that**, since it is still **coming to Be**;

μητε πω εν εκεινω ειναι ετι εγγιγνομενον,

nor yet can it **Be entirely out-of-that**, since then, it would already **have come to Be?**

μητ ετι πανταπασιν εξω εκεινου, επερ ηδη εγγιγνεται ;

**Ari:** Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

ὥ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι;  
οὐδεμία.

ἀλλὰ δὴ χῶραν ἀμείβον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται;

εἴπερ γε δὴ.

οὐκοῦν εἶναι μὲν πού ἐν τινὶ αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη;

ναί.

ἀρ' οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον;

οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπη.

εἰ ἔν τῳ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πω ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, μήτ' ἔτι ἔξω ἐκείνου  
παντάπασιν, εἴπερ ἤδη ἐγγίγνεται;

ἀνάγκη.

[138e] “Now if anything goes through this process, it can be only that which has parts; for a part of it could be already in the other, and the rest outside; but that which has no parts cannot by any possibility be entirely neither inside nor outside of anything at the same time.” 1.33

“True.”

“But is it not still more impossible for that which has no parts and is not a whole to come into anything, since it comes in neither in parts nor as a whole?” 1.34

“Clearly.”



**Par:** Then if this can take place in something else, then it **Must Only** happen to **That** which

138E αρα ει τουτο αν πεισεται τι αλλο, μονον πασχοι εκεινο ου  
has **Parts**; for **One Part** of **Self** will already **Be in-That Whole**, but **Another Part** will **Be**  
ειη μερη: γαρ το μεν αυτου αν ηδη εν εκεινω τι, δε το ειη

**At-Once, out-of-That Whole**, whereas **That** which **has No Parts Cannot** in any way **Be**  
αμα εξω δε το εχον μη μερη οιον ουχ που τροπω εσται

**Wholly-within**, nor again, **Wholly-without** anything, at the same time.

ολον μητε εντος μητε τε εξω ουδενι τινος αμα .

**Ari:** True. (αληθη.)

**Par:** But is it not even **much more Impossible** that **That** which **has** neither **Parts** nor

δε ου ετι πολυ αδυνατωτερον ου εισι μητε μερη μηθ'  
happens to **Be** a **Whole** to **become** in any way; since **It can neither exist**  
τυγχανει ον ολον εγγιγνεσθαι που, μητε

**in a state of becoming** according to **Parts**, nor according to a **Whole**?

εγγιγνομενον κατα μερη μητε κατα ολον;

**Ari:** So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἂν μόνον πάσχοι οὐ μέρη εἶη: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἂν τι αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐν  
ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἔξω εἴη ἅμα: τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἷόν τέ που ἔσται τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς  
εἶναί τινος μήτε ἔξω.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐδὲ μὴτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήτε ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν, οὐ πολὺ ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαί που, μήτε κατὰ μέρη  
μήτε κατὰ ὅλον ἐγγιγνόμενον;

φαίνεται.

|          |                                                                                                                             |      |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
|          | [139a] “Then it does not change its place by going anywhere or into anything, nor does it revolve in a circle, nor change.” | 1.35 |
|          | “Apparently not.”                                                                                                           |      |
| - motion | “Then the one is without any kind of motion.”                                                                               | 1.36 |
|          | “It is motionless.”                                                                                                         |      |
| 1.21     | “Furthermore, we say that it cannot be <i>in</i> anything.”                                                                 | 1.37 |
|          | “We do.”                                                                                                                    |      |
|          | “Then it is never in the same.”                                                                                             | 1.38 |
|          | “Why is that?”                                                                                                              |      |
|          | “Because it would then be in that with which the same is identical.”                                                        | 1.39 |
|          | “Certainly.”                                                                                                                |      |
| 1.21     | “But we saw that it cannot be either <i>in</i> itself or <i>in</i> anything else.”                                          | 1.40 |
|          | “No, it cannot.”                                                                                                            |      |
|          | “Then the one is never in the same.” [139b]                                                                                 | 1.41 |
|          | “Apparently not.”                                                                                                           |      |

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The One** *does not* **Change** place by **going** *Anywhere* and by **becoming**

**139A**      ἀρα            οὐτ' ἀλλάττει χώραν            ἰόν      ποι    και γιγνομενον  
*in-anything, nor* by **Being Carried around** *in-that* which **Is** Self,

ἐν τῷ,    οὐτ'    περιφερομενον            ἐν    τῷ    αὐτῷ  
nor by **undergoing** any **Alteration**. (οὐτε ἀλλοιουμενον.)

**Ari:** It does not seem likely. (οὐκ εοικεν.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The One** “Is” **Immoveable** according to every kind of **Motion**.

ἀρα            τὸ ἐν            ἀκίνητον            κατὰ    πᾶσαν    κίνησιν.

**Ari:** Immoveable. (ἀκίνητον.)

**Par:** But we have certainly indeed also said that it is **Impossible** for

ἀλλὰ            μὴν      γέ    και φαμεν            ἀδύνατον

**Self** to **Be** *in-anything* (**138b**).

αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐν τινι.

**Ari:** We have said so. (γὰρ φαμεν.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **It** cannot ever **Be** *in-That* which **Is** Self.

ἀρα            οὐδ' ποτε ἐστίν    ἐν    τῷ    αὐτῷ.

**Ari:** Why then? (τι δῆ;) )

**Par:** Because then **Self** would already **Be** *in-That*, in which **Self** **Is**.

ὅτι      τῷ    ἂν    ἤδη εἴη ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἐν ᾧ αὐτῷ ἐστίν.

**Ari:** Entirely so. (πάνυ μὲν οὖν.)

**Par:** But **Self** was also found to **Be** such that **It** **Can** neither **Be** *in-It-Self* nor *in-Another*.

ἀλλ' αὐτῷ ἦν τε            οἶον            οὐτε ἐνεῖναι ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐτε ἐν ἄλλῳ.

**Ari:** It cannot. (οὐ γὰρ οὖν.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The One** **Is** never *in* **The Self**.

**139B**      ἀρα      τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.

**Ari:** It does not seem likely. (οὐκ εοικεν.)

τῷ γιγνόμενον χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὐτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον οὐτε ἀλλοιούμενον.  
οὐκ ἔοικε.

κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα κίνησιν τὸ ἐν ἀκίνητον.

ἀκίνητον.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι γέ φαμεν ἐν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον.

φαμὲν γάρ.

οὐτ' ἄρα ποῖ ἰὸν καὶ ἔν οὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν.

τί δῆ;

ὅτι ἤδη ἂν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἴη ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἀλλ' οὐτε ἐν αὐτῷ οὐτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἶόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

|                          |                                                                                                            |                           |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| - <i>motionless rest</i> | “But that which is never in the same is neither motionless nor at rest.”                                   | 1.42                      |
|                          | “No, it cannot be so.”                                                                                     |                           |
|                          | “The one, then, it appears, is neither in motion nor at rest.”                                             | - <i>motion rest</i> 1.43 |
|                          | “No, apparently not.”                                                                                      |                           |
|                          | “Neither, surely, can it be the same with another or with itself; nor again other than itself or another.” | Theorem V 1.44            |
|                          | “Why not?”                                                                                                 |                           |
|                          | “If it were other than itself, it would be other than one and would not be one.”                           | 1.45                      |
|                          | “True.”                                                                                                    |                           |

**Par:** But most certainly, since **It** can never **Be in The Self**, then

ἀλλὰ γε μὴν το μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ

**It** will never **Be At-Rest/At-Peace** nor **Be Led** to **Stand still**.

οὐθ' ὃν ἡσυχίαν οὐθ' ἀγεί εἰστηκεν.

**Ari:** For it is not such that it can be. (γὰρ τε οὐ οἶον.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The One**, as it is likely, neither **Stands-still** nor **Is Moved**.

ἀρα το ἐν, ὡς εἰκεν, οὐθ' εἰστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.

**Ari:** It certainly does not appear to be the case.

γε οὐκ οὖν φαίνεται δι.

**Par:** **It** will certainly not indeed **Be The Same**, neither *with-The Other*,

μὴν Οὐδε γε εἶσται ταῦτον οὐθ' ἑτέρῳ

nor *with It-Self*, nor in turn will **It Be Other**, neither *from-The Self* nor *from-The Other*.

οὔτε ἑαυτῷ, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν εἰ ἑτέρον οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου.

**Ari:** In what way then? (πῇ δι;)

**Par:** For if on the one hand, by **Being** in any way **Other** than **It-Self**, then

μὲν ὃν ποῦ ἑτέρον ἑαυτοῦ

**It** would **Be Other** than **One**, and so **It** would **Be Not-One**.

ἐν εἰ ἑτέρον ἑνὸς καὶ ἐν εἰ οὐκ ἐν.

**Ari:** True. (ἀληθῆ.)

ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὃν οὔτε ἡσυχίαν ἀγεί οὐθ' εἰστηκεν.

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς εἰκεν, οὔτε εἰστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.

οὐκ οὖν δι φαίνεται γε.

οὐδὲ μὴν ταῦτόν γε οὔτε ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ εἶσται, οὐδ' αὖ ἑτέρον οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου ἂν εἴη.

πῇ δι;

ἑτέρον μὲν ποῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὃν ἐνὸς ἑτέρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἑν.

ἀληθῆ.

“And, surely, if it were the same with another, it would be that other, 1.46  
and would not be itself; [139c] therefore in this case also it would not  
be that which it is, namely one, but other than one.”

“Quite so.”

- same another  
- other itself

“Then it will not be the same as another, nor other than itself.” 1.47

“No.”

“But it will not be other than another, so long as it is one. For one 1.48  
cannot be other than anything; only other, and nothing else, can be  
other than another.”

“Right.”

“Then it will not be other by reason of being one, will it?” 1.49

“Certainly not.”

**Par:** And most certainly by **Being The Same** *with-The Other*, **It** would **Be That**;

139C και γε μὴν οὐ ταυτὸν ἑτέρῳ ἂν εἴη ἐκεῖνο,  
thus **It** could not **Be The Self**; so that neither in this way could **It** “**Be**” just as **It** “**Is**”, **One**,  
δ’ ἂν οὐκ εἴη αὐτό: ὥστε οὐδ’ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ὅπερ ἐστίν, ἐν,  
but **The Other One**. (ἀλλ’ ἑτερον ἐνός.)

**Ari:** It could not. (οὐ γὰρ οὐν.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, on the one hand, **It** will not **Be The Same** *with-The Other*, or  
ἀρα μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ ταυτὸν ἑτέρῳ ἢ

**Other** than **It-Self**.

ἑτερον ἑαυτοῦ.

**Ari:** For It could not. (γὰρ οὐ.)

**Par:** But on the other hand, surely **It** will not **Be Other** *from-Another*, so long as  
δε γὰρ ἂν οὐκ ἐστὶ ἑτερον ἑτέρου, ἕως

and in so far as **It** “**Is**” **One**. For it is not Proper for **The One** to **Be Other** *than anything*,  
ἢ ἐν. γὰρ οὐ προσήκει ἐνὶ εἶναι ἑτέρῳ τινός,

but **Simply Other**, but not in any way **another** *from-The Other*.

ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἑτέρου.

**Ari:** Properly so. (ὀρθῶς.)

**Par:** Thus, on the one hand, **It** will not **Be Other** since **It** “**Is**” **One**; or what do you think?

ἀρα μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ ἑτερον τῷ εἶναι ἐν: ἢ οἶει ;

**Ari:** Not in any way at all. (οὐ δητὰ.)

καὶ μὴν ταῦτόν γε ἑτέρῳ ὃν ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη, αὐτὸ δ’ οὐκ ἂν εἴη: ὥστε οὐδ’ ἂν οὕτως εἴη ὅπερ ἐστίν, ἐν,  
ἀλλ’ ἑτερον ἐνός.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ταῦτόν μὲν ἄρα ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἑτερον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἐστὶ.

οὐ γάρ.

ἑτερον δέ γε ἑτέρου οὐκ ἐστὶ, ἕως ἂν ᾗ ἐν: οὐ γὰρ ἐνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ  
ἑτέρου, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί.

ὀρθῶς.

τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἐν εἶναι οὐκ ἐστὶ ἑτερον: ἢ οἶει;

οὐ δητὰ.

“And if not for this reason, not by reason of itself; and if not by reason of itself, not itself; but since itself is not other at all, [139d] it will not be other than anything.” 1.50

“Right.”

“And yet one will not be the same with itself.” 1.51

“Why not?”

“The nature of one is surely not the same as that of the same.” 1.52

“Why?”

“Because when a thing becomes the same as anything, it does not thereby become one.” 1.53

“But why not?”

“That which becomes the same as many, becomes necessarily many, not one.” 1.54

“True.”

“But if the one and the same were identical, whenever anything became the same it would always become one, and when it became one, the same.” 1.55

“Certainly.”



**Par:** But surely if not by reason of this, then **It** will not **Be Other** *from-It-Self*; but if **Self** is  
 139D αλλα μην ει μη τουτω, ουχ εσται εαυτω: δε ει αυτο  
 not at all **Other** *from-Self*, then by **Being** in no way **Other**, **Self** will **Be Other** *than-Nothing*.  
 ουδε μη αυτω: δε ον μηδαμη ετερον αυτο εσται ετερον ουδενος.

**Ari:** Rightly so. (ορθως.)

**Par:** Nor yet will **It Be The Same** *with-It Self*.  
 ουδε μην εσται ταυτον εαυτω.

**Ari:** Why not then? (πως ου δ';)

**Par:** **For surely** **The Nature** of **The One** is not *in the same way as* **Her Self** and **The Same**.  
 δηπου φυσις του ενος ουχ ηπερ αυτη και του ταυτου.

**Ari:** Why then? (τι δη;)

**Par:** Since whenever anything **Comes to Be The Same** *with-anything* it does not **Become One**.  
 οτι επειδαν τι γηνεται ταυτον τω ουκ γινεται εν.

**Ari:** But what then indeed? (αλλα τι μην;)

**Par:** **That** which **Becomes The Same** *with-The Many*, **Must Come to Be Many**, but not **One**.  
 γενομενον ταυτον τοις πολλοις αναγκη γινεσθαι πολλα, αλλ' ουχ εν.

**Ari:** True. (αληθη.)

**Par:** But if **The One** and **The Same Differ** in no way, then when anything **Becomes The Same**  
 αλλ' ει το εν και το ταυτον διαφερει μηδαμη, οποτε τι εγιγνετο ταυτον,  
 it will always **Become One**, and when it **Becomes One**, it will **Be The Same**.

αν αι εγιγνετο εν, και οποτε εν, ταυτον.

**Ari:** Entirely so indeed. (πανυ γε.)

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό: αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὄν ἕτερον οὐδενός ἔσται ἕτερον.

ὀρθῶς.

οὐδὲ μὴν ταυτόν γε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

οὐχ ἥπερ τοῦ ἐνός φύσις, αὐτὴ δὴπου καὶ τοῦ ταυτοῦ.

τί δή;

ὅτι οὐκ, ἐπειδὴν ταυτόν γένηταί τῷ τι, ἐν γίγνεται.

ἀλλὰ τί μὴν;

τοῖς πολλοῖς ταυτόν γενόμενον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν.

ἀληθῆ.

ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ταυτόν μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὅποτε τι ταυτόν ἐγίγνετο, αἰεὶ ἂν ἐν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὅποτε ἓν, ταυτόν.

πάνυ γε.

|                                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                     |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| - other other<br>- same itself | <p>“Then if the one is the same with itself, [139e] it will not be one with itself; and thus, being one, it will not be one; this, however, is impossible; it is therefore impossible for one to be either the other of other or the same with itself.”</p> <p>“Impossible.”</p> | 1.56                                |
|                                | <p>“Thus the one cannot be either other or the same to itself or another.”</p> <p>“No, it cannot.”</p>                                                                                                                                                                           | - other same<br>- itself other 1.57 |
|                                | <p>“And again it will not be like or unlike anything, either itself or another.”</p> <p>“Why not?”</p>                                                                                                                                                                           | Theorem VI 1.58                     |
|                                | <p>“Because the like is that which is affected in the same way.”</p> <p>“Yes.”</p>                                                                                                                                                                                               | 1.59                                |
| 1.52 1.55                      | <p>“But we saw that the <i>same</i> was of a nature distinct from that of the one.”</p> <p>“Yes, so we did.”</p>                                                                                                                                                                 | 1.60                                |

**Par:** Accordingly then, if **The One Is to Be The Same with-It-Self**, then **It will Be**,

139E            αρα            ει το εν εσται ταυτον            εαυτω,            εσται

**That** which is **Not-One with-It-Self**. And in this way **One Being** will **Be Not-One**;

ουχ εν            εαυτω. και            ουτω            εν ον            εσται            ουχ εν:

but certainly, this is indeed **Impossible**. Accordingly then, it is also **Impossible** for **The One**

αλλα μην            τουτο γε αδυνατον:            αρα            και            αδυνατον            τω ενι

to **Be** either, **Other from-The Other** or **The Same with-It-Self**.

ειναι η            ετερον            ετερου η            ταυτον            εαυτω.

**Ari:** Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

**Par:** So in this way **The One** will not **Be Other** or **The Same with-Self** nor **with- Other**.

δη            ουτω το εν αν γε ουτ' ειη ετερον η            ταυτον            αυτω ουτ' αν ετερω.

**Ari:** For thus it could not.

γαρ ουν ου.

**Par:** Surely then, **The One** will neither **Be Like** nor **Unlike anything**,

μην            Ουδε εσται ομοιον ουδ' ανομοιον τινι

neither **in relation to It-Self** nor **in relation to The Other**.

ουθ'            εαυτω ουθ'            ετερω.

**Ari:** Why not then. (τι δη;)

**Par:** Because **The Like Is That** which **Is affected** in some way by **The Same**.

οτι            ομοιον            πεπονθος            που            το ταυτον.

**Ari:** Yes. (ναι.)

**Par:** But it was shown that **The Nature of The Same Is** indeed **Separate** from **The One**.

δε            εφανε            την φυσιν το ταυτον            γε            χωρις            του ενος.

**Ari:** It was so shown. (γαρ εφανε.)

ει ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ταῦτόν ἐσται, οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται: καὶ οὕτω ἐν ὃν οὐχ ἐν ἔσται. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον: ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ τῷ ἐνὶ ἧ ἑτέρου ἕτερον εἶναι ἢ ἑαυτῷ ταῦτόν.

ἀδύνατον.

οὕτω δὴ ἕτερόν γε ἢ ταῦτόν τὸ ἐν οὗτ' ἂν αὐτῷ οὗτ' ἂν ἐτέρῳ εἴη.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐδὲ μὴν ὅμοιον τινι ἔσται οὐδ' ἀνόμοιον οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἐτέρῳ.

τί δή;

ὅτι τὸ ταῦτόν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον.

ναί.

τοῦ δέ γε ἑνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταῦτόν.

ἐφάνη γάρ.

[140a] “But if the one were affected in any way apart from being one, 1.61  
it would be so affected as to be more than one, and that is impossible.”

“Yes.”

“Then the one cannot possibly be affected in the same way as 1.62  
another or as itself.”

“Evidently not.”

*- like another itself* “Then it cannot be like another or itself.” 1.63

“No, so it appears.”

“Nor can the one be so affected as to be other; for in that case it 1.64  
would be so affected as to be more than one.”

“Yes, it would be more.”

**Par:** But certainly, if **The One would experience** anything **Apart** from **Being One**,

**140A** ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τὸ ἐν πέπονθε τι χωρὶς τοῦ εἶναι ἐν, then **It would experience** to **Be More** than **One**, but this, is **Impossible**.

ἐν ἂν πέπονθοι εἶναι πλείω ἢ ἐν, δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον.

**Ari:** Yes. (ναί.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, it is not in any way possible for **The One to experience**

ἀρα ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς τὸ ἐν πέπονθος

**Being The Same**; neither *with-Another* nor *with-It-Self*.

εἶναι ταῦτον, οὔτε ἄλλω οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ.

**Ari:** It has not come to **Light**. (οὐ φαίνεται.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, it **Is Not Possible** for **Self** to be **Like**, neither *to-Another* nor *to-It-Self*.

ἀρα οὐδὲ δυνατόν αὐτὸ εἶναι ὁμοῖον οὔτε ἄλλω οὐθ' ἑαυτῷ.

**Ari:** It does not seem likely. (οὐκ εἰκεν.)

**Par:** Most certainly then, neither can **The One experience Being Other**;

γε μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν πέπονθεν εἶναι ἕτερον:

for in this way, **It** would also **experience** to **Be More** than **One**.

γὰρ οὕτω ἂν καὶ πέπονθοι εἶναι πλείω ἢ ἐν.

**Ari:** For then It would be more. (γὰρ πλείω.)

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἕν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. ναί.

οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταῦτὸν πέπονθός εἶναι τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἄλλω οὔτε ἑαυτῷ. οὐ φαίνεται.

οὐδὲ ὁμοῖον ἄρα δυνατόν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλω οὔτε ἑαυτῷ. οὐκ εἰκεν.

οὐδὲ μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἕν: καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἕν. πλείω γάρ.

“But that which is affected in a way other than itself or other,  
[140b] would be unlike itself or other, if that which is affected in the  
same way is like.” 1.65

“Right.”

- *unlike*  
- *itself other*

“But the one, as it appears, being never affected in a way other than  
itself or other, is never unlike either itself or other.” 1.66

“Evidently not.”

“Then the one will be neither like nor unlike either other or itself.” 1.67

- *like unlike*  
- *other itself*

“So it seems.”

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“Since, then, it is of such a nature, it can be neither equal nor  
unequal to itself or other.” 1.68

Theorem VII

“Why not?”

“If it is equal, it is of the same measures as that to which it is  
equal.” 1.69

“Yes.”

**Par:** Most certainly then that which **undergoes Being Other than-It-Self** or **Another**, will **Be**  
 140B μὴν γε το πεπονθος ετερον η εαυτου η αλλου αν ειη  
**Unlike** either **It-Self** or **Another**, if indeed **That** which **experiences The Same Is Like**.  
 ανομοιον η εαυτω η αλλω, ειπερ το πεπονθος ταυτον ομοιον.

**Ari:** Rightly so. (ορθως.)

**Par:** But **The One**, as it is indeed likely, *by not experiencing in any way*  
 δε το εν , ως γε εοικεν, ου— πεπονθος —δαμως

**Being Other**, “Is” neither **Unlike It-Self** nor **The Other**.

ετερον εστιν ουθ’ ανομοιον εαυτω ουθ’ ετερω.

**Ari:** For thus it cannot. (γαρ ουν ου.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The One** will neither **Be Like** nor **Unlike**,  
 αρα το εν αν ουτε ειη ομοιον ουτε ανομοιον

neither **to-The Other** nor **to-It-Self**.

ουθ’ ετερω ουτε εαυτω.

**Ari:** It has not come to **Light**. (ου φαινεται.)

**Par:** And most certainly then, by “Being” **Such**, **It** will neither **Be Equal** nor **Unequal**,  
 Και γε μὴν ον τοιουτον ουτε εσται ισον ουτε ανισον

neither **to-It-Self** nor **to-Another**. (ουτε εαυτω ουτε αλλω.)

**Ari:** In what way? (πη;)

**Par:** For on the one hand, if **It** were **Equal**, **It** would **Be** of **The Same/Self Measures**  
 μεν η ισον αν εσται των αυτων μετρων

*with-that-to-which* **It Is Being Equal**.

εκαινω ω ον ισον.

**Ari:** Yes. (ναι.)

τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταῦτον  
 πεπονθὸς ὁμοιον.

ὀρθῶς.

τὸ δέ γε ἓν, ὥς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιον ἐστιν οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἑτέρῳ.

οὐ γὰρ οὐδν.

οὔτε ἄρα ὁμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὔθ’ ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν.

οὐ φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὄν οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.

πῇ;

ἴσον μὲν ὄν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν ἴσον ᾖ.

ναί.

“And if it is greater or less than things [140c] with which it is commensurate, it will have more measures than the things which are less and less measures than the things which are greater.” 1.70

“Yes.”

“And in the case of things with which it is not commensurate, it will have smaller measures than some and greater measures than others.” 1.71

“Of course.”

“Is it not impossible for that which does not participate in sameness to have either the same measures or anything else the same?” 1.72

“Impossible.”

*- equal* “Then not having the same measures, it cannot be equal either to itself or to anything else.” 1.73

“No, apparently not.”



**Par:** But on the other hand, by **Being** in some way **Greater** or **Lesser** than *that-to-which*

140C           δε                           ον           που           μειζον η ελαττον           μεν           οις

**It Is Commensurate**, **It** will **have more Measures** than the **lesser**, but **fewer** than the **greater**.

αν    ξυμμετρον,   μεν   εξει   πλειω   μετρα   των   ελαττονων,   δε   ελαττω   των   μειζονων.

**Ari:** Yes. (ναί.)

**Par:** Thus to *those-to-which* **It** would *not* be **Commensurable**, on the one hand, **It** will **have**

          δ'                   οις                   αν   μη           συμμετρον,           μεν                   εσται

**smaller Measures** than some, but on the other hand, **greater Measures** than others.

σμικροτερων   των                           δε                   μειζονων μετρων   των.

**Ari:** How could it not. (πως γαρ ου;)

**Par:** Is it not **Impossible** then, for **That** which does *not* **Participate** of **The Self**

          ουκουν αδυνατον                           το                   μη   μετεχον   του αυτου

to either **Be** of **The Same/Self Measures**, or *of anything else* of **The Same/Selves**?

          η   ειναι   των αυτων μετρων           η   αλλων ωντινωνουν   των αυτων;

**Ari:** It is impossible. (αδυνατον.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, on the one hand, **It** will neither **Be Equal to-It-Self**,

          αρα                           μεν                           αν ουτ' ειη ισον   εαυτω

nor **to-Another**, by not **Being** of **The Same/Self Measures**.

ουτε   αλλω,   μη   ον                   των αυτων μετρων.

**Ari:** It does indeed not appear to be so. (ουκουν γε φαιναται.)

μείζον δέ που ἢ ἔλαττον ὄν, οἷς μὲν ἂν σύμμετρον ᾖ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω μέτρα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ  
μειζόνων ἐλάττω.

ναί.

οἷς δ' ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται.

πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὀντινωνοδν τῶν αὐτῶν;  
ἀδύνατον.

ἴσον μὲν ἄρα οὔτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὄν.

οὐκουν φαίνεται γε.

“But whether it have more measures or less, [140d] it will have as many parts as measures and thus one will be no longer one, but will be as many as are its measures.” 1.74

“Right.”

1.73 “But if it were of one measure, it would be equal to the measure; but we have seen that it cannot be *equal* to anything.” 1.75

“Yes, so we have.”

“Then it will partake neither of one measure, nor of many, nor of few; nor will it partake at all of the same, nor will it ever, apparently, be equal to itself or to anything else; nor will it be greater or less than itself or another.” - *equal greater less*  
*itself other* 1.76

“Perfectly true.”

**Par:** But most certainly then, by **Being** of **more** or **fewer Measures It** will also **Be**  
 ἀλλὰ γε μὴν ὄν πλεονων ἢ ελαττονων μετρων, ἀν καὶ εἴη  
 of as many **Parts** as there are **Measures**; and in this way it will again, no longer “**Be**” **One**,  
 140D τοσαυτων μερων, ὁσωνπερ μετρων, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοὺς οὐκετι ἐστὶ ἐν,  
 but **Be as many as there are also Measures**.  
 ἀλλὰ τοσαυτὰ ὅσαπερ καὶ τὰ μέτρα.

**Ari:** Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς.)

**Par:** But if indeed **It** would **Be** of **One Measure**, **It** would **Become Equal to That Measure**.  
 δὲ εἰ γε εἴη ἑνὸς μετρου, ἀν γίγνοιτο ἴσον τῷ μετρῷ:

But This has come to **Light** that it is **Impossible**; that **The Self Be Equal to anything**.  
 δὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἀδύνατον, αὐτὸ εἶναι ἴσον τῷ.

**Ari:** It has so come to **Light**. (γὰρ ἐφάνη.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **It** will neither **Participate** of **One Measure**, nor of **Many**, nor of a  
 ἀρὰ οὔτε μετέχον ἑνὸς μετρου οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε  
 few; for **That which in no way Participates** of **The Self**, **Can Ever Be Equal**, as it is likely,  
 ὀλίγων τοῦ οὔτε παρὰπαν μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ποτε ἐστὶ ἴσον, ὥς εἰκεν,  
*to-It-Self* nor *to-Another*, nor in turn **Be greater** or **lesser than-It-Self** nor *than-The Other*.  
 ἐαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ: οὐδ’ αὐτοὺς μείζον οὐδὲ ἐλαττον οὔτε ἐαυτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου.

**Ari:** It is thus so in every way.

μὲν οὖν οὕτω παντάπασιν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν πλεονόντων γε μέτρων ὃν ἢ ἐλαττόνων, ὁσωνπερ μέτρων, τοσούτων καὶ μερῶν ἂν εἴη: καὶ οὕτω  
 αὐτὸ οὐκέτι ἐν ἔσται ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ καὶ τὰ μέτρα.

ὀρθῶς.

εἰ δὲ γε ἑνὸς μετρου εἴη, ἴσον ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ μετρῷ: τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη, ἴσον τῷ αὐτὸ εἶναι.  
 ἐφάνη γάρ.

οὔτε ἄρα ἑνὸς μετρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων, οὔτε τὸ παρὰπαν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε  
 ἐαυτῷ ποτε, ὥς εἰκεν, ἔσται ἴσον οὔτε ἄλλῳ: οὔτε αὐτοὺς μείζον οὐδὲ ἐλαττον οὔτε ἐαυτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου.  
 παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν οὕτω.

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|           |                                                                                                                                                                                           |              |      |
|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------|
|           | [140e] “Well, does anyone believe that the one can be older or younger or of the same age?”                                                                                               | Theorem VIII | 1.77 |
|           | “Why not?”                                                                                                                                                                                |              |      |
| 1.62 1.76 | “Because if it has the same age as itself or as anything else, it will partake of equality and likeness of time, and we said the one had no part in <i>likeness</i> or <i>equality</i> .” |              | 1.78 |
|           | “Yes, we said that.”                                                                                                                                                                      |              |      |
| 1.66 1.76 | “And we said also that it does not partake of <i>unlikeness</i> or <i>inequality</i> .”                                                                                                   |              | 1.79 |
|           | “Certainly.”                                                                                                                                                                              |              |      |

**Parmenides:** 12 What next then? Do you believe that **The One Has** to **Possess The Power**  
140E Τι δε; δοκει το εν εχειν δυνατον

to **Be Older** or **Younger** or of **The Self/Same Age**?

ειναι τω πρεσβυτερον η νεωτερον η την αυτην ηλικιαν;

**Aristotle:** Is there any reason why not? (δη γαρ τι ου;)

**Par:** Since on the one hand, if **It** somehow **Has The Self/Same Age** as **Self**, or as **Another**,  
οτι μεν που εχον την αυτην ηλικιαν η αυτω, η αλλω

then, **It** will **Participate** of the **Equality** and **Likeness** of **Time**; of which we said,  
μεθεξει ισοτητος και ομοιοτητος χρονου, ων ελεγομεν

**The One**, did not **Participate**; that is, of neither **Likeness** nor **Equality**.

τω ενι ου μετειναι ουθ' ομοιοτητος ουτε ισοτητος.

**Ari:** Yes, we said that. (ουν γαρ ελεγομεν.)

**Par:** We also said, that **It** certainly does not **Participate** of **Unlikeness** nor **Inequality**.

και ελεγομεν και μην και οτι τουτο ου μετεχει ανομοιοτητος τε και ανισοτητος.

**Ari:** By all means. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

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τί δέ; πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἐν δοκεῖ τῷ δυνατὸν εἶναι;

τί δὴ γάρ οὐ;

ὅτι που ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος χρόνου καὶ ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὧν ἐλέγομεν  
οὐ μετεῖναι τῷ ἐνί, οὔτε ὁμοιότητος οὔτε ἰσότητος.

ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὐν.

καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιότητος τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν.

πάνυ μὲν οὐν.

“How, then, being of such a nature, [141a] can it be either younger or older or of the same age as anything?” 1.80

“In no way.”

“Then the one cannot be younger or older or of the same age as anything.” *- younger older*  
*- same age* 1.81

“No, evidently not.”

“And can the one exist in time at all, if it is of such a nature? Must it not, if it exists in time, always be growing older than itself?” 1.82

“It must.”

“And the older is always older than something younger?” 1.83

“Certainly.”

**Par:** How then, by “**Being**” of **Such a Nature**, can **It** be either **Older**

**141A** πὼς οὖν εἶναι οὐκ ἔστιν οἷον εἶναι ἢ πρεσβύτερον  
or **Younger** or of **The Self/Same Age** as such a thing that **has** to **Be**?  
ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν τῷ τοιοῦτον ἔχειν;

**Ari:** In no way, whatsoever! (οὐδαμῶς.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The One**, could not indeed **Be Younger** nor **Older**

ἀρ’ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔστιν νεώτερον οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον  
nor **have** to **Be** of **The Self/Same Age** as **Self** nor as **Another**.  
οὐδὲ ἔχον τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ .

**Ari:** It has not come to **Light**. (οὐ φαίνεται.)

**Par:** Take notice then, **Neither Can** it **Be Possible** for **The One** to **Be** in **Time, at all**,

ἀρ’ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἔστιν δύναται τὸ εἶναι ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν  
if **It** “**Must Be Such as This**”? For if **Some Entity** were to **Be** in **Time**, then in that case,  
εἰ εἴη τοιοῦτον; εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐν χρόνῳ

**Must** not **Self, Necessarily**, for **All Time Be growing Older** than **Self**.

οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ γίνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον αὐτοῦ;

**Ari:** Necessarily. (ἀνάγκη.)

**Par:** Is it not so then, that the **Older Is** indeed **Always growing Older** than the **Younger**?

οὐκοῦν τὸ πρεσβύτερον αἰεὶ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον;

**Ari:** Certainly. What next? (μὴν τις;)

πὼς οὖν οἷόν τε ἔστιν τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τῷ τοιοῦτον ὄν;  
οὐδαμῶς.

οὐκ ἄρα ἂν εἴη νεώτερόν γε οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον τὸ ἐν οὔτε αὐτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ.  
οὐ φαίνεται.

ἀρ’ οὐκ οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν δύναται ἂν εἶναι τὸ ἐν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰάν τι ἢ ἐν  
χρόνῳ, αἰεὶ αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίνεσθαι;

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν τὸ γε πρεσβύτερον αἰεὶ νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον;

τί μὴν;

“Then that which grows older than itself grows at the same time  
*grows older younger* younger than itself, if it is to have something than which it grows  
 older.” 1.84

“What do you mean?” [141b]

“This is what I mean: A thing which is different from another does  
 not have to become different from that which is already different,  
 but it must be different from that which is already different, it must  
 have become different from that which has become so, it will have to  
 be different from that which will be so, but from that which is  
 becoming different it cannot have become, nor can it be going to be,  
 nor can it already be different: it must become different, and that is  
 all.” 1.85

“There is no denying that.”



**Par:** Accordingly then, **That** which **Is growing Older** than **It Self**, **Is** also at **The Same Time**

141B ἄρα το γιγνομενον πρεσβυτερον εαυτου και αμα  
growing Younger than **It Self**, if indeed **It Must Possess That** which **It grows Older Than**.  
γιγνεται νεωτερον εαυτου, ειπερ μελλει εχειν οτου γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον.

**Aristotle:** What do you mean? (πως λεγεις.)

**Parmenides:** The following; *it is in no way necessary* for **One** which **Is Different** from **another**

ωδε: ουδεν δει ετερον διαφορον ετερου  
to **Become Different**, by **Being already Different**. Thus on the one hand, by **Being already**  
γιγνεσθαι οντος ηδη διαφορου, αλλα μεν οντος ηδη

**Different** from *that which Is already Different*. Whereas, on the other hand, it will *have*

του ειναι ηδη, δε γε—  
**Become Different** from that which *has Become Different*, and furthermore it **Is going to Be**  
—γονεναι του γεγονοτος δε μελλοντος

**Different** from that which *will come to Be Different*; whereas that which **Is in the process of**

**Coming to Be Different**, can neither **have Become Different**, nor **Be about to Be Different**,  
—νομενου ουτε γεγονεναι ουτε μελλειν

nor **Be at all Different**, but it must simply **Come to Be Different**, and not **Be in another way**.

ουτε ειναι πω διαφορον, αλλα γιγνεσθαι ουκ ειναι αλλως.

**Ari:** Necessarily so. (αναγκη γαρ.)

τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνηται.

πῶς λέγεις;

ὦδε: διάφορον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἤδη ὄντος διαφόρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἤδη ὄντος ἤδη εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος μέλλειν, τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε μέλλειν οὔτε εἶναι πῶ διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἶναι.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ δὴ.

[141c] “But surely the notion 'older' is a difference with respect to the younger and to nothing else.” 1.86

“Yes, so it is.”

“But that which is becoming older than itself must at the same time be becoming younger than itself.” 1.87

“So it appears.”

“But surely it cannot become either for a longer or for a shorter time than itself; it must become and be and be about to be for an equal time with itself.” 1.88

“That also is inevitable.”

**Par:** But certainly, **That** which Is **Older Is** simply a **Difference/Distinction**

141C ἀλλὰ μὴν το πρεσβύτερον ἐστὶ γε διαφορότης  
in relation to the **Younger**, and to nothing else.  
νεώτερου καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

**Ari:** So it is. (γὰρ ἐστὶ.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **That** which **Is Becoming Older** than **It-Self**, **Must Necessarily**,

ἀρα το γιγνομενον πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάγκη  
at the same time, also **Become Younger** than **It-Self**.  
ἀμὰ καὶ γίγνεσθαι νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ.

**Ari:** It seems likely. (εἰκοθεν.)

**Par:** But surely, neither can **It** also **Come to Be** in **more** nor **less Time** than **It-Self**; whereas

ἀλλὰ μὴν μήτε καὶ γίγνεσθαι πλείω μῆτ' ἐλάττω χρόνον ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ  
**It Must Be** and **Become** and **have Become** and **Be about to Be** for an **Equal Time** with **It-**  
εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι τὸν ἴσον χρόνον ἑαυτῷ.

**Ari:** For this is also necessarily the case.

γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἀνάγκη οὖν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρεσβύτερον διαφορότης νεωτέρου ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

ἔστι γάρ.

τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἅμᾳ ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι.

ἔοικεν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλείω ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι χρόνον μήτε ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον καὶ γίγνεσθαι  
ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα.

|             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |      |
|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| <i>time</i> | <p>“Apparently, then, it is inevitable that everything which exists in time and partakes of time [141d] is of the same age as itself and is also at the same time becoming older and younger than itself.”</p> <p>“I see no escape from that.”</p> | 1.89 |
| 1.81        | <p>“But the one had nothing to do with such <i>affections</i>.”</p> <p>“No, it had not.”</p>                                                                                                                                                       | 1.90 |
|             | <p>“It has nothing to do with time, and does not exist in time.”</p> <p>“No, that is the result of the argument.”</p>                                                                                                                              | 1.91 |
|             | <p>“Well, and do not the words 'was,' 'has become,' and 'was becoming' appear to denote participation in past time?”</p> <p>“Certainly.”</p>                                                                                                       | 1.92 |

**Par:** Accordingly then, it **Is Necessary**, as it is **Reasonable**, that **Each Self** that **Exists** in **Time**  
 141D      ἀρα            ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη, ὡς    εἰσὶν, ὅσα ἑκάστων αὐτοῦ    ἐστὶ ἐν χρόνῳ  
 and which indeed **Participates** of such an **Existence**, **has** to **Be** of **The Self/Same Age**  
           καὶ            γε        μετέχει        τοῦ τοιούτου,    ἔχειν        τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν  
 as **Self**, and *at the same time*, also **comes to Be Older** and **Younger** than **Self**.  
 αὐτῷ τε            ἀμὰ            καὶ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον αὐτοῦ.

**Ari:** That is likely to be the case. (κινδυνεύει.)

**Par:** But surely, **The One**, **Cannot** indeed, **Participate** of such **experiences**.  
           ἀλλὰ μὴν    τῷ ἐνὶ        οὐδὲν    γε        μετὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων.

**Ari:** It cannot so participate.  
           οὐ γὰρ μετὴν.

**Par:** Accordingly then, **Self** does not **Participate** in **Time**, nor does **It Exist** in any **Time**.  
           ἀρα            αὐτῷ        οὐδὲ    μετέστιν χρόνῳ,    οὐδ'    ἐστὶν ἐν τινὶ χρόνῳ.

**Ari:** Surely then, such cannot be the case, as **The Logos** surely proves.  
           δὴ                    οὐκ οὖν                    ὡς    ὁ λόγος    γε    αἰρεῖ.

**Par:** What then? Does it appear that “**Was**” and “**has Become**” and “**Was Becoming**”,  
           Τί οὖν;        δοκεῖ                    τὸ ἦν καὶ    τὸ γέγονε    καὶ    τὸ ἐγίγνετο  
 signify the **Participation** of **Time** at some period that **has come to Be** in **The Past**?  
           σημαίνειν    μέθεξιν τοῦ χρόνου        ποτὲ                    γεγονότος                    ;

**Ari:** Indeed it does.  
           μάλ᾽ αὖ καί.

ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς εἰσὶν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἑκάστων αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν  
 τε αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν καὶ πρεσβύτερόν τε αὐτοῦ ἅμᾳ καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι.  
 κινδυνεύει.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τῷ γε ἐνὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετὴν.

οὐ γὰρ μετὴν.

οὐδὲ ἄρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἐν τινὶ χρόνῳ.

οὐκ οὖν δὴ, ὡς γε ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ.

τί οὖν; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ ἐγίγνετο οὐ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονότος;  
 καὶ μάλα.

[141e] “And 'will be,' 'will become,' and 'will be made to become,' in future time?” 1.93

“Yes.”

“And 'is' and 'is becoming' in the present?” 1.94

“Certainly.”

“Then if the one has no participation in time whatsoever, it neither has become nor became nor was in the past, it has neither become nor is it becoming nor is it in the present, and it will neither become nor be made to become nor will it be in the future.” 1.95

- *become be*  
- *past present*  
- *future*

“Very true.”

**Par:** What then? Does “**Will Be**” and “**Will come to Be**” and “**Will Be coming to Be**”,

141E τι δε; το εσται και το γενησεται και το γενηθησεται  
not signify **Time** hereafter, at some period in **The Future**?

ου του επειτα που μελλοντος;

**Ari:** Yes. (ναι.)

**Par:** But surely then, does not **That** which “**Is**” and **That** which “**Is Becoming**” signify

δε δη ου το εστι και το γιγνεται

**Time** which **Is Now, Present**?

του νυν παροντος;

**Ari:** By all means. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, if **The One**, does not **Ever Participate** of **Time** in any way at all,

αρα ει το εν μηδενος ποτε μετεχει χρονου μηδαμη

then neither has **It ever come to Be**, nor **was coming to Be**, nor **was**,

ουτε γεγονεν ουτε γιγνεται ουτ’ ην

neither **has It ever come to Be**, nor **Become**, nor **Is** in **The Now**,

ουτε γεγονεν ουτε γιγνεται ουτ’ εστιν νυν,

neither **will It ever come to Be**, nor **will have come to Be**, nor **will It ever Be**.

ουτ’ γενησεται ουτε γενηθησεται ουτ’ επειτα εσται.

**Ari:** Most True! (αληθεστατα.)

τί δέ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσεται οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτα τοῦ μέλλοντος;

ναί.

τὸ δὲ διὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἐν μηδαμῇ μηδενὸς μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονεν οὔτ’ ἐγίγνετο οὔτ’ ἦν ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἔστιν, οὔτ’ ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτε ἔσται.

ἀληθέστατα.

|                |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                             |
|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                | <p>“Can it then partake of being in any other way than in the past,<br/>present, or future?”</p> <p>“It cannot.”</p>                                                                                                                        | 1.96                        |
| - <i>share</i> | <p>“Then the one has no share in being at all.”</p> <p>“Apparently not.”</p>                                                                                                                                                                | 1.97                        |
| <i>is not</i>  | <p>“Then the one is not at all.”</p> <p>“Evidently not.”</p>                                                                                                                                                                                | 1.98                        |
|                | <p>“Then it has no being even so as to be one, for if it were one, it would<br/>be and would partake of being; but apparently one neither is nor is<br/>one, if this argument is to be trusted.” [142a]</p> <p>“That seems to be true.”</p> | <p>- <i>is one</i> 1.99</p> |



**Par:** Therefore, *is it possible* for **It** to **Participate** of **Ousia**,

οὐν εἰσιν ἂν μετὰσχοι οὐσίας

in any other way other than according to any one of those ways?

τι ἄλλως ὅπως ἢ κατὰ τι τούτων;

**Ari:** It is not possible. (εἰσιν οὐκ.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The One** *in no way whatsoever* **Participates** of **Ousia**.

ἀρα τὸ ἐν οὐδαμῶς, μετέχει οὐσίας.

**Ari:** It is not likely. (οὐκ εἰκεν.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The One**, *in no way whatsoever*, **Is**.

ἀρα τὸ ἐν οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶ.

**Ari:** It has not come to **Light**. (οὐ φαίνεται.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, neither **Is It**, in such a way, so as “**To Be**” **One**,

ἀρα οὐδ’ ἐστὶν οὕτως ὥστε εἶναι ἐν

for **It** would already **Be**, by **Being** and by **Participating** of **Ousia**; whereas **According**

γὰρ ἂν ἤδη εἴη ὃν καὶ μετέχον οὐσίας: ἀλλ’ ὥς

to **Reason**, **The One Is** neither **One** nor **Is**, if one **Must Trust** in such a **Logos**.

εἰκεν τὸ ἐν εἶναι οὔτε ἐν οὔτε ἐστὶν, εἰ δεῖ πιστεῦειν τοιῷδε λόγῳ.

**Ari:** I dare say so. (κινδυνεύει.)

ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἂν τι μετὰσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι;

οὐκ ἔστιν.

οὐδαμῶς ἄρα τὸ ἐν οὐσίας μετέχει.

οὐκ εἰκεν.

οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἐν.

οὐ φαίνεται.

οὐδ’ ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἐν εἶναι: εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὃν καὶ οὐσίας μετέχον: ἀλλ’ ὥς εἰκεν, τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν εἶναι οὔτε ἐστὶν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεῦειν.

κινδυνεύει.

*belonging*

“But can that which does not exist have anything pertaining or  
belonging to it?”

1.100

“Of course not.”

“Then the one has no name, nor is there any description or  
knowledge or perception or opinion of it.”

- *name description*  
- *knowledge*  
- *perception*  
- *opinion*

1.101

“Evidently not.”

“And it is neither named nor described nor thought of nor known,  
nor does any existing thing perceive it.”

- *named described*  
- *thought known*  
- *perceive it*

1.102

“Apparently not.”

“Is it possible that all this is true about the one ?”

1.103

“I do not think so.”

Ω

**Par:** But, could any *non-Being Be of Self*, of *The One* which *Is Not*,  
 142A δε, αν τι μη οντι ειη αυτου, ο εστι μη,  
 or could any *non-Being Belong to This Self*? (Not According to 137D: *Pierre Grimes*  
 η τω τουτω αυτω; “*The Self must Be One*”)

**Ari:** And how could it?  
 και πως;

**Par:** Accordingly then, there *Is* neither *Name*, nor *Logos*, nor any *Knowledge*  
 αρα εστιν ουδ’ ονομα ουδε λογος ουδε τις επιστημη  
 nor perception, nor opinion, that can be *attributed to Self*.  
 ουδε αισθησις ουδε δοχα αυτω.

**Ari:** It has not come to *Light*.  
 ου φαινεται.

**Par:** Accordingly then, neither can *It Be* named, nor *Be* spoken of, nor *Be* opined of  
 αρα ουδ’ ονομαζεται, ουδε λεγεται ουδε δοξαζεται  
 nor *Be The Object of Knowledge*, nor do *The Real Beings have a perception of Self*.  
 ουδε γινωσκεται ουδε των οντων τι αισθανεται αυτου.

**Ari:** It is not likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

**Par:** Therefore *Is* it *Possible* that these conclusions *have to Be* in this way about *The One*?  
 ουν δυνατον ταυθ’ εχειν ουτως περι το εν;

**Ari:** To me at least, it certainly does not appear to be in this way.  
 εμοιγε ουκουν δοκει.

ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἂν τι αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ;  
 καὶ πῶς;  
 οὐδ’ ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα.  
 οὐ φαίνεται.  
 οὐδ’ ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γινώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων  
 αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται.  
 οὐκ ἔοικεν.  
 ἢ δυνατόν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἐν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν;  
 οὐκουν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.


|                                              |       |
|----------------------------------------------|-------|
| agreement 0.61                               | 2.2   |
| <i>being one</i>                             | 2.4   |
| <i>one partakes being</i>                    | 2.6   |
| <b>Theorem I</b>                             | 2.7   |
| <i>whole part</i>                            | 2.10  |
| <i>infinite number</i>                       | 2.13  |
| <i>is 2.6</i>                                | 2.15  |
| <i>many 1.6 2.10</i>                         | 2.16  |
| <i>different</i>                             | 2.19  |
| <i>individually one</i>                      | 2.29  |
| <i>necessarily</i>                           | 2.36  |
| <i>number exist</i>                          | 2.37  |
| <i>unity attribute</i>                       | 2.45  |
| <i>absolute one</i>                          | 2.51  |
| <i>one many whole parts limited infinite</i> | 2.54  |
| <i>beginning middle end</i>                  | 2.57  |
| <b>Brumbaugh 2.054A Theorem II</b>           | 2.58  |
| <i>shape</i>                                 | 2.59  |
| <b>Theorem III</b>                           | 2.60  |
| <i>in itself</i>                             | 2.65  |
| <i>in something</i>                          | 2.69  |
| <i>in itself other</i>                       | 2.70  |
| <b>Theorem IV</b>                            | 2.71  |
| <i>motion rest</i>                           | 2.75  |
| <b>Theorem V</b>                             | 2.76  |
| - <i>part whole itself</i>                   | 2.79  |
| <i>same itself</i>                           | 2.82  |
| <i>in itself other 2.70</i>                  | 2.84  |
| <i>other itself</i>                          | 2.85  |
| <i>other others</i>                          | 2.88  |
| - <i>part whole one not one</i>              | 2.100 |
| <i>same 2.77</i>                             | 2.101 |
| <i>same</i>                                  | 2.102 |
| <i>other same other itself</i>               | 2.103 |
| <b>Theorem VI</b>                            | 2.104 |
| <i>other 2.86 2.88</i>                       | 2.105 |
| <i>other others others other</i>             | 2.106 |
| <i>name</i>                                  | 2.113 |
| <i>same state 1.59 2.108</i>                 | 2.115 |
| <i>like</i>                                  | 2.116 |
| <i>same 2.101</i>                            | 2.119 |
| <i>like 2.115</i>                            | 2.121 |
| <i>unlike</i>                                | 2.123 |
| <i>like unlike</i>                           | 2.126 |
| <i>like unlike others</i>                    | 2.127 |
| <i>like unlike itself</i>                    | 2.128 |

On the one hand, it appears that Aristotle is indeed following  
The Reasoned Account of Parmenides,  
but on the other hand, he refuses to believe, let alone Trust The Same Reasoned Account!  
For how can anything possess anything, if first of all it does not possess Being nor existence???

How about, **THE VERY CAUSE** of **Ousia Her Self**;  
**“TRANSCENDANT IN DIGNITY AND POWER” -Republic 509b-**

|                                                           |       |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------|
|                                                           | 2.129 |
| <i>in whole</i> 2.65                                      | 2.130 |
| <i>in other</i> 2.70                                      | 2.131 |
| <i>touch itself others</i>                                | 2.133 |
| <i>next to position</i>                                   | 2.135 |
| <i>- touch itself</i>                                     | 2.137 |
| <i>outside next to</i> 134                                | 2.139 |
| <i>contact</i>                                            | 2.140 |
| <i>- touch others</i>                                     | 2.150 |
| <i>touches - touch itself others</i>                      | 2.151 |
| <b>Theorem VII</b>                                        | 2.152 |
| <i>absolute smallness</i>                                 | 2.161 |
| <i>- greater smaller one other</i>                        | 2.164 |
| <i>equal itself others</i>                                | 2.168 |
| <i>equal greater less itself others</i>                   | 2.175 |
| <i>equal greater less itself other</i>                    | 2.182 |
| <b>Theorem VIII</b>                                       | 2.183 |
| <i>be</i> 2.6                                             | 2.184 |
| <i>partakes time</i>                                      | 2.186 |
| <i>becoming younger becomes older</i> 1.87                | 2.189 |
| <i>becomes older younger itself</i>                       | 2.191 |
| <i>older itself</i>                                       | 2.196 |
| <i>younger itself</i>                                     | 2.198 |
| <i>- older younger itself</i>                             | 2.204 |
| <i>younger other older one</i>                            | 2.211 |
| <i>parts beginning middle end</i> 2.8 2.57                | 2.213 |
| <i>younger one older others</i>                           | 2.217 |
| <i>same age</i>                                           | 2.220 |
| <i>older</i> 2.11 2.17                                    | 2.226 |
| <i>becomes - becomes</i>                                  | 2.233 |
| <i>is becomes- is becomes older younger itself others</i> | 2.234 |
| <i>was is will be becoming become</i>                     | 2.236 |
| <i>relation</i>                                           | 2.237 |
| <i>knowledge opinion perception</i>                       | 2.238 |
| <i>name definition named defined attributes pertain</i>   | 2.239 |

## The One That Is



## The Book of TAO

### XV. The Wise Ones of Old

had Subtle Wisdom and Depth of Understanding;

They were so Profound that They could not be Understood;

And since They could not be Understood,

then They must necessarily be Described in the following way:

Cautious; Like crossing a Wintry Stream...

Lin Yutang, The Wisdom of China and India, edited by JFB

## 2nd

“Shall we then return to our hypothesis and see [142b] if a review  
of our argument discloses any new point of view?” 2.1

“By all means.”

0.61 “We say, then, that if the one exists, we must come to an *agreement*  
about the consequences, whatever they may be, do we not?” 2.2

“Yes.”

“Now consider the first point. If one is, can it be and not partake of  
being?” 2.3

“No, it cannot.”

*being one* “Then the being of one will exist, but will not be identical with one;  
for if it were identical with one, it would not be the being of one,  
nor would one partake of it, 2.4



### The Second Hypothesis

**Parmenides:**13 Do you wish then, that we **Return** again to The Hypothesis from **The Beginning**,

142B Βούλει οὖν επανέλθωμεν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς,  
to **See** if anything of **Another Kind** may come to **Light** for us who are **Returning**?

εἴαν τι ἄλλοιον φάνη ἡμῖν ἐπανιούσιν;

**Aristotle:** By all means then, I do so wish.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι.

**Par:** Is it not the case then, that if we say “**One Is**”, then we must go through **The Same Logos**

οὐκ οὐκ εἰ φάμεν ἔν ἐστιν, διομολογητέα

about these following conclusions about **Self**, whatever they happen to **Be**; or is it not so?

περὶ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα αὐτοῦ, ποῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα, οὐχ οὕτω;

**Ari:** Yes it is so. (Ναί.)

**Par:** **See** then, from **The Beginning**. Accordingly then, on the one hand, if **One Is**, then **Can**

ὅρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς . ἀρα μὲν εἰ ἐν ἐστιν,

**Self Be** such as **It Is**, while on the other hand, **It** does not **Participate** of **Ousia**?

αὐτὸ εἶναι οἷον τε, δὲ μὴ μετέχειν οὐσίας;

**Ari:** It could not be so. (οὐχ οἷον τε.)

**Par:** And is it not the case then, that **The Ousia** of **The One Could Not Be The Same Being**

καὶ οὐκ οὐκ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς ἂν οὐ εἴη ταυτὸν οὐσα

as **The One**; for if **That Were Not The Ousia** of **That One**,

τὼ ἐνί: γὰρ ἐκεῖνη ἂν ἦν οὐ οὐσία ἐκεῖνου,

βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς επανέλθωμεν, εἴαν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιούσιν ἄλλοιον φανῇ;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι.

οὐκοῦν ἔν εἴ ἔστιν, φάμεν, τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποῖα ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα: οὐχ οὕτω;

ναί.

ὅρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἔν εἴ ἔστιν, ἄρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μὲν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν;

οὐχ οἷόν τε.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ ταυτὸν οὐσα τῷ ἐνί: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνη ἦν ἐκεῖνου οὐσία,

[142c] but the statement that one is would be equivalent to the statement that one is one but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is. Do you agree?"

"Certainly."

"In the belief that one and being differ in meaning?" 2.5

"Most assuredly."

"Then if we say concisely 'one is,' it is equivalent to saying that one *one partakes being* 2.6  
partakes of being?"

"Certainly."

---

"Let us again say what will follow if one is and consider whether *Theorem I* 2.7  
this hypothesis must not necessarily show that one is of such a  
nature as to have parts."

"How does that come about?"

then neither **Could This One**

οὐδ' ἂν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν

**Participate** of **That**, for then to say “**One is**” would also be like saying “**One One**”,

142C μετεῖχεν ἐκείνης, ἀλλ' λέγειν ἐν εἶναι ἂν τε καὶ ἡν ὁμοίον ἐν ἐν .

Whereas our **Present Hypothesis** is **not This (First) One**; that is; “What **Must** “Be” the result

δε νῦν ἡ ὑποθεσις ἐστὶν οὐχ αὕτη , τί χρη ἔσμβαινε

if **One One**?” but “What **Must Be** the result, if **One Is**”. Is it not so?

εἰ ἐν ἐν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν, οὐχ οὕτω?

**Ari**: It certainly is so. (πάνυ μὲν οὖν.)

**Par**: Is it not the case then, that **That** which **Is**, signifies **Something Different** than **The One**?

οὐκοῦν ὥς τὸ ἐστὶ σημαῖνον τί ἄλλο τοῦ ἐν;

**Ari**: Necessarily. (ἀνάγκη.)

(**The 1<sup>st</sup> Intelligible Triad**, 1246 (P6) Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)

**Par**: Take notice then, that whenever anyone says that **One Is**, that another way

142C–6 ἀρα οὖν ὅτι ἐπειδὴν τις εἶπῃ ὅτι ἐν ἐστὶν, ἄλλο ἢ  
to say this **concisely**, would be; “**The One Participates** of **Ousia**”.

το λεγόμενον τοῦτ' συλλήβδην ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν μετέχει οὐσίας.

**Ari**: By all means indeed, (πάνυ γε.)

**Par**: Surely then, let us say again, what will happen “If **One Is**”. Consider then,

δη λέγωμεν πάλιν τί συμβήσεται, εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ. σκοπεῖ οὖν

if it is not **Necessarily** the case, that This Hypothesis signifies **The One Being**,

εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑποθεσιν σημαίνειν τὸ ἐν ὄν

in such a way, as to **Possess/Contain Parts/Members** (**Whole Parts** such as **Head, Torso...**)?

τοιούτων οἷον εἶναι μέρη ;

**Ari**: How? (πῶς;)

οὐδ' ἂν ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ἐν, ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη  
ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν, τί χρη συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν: οὐχ οὕτω;

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν ὥς ἄλλο τί σημαίνειν τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐν;

ἀνάγκη.

ἄρα οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἐν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδὴν τις συλλήβδην εἶπῃ ὅτι ἐν  
ἐστὶν;

πάνυ γε.

πάλιν δὲ λέγωμεν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, τί συμβήσεται. σκοπεῖ οὖν εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιούτων  
ὄν τὸ ἐν σημαίνειν, οἷον μέρη ἔχειν;

πῶς;

“In this way: [142d] If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our hypothesis, must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts?” 2.8

“Inevitably.”

“And shall we call each of these parts merely a part, or must it, in so far as it is a part, be called a part of the whole?” 2.9

“A part of the whole.”

*whole part* “Whatever one, then, exists is a whole and has a part.” 2.10

“Certainly.”

**Par:** In the following way. If **That** which **Is**, is said to **Belong** to **The One Being**,

142D            ὥδε:            εἰ    τὸ ἐστὶ    λέγεται            τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος

it will also mean that, **The One Belongs** to **The Being** of **The One**. Whereas, it is **not** the case

καὶ            τὸ ἐν            τοῦ ὄντος            ἐνός,            δὲ            ἐστὶ οὐ

that both **The Ousia** and **The One Are The Self**, since both **Belong** to **That Self** which

τε            ἡ οὐσία καὶ    τὸ ἐν            τὸ αὐτό,    δὲ            τοῦ ἐκείνου αὐτοῦ οὐ

we hypothesized; such as **The One Being**. Accordingly then, on the one hand, **Must** not

ὑπεθέμεθα,            τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος,            ἀρα            μὲν            οὐκ

**The One Being, Necessarily Be The Whole Self**, whereas on the other hand,

ἐν ὃν            ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ ὅλον αὐτό            δὲ

**The One** and **That** which **Is Have Come into Being** as **Parts** of **This Whole** (ET 116, 152)?

τὸ ἐν τε καὶ τὸ εἶναι            γίνεσθαι            μορία    τούτου            ;

**Ari:** Necessarily. (ἀνάγκη.)

**Par:** Then shall we call **Each** of **These Parts**, simply a **piece**, or **Must The Part**

οὐν ποτερον προσερούμεν ἑκάτερον τούτων τῶν μορίων μόνον μόριον, ἢ μόριον

be called, at the very least, a **Member/Part** of **The Whole**?

προσηρτηεον    τὸ γε            μόριον            τοῦ ὅλου;

**Ari:** Of The Whole. (τοῦ ὅλου.)

**“Snatch All The Wine-Members, and Lead Them to Me!” -Orpheus-**

**(The 2<sup>nd</sup> Intelligible Triad, 1247 (P8) Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)**

**Par:** And since **It Is One** which **Is** also a **Whole**, **It** will **Contain** a **Part**.

142D–9 καὶ ἀρα ἐστὶν ἐν, ὃ ἡ καὶ ὅλον ἂν ἔχει μόριον.

**Ari:** By all means indeed. (πάνυ γε.)

ὥδε: εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἐν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου οὐ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος, ἀρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἐν ὃν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίνεσθαι μόρια τὸ τε ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι;

ἀνάγκη.

πότερον οὖν ἑκάτερον τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσερούμεν, ἢ τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τὸ γε μόριον προσηρτέον;

τοῦ ὅλου.

καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἐστὶ, ὃ ἂν ἐν ᾧ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει.

πάνυ γε.

“Well then, can either of these two parts of existent one—unity and being—abandon the other? [142e] Can unity cease to be a part of being or being to be a part of unity?” 2.11

“No.”

“And again each of the parts possesses unity and being, and the smallest of parts is composed of these two parts, and thus by the same argument any part whatsoever has always these two parts; for always unity has being and being has unity; 2.12

**Par:** What then? **Can** each of **These Parts** of **The One Being**; both **The One**

τι ουν; ἀρα ἑκάτερον τούτων των μοριων του ενος οντος, τε το εν

and **The Being** abandon each other, so that neither **The One** be a **Part** of **The Being**, nor

142E και το ον απολειπεσθον, η το εν ειναι μοριου του η

**The Being** be a **Part** of **The One**?

το ον μοριου του ενος;

**Ari:** That could not be. (ουκ αν ειη.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, once again, **Each** of **These Members**, **Maintains/Has** both **The One**

αρα παλιν και ἑκάτερον των μοριων ισχει(ισχω) τε το εν

and **The Being** so that **the least** (mud,hair,dirt) **part** in turn **becomes** a **part** composed of **The Two**,

και το ον και το ελαχιστον το μοριον αυ γιγνεται μοριοιν εκ δυοιν,

and **The Self/Same Logos Is Always According to This Way**, so that whenever a

και τον αυτον λογον αι κατα ουτως, οτιπερ αν

**Part comes to Be, This Relationship Is Always Maintained** with **The Part**: For it **Is Always**

γενηται τουτω αι ισχει τω μοριω: γαρ αι

the case that both, **The One** will **Maintain/Keep The Being** and **The Being Keep The One**.

τε το εν ισχει το ον και το ον το εν:

τί ουν; τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἄρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου;

οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

παλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τό τε ἓν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν αὐ μορίοις τὸ μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως αἰεὶ, ὅτιπερ ἂν μόριον γένηται, τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ αἰεὶ ἴσχει: τό τε γὰρ ἓν τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν τὸ ἓν:

[143a] and, therefore, since it is always becoming two, it can never be one.”

“Certainly.”

*infinite number* “Then it results that the existent one would be infinite in number?” 2.13

“Apparently.”

“Let us make another fresh start.” 2.14

“In what direction?”

2.6 “We say that the one partakes of being, because it *is*?” 2.15

“Yes.”

1.6 2.10 “And for that reason the one, because it is, was found to be *many*.” 2.16

“Yes.”

“Well then, will the one, which we say partakes of being, if we form a mental conception of it alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, be found to be only one, or many?” 2.17

“One, I should say.”



So that it is **Necessary** that **The Two Members Always Come to Be**, but **Never only one**.

143A ωστε ειναι αναγκη δυ αι γιγνομενον μηδεποτε εν.

Ari: By all means, it is so! (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)

(**The 3<sup>rd</sup> Intelligible Triad, 1248** (P12) Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)

Par: Is it not the case then, that **in This Way The One Being** will be **Unlimited Multitude**?

143A-3 ουκουν ουτω το εν ον αν ειη το απειρον πληθος;

Ari: It is likely. (εοικεν.)

(**The 1<sup>st</sup> Intelligible & Intellectual Triad of Gods, 1250** (P29) Proclus Commentary Book 8)

Par: Surely then, let us proceed again in the following way, even further.

143A-5 δη Ιθι και τηδε ετι.

Ari: In what way? (πη;)

Par: We say that **The One Participates** of **Ousia**, on which account, **One Is**?

φαμεν το εν μετεχειν ουσιας, διο εστιν;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: And because of this, it was indeed brought to **Light** that **The One Being** is **Many**.

και δια ταυτα δη εφανη το εν ον πολλα.

Ari: It is so. (ουτως.)

Par: What next? What of **The One Self**, which we surely say **Participates** of **Ousia**.

τι δε; το εν αυτο, ο δη φαμεν μετεχειν ουσιας,

What if we grasp **Self According to Self** by **The Understanding, Alone, Without This Ousia**,

εαν λαβωμεν αυτο καθ' αυτο τη διανοια μονον ανευ τουτου

of **Which** we say **It Participates**, would **One Alone**, indeed come to **Light**,

ου φαμεν μετεχειν, αρα εν μονον γε φανησεται

or is **This Self** also **Many**?

η τουτο το αυτο και πολλα;

(**One** or **One** or **Two**, **Three**, **Four** or **Five**?

Ari: One, at least, I think. (εν εγωγε οιμαι.) compare to 155E 3<sup>rd</sup> Hypo)

ωστε αναγκη δυ' αι γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε έν είναι.

παντάπασι μεν οδν.

οδκοδν άπειρον αν το πληθος οδτω το έν οδν ειη;

εοικεν.

ιθι δη και τηδε ετι.

πη;

οδσίας φαμεν μετεχειν το έν, διο εστιν;

ναι.

και δια ταυτα δη το έν οδν πολλα εφανη.

οδτω.

τι δε; αυτο το έν, ο δη φαμεν οδσίας μετεχειν, εαν αυτο τη διανοία μονον καθ' αυτο λάβωμεν ανευ τουτου οδ φαμεν μετεχειν, άρα γε έν μονον φανήσεται η και πολλα το αυτο τοδτο;

έν, οίμαι εγωγε.

[143b] “Just let us see; must not the being of one be one thing and one itself another, if the one is not being, but, considered as one, partakes of being?” 2.18

“Yes, that must be so.”

“Then if being is one thing and one is another, one is not other than being because it is one, nor is being other than one because it is being, but they differ from each other by virtue of being other and different.” 2.19

“Certainly.”

“Therefore the other is neither the same as one nor as being.” 2.20

“Certainly not.”

**Par:** Let us **See** then. On the one hand, must not **The Ousia** of **Self Be/Exist**

**143B** ἰδωμεν δὴ:                    μὲν                    ἀνάγκη μὴ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι

**In-One-Certain-Way**, whereas on the other hand, **Self Is Different**, if indeed

τι ἄλλο                                            δὲ                                            αὐτο                    ἕτερον, εἴπερ

**The One Is Not The Ousia**, but is **Seen** as **Being One**, by **Participating** of **The Ousia**.

τὸ ἐν            μὴ            οὐσία,            ἀλλ' ὥς                    ἐν                    μετέσχεν            οὐσίας.

**Ari:** Necessarily. (ἀνάγκη.)

**Par:** Is it not the case then, that if on the one hand, **The Ousia Is Different**,

οὐκοῦν                    εἰ                    μὲν                    ἡ οὐσία                    ἕτερον,

while on the other hand, **The One Is Different**; then in that case,

δὲ                                            τὸ ἐν                    ἕτερον,

it is neither by **The One** of **The Ousia** that **The One Is Different**,

οὔτε τῷ ἐν τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ἐν ἕτερον

nor by **The Ousia** of **The One** that **Is**, that **The Ousia** is **Other**,

οὔτε τῷ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ ἐνός εἶναι ἡ οὐσία ἄλλα,

but by **That** which is **Different** and also **Other**, that **They** are **Different** from **Each Other**.

ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.

**Ari:** By all means so. (πάνυ μὲν οὖν.)

**Par:** So that **That** which **Is Different Is** not **The Same** with either **The One** nor **The Ousia**.

ὥστε τὸ ἕτερον ἐστὶν οὐ ταῦτον οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ.

**Ari:** How is this the case? (πῶς γάρ;)

ἰδωμεν δὴ: ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτό, εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἐν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐν οὐσίας μετέσχεν.

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἡ οὐσία, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν, οὔτε τῷ ἐν τὸ ἐν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἐνός ἄλλο,

ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ὥστε οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἕτερον.

πῶς γάρ;

“Well, then, if we make a selection among them, [143c] whether we select being and the other, or being and one, or one and the other, in each instance we select two things which may properly be called both?” 2.21

“What do you mean?”

“I will explain. We can speak of being?” 2.22

“Yes.”

“And we can also speak of one?” 2.23

“Yes, that too.”

“Then have we not spoken of each of them?” 2.24

“Yes.”

“And when I speak of being and one, do I not speak of both?” 2.25

“Certainly.”

“And also when I speak of being and other, or other and one, in every case I speak of each pair as both?” [143d] 2.26

“Yes.”

**Par:** How then you ask? If you wish that we make a **Selection** of **Selves**; such as either

143C Τι οὖν ; εἰαν βουλεῖ προελωμεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε  
of **The Ousia** and **The Other/Different**, or, of **The Ousia** and **The One**, or  
τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἐν εἴτε

of **The One** and **The Other**, accordingly then, is it not the case, that in either way that  
εἴτε τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἂρ' οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἐκάστη  
we may choose, we are choosing a certain **Duality**, which can **Correctly** be called, **Both**?

προαἰρεσεῖ προαἰρουμεθα τινε (dual) ὧς ἔχει ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω;

**Ari:** How? (πῶς;)

**Par:** In the following way. Is it possible to say **Ousia**? (ὥδε: ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν οὐσίαν;)

**Ari:** It is. (ἐστὶν.)

**Par:** And in turn, is it possible to say **One**? (καὶ αὐθις εἰπεῖν ἐν;)

**Ari:** This also. (τοῦτο καὶ.)

**Par:** Take notice then, have we not spoken of **Each One** of **The Two Selves**?

ἂρ' οὖν οὐχ εἰρηται ἑκάτερον [dual] αὐτοῖν;

**Ari:** Yes. (ναί.)

**Par:** What about when I say **Ousia** and **One**, have I not accordingly mentioned **Both**?

τί δ' ὅταν εἰπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἐν, οὐκ ἄρα ἀμφοτέρω;

**Ari:** By all means indeed. (πάνυ γε. )

**Par:** Is it not the case then, that if there is **Both Ousia** and **Other**, or **Both**

οὐκ οὖν εἰαν καὶ οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον ἢ τε

**Other** and **One**, then in this way, I speak of **Each Pair**, in every way, as **Both**?

ἕτερον καὶ ἐν, καὶ οὕτω λέγω ἐφ' ἑκάστου πανταχῶς ἀμφω;

**Ari:** Yes. (ναί.)

τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἐν εἴτε τὸ ἐν  
καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἂρ' οὐκ ἐν ἐκάστη τῇ προαἰρέσει προαἰρούμεθά τινε ὧς ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω;  
πῶς;

ὥδε: ἐστὶν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν;

ἐστὶν.

καὶ αὐθις εἰπεῖν ἐν;

καὶ τοῦτο.

ἂρ' οὖν οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἴρηται;

ναί.

τί δ' ὅταν εἰπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἐν, ἄρα οὐκ ἀμφοτέρω;

πάνυ γε.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον ἢ ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἐν, καὶ οὕτω πανταχῶς ἐφ' ἑκάστου ἀμφω λέγω;

ναί.

“If things are correctly called both, can they be both without being two?” 2.27

“They cannot.”

“And if things are two, must not each of them be one?” 2.28

“Certainly.”

*individually one* “Then since the units of these pairs are together two, each must be individually one.” 2.29

“That is clear.”

“But if each of them is one, by the addition of any sort of one to any pair whatsoever the total becomes three?” 2.30

“Yes.”

“And three is an odd number, and two is even?” 2.31

“Of course.”

**Par:** If **Both** of which have been **Named Correctly**; then on the one hand, can it

143D αν αμφω ω προσαγορευησθον ορθως, δ' μεν αρα  
possibly be the case, for **Self** to be **Both**, and on the other hand, not be **Two**?

οιον τε αυτω ειναι αμφω, δε μη δυο;

**Ari:** It cannot exist in such a way. (ουχ οιον τε.)

**Par:** Concerning which then, if **Two** should exist [ητον-subj.dual for ειμι], then could **Each**

ω δ' δυο αν ητον, μη εκα-

**One** of **The Two** Selves **Exist** by some (**Divine**) **Resource/Efficacy/Design** and not be **One**?

-τερον αυτοιν εστι τις μηχανη ουχ ειναι εν;

### [The Metaphysical Creative Process

that First Produces The Multiplying Power of **Number**. Pierre Grimes]

[[The LS Lexicon shows that **Herodotus** used **This** word to bring to Light **The Arts** of **Zeus**]]

**Ari:** Not in any way! (ουδεμια.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, seeing that **Each** of **These Pairs** turns-out to be a **Couple**,

αρα επειπερ εκαστα τουτων ξυμβαίνει ειναι συνδυο,

so that **Each Pair** would also be **One Couple**. (εκαστον αν και ειη εν.)

**Ari:** It has so come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

**Par:** But if **Each** of **The Selves**, **Is One**, by **Adding-together** [from συντιθημι] whatsoever

δε ει εκαστον αυτων εστι εν, συντεθέντος οποιουσιν

**Yoked-Pair** (**Phaedo 71c**) to any **One**, would not **All The Yoked-Pairs Become Three**?

συζυγια ητινιουν ενος ου τα παντα γινεται τρια;

**Ari:** Yes. (ναι.)

**Par:** But is not **Three** an **Odd Number** and **Two** an **Even Number**?

δε ου τρια περιττα και δυο αρτια;

**Ari:** How could they not be; (πως δ' ου;)

ὦ δ' ἂν ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορευήσθον, ἄρα οἶόν τε ἄμφω μὲν αὐτῷ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μή;

οὐχ οἶόν τε.

ὦ δ' ἂν δύο ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἓν εἶναι;

οὐδεμία.

τούτων ἄρα ἐπείπερ σύνδυο ἕκαστα συμβαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἓν ἂν εἴη ἕκαστον.

φαίνεται.

εἰ δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστι, συντεθέντος ἑνὸς ὁποιοῦσιν ἦτινιὸν συζυγία οὐ τρία γίγνεται τὰ πάντα;

ναί.

τρία δὲ οὐ περιττὰ καὶ δύο ἄρτια;

πῶς δ' οὔ;

1  
2 3  
4 6  
9

[143e] “Well, when there are two units, must there not also be twice, 2.32  
and when there are three, thrice, that is, if two is twice one and three is  
thrice one?”

“There must.”

“But if there are two and twice, must there not also be twice two? 2.33  
And again, if there are three and thrice, must there not be thrice  
three?”

“Of course.”

“Well then, if there are three and twice and two and thrice, must 2.34  
there not also be twice three and thrice two?”

“Inevitably.”



**Par:** What next then? By **Being Two**,

143E τι δε; οντοιν δυοιν

is it not **Necessary**, that **Twice**, also **Exists**,

ουκ αναγκη δις και ειναι

and by **Being Three, Thrice**, if indeed **Two**, **First-Arises** from **Twice The One**

και οντων τριων τρις ειπερ τω δυο υπαρχει τε δις το εν

and **Three**, **First-Arises** from **Thrice The One**?

και τω τρια τρις το εν;

**Ari:** Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

**Par:** Then, by **Being Two** and **Twice**, is it not also **Necessary** that **Twice-Two Exist**?

δε οντοιν δυοιν και δις ουκ αναγκη δις δυο ειναι;

and in turn by **Being Three** and **Thrice**, is it not **Necessary** that **Thrice-Three** also **Exist**?

και αυ τριων και τρις ουκ αναγκη τρις τρια ειναι;

**Ari:** How could they not? (πως δ' ου;)

**Par:** What next then? By **Being Three** and **Twice** and by **Being Two** and **Thrice**,

τι δε ; οντων τριων και οντων δις και οντοιν δυοιν και οντοιν τρις;

is it not **Necessary**, that **Twice-Three** and **Thrice-Two Exist**;

ουκ αναγκη δις τρια τε και τρις δυο ειναι;

**Ari:** It is altogether so indeed. (πολλή γε.)

τί δέ; δυοῖν ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δίς, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δίς ἓν καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρίς ἓν;

ἀνάγκη.

δυοῖν δὲ ὄντοιν καὶ δίς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δίς εἶναι;

καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρίς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὖ τρία τρίς εἶναι;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

τί δέ; τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δίς ὄντων καὶ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ τρίς ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε τρία δίς εἶναι καὶ δύο τρίς;

πολλή γε.

“Then there would be even times even, [144a] odd times odd, odd times even, and even times odd.” 2.35

“Yes.”

*necessarily*

“Then if that is true, do you believe any number is left out, which does not necessarily exist?” 2.36

“By no means.”

*number exist*

“Then if one exists, number must also exist.” 2.37

“It must.”

“But if number exists, there must be many, indeed an infinite multitude, of existences; or is not number infinite in multitude and participant of existence?” 2.38

“Certainly it is.”

“Then if all number partakes of existence, every part of number will partake of it?” 2.39

“Yes.”

**Par:** Accordingly then, there would also **Exist Even-Times Even** and **Odd-Times Odd**  
 144A ἄρα ἂν τε εἴη ἀρτιακὶς ἀρτία καὶ περιττακὶς περιττά  
 and **Odd-Times Even** and **Even-Times Odd**.  
 καὶ περιττακὶς ἀρτία καὶ ἀρτιακὶς περιττά.

**Ari:** It is so. (ἐστὶν αὐτῷ.)

**Par:** If then, These Aspects **have to Be** in this way, can you think of some **Number**  
 εἰ οὖν ταῦτα ἔξει οὕτως, οἶει τίνα ἀριθμὸν  
 that has been left out, which does not **Necessarily Exist**?  
 ὑπολείπεσθαι, ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι;

**Ari:** Not in any way indeed. (οὐδαμῶς γε.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, if **One Is**, then also, **Number** has to **Necessarily Exist**.  
 ἄρα εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν, καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

**Ari:** Necessarily.  
 ἀνάγκη.

**Par:** Then certainly, if **Number Is**, then **Many** would also **Exist**,  
 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ ὄντος πολλὰ ἂν καὶ εἴη  
 and indeed An **Unlimited Multitude** of **Beings**; or is not **Unlimited Number**  
 καὶ γε ἀπείρον πλῆθος τῶν ὄντων: ἢ οὐκ ἀπείρος ἀριθμὸς  
**Quantity/Multitude Arising into Existence while Participating** of **Ousia**?  
 πληθεὶ γιγνεται μετέχων οὐσίας;

**Ari:** By all means indeed! (καὶ πάνυ γε.)

**Par:** Is it not the case then, that if **All Number Participates** of **Ousia**,  
 οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς μετέχει,  
 then, **Each Part** of **Number**, would also **Participate** of **Her Self**?  
 τὸ ἐκάστων μῦριον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἂν καὶ μετέχοι αὐτῆς;

**Ari:** Yes! (ναί.)

ἄρτιά τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκῃς ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττὰ περιττάκῃς καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκῃς καὶ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκῃς.  
 ἔστιν οὕτω.

εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἶει τίνα ἀριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι;  
 οὐδαμῶς γε.

εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἓν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι.

ἀνάγκη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος πολλὰ ἂν εἴη καὶ πλῆθος ἀπείρον τῶν ὄντων: ἢ οὐκ ἀπείρος ἀριθμὸς πληθεὶ  
 καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γίγνεται;

καὶ πάνυ γε.

οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μῦριον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχει ἂν αὐτῆς;

ναί.

[144b] “Existence, then, is distributed over all things, which are many, 2.40  
and is not wanting in any existing thing from the greatest to the  
smallest? Indeed, is it not absurd even to ask that question? For how  
can existence be wanting in any existing thing?”

“It cannot by any means.”

“Then it is split up into the smallest and greatest and all kinds of 2.41  
existences nothing else is so much divided, [144c] and in short the  
parts of existence are infinite.”

“That is true.”

**Parmenides:** 14 Accordingly then, **The Ousia** has been **Distributed** to **All Beings**

144B                      ἀρα                      ἡ οὐσία νενεμηται (νεμω) Ἐπὶ πάντα ὄντα  
which are **Many**, and will *not* abandon **a Single One** of **The Real-Beings**, neither **The Least**  
πολλὰ                καὶ                ἀποστατεῖ                οὐδενος                τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου  
**nor The Greatest?** Rather, is it not irrational to even ask this question? For surely then,  
οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἢ                καὶ                ἀλογον μὲν εἰρᾶσθαι τοῦτο; γάρ                δὴ  
how can **Ousia** indeed abandon **Any** of **The Real-Beings**?  
πὺς ἀν οὐσία γε ἀποστατοὶ τοῦ τῶν ὄντων;

**Aristotle:** Not in any way. (ουδαμως.)

[[The Second Member of The Yoked-Pair/Couple: **The Dividing Power** of Number. Pierre

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The Ousia**, as **Such**, has been **thoroughly** and **in-every-way**  
 ἀρα            της ουσιας   ως οιον   **κατακεκερματισται**   και πανταχως  
**cut-up-in-pieces**; into both **The Least** and **The Greatest Beings**, and so **She** is **The Most**  
                  τε   μικροτατα   και                    μεγαιστα   οντα,   και   εστι   μαλιστα  
**divided** of **All Beings**, and thus **She Contains Unlimited/Inexterminal Parts/pieces**.  
 144C   μεμερισται   παντων                    και                    απεραντα                    μερη.  
**Ari:** It has to be so. (εχει ουτω.)

ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἡ οὐσία νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν διὴ οὐσία γε τῶν ὄντων τοῦ ἀποστατοῖ; οὐδαμῶς.

κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ὥς οἶόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ πανταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντα τῆς οὐσίας.

ἔγει οὕτω.

“Its parts are the most numerous of all.” 2.42

“Yes, they are the most numerous.”

“Well, is there any one of them which is a part of existence, but is no part?” 2.43

“How could that be?”

“But if there is, it must, I imagine, so long as it is, be some one thing; it cannot be nothing.” 2.44

“That is inevitable.”

*unity attribute* “Then unity is an attribute of every part of existence and is not wanting to a smaller or larger or any other part.” 2.45

“True.”

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The Parts/pieces** of **Her Self** **Are** **very Many**.

αρα τα μερη αυτης εστι πλειστα.

**Ari:** Very many indeed. (πλειστα μεντοι.)

**Par:** What follows then? Is there any one of **These Selves** which **Exists**, on the one hand,

τι ουν; εστι τι αυτων ο εστι μεν

a **Part/piece** of **The Ousia**, but yet, it is **Not One Part/piece**?

μερος της ουσιας, μεντοι ουδεν μερος;

**Ari:** And how can this come to be? (και πως αν τουτο γενοιτο;)

**Par:** But surely if it is indeed the case, then I suspect, that it **Must Always Be** the case, that

αλλ' γε ειπερ εστιν , οιμαι, αναγκη αι ,

as long as **Self** is such as **It Is**, **It Must Indeed Be a Certain One**; and so **It** cannot be *nothing*.

εωσπερ αυτο η αν γε ειναι τι εν, δε αδυνατον μηδεν.

**Ari:** Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, **The One**, **Is Present** with **Each** and **Every Part/piece** of **The Ousia**

αρα το εν προεστι προς τω εκαστω απαντι μερει της ουσιας

by **not abandoning** any **Part/piece**, neither **small** nor **Great**, nor any other **Singular Part**.

ουκ απολειπομενον μερους ουτε σμικροτερου ουτε μειζονος ουτε αλλου ουδενος.

**Ari:** It is so. (ουτω.)

πλείστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς.

πλείστα μέντοι.

τί οὖν; ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ὃ ἔστι μὲν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας, οὐδὲν μέντοι μέρος;

καὶ πῶς ἂν τοι τοῦτο γένοιτο;

ἀλλ' εἴπερ γε οἶμαι ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ αἰεὶ, ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾤ, ἔν γε τι εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον.

ἀνάγκη.

πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἐκάστω τῷ τῆς οὐσίας μέρει πρόσεστιν τὸ ἓν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε σμικροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός.

οὕτω.

[144d] “Can the one be in many places at once and still be a whole?  
Consider that question.” 2.46

“I am considering and I see that it is impossible.”

“Then it is divided into parts, if it is not a whole; for it cannot be  
attached to all the parts of existence at once unless it is divided.” 2.47

“I agree.”

“And that which is divided into parts must certainly be as numerous  
as its parts.” 2.48

“It must.”

“Then what we said just now—that existence was divided into the  
greatest number of parts—was not true 2.49



**Par:** Therefore, can **One Being Be** a **Whole** that **Exists in Many Ways/Places At-Once?**

144D ουν αρα εν ον ολον εστι πολλαχου αμα;  
Consider this. (αθρει τουτο.)

**Ari:** But I do consider it and I “see” that it is impossible.

αλλ’ αθρω και ορω οτι αδυνατον.

**Par:** Accordingly then, **One Being has been cut-up in pieces, if indeed It Is not Whole**  
αρα μεμερισμενον ειπερ μη ολον:

for in no other way at all, can **It Be Present** with **All The Parts/pieces** of **The Ousia**  
γαρ ουδαμως αλλως που παρεστι απασι τοις μερεσιν της ουσιας

other than by **existing in a cut-up/scattered state** (*At-Once* like **The Harmonic Inter-dependant**  
η μεμερισμενον. **Parts** in a **Homogeneous Whole** and in the pieces of

**Ari:** Yes. (ναί.) mud, hair, dust in **The Living-Body** of **The All**. jfb)

~~~**Indivisible Beings/Parts** as opposed to **divisible pieces**~~~

Par: And most certainly then, **that which is partible Must Be** as many as **its pieces**.

και γε μην το μεριστον αναγκη ειναι οσαπερ πολλη τοσαυτα μερη.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then we did **not** just now speak **The Truth**, when we said that **The Ousia**
αρα ουκ αρτι λεγοντες αληθη ελεγομεν ως η ουσια

Distributed into **very many Parts**.

144E ειη νενεμημενη πλειστα μερη.

ἀρα οὖν ἐν ὄν πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον ἐστί; τοῦτο ἄθρει.

ἀλλ’ ἀθρῶ καὶ ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον.

μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ὅλον: ἄλλως γάρ που οὐδαμῶς ἅμα ἅπασι τοῖς τῆς οὐσίας μέρεσιν
παρέσται ἢ μεμερισμένον.

ναί.

καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ μέρη.

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκ ἄρα ἀληθὴ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν λέγοντες ὡς πλεῖστα μέρη ἢ οὐσία νενεμημένη εἶη.

for it is not divided, you see, into any more parts than one, [144e]
 but, as it seems, into the same number as one for existence is not
 wanting to the one, nor the one to existence, but being two they are
 equal throughout.”

“That is perfectly clear.”

“The one, then, split up by existence, is many and infinite in
 number.”

2.50

“Clearly.”

absolute one

“Then not only the existent one is many, but the absolute one
 divided by existence, must be many.”

2.51

“Certainly.”

For **She** is *not* **Distributed** into more **Parts** than **The One** is,

γὰρ οὐδὲ νενεμηται πλειὼ τοῦ ἑνός,

but as it is likely, **She Is Equal** to **The One**. For **The Being** does *not* **abandon The One**, *nor*

ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκε, ἴσα τῷ ἑνί. γὰρ τὸ ὄν οὔτε ἀπολείπεται τοῦ ἑνός οὔτε

does The One abandon The Being; but **Always Subsist** as **Two Parts Equalized Through All**.

τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ὄντε δύο ἐξισουσθον παρὰ πάντα.

Ari: It has come to **Light** entirely in this way. (φαίνεται παντάπασιν οὕτω.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One Self**, **has been Distributed** by **The Ousia**

ἀρὰ τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας

which is both **Many** and also **Unlimited Multitude**.

ἐστὶν τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀπειρα πλῆθος.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαίνεται.)

Par: Accordingly then, not only **Is The One Being Many**, but it is also **Necessary**

ἀρὰ οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν τὸ ἐν ὄν πολλὰ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη

that **The One Self** which is **Distributed** by **The Being** to **Be Many**.

τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ διανενημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι πολλὰ.

Ari: Entirely so. (παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.)

οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω τοῦ ἑνός νενέμηται ἀλλ' ἴσα, ὡς εἰκε, τῷ ἑνί: οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὄν τοῦ ἑνός ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἐν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἐξισοῦσθον δύο ὄντε αἰεὶ παρὰ πάντα.

παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πολλὰ τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος ἐστὶν.

φαίνεται.

οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὄν ἐν πολλὰ ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

“And because the parts are parts of a whole, the one would be limited by the whole; [145a] or are not the parts included by the whole?” 2.52

“They must be so.”

“But surely that which includes is a limit.” 2.53

“Of course.”

“Then the existent one is, apparently, both one and many, a whole and parts, limited and of infinite number.” 2.54

*one many
whole parts
limited infinite*

“So it appears.”

“Then if limited it has also extremes ?” 2.55

“Certainly.”

“Yes, and if it is a whole, will it not have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these is wanting, will it still be a whole?” 2.56

“It will not.”

Parmenides: 15 And certainly, since **The Parts Are** indeed **Parts** of a **Whole**, in that case
Και μὴν ὅτι τὰ μέρη γὰρ μέρη ὅλου

The One will **Be Limited** by **The Whole**; or are not **The Parts Contained** by **The Whole**?

145A το ἐν ἂν εἴη πεπερασμένον κατὰ τὸ ὅλον: ἢ οὐ τὰ μέρη περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ

Aristotle: Necessarily so. (ἀναγκη.)

Par: Then certainly, **That** which **Contains** will indeed **Be The Limit**.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ περιέχον ἂν γὰρ εἴη πέρας.

Ari: How could it not be? (πῶς δ' οὐ;)

(**The 2nd Intelligible & Intellectual Triad of Gods, 1251** (P31) **Proclus Commentary Book 8**)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One Being, Is** in some way, both **One and Many**,

145A–3 ἀρα τὸ ἐν ὄν ἐστὶ πού τε ἐν καὶ πολλὰ,

both **Whole and Parts**, and **Limited/finite and Unlimited/infinite Multitude**.

καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρη, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἀπείρον πλήθει.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαίνεται.) (Nicomachos Intro to Arith Book 1 Chap 7)

(**The 3rd Intellectual Triad of The Perfective-Preservative Gods, 1252** (P34) **Proclus Book 8**)

Par: Take notice then, if **It Has** indeed been **Limited**, then **Must It** not also **Possess Extremes**?

145A–5 ἀρ' οὐν ἐπεὶ πεπερασμένον, οὐκ καὶ ἔχον ἑσχατά;

Ari: It must. (ἀναγκη.)

Par: What then? If **The One Being Is** a **Whole**, then will **It** not also **Possess** a **Beginning**,

τί δ'; εἰ ὅλον, ἂν οὐ καὶ ἔχῃ καὶ ἀρχὴν

a **Middle** and an **End**? Or is it *possible* for any **Whole** to **Exist without These Three**? And if

καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; ἢ οἷον τί ὅλον εἶναι ἀνευ τούτων τριῶν; καὶ οἷον

any one of **These Selves** is absent, then will **It** be **Disposed** to **Exist** any longer as a **Whole**?

τοῦ ἐν αὐτῶν ἀποστατή, ἐθελήσει εἶναι ἐτι ὅλον;

Ari: It will not be so disposed. (οὐκ ἐθελήσει.)

καὶ μὴν ὅτι γὰρ ὅλου τὰ μέρη μέρη, πεπερασμένον ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἓν: ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μέρη;

ἀνάγκη.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γὰρ περιέχον πέρας ἂν εἴη.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὃν ἓν τέ ἐστὶ πού καὶ πολλὰ, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μέρη, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἀπείρον πλήθει.

φαίνεται.

ἄρ' οὐδ' οὐκ, ἐπεὶ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἑσχατά ἔχον;

ἀνάγκη.

τί δέ; εἰ ὅλον, οὐ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχῃ καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; ἢ οἷον τί ὅλον εἶναι ἀνευ τριῶν τούτων; καὶ οἷον τοῦ ἓν ὅτιον αὐτῶν ἀποστατή, ἐθελήσει ἐτι ὅλον εἶναι;

οὐκ ἐθελήσει.

| | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|------|
| [145b] “Then the one, it appears, will have a beginning, a middle, and an end.”
“It will.” | <i>beginning
middle end</i> | 2.57 |
| “But surely the middle is equally distant from the extremes for otherwise it would not be a middle.”

“No.” | Brumbaugh
2.054A
Theorem II | 2.58 |
| “And the one, apparently, being of such a nature, will partake of some shape, whether straight or round or a mixture of the two.”

“Yes, it will.” | <i>shape</i> | 2.59 |
| “This being the case, will not the one be in itself and in other?”

“How is that?” | Theorem III | 2.60 |
| “Each of the parts doubtless is in the whole and none is outside of the whole.”

“True.” | | 2.61 |

Par: And thus, **The One**, as it is **Reasonable**, will **Possess** a **Beginning**, an **End** and a **Middle**.

145B και δη το εν, ως εοικεν, αν εχαι αρχην και τελευτην και μεσον.

Ari: It will possess these. (εχαι.) (**Inherent Overall Symmetry**)

Par: Then **The Middle** will most certainly **Be Equally Distant** from **The Extremes**;

αλλα το μεσον μην γε ισον επεχει των εσχάτων:

for **It** could not be **The Middle** in any other way. (**Parmenides Poem, Fragment 8 42-44**)

γαρ αν ου ειη μεσον αλλως .

Ari: It could not. (γαρ ου.)

Par: And certainly, as it **Reasonable**, by **Being So Disposed**, **The One** will **Participate**

και δη , ως εοικε, ον τοιουτον το εν αν μετεχαι

of a **Certain Figure**, whether **Straight** or **Round**, or of a **Certain Mixture** from both.

τινος σχηματος ητοι ευθεος η στρογγυλου η τινος μικτου εξ αμφοιν.

Ari: For it will so participate. (γαρ αν μετεχαι.)

(**Kronos: The Monad of The Intellectual Gods/Hebdomad, 1253 (P40) Proclus Book 8**)

Par: Take notice then, by **Being Maintained** in this way, will **Self** not **Subsist**

145B-8 Ἀρ' οὖν εχον ουτως αυτο ουκ εσται

both **In-It-Self** and **In-Another?**

τε εν εαυτω και εν αλλω;

Ari: How? (πως;)

Par: For **Each One** of **The (Beginning-Middle-End/Future-Present-Past) Parts Is**, in some way,

εκαστον των μερων εστι που

In The Whole, and is *not in any way Outside* of **The Whole**.

εν τω ολω και ουδεν εκτος του ολου.

Ari: It is so. (ουτως.)

και αρχην δη, ως εοικεν, και τελευτην και μεσον εχαι αν το εν.

εχαι.

αλλα μην το γε μεσον ισον των εσχάτων απέχει: οὐ γάρ αν ἄλλως μεσον εἴη.

οὐ γάρ.

και σχήματος δη τινος, ως εοικε, τοιουτον ον μετέχαι αν το εν, ητοι ευθέος η στρογγύλου η τινος μεικτου εξ αμφοιν.

μετέχαι γάρ αν.

αρ' οὖν οὕτως εχον ουκ αυτο τε εν εαυτῳ εσται και εν ἄλλῳ;

πῶς;

των μερων που εκαστον εν τῳ ὅλῳ εστι και ουδεν εκτος του ὅλου.

οὕτω.

“And all the parts are included in the whole ?” 2.62

“Yes.” [145c]

“And surely the one is all its parts, neither more nor less than all.” 2.63

“Certainly.”

“But the whole is the one, is it not?” 2.64

“Of course.”

in itself

“Then if all the parts are in the whole and all the parts are the one 2.65
and the one is also the whole, and all the parts are included in the
whole, the one will be included in the one, and thus the one will be
in itself.”

“Evidently.”

Par: Thus *All The Parts Are Comprehended/Contained* by *The Whole*?

145C δε παντα τα μερη περιεχεται υπο του ολου;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: And certainly, *The One Is* indeed *All The Parts* of Self;

και μην το εν εστι γε παντα τα μερη αυτου,

and is *neither* any more, *nor* any less than *All*.

και ουτε τι πλεον ουτε ελαττον η παντα.

Ari: How could it not be. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that *The One, Is* also *The Whole*?

ουκουν το εν εστιν και το ολον;

Ari: How could it not be so? (πως δ' ου;)

Par: Accordingly then, if *All The Parts* happen to *Be In The Whole*, since *All*

αρα ει παντα τα μερη τυγχανει εν ολω, δε παντα

The Parts Are both *The One* and *It Is The Whole Self*, then since *All The Parts*

τα οντα τε το εν και εστι το ολον αυτο, δε παντα τα

Are Comprehended by *The Whole*, then *The One will Be Comprehended* by *The One*,

περιεχεται υπο του ολου, το εν αν περιεχοιτο υπο του ενος,

and in this way, *The One Self will already Be In-It-Self*.

και ουτως το εν αυτο αν ηδη ειη εν εαυτω.

Ari: It has so come to *Light*. (φαινεται.)

πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου περιέχεται;

ναί.

καὶ μὴν τὰ γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἓν ἐστι, καὶ οὔτε τι πλεον οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ πάντα.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἓν ἐστιν;

πῶς δ' οὔ;

εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἔστι δὲ τὰ τε πάντα τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἂν περιέχοιτο τὸ ἓν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη.

φαίνεται.

“But the whole is not in the parts, neither in all of them nor in any. 2.66
[145d] For if it is in all, it must be in one, for if it were wanting in
any one it could no longer be in all; for if this one is one of all, and
the whole is not in this one, how can it still be in all?”

“It cannot in any way.”

“Nor can it be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some 2.67
parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.”

“Yes, it is impossible.”

“But not being in one or several or all of the parts, it must be in 2.68
something else or cease to be anywhere at all?”

“It must.”

Par: But certainly in turn, **The Whole Is** indeed *not In The Parts*; *neither In All*,

145D ἀλλὰ μέντοι αὐτὸ ὅλον ἐστὶν γε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μερεσὶν, οὔτε ἐν πασὶν

nor In a Certain One. For if **It Were In All**, then **It** would **Necessarily** also **Be In One**: for if οὔτε ἐν τινὶ .γὰρ εἰ ἐν πασὶν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ: γὰρ

It Were not In a Certain One, then **It** would *indeed not* still **Be Able** to **Be**, somehow, *In All*; μὴ ἐν τινὶ ἐνὶ ἀν γε οὐκ ἐτι ὄν δύναίτο εἶναι ποῦ ἐν ἀπασιν;

but if on the one hand, **This One Is The One** of *All The Parts*, whereas on the other hand,

δὲ εἰ μὲν, τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπαντῶν, δὲ

The Whole Is not In This One, then how can **It** still indeed **Be In All The Parts**?

τὸ ὅλον μὴ ἐν τούτῳ ἐνὶ, πῶς ἐτι γε ἐνεστὶ ἐν πασὶν τοῖς;

Ari: In no way at all. (οὐδαμῶς.)

Par: Surely then, **It** cannot **Be In Any** of *The Parts*. For if **The Whole Were In Any**

μὴν οὐδὲ ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν. γὰρ εἰ τὸ ὅλον εἴη ἐν τισὶ

of *The Parts*, then **The Greater** would **Be In The Less**, which is **Impossible**.

τὸ πλεον ἂν εἴη ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον.

Ari: It is impossible. (γὰρ ἀδύνατον.)

Par: Then by not **Being In Many**, nor *In One*, nor *In All* of *The Parts*, then **Must** not

δ' μὴ ὄν ἐν πλεοσὶ μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ μηδ' ἐν ἀπασὶ τοῖς μερεσὶ οὐκ

The Whole Necessarily Be, *In some other way*, or cease to **Be** in any way at all?

τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἐν τινὶ ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἐτι εἶναι μηδαμοῦ;

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀνάγκη.)

ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον αὐτὸ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μερεσὶν ἐστὶν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν τινί. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ: ἐν τινὶ γὰρ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν ἐτι ποῦ δύναίτο ἐν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἐνὶ, πῶς ἐτι ἐν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται;

οὐδαμῶς.

οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν: εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἴη, τὸ πλεον ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι εἴη, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον.

ἀδύνατον γάρ.

μὴ ὄν δ' ἐν πλεοσὶν μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ μηδ' ἐν ἀπασὶ τοῖς μερεσὶ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἐτι εἶναι;

ἀνάγκη.

in something “And if it were nowhere, it would be nothing, but being a whole, since it is not in itself, it must be in something else, must it not?” [145e] 2.69

“Certainly.”

“Then the one, inasmuch as it is a whole, is in other and inasmuch as it is all its parts, it is in itself; and thus one must be both in itself and in other.” *in itself other* 2.70

“It must.”

“This being its nature, must not the one be both in motion and at rest?” Theorem IV 2.71

“How is that?”

Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, by **Being in no way at all, It** would

145E ουκουν μεν ον μηδαμου αν

be **nothing**, but on the other hand, by **Being Whole**, if indeed **It Is not In-Self**,

ειη ουδεν, δε ον ολον ειπερ εστιν ουκ εν αυτω,

then **It Must Necessarily Be In-Another**?

αναγκη ειναι εν αλλω;

Ari: By all means indeed. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, inasmuch as **The One Is Whole, It Is In-Another**,

αρα μεν η το εν ολον, εστιν εν αλλω

whereas on the other hand, by **Self Being In-It-Self**, **It** happens to **Be All The Parts**,

δε η αυτο οντα εν εαυτω τυγχανει παντα τα μερη,

and in this way **The One Self Must Necessarily Be** both **In-It-Self** and **In-Another**.

και ουτω το εν αυτο αναγκη ειναι τε εν εαυτω και εν ετερω.

Ari: It must be so. (αναγκη.)

Par: Surely then, since **The One Disposition Is-Established** in this way, is it not then

δη το εν πεφυκος εσταναι Ουτω ουκ αρ'

Necessary that **It** should also **Be Moved (In-Another)** and **Remain-Still (In-It-Self)**?

αναγκη και κινεισθαι και εσταναι ;

Ari: In what way? (πη;)

ουκοουν μηδαμου μεν ον ουδεν αν ειη, ολον δε ον, επειδι ουκ εν αυτω εστιν, αναγκη εν αλλω ειναι;

πανυ γε.

ηι μεν αρα το εν ολον, εν αλλω εστιν: η δε τα παντα μερη οντα τυγχανει, αυτο εν εαυτω: και ουτω το εν αναγκη αυτο τε εν εαυτω ειναι και εν ετερω.

αναγκη.

ουτω δι πεφυκος το εν αρ' ουκ αναγκη και κινεισθαι και εσταναι;

πη;

“It is at rest, no doubt, if it is in itself; for being in one, [146a] and not passing out from this, it is in the same, namely in itself.” 2.72

“It is.”

“But that which is always in the same, must always be at rest.” 2.73

“Certainly.”

“Well, then, must not, on the contrary, that which is always in other be never in the same, and being never in the same be not at rest, and being not at rest be in motion?” 2.74

“True.”

“Then the one, being always in itself and in other, must always be in motion and at rest.” *motion rest* 2.75

“That is clear.”

Par: On the one hand, **It** must somehow **Stand-still**, if indeed **Self Is In-It-Self**. For by
 μεν που εστηκε, ειπερ αυτο εστιν εν εαυτω. γαρ

Being In One and by not departing from **This**, **It** will **Be In-The Self**; that is, **In-It-Self**.

146A γαρ ον εν ενι και μη μεταβαινον εκ τουτου αν ειη εν τω αυτω, εν εαυτω.

Ari: It is so. (εστι γαρ.)

Par: But **That** which **Is** indeed **Always In The Self**, without a doubt, **Must Necessarily**
 δε το γε αι εν τω αυτω δηπου αναγκη

Always Be At-Rest. (αι ειναι εστος.)

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: What follows then? On the contrary, is it not **Necessary** that **That** which **Is**
 τι δε ; το εναντιον ου αναγκη το ον

Always In-Another Must Never Be In The Self? But if **It Never Is In The Self**,

αι εν ετερω μηδεποτ' ειναι εν τω αυτω, δε μηδεποτε ον εν τω αυτω

then neither **Can It Stand-still**. But if **It Cannot Stand-still**, then **It Must Be In-Motion**?

μηδε εσταναι, δε μη εστος κινεισθαι ;

Ari: It must be so. (ουτως.)

(Rhea: **The Monad of The 1st Triad of The Intellectual Hebdomad, 1254** (P45) Proclus **Book 8**)

Par: Accordingly then, by **The Self Always Being** both **In-It-Self** and **In-Another**,

146A-7 αρα αυτο αι ον τε εν εαυτω και εν ετερω,

then **The One Must Necessarily Always Be In-Motion**, and also **Always Be At-Rest**.

το εν αναγκη αι κινεισθαι τε και εσταναι.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

εστηκε μεν που, ειπερ αυτο εν εαυτω εστιν: εν γαρ ενι ον και εκ τουτου μη μεταβαινον εν τω αυτω αν
 ειη, εν εαυτω.

εστι γαρ.

το δε γε εν τω αυτω αι ον εστος δηπου αναγκη αι ειναι.

πανυ γε.

τι δε; το εν ετερω αι ον ου το εναντιον αναγκη μηδεποτ' εν ταυτω ειναι, μηδεποτε δε ον εν τω αυτω
 μηδε εσταναι, μη εστος δε κινεισθαι;

ουτως.

αναγκη αρα το εν, αυτο τε εν εαυτω αι ον και εν ετερω, αι κινεισθαι τε και εσταναι.

φαινεται.

| | | | |
|---------------------|---|-----------|------|
| | <p>“And again, it must be the same with itself and other than itself, [146b] and likewise the same with all other things and other than they, if what we have said is true.”</p> <p>“How is that?”</p> | Theorem V | 2.76 |
| | <p>“Everything stands to everything in one of the following relations: it is either the same or other; or if neither the same or other, its relation is that of a part to a whole or of a whole to a part.”</p> <p>“Obviously.”</p> | | 2.77 |
| | <p>“Now is the one a part of itself?”</p> <p>“By no means.”</p> | | 2.78 |
| - part whole itself | <p>“Then it cannot, by being a part in relation to itself, be a whole in relation to itself, as a part of itself.”</p> <p>“No, that is impossible.”</p> | | 2.79 |
| | <p>“Nor can it be other than itself.” [146c]</p> <p>“Certainly not.”</p> | | 2.80 |

(**Zeus: The Monad of The 2nd Triad of The Intellectual Hebdomad, 1255 (P50) Proclus Book 8**)

Par: And Self **Must** certainly **Be The Same** *With-It-Self* and **Other** *Than-It-Self*;

146B Και αυτο δει μην γε ειναι ταυτον εαυτω και ετερον εαυτου,
and similarly **Be The Same** and also **Other** *Than-The Others*, if indeed **It** also **Experiences**
και ωσαυτως ειναι ταυτον τε και ετερον τοις αλλοις, ειπερ και πεπονθεν

The Prior Relationships/Dispositions. (τα προσθεν.)

Ari: How? (πως;)

Par: *In some way, Everything Has to Be in this way in Relation to Everything.* For
που παν εχει ωδε προς απαν .

Is either **The Self/Same** *with* or **Other** *than something*: or if **It Is not The Same nor Other**,

εστιν η ταυτον η ετερον : η εαν μη ταυτον μηδ' η ετερον
then **It** will have **The Same Dynamic** that a **Part Has to** a **Whole** or that a **Whole Has to** a **Part**.
αν ειη ουτως μέρος εχει προς τουτου, η ως ολον αν ειη προς μέρος.

Ari: It has so come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

Par: Take notice then, **Is The One Self** a **Part** of Self?

αρ' ουν εστιν το εν αυτο μέρος αυτου;

Ari: Not at all. (ουδαμως.)

Par: Accordingly then, **Self** will not **Have** a **Whole** to **Part Relationship with It-Self**,

αρα αυτο αν ουδ' ειη ολον προς μέρος προς εαυτου

as if **It** were a **Part** of Self. (ως ον μέρος αυτου.)

Ari: That is not possible. (γαρ ου οιον τε.)

Par: But accordingly then, **Oneness/Unity** is **Other** than **The One**?

αλλ' αρα ενος(Genitive of εις) εστιν ετερον το εν;

Ari: Without a doubt. (ου δητα.)

και μην ταυτόν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ταυτόν τε καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν.

πῶς;

πάν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει, ἢ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον: ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ταυτόν ἢ μὴδ' ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὥς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἴη.

φαίνεται.

ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν;

οὐδαμῶς.

οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν.

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε.

ἀλλ' ἄρα ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐνὸς τὸ ἐν;

οὐ δητα.

| | | |
|---------------------|---|------|
| | — (no Loeb) | 2.81 |
| | — (no Loeb) | |
| <i>same itself</i> | “Then if it is neither other nor a part nor a whole in relation to itself, must it not therefore be the same with itself?” | 2.82 |
| | “It must.” | |
| | “Well, must not that which is in another place than itself—the self being in the same place with itself—be other than itself, if it is to be in another place?” | 2.83 |
| | “I think so.” | |
| 2.70 | “Now we saw that this was the case with one, for it was <i>in</i> itself and <i>in</i> other at the same time.” | 2.84 |
| | “Yes, we saw that it was so.” | |
| <i>other itself</i> | “Then by this reasoning the one appears to be other than itself.” | 2.85 |
| | [146d] “So it appears.” | |

(Ocean: The Seventh Intellectual Monad, 1255 (P53) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Accordingly then, nor can **Unity/Oneness** indeed be **Other than It-Self**.

146C αρα ουδ' αν γε ειη ετερον εαυτου.

Ari: Certainly not. (μεντοι ου.)

Par: Therefore, if **Self Is** neither **Other** nor a **Whole** nor a **Part in Relation to It-Self**,

 ουν ει αυτο εστιν μητε ετερον μηθ' ολον μητε μερος προς εαυτο,
then **Self Must Necessarily not** already **Be, The Same with It-Self?**

 αυτο αναγκη ουκ ηδη ειναι ταυτον εαυτω;

Ari: It must. (αναγκη.)

Par: What then? By **Self Being In The Self**, is not **That** which **Is elsewhere than with It-Self**

 τι δε; αυτο οντος εν τω αυτω ουκ το ον ετερωθι εαυτω

Necessarily Be Other than It-Self, if indeed **Self** will also **Be elsewhere than with It-Self?**

 αναγκη ειναι ετερον εαυτου, ειπερ αυτο και εσται ετερωθι εαυτου;

Ari: It so appears to me at least. (δοκει εμοιγε.)

Par: **In this way**, as it has come to **Light, The One Being** certainly **Has** to **Be At-Once**,

 ουτω εφανε το εν ον μην εχον αμα

both **In-It-Self** and **In-Another?** (τε εν εαυτου και εν ετερω;)

Ari: For it has come to **Light**. (γαρ εφανε.)

Par: Accordingly then, as it is likely, from this account **The One** will **Be Other than It-Self**.

 αρα , ως εοικεν, ταυτη το εν αν ειη ετερον εαυτου.

Ari: It is likely. (εοικεν.)

(loeb greek) ουδ' αρα εαυτου γε ετερον αν ειη.

(loeb greek) ου μεντοι.

ει ουν μητε ετερον μητε ολον μητε μέρος αυτο προς εαυτο εστιν, ουκ αναγκη ηδη ταυτον ειναι αυτο
εαυτω;

αναγκη.

τι δε; το ετέρωθι ον αυτο εαυτου εν τω αυτω οντος εαυτω ουκ αναγκη αυτο εαυτου

ετερον ειναι, ειπερ και ετέρωθι εσται;

εμοιγε δοκει.

ουτω μην εφανε εχον το εν, αυτο τε εν εαυτω ον αμα και εν ετέρω.

εφανε γαρ.

ετερον αρα, ως εοικεν, ειη ταυτη αν εαυτου το εν.

εοικεν.

“Well then, if a thing is other than something, will it not be other than that which is other than it?” 2.86

“Certainly.”

“Are not all things which are not one, other than one, and the one other than the not one?” 2.87

“Of course.”

other others

“Then the one would be other than the others.” 2.88

“Yes, it is other.”

“Consider; are not the absolute same and the absolute other opposites of one another?” 2.89

“Of course.”

“Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?” 2.90

“No.”

Par: What follows then? If *Anything Is Other from Another*,

146D τι ουν; ει τι εστιν ετερον του,

will *It* not *Be Other from That* to which *It Is Being Other*?

εσται ουχ ετερον οντος ετερου;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Parmenides: 16 Is it not the case then, that *As many as Are Not-One*,

Ουκουν οσα εστιν μη εν,

So many Are Other than *The One*; and is not *The One Other* from *Those* that *are Not-One*?

απανθ' ετερα του ενος, και το εν των μη εν;

Aristotle: How could it not be? (πως δ' ου;)

Par: Accordingly then, *The One* will be *Other* than *The Others*.

αρα το εν αν ειη ετερον των αλλων.

Ari: It is other. (ετερον.)

Par: *See* then; are not both *The Self/Same* and *The Other Opposite* to each other?

ορα δη: αρ' ουκ τε ταυτον και το ετερον εναντια αλληλοις;

Ari: How could they not be? (πως δ' ου;)

Par: Therefore, will *The Self/Same* ever *Be Truly Disposed In The Other*, or *The Other*

ουν ταυτον ποτε ειναι η εθελησει εν τω ετερω η το ετερον

In The Self/Same? (εν ταυτω;)

Ari: They will not be so disposed. (ουκ εθελησει.)

τί οὖν; εἴ τοῦ τι ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἑτέρου ὄντος ἕτερον ἔσται;

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἓν ἐστιν, ἅπανθ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἓν;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων.

ἕτερον.

ὄρα δὴ: αὐτό τε ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἄρ' οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ἢ οὖν ἐθελήσει ταῦτόν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν ταύτῳ ποτε εἶναι;

οὐκ ἐθελήσει.

“Then if the other can never be in the same, there is no existing thing [146e] in which the other is during any time; for if it were in anything during any time whatsoever, the other would be in the same, would it not?” 2.91

“Yes, it would.”

“But since the other is never in the same, it can never be in any existing thing.” 2.92

“True.”

“Then the other cannot be either in the not one or in the one.” 2.93

“No, it cannot.”

“Then not by reason of the other will the one be other than the not one or the not one other than the one.” 2.94

“No.”

“And surely they cannot by reason of themselves be other than one another, if they do not partake of the other.” [147a] 2.95

“Of course not.”

Par: Accordingly then, **if The Other** will **Never Be In The Self/Same**, then there **Are None** of
 αρα ει το ετερον μηδεποτε εσται εν ταυτω, εστι ουδεν

The Beings In which The Other Ever Subsists. For if **It Were** in **any Being at any time at all**,

146E των οντων εν ω το ετερον ουδενα χρονον εστιν. γαρ ει ειη εν τω οντιουν

then at that time, The Other would **also Be In The Self/Same**. Or is it not so?

τον εκεινον χρονον, το ετερον αν ειη εν ταυτω . ουχ ουτως;

Ari: It would be so. (ουτως.)

Par: But since **It Is** never **In The Self/Same**, **The Other** will never **Be In** any of **The Beings**.

δ' επειδη εστιν ουδεποτε εν τω αυτω, το ετερον αν ουδεποτε ειη εν τινι των οντων.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The Other** will not **Be In Those** that **Are Not-One**, nor **In The One**.

αρα το ετερον αν ουτ' ειη εν τοις μη εν ουτε εν τω ενι.

Ari: It will not be so. (γαρ ου συν.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One**, will indeed **not Be Other** from **Those** that **Are Not-One**

nor **The Beings** which **Are Not-One Be Other** than **The One** by **That** which is **Other**.

ουδε τα μη εν ετερα του ενος τω ετερω.

Ari: Indeed not. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Then **They** will not **Be Other** than **Each Other** by not **Participating** of **The Other**.

γε μην εαυτοις αν ουδε ειη ετερ' αλληλων μη μετεχοντα του ετερου.

Ari: How can they? (πως γαρ;)

ει ἄρα τὸ ἕτερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν τὸ ἕτερον χρόνον
 οὐδένα: εἰ γὰρ ὄντινον εἶη ἐν τῷ, ἐκεῖνον ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν ταύτῳ εἶη τὸ ἕτερον. οὐχ οὕτως;
 οὕτως.

ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστίν, οὐδέποτε ἔν τινι τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἶη τὸ ἕτερον.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἐν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ ἐνείῃ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐκ ἄρα τῷ ἑτέρῳ γ' ἂν εἶη τὸ ἐν τῶν μὴ ἐν οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἐν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερα.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἕτερ' ἂν εἶη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑτέρου.

πῶς γάρ;

“But if they are not other than one another either by reason of themselves or by reason of the other, will it not be quite impossible for them to be other than one another at all?” 2.96

“Quite impossible.”

“But neither can the not one partake of the one; for in that case they would not be not one, but would be one.” 2.97

“True.”

“Nor can the not one be a number; for in that case, too, since they would possess number, they would not be not one at all.” 2.98

“No, they would not.”

“Well, then, are the not one parts of the one? Or would the not one in that case also partake of the one?” 2.99

“Yes, they would partake of it.”

Par: But if **They** are neither **Other from-Them Selves**, nor **from The Other**, then **Must**
 147A δε ει εστι μητε ετερα αυτοις μητε τω ετερω, αν μη
They not **Already Entirely Flee** from (Phaedo 104c) **That** which **Is Other from Each Other?**
 ου ηδη παντη εκφευγοι το ειναι ετερα αλληλων;

Ari: They must flee. (εκφευγοι.)

Par: Most certainly then, neither will **Those** that are **Not-One Participate** of **The One**;
 γε μην αλλα ουδε τα μη εν μετεχει του ενος:
 for if **They** did, then **They** would no longer **Be Not-One**, but *in a certain way* **Be One**.
 γαρ αν αν ου ην μη εν αλλα πη εν.

Ari: **True**. (αληθη.)

Par: Accordingly then, **Those** that are **Not-One** will not **Be Number**; for in this way,
 αρα τα μη εν αν ουδ' ειη αριθμος; γαρ ουτω
 by indeed **Possessing Number**, **They** could not *entirely* **Be**, **Not-One**.
 γε εχοντα αριθμον αν πανταπασιν ην μη εν

Ari: Certainly not. (γαρ ουν ου.)

Par: What follows then? **Are Those** that are **Not-One**, **Parts** of **The One**? Or would **Those**
 τι δε; εστιν τα μη εν μορια του ενος; η καν τα
 that are **Not-One**, by **Possessing Number in this (Negative) way**, **Partake** of **The One**?
 μη εν αρα ουτω μετειχε του ενος;

Ari: They would so participate. (μετειχεν.)

ει δε μήτε αὐτοῖς ἕτερα ἔστι μήτε τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οὐ πάντῃ ἤδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων;
 ἐκφεύγοι.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἑνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἓν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἓν ἦν, ἀλλὰ πῃ ἂν ἓν ἦν.
 ἀληθῆ.

οὐδ' ἂν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἓν: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἓν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμὸν γε ἔχοντα.
 οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

τί δέ; τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνός ἄρα μόριά ἐστιν; ἢ κἂν οὕτω μετείχε τοῦ ἑνός τὰ μὴ ἓν;
 μετείχεν.

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| <p>- <i>part whole</i>
- <i>one not one</i></p> | <p>[147b] “If, then, in every way the one is one and the not one are not one, the one cannot be a part of the not one, nor a whole of which the not one are parts, nor are the not one parts of the one, nor a whole of which the one is a part.”</p> <p>“No.”</p> | 2.100 |
| 2.77 | <p>“But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, are the <i>same</i> as one another.”</p> <p>“Yes, we did.”</p> | 2.101 |
| <i>same</i> | <p>“Shall we say, then, that since the relations of the one and the not one are such as we have described, the two are the same as one another?”</p> <p>“Yes, let us say that.”</p> | 2.102 |
| | <p>“The one, then, is, it appears, other than all other things and than itself, and is also the same as other things and as itself.” [147c]</p> <p>“That appears to be the result of our argument.”</p> | <p><i>other same</i>
<i>other itself</i> 2.103</p> |

Par: Accordingly then on the one hand, if **The (Positive) One Is entirely One**, then

147B αρα μεν ει το εν εστι παντη δε
in relation to Those that are **Not-One**; **The One** will not **Be** a **Part** of **Those** that are **Not-One**,

τα μη εν, το εν αν ουτ' ειη μοριον των μη εν
 nor could **The One Be** a **Whole in relation to Them**, as if **They** were **Parts**; nor in turn, will
 ουτε ολον ως μοριων : ουτε αυ

Those that are **Not-One Be Parts** of **The One**, nor **Wholes**, just as if **The One Were** a **Part**.

τα μη εν μορια του ενος, ουτε ολα ως τω ενι μοριω.

Ari: They will not. (γαρ ου.)

Par: But we have certainly said that **Those** that **Are** neither **Parts** nor **Wholes**,

αλλα μην εφαμεν τα μητε μορια μητε ολα

nor **Other** from **Each Other**, will have to **Be The Same** with **Each Other**.

μητε ετερα αλληλων εσεσθαι ταυτα αλληλοις.

Ari: For we have said so. (γαρ εφαμεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, shall we also say that **The One Has The Relationship to**

αρα και φωμεν το εν εχον προς

Those that **Are Not-One, in the same way as The Self Has** to **Be** to Selves?

τα μη εν ουτως το αυτο ειναι αυτοις;

Ari: We must say so. (φωμεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One**, as it is **Reasonable, Is** both **Other/Different**

αρα το εν, ως εοικεν, εστιν τε ετερον

from The Others and *from It Self* and **The Self/Same as Those** and *with It Self*.

των αλλων και εαυτου και ταυτον εκεινοις τε και εαυτω.

Ari: It has indeed come to **Light** from this **Logos** to venture saying it.

147C γε φαινεσθαι εκ του λογου κινδυνευει.

εἰ ἄρα πάντῃ τὸ μὲν ἔν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔν, οὐτ' ἂν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἔν τὸ ἐν εἴη οὔτε ὅλον ὡς μορίων· οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἔν τοῦ ἐνὸς μόρια, οὔτε ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ τῷ ἐνί.

οὐ γάρ.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήτε ὅλα μήτε ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ταῦτ' ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις.

ἔφαμεν γάρ.

φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἔν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς;

φῶμεν.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ.

κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου.

| | | | |
|--|---|------------|-------|
| | “Is it, then, also like and unlike itself and others?” | Theorem VI | 2.104 |
| | “Perhaps.” | | |
| 2.86.2.88 | “At any rate, since it was found to be <i>other</i> than others, the others must also be <i>other</i> than it.” | | 2.105 |
| | “Of course.” | | |
| <i>other others</i>
<i>others other</i> | “Then it is other than the others just as the others are other than it, neither more nor less?” | | 2.106 |
| | “Certainly.” | | |
| | “And if neither more nor less, then in like degree?” | | 2.107 |
| | “Yes.” | | |
| | “In so far as it is so affected as to be other than the others and the others are affected in the same way in relation to the one, to that degree the one will be affected [147d] in the same way as the others and the others in the same way as the one.” | | 2.108 |
| | “What do you mean?” | | |

(The Assimilative/Leading/Super-Kosmic Gods, 1255 (P55) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Take notice then, **Is It** also **Like** and **Unlike It-Self** and **Like** and **Unlike The Others**?

147C–2 Ἀρ' οὖν και ὁμοιον τε και ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε και τοῖς ἄλλοις;

Ari: Perhaps. (ἴσως.)

Par: Seeing that **The One Has** come to **Light Other/Different from The Others**,

ἐπειδὴ ἐφάνη ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων,

then surely **The Others** will also **Be Other/Different in some (indefinite) way from That**.

γουν ταλλα ἀν και εἴη ἕτερ' οὗ ἐκείνου.

Ari: What next then? (τι μὲν;)

Par: *In the same way*, will not **The One Be Other/Different from The Others**, just as

οὕτως οὐκοῦν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ

The Others Are also **Different from That**, and **It** is neither *more* nor *less* (in this **Difference**)?

ταλλα και ἐκείνου, και οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἥττον;

Ari: How could it not be so? (τι ἀν γάρ;)

Par: Accordingly then, if **It** is neither *more* nor *less*, **They Are Different** in a *similar* way.

ἀρα εἰ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἥττον, ὁμοίως.

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

Par: Is it not so then, that inasmuch as **The One experiences Being Different than The Others**,

οὐκοῦν ἡ πεπονθεν εἶναι ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων

and **The Others also than The One**, then *in this way* **The One** will also *experience Being*

και ταλλα ὡσαύτως ἐκείνου ταύτη ἀν πεπονθότα εἶεν

The Self/Same both *in relation to The Others* and *The Others in relation to The One*.

147D ταυτον τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις και ταλλα τῷ ἐνι.

Ari: What do you mean? (πῶς λέγεις;)

ἀρ' οὖν και ὁμοίον τε και ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε και τοῖς ἄλλοις;

ἴσως.

ἐπειδὴ γοὺν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, και τᾶλλα οὗ ἕτερα ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη.

τί μὲν;

οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ και τᾶλλα ἐκείνου, και οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἥττον;

τί γὰρ ἂν;

εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἥττον, ὁμοίως.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν ἢ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων και τᾶλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως, ταύτη ταυτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις και τᾶλλα τῷ ἐνί.

πῶς λέγεις;

- “I will explain. You give a particular name to a thing?” 2.109
- “Yes.”
- “Well, you can utter the same name once or more than once?” 2.110
- “Yes.”
- “And do you name that to which the name belongs when you utter it 2.111
once, but not when you utter it many times? Or must you always mean
the same thing when you utter the same name, whether once or
repeatedly?”
- “The same thing, of course.”
- “The word other is the name of something, is it not?” 2.112
- “Certainly.”

Par: The following. Do you not *assign* every *Name* to something?

ὥδε . οὐκ καλεῖς ἑκάστων τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπὶ τινὶ;

Ari: I do at least. (ἐγὼ γε.)

Par: What follows then? Can you *pronounce The Self/Same Name* either often or once?

τί οὖν; ἂν εἴποις τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα πλεονάκις ἢ ἀπαξ;

Aris I can at least. (ἐγὼ γε.)

Par: Therefore on the one hand, do you *Name That* to which the name *belongs*, when

οὖν μὲν πότερον εἰπῆς οὐπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐστὶ ἐὰν

you say *It* once; but *not* on the other hand, when you say that *Name* often? Or rather,

προσαγορεύεις ἀπαξ, οὐκ δὲ ἐὰν ἐκεῖνο πολλάκις; ἢ πολλὰ

must you *always mean The Same Name* whether you utter *The Same Name* once or often?

ἀνάγκη σε αἰεὶ λέγειν ταῦτον ὄνομα ἐάντε φθῆγῃ ταῦτον ἀπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις;

Ari: Of course, what follows then? (μὴν τι;)

Par: Is it not the case then, that *Another Name* also *belongs* to some particular?

οὐκοῦν τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομα καὶ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τινὶ.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)

ὥδε: ἑκάστων τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπὶ τινὶ καλεῖς;

ἔγωγε.

τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκις ἢ ἀπαξ;

ἔγωγε.

πότερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἀπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεις οὐπὲρ ἐστὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; ἢ ἐάντε ἀπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις ταῦτον ὄνομα φθῆγῃ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταῦτον καὶ λέγειν αἰεὶ;

τί μὴν;

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τινὶ;

πάνυ γε.

name

[147e] “Then when you utter it, whether once or many times, you apply it to nothing else, and you name nothing else, than that of which it is the name.”

2.113

“Assuredly.”

“Now when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one is other than the others, though we use the word other twice, we do not for all that apply it to anything else, but we always apply it to that nature of which it is the name.”

2.114

“Certainly.”

Par: Accordingly then, when you utter **Self** whether once or often, you do *not apply* the **Name**
 147E αρα όταν φθενηται αυτο, εαντε απαξ εαντε πολλακις, ουκ ονομαζεις
 to nothing else, *nor mean* anything else, than **That** to which the **Name belongs**.

επ' αλλω ουδε αλλο τι η εκεινο ουπερ ονομα ην.

Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

Par: Surely then when we **say**, on the one hand, that **The Others Are Other from The One**,
 δη όταν λεγωνεν μεν οτι ταλλα ετερον του ενος,

and on the other hand, that **The One Is Other from The Others**, by **saying Other Twice**,
 δε το εν ετερον των αλλων, ειποντες το ετερον δις

we still *signify* nothing else, but **That Nature** of which **This Name is Always The Self/Same**.
 μαλλον λεγομεν ουδεν τι επ' αλλη, αλλ' τη φυσει ησπερ επ' εκεινη τουνομα ην αι αυτο.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

όταν ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, ἔαντε ἅπαξ ἔαντε πολλαῖς, οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὐπερ
 ἦν ὄνομα.

ἀνάγκη.

όταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν τᾶλλα τοῦ ενός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, δις τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόντες
 οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἄλλῃ, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ αἰ λέγομεν ἥσπερ ἦν τοῦνομα.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

| | | |
|-------------|--|-------|
| | [148a] “In so far as the one is other than the others and the others are
other than the one, the one and the others are not in different states,
but in the same state; but whatever is in the <i>same state</i> is like, is it
not?” | 2.115 |
| 1.59 1.08 | “Yes.” | |
| | “Then in so far as the one is in the state of being other than the
others, just so far everything is like all other things; for everything is
other than all other things.” | 2.116 |
| <i>like</i> | “So it appears.” | |
| | “But the like is opposed to the unlike.” | 2.117 |
| | “Yes.” | |
| | “And the other to the same.” | 2.118 |
| | “That is also true.” | |
| 2.101 | “But this, too, was shown, that the one is the <i>same</i> as the
others.” [148b] | 2.119 |
| | “Yes, it was.” | |

Par: Accordingly then, inasmuch as **The One Is Other from The Others**, and **The Others**

148A αρα η το εν ετερον των αλλων και ταλλα
from **The One**, by *having experienced* **The Other Self**, otherwise, **The One** will not

του ενος, κατ' πεπονθεναι το ετερον αυτο αλλα το εν αν ουκ
experience **Being Other**, but **Be The Self/Same** as **The Others**. But **Is** not **That** which
πεπονθος αλλο ειη το αυτο τοις αλλοις; δε ουχι το

experiences **The Self/Same in some way Similar?**

πεπονθος ταυτον που ομοιον;

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

Par: Surely then inasmuch as **The One experiences That** which **Is Other from All The Others**,

δη η το εν πεπονθεν ειναι ετερον των αλλων
then **Absolutely All The Others** will **Be Similar** to **This Self**; for **All Are Other from All**.
απαν απασιν αν ειη ομοιον τουτο αυτο; γαρ απαν εστιν ετερον απαντων.

Ari: It is **Reasonable**. (εοικεν.)

Parmenides: 17 But surely then, **The Like Is** indeed contrary to **The Unlike**.

Αλλα δη το ομοιον γε εναντιον τω ανομοιω.

Aristotle: Yes. (ναί.)

Par: Is it not also the case, that **The Other/Different Is** contrary to **The Self/Same?**

ουκουν και το ετερον τω ταυτω.

Ari: And this also. (και τουτο.)

Par: But certainly this was indeed also shown; that in an according way,

αλλα μην τουτο γ' και εφανε ως αρα

The One Is The Self/Same with The Others.

το εν ταυτον τοις αλλοις.

Ari: For it has come to **Light**. (γαρ εφανε.)

ἢ ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἕτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν
πεπονθὸς εἶη τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις; τὸ δὲ πού ταῦτόν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον; οὐχί;

ναί.

ἢ ἢ δὴ τὸ ἐν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασιν ὅμοιον ἂν εἶη; ἅπαν γὰρ ἀπάντων
ἕτερόν ἐστιν.

εοικεν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ ἐναντίον.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ταύτῳ.

καὶ τοῦτο.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γ' ἐφάνη, ὥς ἄρα τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ταῦτόν.

ἐφάνη γάρ.

“And being the same as the others is the opposite of being other than the others.” 2.120

“Certainly.”

2.115 “In so far as it was other it was shown to be *like*.” 2.121

“Yes.”

“Then in so far as it is the same it will be unlike, since it has a quality which is the opposite of the quality which makes it like, for the other made it like.” 2.122

“Yes.”

unlike “Then the same will make it unlike; otherwise the same will not be the opposite of the other.” [148c] 2.123

“So it appears.”

Par: But to **Be The Self/Same with The Others** is indeed the opposite *experience*

148B δε ειναι το ταυτον τοις αλλοις εστι γε τουναντιον παθος
from that to **Be Other from The Others**.

τω ειναι ετερον των αλλων.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Most certainly, insofar as **The One Is Other**, **It** has come to **Light** to **Be Like**.

γε μην η ετερον, εφανη ομοιον.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, insofar as **It Is The Self/Same**, **It** will **Be Unlike**,

αρα η ταυτον εσται ανομοιον

by *experiencing the experience* that **Is** opposite to **That** which *makes It Like*.

κατα παθει παθος τουναντιον τω ομοιουντι .

Whereas on the other hand, **The Other in some way made It Like?**

δε το ετερον που ωμοιου;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, **That** which **Is The Self/Same** will *make It Unlike*;

αρα το ταυτον ανομοιωσει,

otherwise **The Same** will *not Be* opposite to **The Other**.

η ουκ εσται εναντιον τω ετερω.

Ari: It is reasonable. (εοικεν.)

τουναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταῦτόν τοις ἄλλοις τῷ ἑτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων.

πάνυ γε.

ἦι γε μὴν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον ἐφάνη.

ναί.

ἦι ἄρα ταῦτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τουναντίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιῶντι πάθει. ὁμοίου δέ που τὸ ἕτερον;

ναί.

ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τὸ ταῦτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

ἔοικεν.

“Then the one will be both like and unlike the others, like in so far as it is other, unlike in so far as it is the same.” 2.124

“Yes, that sort of conclusion seems to be tenable.”

“But there is another besides.” 2.125

“What is it?”

like unlike

“In so far as it is in the same state, the one is not in another state, and not being in another state it is not unlike, and not being unlike it is like but in so far as it is in another state, it is of another sort, and being of another sort it is unlike.” 2.126

“True.”

“Then the one, because it is the same as the others and because it is other than the others, for both these reasons or for either of them would be both like and unlike the others.” [148d] *like unlike others* 2.127

“Certainly.”

Par: Accordingly then, **The One** will **Be** both **Like** and **Unlike The Others**. On the one hand,
 148C ἀρα το ἐν ἐστὶ ὁμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις, μὲν
 insofar as **It Is Other**, **It** will **Be Like**; but on the other hand, insofar as **It Is Same**, **Unlike**.
 ἢ ἕτερον, ὁμοιον, δὲ ἢ ταυτον, ἀνόμοιον.

Ari: As it is reasonable, and according to **This Logos**, it surely has to be so.
 ὡς εἰκεν, καὶ γὰρ τοιούτον λόγον, δὴ ἔχει οὖν.

Par: For **The One** also has to **Be** in the following way.
 γὰρ καὶ ἔχει τόνδε.

Ari: In what way? (τίνα;)

Par: Insofar as **It experiences Being The Same**, **It does not experience alteration**; whereas if
 ἢ πεπονθε ταυτον, μὴ πεπονθεναι ἄλλοιον, δὲ

It does not experience alteration, **It Cannot Be Unlike**; but if **It Is not Unlike**, **It Is Like**;
 μὴ πεπονθος ἄλλοιον μὴ ἀνόμοιον, δὲ μὴ ἀνόμοιον: εἶναι ὁμοιον:
 but insofar as **It experiences Being Other**, then **It experiences alteration**, thus by **Being**
 δ' ἢ πεπονθεν ἄλλο αἰλλοιον, δὲ ὄν
 altered **It Is Unlike**. (ἀλλοιον εἶναι ἀνόμοιον.)

Ari: You speak **The Truth**. (λέγεις ἀληθῆ.)

Par: Accordingly then, since **The One Being Is** both **The Same** and **Other from The Others**,
 ἀρα ὅτι τὸ ἐν ὄν ἐστὶ τε ταυτον καὶ ἕτερον τοῖς ἄλλοις,
 according to both and according to each, thus, **It** will **Be** both **Like** and **Unlike The Others**.
 148D κατ' ἀμφοτέρα καὶ καθ' ἑκάτερον, ἀν εἴη τε ὁμοιον καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)

ὁμοιον ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἔσται τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ μὲν ἕτερον, ὁμοιον, ἢ δὲ ταυτόν, ἀνόμοιον.

ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δὴ, ὡς εἰκεν, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον.

καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει.

τίνα;

ἢ ταυτόν πέπονθε, μὴ ἄλλοιον πέπονθέναι, μὴ ἄλλοιον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὁμοιον
 εἶναι: ἢ δ' ἄλλο πέπονθεν, ἄλλοιον, ἄλλοιον δὲ ὄν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι.

ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ταυτόν τε ἄρα ὄν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, κατ' ἀμφοτέρα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον, ὁμοιόν τε ἂν
 εἶη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις.

πάνυ γε.

“And likewise, since it has been shown to be other than itself and *like unlike itself* 2.128
the same as itself, the one will for both these reasons or for either of
them be both like and unlike itself.”

“That is inevitable.”

“Now, then, consider the question whether the one touches or does 2.129
not touch itself and other things.”

“I am considering.”

2.65 “The one was shown, I think, to be *in the whole* of itself.” 2.130

“Right.”

2.70 “And the one is also *in other* things?” 2.131

“Yes.”

Par: And in a similar way, is **This** not the case, *in relation to-Itself*, **Seeing** that **The One**

και ωσαύτως ουκουν εαυτω επειπερ

Being has come to **Light** both **Other from-It-Self** and **The Same with-It-Self**;

εφάνη τε ετερον εαυτου και ταυτον εαυτω,

according to both and according to each, thus, **It** will come to **Light** both **Like** and **Unlike**?

κατ' αμφοτερα και κατα εκατερον φανησεται τε ομοιον και ανομοιον;

Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

(**The Unpolluted/Liberated/Super-Kosmic & Kosmic Middle Order of Gods**, (P58) Proclus)

Par: What then? Consider how **The One Has** to **Be in relation to Grasping/Touching**,

148D-6 Τι δη δε; σκοπει, πως το εν εχει περι απτεσθαι

according to **The Self** and to **The Others**, and then *in relation to not Grasping/Touching*.

περι του αυτου και των αλλων και του μη απτεσθαι.

Ari: I so consider. (σκοπω.)

Par: For **The One Being** has come to **Light in some way In The Whole It-Self**.

γαρ το εν ον εφάνη που εν ολω εαυτω.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that **The One Is** also **In The Others**?

ουκουν το εν και εν τοις αλλοις;

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐαυτῷ ὡσαύτως, ἐπεὶ περ ἕτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατ' ἀμφοτέρα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται;

ἀνάγκη.

τί δὲ δὴ; περὶ τοῦ ἄπτεσθαι τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄπτεσθαι πέρι πῶς ἔχει, σκόπει.

σκοπῶ.

αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν ἐαυτῷ ὅλω τὸ ἐν ἐφάνη ὄν.

ὀρθῶς.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἔν;

ναί.

“Then by reason of being in the others [148e] it would touch them, 2.132
and by reason of being in itself it would be prevented from touching
the others, but would touch itself, since it is in itself.”

“That is clear.”

touch itself others “Thus the one would touch itself and the other things.” 2.133

“It would.”

“But how about this? Must not everything which is to touch 2.134
anything be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy that
position which, being next to that of the other, touches it?”

“It must.”

next to position “Then the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie next to itself and 2.135
occupy the position next to that in which it is.”

“Yes, it must.”

Par: Thus on the one hand insofar as **The One Is In Others, It** will **Grasp The Others**;

148E αρα μεν η εν τοις αλλοις, αν απτοιτο των αλλων:

but insofar as **Self Is In It-Self**, on the one hand, **It** will be kept from **Grasping The Others**,

δε η αυτο εν εαυτω, μεν απειργοιτο απτεσθαι των αλλων,

whereas on the other hand, **Self** will **Grasp Self**, by **Being In It-Self**.

δε αυτο αν απτοιτο αυτου ον εν εαυτω.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

Par: In this way then, on the one hand, **The One** will **Grasp** both **Self** and **The Others**.

ουτω δη μεν το εν αν απτοιτο τε αυτου και των αλλων.

Ari: It will so grasp. (απτοιτο.)

Par: But on the other hand, what about the following? **Must** not **Everything** which is about

δε τι τηδε ; αρ' δει ου παν το μελλον

to **Grasp Anything**, be situated next to *That* which **It** is about to **Grasp**, by **Filling-up**

αψεσθαι τινος κεισθαι εφεξης εκεινω ου μελλει απτεσθαι, κατεχον

That Same Place, which lies **Besides That**, so as to **Grasp It?** (Direct Contact,

την ταυτην εδραν η αν κηται μετ' η εκεινην, η απτεσθαι; (No Intermediary)

Ari: It must. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, if **The One Self** were also about to **Grasp Self**, then **It** must be situated

αρα ει το εν αυτο και μελλει αψεσθαι αυτου, δει κεισθαι

Immediately Next to It-Self; by **Filling-up That Neighboring Place, In-which, Self Is**.

ευθυς μεθ' εαυτο, κατεχον εκεινης χωραν την εχομενην εν η αυτο εστιν.

Ari: It must do so. (γαρ δει ουν.)

ἢ ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἄπτοιτο ἄν: ἢ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἄπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄπτοιτο ἄν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν.

φαίνεται.

οὕτω μὲν δι' ἄπτοιτο ἄν τὸ ἐν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ἄπτοιτο.

τί δὲ τῇδε; ἄρ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἄψεσθαί τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κείσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὐ μέλλει ἄπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἔδραν κατέχον ἢ ἄν μετ' ἐκείνην ἢ ἔδρα ἢ ἄν κέηται, ἄπτεται;

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἄψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθὺς μετὰ ἑαυτὸ κείσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης ἐν ἢ αὐτό ἐστιν.

δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

[149a] “The one, then, might do this if it were two, and might be in two places at once; but so long as it is one, it will not?” 2.136

“No, it will not.”

- *touch itself* “The one can no more touch itself than it can be two.” 2.137

“No.”

“Nor, again, will it touch the others.” 2.138

“Why not?”

1.34 “Because, as we agreed, that which is to touch anything must be *outside* of that which it is to touch, and *next to* it, and there must be no third between them.” 2.139

“True.”

contact “Then there must be two, at least, if there is to be contact.” 2.140

“There must.”

Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, if **The One Being** were **made Two**; then

149A ουκ ουν μεν το εν ον ποιησειεν δυο

These Two Selves could also **come-to-Be** in **Two Places at the same time**; but on the other

ταυτα αν και γενοιτο εν δυοιν χωραιν αμα : δ'

hand, as long as and inasmuch as **It Is One**, **It will not Be** so Disposed?

, εως η εν ουκ εθελήσει ;

Ari: It will not do so. (γαρ ου ουν.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The Self/Same Necessity Applies** to **The One**;

αρα η αυτη αναγκη τω ενι

so that **It** can neither **Be Two**, nor can **Self Be Grasped** by **Self**.

μητε ειναι δυο μητε αυτου απτεσθαι αυτω.

Ari: The Self/Same necessity. (η αυτη.)

Par: Certainly then, **It** will not **Grasp The Others**.

μην αλλ' ουδε αψεται των αλλων.

Ari: Why then? (τι δη;)

Par: For we say that, **That** which is about to **Grasp**, must be **Separate** from **That**, by **Being**

φαμεν οτι, το μελλον αψεσθαι δει ειναι χωρις εκεινω ον

next to **That** which **It Is** about to **Grasp**; thus there **Is no Third Term Between Them Selves**.

εφεξης ου μελλει αψεσθαι, δε ειναι μηδεν τριτον εν μεσω αυτων.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: Accordingly then, at the very least **Two Terms Are Necessary**, if **Contact** is about to be.

αρα ολιγιστον δυο το ειναι δει, ει αψις μελλει ειναι.

Ari: It is necessary. (δει.)

οὐκοῦν δύο μὲν ὃν τὸ ἐν ποιήσειεν ἂν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἅμα γένοιτο: ἕως δ' ἂν ᾗ ἓν, οὐκ ἐθελήσει;

οὐ γὰρ οὔν.

ἢ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἐνὶ μήτε δύο εἶναι μήτε ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὐτοῦ.

ἢ αὐτή.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄφεται.

τί δή;

ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἄφασθαι χωρὶς ὃν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ εἶναι οὐ μέλλει ἄφασθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι.

ἀληθῆ.

δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἄψις εἶναι.

δεῖ.

“And if [149b] to the two a third be added in immediate succession, 2.141
there will be three terms and two contacts.”

“Yes.”

“And thus whenever one is added, one contact also is added, and 2.142
the number of contacts is always one less than the number of terms;
for every succeeding number of terms exceeds the number of all the
contacts just as much as the first two terms exceeded the number of
their contacts.

Par: But if on the one hand, a **Third Term** is added right after **The Two**, then (**Their**) **Selves** **149B** δε εαν μεν τριτον προσγενηται εξης τοιν δυοιν, μεν αυτα will be **Three**, but **Their Contacts (Relationships)** will **Be Two**.

εσται τρια, δε αι αψεις δυο. (Nicomachus Book 1 Chap 8

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

Introduction to Arithmetic)

Par: And surely then in this way, whenever **One Term Is** added, **One Contact Is** also added, και δη ουτω συμβαινει ενος προσγινομενου μια αψις και προσγιγνεται, and the amount of all the **Contacts** will **Always Be One** less than **The Number** of **Terms**. For και του πληθους πας τας αψεις αι ειναι μια ελαττους η των αριθμων . γαρ every succeeding **Number** of **Terms** *exceeds* the amount of all **Contacts**, *by just as much as*, ο επειτα αριθμος ω πλεονεκτει το πλειω πασων των αψεων τω ισω

The Number of their **Contacts** *was exceeded* by **The Number** of the first **Two Terms**.

τουτω των αψεων ειναι επλεονεκτησε εις τον αριθμον τα πρωτα δυο.

ἐὰν δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν ὅρῳιν τρίτον προσγένηται ἐξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν τρία ἔσται, αἱ δὲ ἄψεις δύο.

ναί.

καὶ οὕτω δὴ αἰ ἐνὸς προσγινομένου μία καὶ ἄψις προσγίγνεται, καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾷ ἐλάττους εἶναι. ὧ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησεν τῶν ἄψεων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὰς ἄψεις, τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς πᾶς πασῶν τῶν ἄψεων πλεονεκτεῖ:

[149c] For after the first every additional term adds one to the number of contacts.”

“Right.”

“Then whatever the number of terms, the contacts are always one less.” 2.143

“True.”

“But if only one exists, and not two, there can be no contact.” 2.144

“Of course not.”

“We affirm that those things which are other than one are not one and do not partake of oneness, since they are other.” 2.145

“They do not.”

“Then there is no number in others, if one is not in them.” 2.146

“Of course not.”

For the rest, **One Term Is** immediately added to both **The Number of Terms** and at the same
 γαρ το 149C λοιπον εν ηδη προσγιγνεται τε τω αριθμω και αμα
 time **One Contact Is** immediately added, to **The Contacts**.

μια ταις αψεσιν.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: Accordingly then, whatever **The Number of Terms** there **Are** of **The Selves**,
 αρα οσα τον αριθμον τα οντα εστι αυτων

Their Contacts will **Always Be less**, by **One**.

αι αψεις αιει εισιν ελαττους μια.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: Then, if indeed **Only One Term Exists**, but **Two Are not**, then there can **Be no Contact**.
 δε ει γε μονον εν εστι, δε δυας εστιν μη, αν ειη ουκ αψις.

Ari: How could there be? (πως γαρ;)

Par: Have we not said that, **Those** that **Are Other** than **The One Are Not-One**,
 ουκουν, φαμεν, τα αλλα του ενος εστιν ουτε εν

nor do **They Participate** of **Self**, if indeed **They Are Other**?

ουτε μετεχει αυτου, ειπερ εστιν αλλα.

Ari: Neither. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Accordingly then, there **Is no Number** that **Is Inherent In The Others**,
 αρα ουκ αριθμος ενεστιν εν τοις αλλοις,

since **One/Unity Is not Inherent In Them**.

ενος μη ενοντος εν αυτοις.

Ari: How could it? (πως γαρ;)

ἤδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἅμα ἔν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἄψις ταῖς ἄψεσιν.
 ὀρθῶς.

ὅσα ἄρα ἐστὶν τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἀριθμόν, αἰ μὴ αἱ ἄψεις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν.

ἀληθῆ.

εἰ δέ γε ἓν μόνον ἐστίν, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄψις οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

πῶς γάρ;

οὐκουν, φαμέν, τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός οὔτε ἓν ἐστιν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ ἄλλα ἐστίν.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐνός μὴ ἐνόντος ἐν αὐτοῖς.

πῶς γάρ;

“Then the others are neither one nor two, [149d] nor have they the
name of any other number.” 2.147

“No.”

“The one is, then, only one, and there can be no two.” 2.148

“That is clear.”

“There is no contact if there are no two terms.” 2.149

“No, there is none.”

- touch others “Then the one does not touch the others, nor the others the one,
since there is no contact.” 2.150

“No, certainly not.”

“Thus on all these grounds the one touches and does not touch
itself and the others.” touches - touch
itself others 2.151

“So it appears.”

“And is the one both equal and unequal to itself and the others?” Theorem VII 2.152

“How is that?”

Par: Accordingly then, **The Others Are neither One nor Two**,

149D αρα τα αλλα εστι ουτ' εν ουτε δυο

nor do They Possess The Name of any other Number.

ουτε εχοντα ονομα ουδεν αλλου αριθμου.

Ari: They do not. (ου.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One Is One, Alone**, and **It** will not **Be Two**.

αρα το εν εστιν εν μονον, και αν ουκ ειη δυας.

Ari: It will not so come to **Light**. (ου φαινεται.)

Par: Accordingly then, there is **no Contact**; since there are **no Two Terms/Beings/Selves**.

αρα εστι ουκ αψις οντοιν μη δυοιν .

Ari: There are not. (εστιν ουκ.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One** will **neither Grasp The Others**,

αρα το εν ουτ' απτεται των αλλων

nor will The Others Grasp The One, if indeed there **Is no Contact**.

ουτε τα αλλα του ενος, επειπερ εστιν ουκ αψις.

Ari: Certainly not. (γαρ ουν ου.)

Par: Surely then in this way, according to all these statements, **The One** will both

δη ουτω κατα παντα ταυτα το εν τε

Grasp and not Grasp The Others and It-Self.

απτεται και ουχ απτεται των αλλων και εαυτου.

Ari: It is Reasonable. (εοικεν.)

(The Kosmic/Sublunary Gods, 1201 (P 63) Proclus Book 8)

Parmenides: 18 Take notice then, **Is The One Equal and Unequal to Self** and to **The Others?**

149D-10 Αρ' ουν εστι ισον και ανισον και αυτω τε και τοις αλλοις;

Aristotle: How? (πως;)

ούτ' ἄρα ἐν ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν.

οὔ.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν ἓν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

οὐ φαίνεται.

ἄψις ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν δυοῖν μὴ ὄντοι.

οὐκ ἔστιν.

ούτ' ἄρα τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, ἐπεὶ περ ἄψις οὐκ ἔστιν.

οὐ γὰρ οὐδ'.

ούτω δὴ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπτεταί τε καὶ οὐχ ἀπτεται.

εοικεν.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνισον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις;

πῶς;

“If the one were greater or less than the others, [149e] or, again, the others greater or less than the one, is it not true that the one, considered merely as one, and the others, considered merely as others, would be neither greater nor less than one another, so far as their own natures are concerned; but if in addition to their own natures, they both possessed equality, they would be equal to one another or if the others possessed greatness and the one smallness, or vice versa, that class to which greatness was added would be greater, and that to which smallness was added would be smaller?”

2.153

“Certainly.”

“These two ideas, greatness and smallness, exist, do they not? For if they did not exist, they could not be opposites of one another and could not come into being in things.”

2.154

“That is obvious.”

Par: If **The One** were *bigger* or *smaller* than **The Others**, or in turn if **The Others** were *bigger*

149E εἰ το ἐν εἰη μείζον ἢ ἐλάττων ἢ τὰλλα, ἢ αὐτὰ τὰλλα μείζω

or *smaller* than **The One**, would it not follow that on the one hand, neither **The One** by **Being**

ἢ ἐλάττω ἢ τοῦ ἐνός, ἀν οὐκ ἀρα καὶ μὲν οὔτε το ἐν τῶ εἶναι

One, nor **The Others** by **Being Other** than **The One** would **Be** something *bigger* nor something

ἐν οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐνός ἀν εἰη τι μείζω οὔτε τι

smaller than **Each Other**, by **Virtue** of **The Selfhood** of **Their Ousias**. But if **Each One**,

ἐλάττω ἀλλήλων γε ταῖς αὐταῖς ταῦταις οὐσίαις; ἀλλ' εἰ ἑκάτερα μὲν

besides Being Such as They Are, would also **Possess Equality**, then **They** would **Be Equal** to

πρὸς εἶναι τοιαῦτα ἔχοιεν ἰσότητά ἀν εἰη ἴσα πρὸς

Each Other. But if, **The Others Possessed Bigness** but **The One Smallness**, or **The One**

ἀλλήλα: δὲ εἰ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος δὲ το σμικρότητα, ἢ το ἐν

Bigness but **The Others Smallness**, then on the one hand, wherever **The Idea** of **Bigness** would

μέγεθος δὲ τὰλλα σμικρότητα, μὲν ὁποτέρῳ τῷ εἶδει μέγεθος

Be Present, **One** would **Be bigger**; but **The One** in which **Smallness Exists** would **Be smaller**?

προσείη, ἀν εἰη μείζον, δὲ ὧ σμικρότης ἐλάττων;

Ari: Necessarily. (ἀναγκη.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that both **These Certain Ideas**; **Bigness** and **Smallness**,

οὐκοῦν τε τούτῳ τινε εἶδη το μέγεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης

do indeed **Exist**? For if **They** did not **Subsist in some way**, then **They** would certainly never

γε εἶναι; γὰρ εἴτην οὐ ὄντε που ἀν γε

oppose Each Other and **They** would never have **Come to Be** among **The Real Beings**.

ἐναντιῷ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐγγιγνοίσθην ἐν τοῖς οὐσίῃ.

Ari: How could they? (πῶς ἀν γαρ;)

εἰ μείζον εἴη τὸ ἐν ἢ τὰλλα ἢ ἐλάττων, ἢ αὖ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἄρα οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰλλα ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι ἐλάττω ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις ταῖς οὐσίαις; ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πρὸς τῷ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἑκάτερα ἰσότητά ἔχοιεν, ἴσα ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἀλλήλα: εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἐν, σμικρότητα δὲ τὰλλα, ὁποτέρῳ μὲν τῷ εἶδει μέγεθος προσείη, μείζον ἂν εἴη, ὧ δὲ σμικρότης, ἐλάττων;

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν ἐστὸν γέ τινε τούτῳ εἶδη, τό τε μέγεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης; οὐ γὰρ ἂν που μὴ ὄντε γε ἐναντίῳ τε ἀλλήλοιν εἴτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὐσίῃ ἐγγιγνοίσθην.

πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

[150a] “Then if smallness comes into being in the one, it would be either in a part or in the whole of it.” 2.155

“Necessarily.”

“What if it be in the whole of one? Will it not either be on an equality with the one, extending throughout the whole of it, or else contain it?” 2.156

“Clearly.”

“And if smallness be on an equality with the one, will it not be equal to the one, and if it contain the one, greater than the one?” 2.157

“Of course.”

“But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, performing the functions of greatness or equality and not its own functions?” [150b] 2.158

“No, it cannot.”

Par: Accordingly then, if **Smallness Comes to Be In The One**, then **It** will either **Be Present**
 150A αρα ει σμικροτης εγγινετα εν τω ενι, αν ητοι ενειη
In The Whole of Self or **In a Part** of Self.
 εν ολω αυτου η εν μερει .

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: What then, if **Smallness** would **Come to Be In The Whole**? Will **It** not either **Be**
 τι δ' ει εγγιγνοιτο εν ολω; αν ουχι η ειη
 extended **Equally** throughout **The Whole** of **The One Self** or **Encompass/Contain Self**?
 εξ τεταμη ισου δι' ολου τω ενι αυτου η περιεχουσα αυτο;

Ari: Manifestly so. (δηλον δη.)

Par: Take notice then, if on the one hand, **Smallness Is** extended **Equally to The One**, then **It**
 αρ' ουν η μεν σμικροτης εξ ισου τω ενι
 will **Be Equal to Self**; whereas, if **It Encompasses The One**, then **Smallness** will be **bigger**?
 αν ειη ιση αυτω, δε περιεχουσα μειζων;

Ari: How could it not be so?

πως ου δ';

Par: Therefore, **Is** it indeed **Possible** for **Smallness** to **Be Equal** or **bigger** than *anything*, and to
 ουν γε δυνατον σμικροτητα ειναι ισην η μειζω τω τινος, και
 do the functions of **Bigness/Magnitude** and **Equality**, but not perform the functions of **It-Self**?
 πραττειν τα μεγεθου τε και ισοτητος, αλλα μη τα εαυτης;

Ari: **Impossible**. (αδυνατον.)

ει ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ σμικρότητι ἐγγίγνεται, ἥτοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἂν ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη.

ἀνάγκη.

τί δ' εἰ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγίγνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δι' ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἴη ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό;

δηλον δῆ.

ἂρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὔσα ἢ σμικρότητι τῷ ἐνὶ ἴσῃ ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

δυνατὸν οὖν σμικρότητα ἴσην τῷ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ μὴ
 τὰ ἐαυτῆς;

ἀδύνατον.

“Then smallness cannot exist in the whole of the one, but, if at all, only in a part of it.” 2.159

“Yes.”

“And neither can it exist in a whole part, for then it will behave just as it did in relation to the whole; it will be equal to or greater than the part in which it happens to exist.” 2.160

“Inevitably.”

absolute smallness “Then smallness will never exist in anything, either in a part or in a whole, nor will anything be small except absolute smallness.” 2.161

“So it appears.”

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, **Smallness** will not **Be** extended throughout

150B αρα μεν σμικροτης αν ουκ ειη
the **Whole** of **The One**, but in a **Part**, if indeed at all.

ολω τω ενι, αλλ' εν μερει ειπερ.

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

Par: Nor indeed in turn, **In The Whole Part**; for if **It** did, then would not these **Be** functions

ουδε γε αυ εν τω παντι μερει δε ει μη ταυτα ποιησει
of **The Whole Part**, just as it happened in relation to **The Whole**; in which case, **It** will
του μερους απερ προς το ολον: εν ω

Always Be either **Equal** or **bigger** than that **in** which **Smallness** happens to **Be** extended.

αι εσται ιση η μειζων ενη .

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, **Smallness** will never **Exist in** any of **The Real Beings**, since **It** cannot

αρα σμικροτης ποτε ενεσται ουδενι των οντων, μητ'
Exist in a **Part** nor **in** a **Whole**; nor will there **Be** anything **small** except **The Smallness** of **Self**.
εγγιγνομενη εν μερει μητ' εν ολω: ουδε εσται τι σμικρον πλην σμικροτητος αυτης.

Ari: It does not seem likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα τῷ ἐνὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη σμικρότης, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει.

ναί.

οὐδέ γε ἐν παντὶ αὐτῷ μέρει: εἰ δὲ μή, ταῦτά ποιήσει ἅπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον: ἴση ἔσται ἢ μείζων τοῦ μέρους
ἐν ᾧ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐνῇ.

ἀνάγκη.

οὐδενὶ ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων σμικρότης, μήτ' ἐν μέρει μήτ' ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγιγνομένη: οὐδέ τι ἔσται
σμικρὸν πλην αὐτῆς σμικρότητος.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

“Nor will greatness exist in the one. [150c] For in that case, 2.162
something other than absolute greatness and differing from it,
namely that in which greatness exists, would be greater, and that
although there is no smallness in it, which greatness must exceed, if
it be great. But this is impossible, since smallness exists nowhere.”

“True.”

“But absolute greatness is not greater than anything but absolute 2.163
smallness, and absolute smallness is not smaller than anything but
absolute greatness.”

“No.”

Par: Accordingly then, neither will **Magnitude Be Inherent in Self**. For then there will **Be**
 150C αρα ουδ' μεγεθος ενεσται εν αυτω. γαρ αν ειη
*some other **big** aspect* besides **The Magnitude of Self; That in which Bigness Is Inherent**;
 τι αλλο μειζον και πλην μεγεθους αυτου, εκεινο εν ω το μεγεθος ενειη,
 even if **The Being of Smallness** is not; *these* which **Self Must surpass** by whatever **Is big**;
 και οντος μικρου ουκ, ταυτα ου αυτω αναγκη υπερεχειν εανπερ η μεγα;
 but this, **Is Impossible**, seeing that **Smallness** cannot ever **Be Inherent in any being**.
 δε τουτο αδυνατον, επειδη σμικροτης ουδαμου ενι .

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: Then certainly, **Self Magnitude** will not be *bigger* than another, except **Self Smallness**,
 αλλα μην αυτο μεγεθους (genitive) ουκ μειζον η αλλου αυτης σμικροτητος
 nor will **Smallness Be smaller** than another, except **Self Magnitude**.
 ουδε σμικροτης ελαττον η αλλου αυτου μεγεθους.

Ari: It will not. (γαρ ου.)

οὐδ' ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ: μείζον γὰρ ἂν τι εἴη ἄλλο καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ μεγέθους, ἐκεῖνο ἐν ᾧ τὸ
 μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτῷ οὐκ ὄντος, οὗ ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, ἐάνπερ ἢ μέγα: τοῦτο δὲ
 ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἐνι.

ἀληθῆ.

ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μείζον ἢ αὐτῆς σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ
 μεγέθους.

οὐ γάρ.

- *greater smaller*
- *one other*

“Then other things are neither greater nor smaller than the one, if they have neither greatness nor smallness, [150d] nor have even these two the power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to each other, nor can the one be greater or less than these two or than other things, since it has neither greatness nor smallness.” 2.164

“Evidently not.”

“Then if the one is neither greater nor smaller than the others, it can neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?” 2.165

“Certainly not.”

“Then that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded must be on an equality and being on an equality, must be equal.” 2.166

“Of course.”

Par: Accordingly then, neither will **The Others Be bigger** nor **smaller** than **The One**, since
 αρα ουτε τα αλλα μειζω ουδε ελαττω του ενος,

They neither **Possess Bigness** nor **Smallness**, nor **Is This Self, That** which **Has The Power in**
 150D μητε εχοντα μεγαθος μητε σμικροτητα, ουτε τουτω αυτω εχετον την δυναμιν
 relation to **The One**, of either **surpassing** or of **being surpassed**, but this will only be the case
 του την υπερεχειν και υπερεχεσθαι, αλλα

in relation to **Each Other**; nor in turn will **The One Be** either **bigger** nor **smaller** than **These**
 προς αλληλων, ουτε αυ αν το εν ειη μειζον ουδ' ελαττον τουτοι
 nor **The Others**, since **It** neither **Possesses Bigness** nor **Smallness**.
 ουδε των αλλων, μητε εχον μεγαθος μητε σμικροτητα.

Ari: It has not indeed come to **Light**.

ουκουν γε φαίνεται.

Par: Take notice then, if **The One** is neither **bigger** nor **smaller** than **The Others**,

αρ' ουν, ει το εν μητε μειζον μητε ελαττον των αλλων,

then **Self Must Necessarily** neither **surpass** or **Be surpassed** by **Them**?

αυτο αναγκη μητε υπερεχειν μητε υπερεχεσθαι εκεινων;

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Is it not **Abundantly Necessary Indeed**, for **That** which neither **surpasses**

ουκουν πολλη αναγκη γε το μητε υπερχον

nor **Is surpassed** to **Be Equally** extended; for by **Being Equally** extended **It Must Be Equal**.

μητε υπερεχομενον ειναι ισου εξ, δε ον ισου εξ ειναι ισον.

Ari: How could it not? (πως γαρ ου;) (**Nicomachus** Book I Chapter 17-3, **Intro. to Arith.**)

οὔτε ἄρα τὰ ἄλλα μείζω τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐδὲ ἐλάττω, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχοντα, οὔτε αὐτῶ
 τούτῳ πρὸς τὸ ἔν ἔχετον τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ, οὔτε αὖ τὸ
 ἔν τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μείζον ἂν οὐδ' ἐλάττον εἴη, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον.

οὔκουν φαίνεται γε.

ἂρ' οὖν, εἰ μήτε μείζον μήτε ἐλάττον τὸ ἔν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήτε
 ὑπερέχεσθαι;

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ ὃν ἴσον εἶναι.

πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

[150e] “And the one will be in the same relation to itself also; if it have in itself neither greatness nor smallness, it cannot be exceeded by itself or exceed itself; it would be on an equality with and equal to itself.” 2.167

“Certainly.”

equal itself others “The one is, then, equal to itself and to the others.” 2.168

“Evidently.”

“But the one, being within itself, would also be contained by itself, and since it contains itself it would be greater than itself, 2.169

Par: And most certainly, **The One Self** will also **have** to **Be in The Same relation to It-Self**;

150E και γε μην το εν αυτο αν και εχου ουτως προς εαυτο:

by neither **Possessing Bigness** nor **Smallness in It-Self**, nor will **It surpass** nor will

μητε εχον μεγαθος μητε σμικροτητα εν εαυτω ουτ' αν υπερεχοιτο ουτ' αν

It Be surpassed by It-Self; but by **Being Equally** extended, **It** will **Be Equal to It-Self**.

υπερχει εαυτου, αλλ' ον ισου εξ αν ειη ισον εαυτω.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One** will **Be Equal** both **to It-Self** and **to The Others**.

αρα το εν αν ειη ισον τε εαυτω και τοις αλλοις.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

Par: And certainly if **Self** were **in It-Self**, then **It** would also be **Outside About It-Self**,

και μην αυτο ον εν εαυτω αν και ειη εξωθεν περι εαυτο

and indeed on the one hand, by **Containing It-Self**, **It** would **Be bigger than It-Self**;

γε μεν περιεχον αν ειη μειζον εαυτου,

ἔχον οὐτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοιτο οὐτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου ὃν ἴσον ἂν εἶη ἑαυτῷ.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον ἂν εἶη.

φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὃν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτό ἂν εἶη ἔξωθεν, καὶ περιέχον μὲν μείζον

ἂν ἑαυτοῦ εἶη,

and since it is contained by itself it would be less than itself; [151a]
thus the one would be both greater and less than itself.”

“Yes, it would.”

“And is it true, moreover, that nothing can exist outside of the one
and the others?” 2.170

“Of course.”

“But that which exists must always exist *somewhere*.” 2.171

“Yes.”

“And that which exists in anything will be smaller and will exist in
the greater? One thing cannot exist in another in any other way, can
it?” 2.172

“No, it cannot.”

“But since there is nothing else apart from the one and the others,
and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the
others in the one and the one in the others, [151b] or else be
nowhere at all?” 2.173

“Clearly.”

but on the other hand, by **Being Contained**, It would **Be smaller than It-Self**; and in this way

151A δε περιεχομενον ελαττον , και ουτω

The One Self would be **bigger** and **smaller** than **It-Self**.

το εν αυτο αν ειη μειζον και ελαττον εαυτου.

Ari: It would be so. (αν ειη γαρ.)

Par: Must not the following also be the case; that there **Is nothing at all Outside**

αναγκη ουκουν τοδε και, ειναι μηδεν εκτος

of **The One** and **The Others**? (του ενος τε και των αλλων;)

Ari: How could it not be in this way? (πως ου γαρ;)

Par: But it **Must Be** the case that, **That** which **Is**, **Must Always Be somewhere**.

αλλα δει γε μην το ον αει ειναι που .

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Is it not indeed the case that, **That** which **Is in anything**, will **Subsist**

ουκουν γε το ον εν τω εσται

by **Being** the **smaller in** the **bigger**? For otherwise, **One** cannot **Subsist in The Other**.

ον ελαττον εν μειζονι; γαρ αλλως ετερον αν ου ειη εν ετερω.

Ari: It cannot. (γαρ ου.)

Par: But since there **Is no Other**, apart from **The One** and **The Others**, then **Selves**

δε επειδη εστι ουδεν ετερον χωρις του ενος και των αλλων, δε αυτα

Must Be in something. Then is it not also **Necessary** that since **Selves Are** already **in**

δει ειναι εν τω, ουκ αναγκη ειναι ηδη εν

Each-Other, then **The Others** also **Subsist in The One** and **The One** also **Subsists in**

αλληλοις, τα αλλα τε εν τω ενι και το εν εν

The Others, or else **Selves Exist in no way whatsoever**?

151B τοις αλλοις, η ειναι μηδαμου ;

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

περιεχόμενον δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ οὕτω μείζον ἂν καὶ ἔλαττον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἔν.

εἴη γὰρ ἄν.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μὴδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἑνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων;

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί που δεῖ τό γε ὃν ἀεί.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔν τῳ ὃν ἐν μείζονι ἔσται ἔλαττον ὄν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἴη.

οὐ γάρ.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔστι χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐν τῳ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἐν τῳ ἑνὶ καὶ τὸ ἔν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ μὴδαμοῦ εἶναι;

φαίνεται.

“And because the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one less than the others, since it is contained; but because the others are in the one, the one will by the same reasoning be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.”

2.174

“So it appears.”

*equal greater less
itself others*

“Then the one is equal to and greater and less than itself and the others.”

2.175

“Evidently.”

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, since **The One Is Inherent in The Others**, then
 αρα μεν οτι το εν ενεστι εν τοις αλλοις,

The Others will **Be bigger than The One**, by **Comprehending/Containing The Self**;
 τα αλλα αν ειη μειζω του ενος, περιεχοντα αυτο,

whereas on the other hand, **The One** will **Be smaller** than **The Others** by **Being Contained**;
 δε το εν ελαττον των αλλων, περιεχομενον:

but since **The Others Are Inherent in The One**, then by **The Self/Same Logos**, **The One**
 δε οτι τα αλλα εν τω ενι, κατα τον αυτον λογον το εν

will **Be bigger** than **The Others**; and thus, **The Other Beings** will be **smaller** than **The One**.
 αν ειη μειζον των αλλων, δε τα αλλα ελαττω του ενος.

Ari: As it is **Reasonable**. (εοικεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One Self, Is Equal to**, and **bigger** and **smaller than**,
 αρα το εν αυτο εστιν ισον τε και μειζον και ελαττον

both **Self** and **The Others**.

τε αυτου και των αλλων.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

ὅτι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνεστι, μείζω ἂν εἴη τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός, περιέχοντα αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἐν
 ἔλαττον τῶν ἄλλων, περιεχόμενον: ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον
 μείζον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἐλάττω.

ἔοικεν.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα ἴσον τε καὶ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττόν ἐστιν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

φαίνεται.

“And if equal and greater and less, it will be of equal and more and [151c] less measures with itself and the others, and since of equal, more, and less measures, of equal, more, and less parts.” 2.176

“Of course.”

“And being of equal and more and less measures, it will be less and more in number than itself and the others and likewise equal in number to itself and the others.” 2.177

“How is that?”

“If it is greater than any things, it will be of more measures than they; and of as many parts as measures. Similarly if it is less or equal, the number of parts will be less or equal.” 2.178

“True.”

Par: And certainly, if indeed **It Is bigger, smaller** and **Equal**, then **It** will **Be** of **Equal, more**
 151C και μὴν εἴπερ μείζον καὶ ἐλάττων καὶ ἴσον, καὶ ἂν εἴη ἴσων πλείονων
 and **less Measures** than **Self** and **The Others**; whereas if of **Measures**, then also of **Parts**.
 καὶ ἐλαττονων μετρων αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, δὲ ἐπειδὴ μετρων, καὶ μερῶν.

Ari: How could it not be? (πῶς δ' οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, by **Being** of **Equal, more** and **lesser Measures**,
 ἀρα μὲν ὄν ἴσων καὶ πλείονων καὶ ἐλαττονων μετρων,
 then **It** will also **Be less** and **more** in **Number**, both **in relation to Self** and **The Others**,
 ἂν καὶ εἴη ἐλάττων καὶ πλεον ἀριθμῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 and also, according to **The Same Logos**, **It** will **Be Equal** to **Self** and to **The Others**.
 καὶ τε κατὰ ταῦτα ἴσον αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ari: How? (πῶς;)

Par: Whatever **Is big**, will also **Be in some way of more Measures** than **Selves**, whereas
 ὥνπερ ἐστὶ μείζον, ἂν καὶ εἴη πού πλείονων μετρων αὐτῶν: δὲ
 it will also **Be of as many Measures as Parts**; and **in the same way** for that which **Is small**,
 ὅσων μετρων, μερῶν: καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄν ἐλάττων,
 and according to **The Same Logos** for that which **Is equal**.
 κατὰ ταῦτα οἷς ἴσον.

Ari: In the same way. (οὕτως.)

καὶ μὴν εἴπερ μείζον καὶ ἐλάττων καὶ ἴσον, ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλείονων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ καὶ
 τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μετρων, καὶ μερῶν.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μετρων ὄν καὶ πλείονων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐλάττων ἂν καὶ πλεον εἴη αὐτό τε
 αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἴσον αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ ταῦτά.

πῶς;

ὥνπερ μείζον ἐστὶ, πλείονων πού καὶ μετρων ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν, ὅσων δὲ μετρων, καὶ μερῶν: καὶ ὦν
 ἐλάττων, ὡσαύτως: καὶ οἷς ἴσον, κατὰ ταῦτά.

οὕτως.

“Then one, being greater and less than itself [151d] and equal to itself, will be of more and less measures than itself and of equal measures with itself, and if of measures, of parts also?” 2.179

“Of course.”

“And being of equal parts with itself, it will also be equal in number to itself, and if of more parts, more in number, and if of less parts, less in number than itself.” 2.180

“Clearly.”

“And will not the one possess the same relation towards other things? Because it is shown to be greater than they, must it not also be more in number than they and because it is smaller, less in number? And because it is equal in size, must it not be also, equal in number to the others?” 2.181

“Yes, it must.”

Par: Is it not the case then, that by **Being big** and **small** and **Equal** to **It-Self**,

151D ουκουν ον μειζον και ελαττον και ισον εαυτου,

It will also **Be** of **Equal Measures**, and of **more** and of **less Measures than Self**?

αν και ειη ισων μετρων πλειονων και ελαττονων αυτω,

But if this is indeed the case of **Measures**, then will it not also **Be** the case for **Parts**?

δε επειδη μετρων, και μερων;

Ari: How could it not be? (πως ου δ';)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, by **Being** of **Equal Parts** to **Self**,

αρα μεν ον ισων μερων αυτω

It will **Be Equal in Multitude** to **Self**; but on the other hand, if of **more**, then **more**,

αν ειη ισον το πληθος αυτω, δε πλειονων πλεον,

but if of **less**, then **less in Number**, than **Self**.

δε ελαττονων ελαττον τον αριθμον αυτου.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that **The One Has** to **Be Related** in the same way to **The Others**?

ουκουν το εν εξει ωσαυτως προς ταλλα;

For on the one hand, **It** has come to **Light bigger** than **Them Selves**, and so **It** must **Be more**

οτι μεν φαινεται μειζον αυτων, και αναγκη ειναι πλεον

in Number than **Selves**. But, since **It Is smaller**, then must **It** not also **Be less in Number**?

τον αριθμον αυτων: δε οτι σμικροτερον, ελαττον :

And since **It Is Equal in Magnitude**, **Must It** not also **Be Equal in Multitude** to **The Others**?

δε οτι ισον μεγεθει, και ειναι ισον το πληθος τοις αλλοις;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

οὐκοῦν ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον ὃν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἂν εἶη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ,
ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὃν αὐτῷ ἴσον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ εἶη, πλειόνων δὲ πλεον, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἔλαττον
τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ.

φαίνεται.

οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα ὡσαύτως ἔξει τὸ ἓν; ὅτι μὲν μείζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλεον εἶναι καὶ τὸν
ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν: ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ἔλαττον: ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις;
ἀνάγκη.

[151e] “And so once more, as it appears, the one will be equal to, greater than, and less than itself and other things in number.”

*equal greater less
itself other*

2.182

“Yes, it will.”

“And does the one partake of time and if it partakes of time, is it and does it become younger and older than itself and other things, and neither younger nor older than itself and the others?”

Theorem VIII

2.183

“What do you mean?”

2.6

“If one is, it is thereby shown to *be*.”

2.184

“Yes.”

Par: Surely then, in this way in turn, as it is Reasonable, **The One Self** will **Be Equal**, 151E
 δη ουτω αυ, ως εοικε, το εν αυτο εσται και ισον

and **more** and **less in Number**, **than** both **Self** and **The Others**.
 και πλεον και ελαττον τον αριθμον τε αυτου και των αλλων.

Ari: It will be so. (εσται.)

(**Time: Kosmic Souls**, (P68, P92) **Proclus Book 8**)

Parmenides: 19 Take notice then, will **The One** also **Participate** of **Time**? And does

Αρ' ουν το εν και μετεχει χρονου, και εστι

Self also become **younger** and **older**, both than **It-Self** and **The Others**, and also
 αυτο τε και γινεται νεωτερον τε και πρεσβυτερον τε εαυτου και των αλλων, και

neither **younger** nor **older** than **It-Self** nor **The Others**, by **Participating** of **Time**?
 ουτε νεωτερον ουτε πρεσβυτερον ουτε εαυτου ουτε των αλλων, μετεχον χρονου;

Aristotle: How? (πως;)

Par: On the one hand, **To Be, Is Present in some way** with **Self**, if indeed **It Is One**.

μεν ειναι υπαρχει που αυτω ειπερ εστιν εν.

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

οὕτω δὴ αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλεόν καὶ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὐτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ἔσται.

ἄρ' οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἐν, καὶ ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίνεταί νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχον;

πῶς;

εἶναι μὲν που αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἐν ἔστιν.

ναί.

“But is 'to be' anything else than participation in existence together with present time, [152a] just as 'was' denotes participation in existence together with past time, and 'will be' similar participation together with future time?” 2.185

“True.”

“Then the one partakes of time if it partakes of being.” *partakes time* 2.186

“Certainly.”

“And the time in which it partakes is always moving forward?” 2.187

“Yes.”

“Then it is always growing older than itself, if it moves forward with the time.” 2.188

“Certainly.”

1.87 “Now, do we not remember that there is something *becoming* *younger* when the older *becomes older* than it?” 2.189

“Yes, we do.”

(Present-Past-Future/Angels-Spirits-Heroes, (P68, P97) Proclus Book 8)

Par: But on the other hand, what else **Is The To Be**, than **The Participation** of **Ousia** with
 δε τι άλλο εστιν το ειναι η μεθεξις ουσιας μετα

The Present of **Time**? Just as, **The Was Is The Participation** of **Ousia** with

152A του παροντος χρονου, ωσπερ το ην μετα

The Past, and in turn, **The Will be Is The Communion** of **Ousia** with **The Future**?
 του παρεληλυθοτος και αυ το εσται εστι κοινωνια ουσιας μετα του μελλοντος;

Ari: It is so. (εστι γαρ.)

Par: Accordingly then, **It Participates** of **Time**, if indeed **It** also **Participates** of **The To Be**.
 αρα μεν μετεχει χρονου, ειπερ και του ειναι.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)

Par: Will not then, **The Time** of which **It Participates**, **Be in** a state of **Procession**?
 ουκουν του χρονου πορευομενου;

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

Par: Accordingly then, **It Is Always becoming older than It-Self**,
 αρα αι γινεται πρεσβυτερον εαυτου,

if indeed **It Proceeds** according to **Time**. (As opposed to **Abiding** in **The Eternal**)
 ειπερ προερχεται κατα χρονον.

Ari: Necessarily. (ανάγκη.)

Par: Take notice then, do we remember (141a) that whatever **becomes younger** does so,
 αρ' ουν μεμνημεθα γιγνομενου νεωτερου

because the **older becomes older** (than **it**)?
 οτι το πρεσβυτερον γινεται πρεσβυτερον;

Ari: We do remember. (μεμνημεθα.)

τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἦν μετὰ τοῦ
 παρεληλυθότος καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐσίας ἐστὶ κοινωνία;
 ἔστι γάρ.

μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι.

πάνυ γε.

οὐκοῦν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου;

ναί.

ἀεὶ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον.

ἀνάγκη.

ἀρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται;

μεμνήμεθα.

“Then the one, since it becomes older than itself, [152b] would
become older than a self which becomes younger?” 2.190

“There is no doubt of it.”

*becomes older
younger itself*

“Thus the one becomes older and younger than itself.” 2.191

“Yes.”

“And it is older, is it not, when in becoming older it is in the present
time, between the past and the future; for in going from the past to
the future it cannot avoid the present.” 2.192

“No, it cannot.”

Par: Is it not the case then, that while **The One**, becomes *older* than **It-Self**,
 ουκουν επειδη το εν γινεται πρεσβυτερον εαυτου,

that **It** is becoming *older* than **It-Self**, while **It** is becoming *younger* than **It-Self**?

152B γιγνομενου πρεσβυτερον εαυτου αν γιγνοιτο νεωτερου ;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Surely then in this way, on the one hand, **It** will become *younger* and *older* than **Self**.
 δη ουτως μεν γινεται νεωτερον τε και πρεσβυτερον αυτου.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But accordingly, on the other hand, **It Is** not in any way *older*, when **Coming-to-Be**
 αρ' δε εστι ουχ η πρεσβυτερον οταν γιγνομενον
 according to **The Present Time**; **That** which **Is between The Was** and **The Will Be**? For
 κατα τον νυν χρονον τον μεταξυ του ην τε και εσται; γαρ
 by **Proceeding** from **The Past** to **The Future**, **It** will not somehow go-beyond **The Present**?
 πορευομενον εκ του ποτε εις το επειτα γε ου που υπερβησεται το νυν.

Ari: How could it. (γαρ ου.)

ουκοδν επειδη πρεσβύτερον έαυτοδ γίνεται το έν, νεωτέρου αν γιγνομένου έαυτοδ πρεσβύτερον
 γίγνοιτο;

ανάγκη.

γίνεται μεν δη νεώτερόν τε και πρεσβύτερον αύτοδ ούτω.

ναί.

έστι δε πρεσβύτερον αρ' ουχ όταν κατα τον νυν χρόνον ή γιγνώμενον τον μεταξυ τοδ ήν τε και έσται; οδ
 γάρ που πορευόμενόν γε εκ τοδ ποτε εις το έπειτα ύπερβήσεται το νυν.

οδ γάρ.

“Then is it not the case that it ceases to become older [152c] when it arrives at the present, and no longer becomes, but actually is older? For while it moves forward it can never be arrested by the present, since that which moves forward touches both the present and the future, letting the present go and seizing upon the future, proceeding or becoming between the two, the present and the future.”

2.193

“True.”

is

“But if everything that is becoming is unable to avoid and pass by the present, then when it reaches the present it always ceases to become [152d] and straightway is that which it happens to be becoming.”

2.194

“Clearly.”

Par: Take notice then, will **It** not *at that time cease* to *become older*, since **It arrives** at **The** 152C **Now** and is *no longer becoming*, but *at that time It Is already older*? For when **It Proceeds** νυν και ου γινεται, αλλ' τοτ' εστι ηδη πρεσβυτερον; γαρ ποτε προιον **It** will not **Be Grasped** by **The Now**. For **That** which **Proceeds Has To Be in such a way** as αν ουκ ληφθειη υπο του νυν. γαρ το προιον εχει ουτως ως to *Grasp both The Now* and *The Future*; on the one hand, *by Departing from The Now*, while εφαπτεσθαι αμφοτερων, του νυν τε και του επειτα, μεν αφιεμενον του νυν, δ' also *Apprehending The Future*, by *Coming-to-Be Between* both *The Future* and *The Now*. επιλαμβανομενον του επειτα, γιγνομενον μεταξυ αμφοτερων, του επειτα τε και του νυν.

Ari: **True.** (αληθη.)

Par: But if it is indeed **Necessary** that **All** that **Is becoming** should not by-pass

δε ει γε αναγκη παν το γιγνομενον μη παρελθειν

The Now; since, *as soon as it arrives at This Now*, **That/Ousia** will *Always cease becoming*,

το νυν, επειδαν η κατα τουτο, του αει επισχει γινεσθαι

and **Is, at that time, That** which **It** was **Aiming to become**.

152D και εστι τοτε τουτο οτι αν τυχη γιγνομενον.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

ἀρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον, ἐπειδὴν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχη, καὶ οὐ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἔστι τότ' ἤδη πρεσβύτερον; προῖον γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ληφθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προῖον οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμενον, τοῦ δ' ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον, μεταξύ ἀμφοτέρων γιγνόμενον, τοῦ τε ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν.

ἀληθῆ.

εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἦ, ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχη γιγνόμενον.

φαίνεται.

“The one, then, when in becoming older it reaches the present,
ceases to become and straightway is older.” 2.195

“Certainly.”

older itself

“It therefore is older than that than which it was becoming older;
and it was becoming older than itself.” 2.196

“Yes.”

“And that which is older is older than that which is younger, is it
not?” 2.197

“It is.”

younger itself

“Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it
reaches the present.” [152e] 2.198

“Undoubtedly.”

Par: Accordingly then, **The One**, also, *in Aiming* at *becoming older*, when **It Hits-upon**
 αρα το εν και γιγνομενον πρεσβυτερον οταν εντυχη

The Now, **It** will also *cease becoming at that time* that **It Is older**.

τω νυν, και επεσχεν του γιγνεσθαι τοτε εστι πρεσβυτερον.

Ari: Entirely so.

πανυ γε.

Par: Is it not the case then, that **It** is also *older* than *that*, in relation to which
 ουκουν εστιν και πρεσβυτερον τουτου ουπερ

It has become older, when it was thus *becoming older* than **Self**?

εγινετο δε εγινετο αυτου;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But the *older* is *older* than the *younger*?

δε το πρεσβυτερον εστι πρεσβυτερον νεωτερου;

Ari: It is. (εστιν.)

Par: Accordingly then, at that time, **The One** is *younger* than **Self**,
 αρα τοτε το εν εστι νεωτερον αυτου,

when by *becoming older It Hits upon The Now*.

οταν γιγνομενον πρεσβυτερον εντυχη τω νυν.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

και το εν αρα, οταν πρεσβυτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχη τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχεν τοῦ γίγνεσθαι και ἔστι τότε πρεσβύτερον.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν οὐπερ ἐγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον, τούτου και ἔστιν: ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὐτοῦ;

ναί.

ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον;

ἔστιν.

και νεώτερον αρα τότε αὐτοῦ ἐστι τὸ ἐν, οταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχη τῷ νῦν.

ἀνάγκη.

“But the present is inseparable from the one throughout its whole existence; for it always is now whenever it is.” 2.199

“Of course.”

“Always, then, the one is and is becoming younger than itself.” 2.200

“So it appears.”

“And is it or does it become for a longer time than itself, or for an equal time?” 2.201

“For an equal time.”

“But that which is or becomes for an equal time is of the same age.” 2.202

“Of course.”

“But that which is of the same age is neither older nor younger.” 2.203

“No.”

- older younger
itself

“Then the one, since it is and becomes for an equal time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself.” 2.204

“I agree.”

Par: Most certainly then, **The Now** is **Always Present** with **The One** (Like @ 142c 6),

152E γε μὴν το νυν αει παρεστι τῷ ἐνι

through-out **The Whole** of **Its Being**: For **It Is Always Now**, as long as and insofar as, **It Is**.

δια παντος του ειναι: γαρ αει νυν οτανπερ η εστι.

Ari: How could it not be? (πῶς γὰρ οὐ;)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One Always Is** and also **becomes older** and **younger** than **It-Self**.

αρα το εν αει εστι τε και γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον εαυτου.

Ari: It is **Reasonable**. (εοικεν.)

Par: But **Is** or does **Self become** in a more-extended or in an **Equal Period** of **Time** to **It-Self**?

δε εστιν η αυτο γιγνεται, πλειω η ισον τον χρονον εαυτου;

Ari: In an equal period of time. (τον ισον.)

Par: But most certainly, **That** which either **Is** or **becomes** in an **Equal Period** of **Time**,

αλλα γε μὴν τον η ον η γιγνομενον ισον χρονον

has to be of **The Same Age**.

εχει την αυτην ηλικιαν.

Ari: How could it not? (πῶς δ' οὐ;)

Par: But **That** which is of **The Same Age**, is neither **older** nor **younger**.

δε το εχον την αυτην ηλικιαν εστιν ουτε πρεσβυτερον ουτε νεωτερον.

Ari: It is not. (γὰρ οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly then, since **The One Self** both **becomes** and **Is** in a **Period** of **Time** that

αρα το εν αυτο και γιγνομενον και ον τον χρονον

Is Equal to **It-Self**, then **It** neither **Is** nor **becomes** neither **younger** nor **older** than **It-Self**.

ισον εαυτω ουτε εστιν ουδε γιγνεται ουτε νεωτερον ουτε πρεσβυτερον εαυτου.

Ari: It does not appear to me, that it can. (οὐ δοκεῖ μοι.)

τό γε μὴν νὺν αἰεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἐνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι: ἔστι γὰρ αἰεὶ νὺν ὅτανπερ ᾗ.

πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

αἰεὶ ἄρα ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἔν.

ἔοικεν.

πλείω δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἴσον;

τὸν ἴσον.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ ὃν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν.

οὐ γάρ.

τὸ ἔν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὃν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν οὐδὲ γίγνεται.

οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

“Well, then, is it or does it become older or younger than other things?” 2.205

[153a] “I cannot tell.”

“But you can at any rate tell that the others, if they are others, not 2.206
an other—plural, not singular—are more than one; for if they were
an other, they would be one; but since they are others, they are
more than one and have multitude.”

“Yes, they have.”

“And being a multitude, they would partake of a number greater than one.” 2.207

“Of course.”

“Well, which shall we say come and have come into being first, the 2.208
greater or the smaller numbers?”

“The smaller.”

“Then the smallest comes into being first and that is the one, is it 2.209
not?” [153b]

“Yes.”

Par: What follows then, **in relation to The Others?**

τι δε; των αλλων;

Ari: I know not what to say. (οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.)

Par: You may certainly say the following; that **Those Other** than **The One**,

153A εχεις μὴν λέγειν τοδε, οτι τα αλλα του ενος,
if indeed **They Are** indeed **Other** (plural), but not **Another** (singular), **Are more** than **One**.
επειρ εστιν γε ετερα, αλλα μη ετερον, εστιν πλειω ενος:

For on the one hand, by **Being Other**, **They** will also **Be One**; but on the other hand, by **Being**
γαρ μεν ον ετερον αν ην εν: δε οντα

Others, **They Are more** than **One**, and **They** will **Possess Multitude**.

ετερα εστι πλειω ενος και αν εχοι πληθος.

Ari: They will possess it. (γαρ αν εχοι.)

Par: But by **Being Many They** will **Participate** of a **greater Number** than **The One**.

δε ον πληθος αν μετεχοι πλειονος αριθμου η του ενος.

Ari: How could they not? (πως δ' ου;)

Par: What then? Do we say that **Those** that are **more** in **Number are generated**, and

τι ουν; φησομεν τα πλειω αριθμου γινεσθαι τε

have also **been generated before** or do we say that **The Few were generated before/Prior?**

και γεγονεναι προτερον η τα ελαττω ;

Ari: The few. (τα ελαττω.)

Par: Accordingly then, **That** which **Is Least Is First**. But **This Is The One**. Can it be so?

αρα το ολιγιστον πρωτον: δ' τουτο εστι το εν. η γαρ;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

τί δέ; τῶν ἄλλων;

οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ ἕτερά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω ἐστὶν ἑνός:
ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὃν ἐν ᾧ ἦν, ἕτερα δὲ ὄντα πλείω ἑνός ἐστι καὶ πλήθος ἃν ἔχοι.

ἔχοι γὰρ ἃν.

πλήθος δὲ ὃν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἢ μετέχοι ἢ τοῦ ἑνός.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίνεσθαί τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω;

τὰ ἐλάττω.

τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον: τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ἓν. ἢ γάρ;

ναί.

“The one, therefore, has come into being first of all things that have number; but all others also have number, if they are others and not an other.” 2.210

“They have.”

*younger other
older one*

“And since it came into being first, it came into being, I suppose, before the others, and the others later; but things which have come into being later are younger than that which came into being before them and thus the other things would be younger than the one, and the one older than the other things.” 2.211

“Yes, they would.”

“Here is another question: Can the one have come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?” 2.212

“It is impossible.”

Par: Accordingly then, **The One** *has become* **The First** of **All Those Possessing Number**:

153B ἄρα το ἐν γέγονε πρῶτον πάντων τῶν ἔχοντων ἀριθμὸν.

But **All The Others** also **Possess Number**, if indeed **They** are **Others** and not **Another**.

δὲ πάντα τὰλλα καὶ ἔχει ἀριθμὸν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο.

Ari: They have to be. (γὰρ ἔχει.)

Par: But indeed, by *having-come-to-be* **First**, I think, **It came-to-be** **Before**,

δὲ γε γέγονος πρῶτον, οἶμαι, γέγονε πρότερον,

but **The Others** *came-to-be* **Later**. But **Those** that *have-come-to-be* **Later** are *younger*

δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ὕστερον. δ' τὰ γεγονότα ὕστερον νεώτερα

than **That** which *has come-to-be* **Before**: and thus, **The Others** will **Be** *younger*

τοῦ γεγονότος πρότερον: καὶ οὕτως τὰλλα ἂν εἴη νεώτερα

than **The One**, but **The One** will be *Older* than **The Others**.

τοῦ ἐνός, δὲ τὸ ἐν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἄλλων.

Ari: For it will be.

γὰρ ἂν εἴη.

Parmenides: 20 But what about the following? Could it **Be** the case, that **The One**

δὲ τί τοδε; ἀρ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν

has come-to-Be, contrary to **The Nature of Self**, or is this **Impossible**?

γέγονος παρὰ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἀδύνατον;

Aristotle: Impossible. (ἀδύνατον.)

πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἐν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντων: ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ἀριθμὸν, εἴπερ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστίν.

ἔχει γάρ.

πρῶτον δὲ γε οἶμαι γέγονος πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὕστερον,

τὰ δ' ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος: καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη τὰλλα νεώτερα τοῦ ἐνός, τὸ δὲ ἐν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἄλλων.

εἴη γὰρ ἂν.

τί δὲ τοδε; ἀρ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ γέγονος, ἢ ἀδύνατον;

ἀδύνατον.

- 2.8 2.57 [153c] “But surely the one was shown to have *parts*, a *beginning*, a *middle*, and an *end*.” 2.213
- “Yes.”
- “And the beginning of everything—of one and everything else alike —comes into being first, and after the beginning come all the other parts until the end arrives, do they not?” 2.214
- “Certainly.”
- “And we shall say also that all these others are parts of the whole and the one, and that it has become one and whole at the moment when the end arrives.” 2.215
- “Yes, we shall say that.”

Par: But surely, **The One** has indeed come to **Light** to consist of **Parts** (*Older, Same, Younger*);

153C ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἐν γε ἐφάνη εἶχον μέρη,

but if of **Parts**, then also of a **Beginning**, **End** and **Middle**.

δε εἰ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον.

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

Par: Is it not so then, that **The Beginning** (**HYPARXIS**) **Is The First** of **All** to come to **Light**,

οὐκοῦν ἀρχὴ πρῶτον πάντων γίγνεται,

of both **The One Self** and of **Each** of **The Others**; and after that, **The Beginning**

καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν

of **All the others** as far as to **the end**?

πάντα τὰλλα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους;

Ari: What follows then? (τι μὴν;)

Par: And we shall most certainly say that **All** these **Others**, **Are Parts** of **The Whole** and

καὶ γε μὴν φήσομεν πάντα ταῦτ' ἅλλα εἶναι μορία τοῦ ὅλου τε

of **The One**; but **That Self** *has come-to-Be At-Once* with **The End**, **One-and-Whole**.

καὶ ἐνός, δε ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ γέγονεν αἷμα τῇ τελευτῇ ἐν τε καὶ ὅλον.

Ari: We shall say so. (γὰρ φήσομεν.)

ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη τὸ ἓν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον.

ναί.

οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους;

τί μὴν;

καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ' εἶναι πάντα τὰλλα τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἐνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἐν τε καὶ ὅλον.

φήσομεν γάρ.

“The end, I imagine, comes into being last; and at that moment the one naturally comes into being; [153d] so that if the absolute one cannot come into being contrary to its own nature, since it has come into being simultaneously with the end, its nature must be such that it comes into being after all the others.” 2.216

“That is clear.”

younger one
others older

“Then the one is younger than the others and the others are older than the one.” 2.217

“I think that is clear, too.”

“Well, must not a beginning or any other part whatsoever of one or of anything else whatsoever, if it be a part, not parts, be one, since it is a part?” 2.218

“It must.”

Par: But **The End** I suspect, *comes-to-Be* the very **last** of all. Thus **The One Naturally**

δε τελευτη, οἰμαι, γιγνεται γε υστατον: δ' το εν πεφυκε
comes-to-Be in this way **At-Once**; so that, if indeed it **Is Necessary** that **The One Self**
 153D γιγνεσθαι ουτω αμα: ωστ' ειπερ αναγκη το εν αυτο
come-to-Be contrary to **Nature**, in that **The One** would *have-come-to-Be*, **At-Once**
 μη γιγνεσθαι παρα φυσιν, αν γεγονος αμα

with **The End**; which will **Be Naturally Generated Last** of **The Others**.

τελευτη αν ειη πεφυκος γιγνεσθαι υστατον των αλλων.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One Is younger** than **The Others**,

αρα το εν εστι νεωτερον των αλλων,

while **The Others** are *older* than **The One**.

δ' τα αλλα πρεσβυτερα του ενος.

Ari: To me, it has come to **Light** in this way in turn. (μοι φαινεται ουτως αυ.)

Par: But what then? Must not **The Beginning** or any other **Part** whatsoever

δε τι δη; ουκ αρχην η αλλο μερος σιουν

of **The One**, or of anything else, if indeed and inasmuch as it **Is** a **Part** (singular),

του ενος η οτουουν αλλου, εανπερ η μερος

but not **Parts** (plural), **Necessarily** be **One**, if it **Is** indeed a **Part**?

αλλα μη μερη, αναγκαιον ειναι εν, ον γε μερος;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

τελευτη δε γε οἶμαι υστατον γιγνεται, τούτω δ' ἅμα τὸ ἐν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι: ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τελευτῇ ἂν γεγονὸς υστατον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἴη γίγνεσθαι. φαίνεται.

νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἐν ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς πρεσβύτερα.

οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται.

τί δὲ δὴ; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὅτιοδν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ ἄλλου ὅτουοδν, ἐάνπερ μέρος ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ μέρη, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν;

ἀνάγκη.

[153e] “Then the one would come into being simultaneously with the first part and with the second, and it is not wanting in any part which comes into being in addition to any part whatsoever which may precede it, until it reaches the end and becomes complete one; it will not be wanting in the middle, nor in the first, nor in the last, nor in any other part in the process of coming into being.”

2.219

“True.”

“Then one has the same age as all the others so that the absolute one, unless it is naturally contrary to nature, could not have come into being either before or after the others, but only simultaneously with them.

2.220

same age

Par: Is it not the case then, that **The One** *Has-come-to-Be At-Once* with both **The First Part**,
 153E ουκουν το εν γιγνομενω αμα τε τω πρωτω
 and also **Will come-to-Be At-Once** with **The Second Part**; and **It** does not abandon a single one
 και αν γιγνοιτ' αμα τω δευτερω, και απολειπεται ουδενος
 of **The Others** that are *coming-to-Be*, nor any **Part** to which **It Can Be Attached**; until
 των αλλων γιγνομενων, οτιπερ οτωουν αν προσγινηται, εως
Arriving at The Extreme Part, It Becomes One Whole; by neither **Being** excluded
 διελθον προς το εσχατον γενηται εν ολον, ουτε απολειφθεν
 of **The Middle** nor of **The First** nor of **The Last**, nor of any other **Part** in *Its coming-to-Be*.
 μεσου ουτε πρωτου ουτε εσχατου ουτε ουδενος αλλου εν τη γενεσει.

Ari: **True.** (αληθη.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One**, will **Possess The Self/Same Age** with **All The Others**.
 αρα το εν ισχει την αυτην ηλικιαν πασιν τοις αλλοις.

So that if **The One** was not **Produced** contrary to **Its Self Nature**, then **It has come-to-Be**
 ωστ' ει το εν ειη μη πεφυκεν παρα αυτο φυσιν, αν γεγονος
 neither **Before** nor **Later** than **The Others**, but *at-the-same-time* with **Them**.

154A ουτε προτερον ουτε υστερον των αλλων, αλλ' αμα .

οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ἅμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ' ἂν καὶ ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν
 ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὅτιπερ ἂν προσγίγηται ὁ τωοῦν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὼν ὅλον ἐν γένηται,
 οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

ἀληθῆ.

πάσιν ἄρα τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει τὸ ἐν: ὥστ' εἰ μὴ παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, οὔτε
 πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ' ἅμα.

[154a] And by this reasoning the one would be neither older nor younger than the others nor the others than the one, but of the same age; but by the previous reasoning the one would be both older and younger than the others, and likewise the others than the one.”

“Certainly.”

“In this state, then, it is and in this way it has come into being. But what about the one becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and becoming neither older nor younger? Is it the same with becoming as with being, or otherwise?”

2.221

[154b]

“I cannot say.”

And by *This*
καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον

Relationship, *The One* will neither be *older* nor *younger* than *The Others*, nor *The Others* τὸν λόγον, τὸ ἐν ἂν οὔτε εἰη πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲ τὰλλα than *The One*. Whereas, according to the former *Relationship*, *The One* was both *older* τοῦ ἐνός: δὲ κατὰ τὸν πρόσθεν τε πρεσβύτερον and *younger* than *The Others*, and *The Others*, *in a similar way*, than *That*. καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τὰλλα ὡσαύτως ἐκείνου.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ μὲν οὖν.)

Par: Surely then, on the one hand, *The One Is* and *Has-to-Be* and *Has-come-to-Be in this way* δη μὲν ἐστὶ τε ἔχον καὶ γεγονός οὕτως also. But then in turn, what shall we say about *Self coming-to-Be older* and also *younger* καὶ. ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ γίνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον τε καὶ νεότερον than *The Others*, and *The Others* than *The One*; and again, that *It* neither *comes-to-Be* τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ μήτε γίνεσθαι *younger* nor *older*? Therefore does *It Have-to-Be in the same way* with *That* which *Is* νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον; ἀρα ἔχει οὕτω περὶ τοῦ εἶναι just as *It* also does with *That* which *Is coming-to-Be*, or otherwise? ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι, ἢ ἑτέρως;

Ari: I am not able to say. (ἐχω οὐκ λέγειν.)

καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός: κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τὰλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως.
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ἔστι μὲν δι' οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός. ἀλλὰ τί αὐτὸ περὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός, καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίνεσθαι; ἀρα ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἔχει, ἢ ἑτέρως;
οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

“But I can say as much as this, that even if one thing be older than another, it cannot become older by any greater difference in age than that which existed at first, nor if younger can it become younger by any greater difference; for the addition of equals to unequals, whether in time or anything else whatsoever, makes the difference always equal to that which existed at first.”

2.222

“Yes, of course.”

Par: But I am indeed able to affirm the following, that if **One Member Is** also *older*
 154B ἀλλ' ἐγὼ γε τοσόνδε, ὅτι εἰ ἕτερον ἐστὶν καὶ πρεσβύτερον
 than **Another Member**, **Self** cannot still *become* even *older*, other than by the age difference
 ἑτέρου, αὐτὸ ἀν οὐκ δύναται ἐτι γίγνεσθαι ἐτι πρεσβύτερον, ἢ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διήνεγκε
 which **Self First** possessed as soon as **Self** *came-to-Be*; nor in turn that by *Being younger* can **It**
 ὥς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθύς γενομένον, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ ὀν νεώτερον
become still younger; for if **Equals** are added to *un-equals* -whether **Time** is added or *anything*
 γίγνεσθαι ἐτι : γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα ἀνίστοις, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ
whatsoever- **It** will always make *them* differ **Equally** by just as much as *they* differed at **First**.
 ὅτι οὖν, ἀν αἰεὶ ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἴσῳ ὅσῳ περ διενέγκῃ τὸ πρῶτον.
Ari: How could it be otherwise? (πῶς γὰρ οὐ;)

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοσόνδε γε: εἰ καὶ ἔστιν πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, γίγνεσθαι γε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι ἢ ὥς
 τὸ πρῶτον εὐθύς γενομένον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δύναται, οὐδ' αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὃν ἔτι νεώτερον
 γίγνεσθαι: ἀνίστοις γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὅτῳ οὖν, ἴσῳ ποιεῖ διαφέρειν αἰεὶ ὅσῳ περ
 ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ.
 πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

“Then that which exists [154c] can never become older or younger 2.223
than that which exists, if the difference in age is always the same;
but it is and has become older, and the other is and has become
younger, but it does not become so.”

“True.”

“And the one, since it exists, never becomes either older or younger 2.224
than the other things.”

“No, it does not.”

“But see whether they become older and younger in this way.” 2.225

“In what way?”

2.11 2.17 “Because the one was found to be *older* than the others, and the 2.226
others than the one.”

“What then?”

Par: Accordingly then, **The Being Cannot** indeed **come-to-Be older** nor **younger**
 154C αρα το ον αν ουκ γε γιγνοιτ' πρεσβυτερον ουδε νεωτερον
 than **The One**, at any time, if indeed **It Is Always Equally** different in age; whereas
 (του ενος **BT**) ποτε, ειπερ αι ισω διαφερει την ηλικιαν: αλλ'
It Is and **Has Come-to-Be older**, but then **That** which **Is younger**, does not **come-to-Be**.
 εστι και γεγονε πρεσβυτερον, δε δ' το νεωτερον, ου γινεται.

Ari: **True.** (αληθη.)

Par: And so, **The One Being**, will not at any time **become older** nor **younger**,
 και αρα το εν ον ουτε ποτε γινεται πρεσβυτερον ουτε νεωτερον
 than **The Others Beings.** (των αλλων οντων.)

Ari: It will not. (γαρ ουν ου.)

Par: Then **See** if **The One Being becomes older** and **younger in this way**.
 δε ορα ει γινεται πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον τηδε.

Ari: In what way then? (πη δη;)

Par: Insofar as **The One** has come to **Light older** than **The Other Beings**,
 η το εν εφανε πρεσβυτερον των αλλων
 and **The Others** than **The One**.
 τε και ταλλα του ενος.

Ari: What follows then? (τι ουν;)

οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὄν τοῦ ἐνός ὄντος γίγνοιτ' ἂν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἴσω διαφέρει αἰ
 τὴν ἡλικίαν: ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον, γίγνεται δ' οὐ.

ἀληθῆ.

καὶ τὸ ἐν ἄρα ὄν τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβυτέρον ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον γίγνεται.

οὐ γὰρ οὐδ.

ὅρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται.

πη δῆ;

ἦι τό τε ἐν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦ ἐνός.

τί οὖν;

“When the one is older than the others, [154d] it has come into
being a longer time than the others.” 2.227

“Yes.”

“Then consider again. If we add an equal to a greater and to a less
time, will the greater differ from the less by the same or by a smaller
fraction?” 2.228

“By a smaller fraction.”

“Then the proportional difference in age which existed originally
between the one and the others will not continue afterwards, but if
an equal time be added to the one and the others, the difference in
their ages will constantly diminish, will it not?” [154e] 2.229

“Yes.”

Par: At the **Time** when **The One** has come to **Light older** than **The Others**, **It has-come-to-be**
 154D οταν το εν η πρεσβυτερον των αλλων, γεγονεν
in some way for a **longer Period** of **Time** than **The Others**.
 που πλειω χρονον η τα αλλα.

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

Par: Surely then consider again. If we add an **Equal Time** to a **longer** and **shorter Period**
 δη σκοπει παλιν: εαν προστιθωμεν τον ισον χρονον πλεονι και ελαττονι
 of **Time**, then will the **longer differ from** the **shorter by** an **Equal** or **by** a **smaller Part**?
 χρονω, αρα το πλεον διοισει ου ελαττονος τω ισω η σμικροτερω μοριω;

Ari: By a smaller part. (σμικροτερω.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One** will not be different in age from **The Others** by **as much as**
 αρα το εν ουκ εσται διαφερον ηλικια προς ταλλα οτιπερ
This Time and in **The Future**, as **It Was** at **First (longer)**; but by receiving an **Equal Time**
 τουτο και εις το επειτα, ην το πρωτον , αλλα λαμβανον ισον χρονον
 along with **The Others**, **It** will **Always** differ by a **less** age than **Theirs** than **before**. Or not?
 τοις αλλοις, αι διοισει ελαττον τη ηλικια αυτων η προτερον: η ου;

Ari: Yes, this is the case. (ναί.)

οταν το εν των άλλων πρεσβύτερον ἦ, πλείω που χρόνον γέγονεν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα.

ναί.

πάλιν διὴ σκόπει: ἐὰν πλεονι καὶ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, ἄρα τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ
 διοίσει τὸ πλεόν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἢ σμικροτέρῳ;

σμικροτέρῳ.

οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται, ὅτιπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς τὰλλα ἡλικία διαφέρων τὸ ἐν, τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ
 ἴσον λαμβάνον χρόνον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔλαττον αἰ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρότερον: ἢ οὐ;

ναί.

“And that which differs less in age from something than before
becomes younger than before in relation to those things than which
it formerly was older?” 2.230

“Yes, it becomes younger.”

“But if the one becomes younger, must not those other things in
turn become older than formerly in relation to the one?” 2.231

“Certainly.”

“Then that which came into being later, becomes older in relation
to the older, which came into being earlier; yet it never is older, but
is always becoming older; 2.232

Par: Is it not the case indeed, that **Whatever** differs *less* in age, in relation to anything,
 154E ουκουν γε το διαφερων ελαττον ηλικια προς τι
 than **It** did *before*, **It** will *become younger* than in *the past*, in relation to **Those** to which
 η προτερον αν γιγνοιτ' νεωτερον η εν τω προσθεν προς εκεινα προς α
It was older before? (ην πρεσβυτερον προτερον;)

Ari: Younger. (νεωτερον.)

Par: But if in turn, **That** *Is younger*, will not **The Others** *Be older* than *before*,
 δε ει αυ εκεινο νεωτερον, ουκ εκεινα τα αλλα πρεσβυτερα η προτερον
 in relation to **The One**? (προς το εν;)

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, **That** which *has-come-to-be younger*,
 αρα μεν το γεγονος νεωτερον
 will *become older*, in relation to **That** which *has-come-to-be before* and by *Being older*; but on
 γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον προς το γεγονος προτερον τε και ον πρεσβυτερον,
 the other hand, **It** never (really) *Is older*, for **It Is Always becoming older** than **That**;
 δε ουδεποτε εστι πρεσβυτερον, αλλα αι γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον εκεινου:

ουκοδν τό γε ἔλαττον διαφέρων ἡλικία πρὸς τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς
 ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἃ ἦν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον;

νεώτερον.

εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὖ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἐν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρότερον;

πάνυ γε.

τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονὸς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὄν,
 ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρεσβύτερον:

for the latter always tends towards being younger, [155a] and the former towards being older. And conversely the older becomes in the same way younger than the younger. For as they are moving in opposite directions, they are becoming the opposites of one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger; but they cannot finish the process of becoming; for if they finished the process of becoming, they would no longer be becoming, they would be. But as the case is, they become older and younger than one another—the one becomes younger than the others, because, as we saw, it is older and came into being earlier,

for on the
 γαρ μὲν

one hand, **That** advances to a *younger* state, but on the other hand, **The Other** to an *older* state.

155A ἐκεῖνο ἐπιδίδωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον, δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον.

But in turn, in the same way, **That** which *Is older* is *becoming younger* than **The younger**.

δ' αὖ ὡσαύτως τὸ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται νεώτερον τοῦ νεώτερου.

For by *both* of Them tending to that which is opposite, They *become* opposite to Each other;

γαρ αὐτοῖν ἰόντε εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον γίγνεσθον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοις,

on the one hand, **The younger** *become older* than **The older**, but on the other hand, **The older**

μὲν τὸ νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον

become younger than **The younger**; but they will not **Be** able to **Be** such. For if They

νεώτερον τοῦ νεώτερου: δὲ ἂν οὐκ εἴτην γενέσθαι οἶω τε. γὰρ εἰ

would-have-become, then They *would* no longer *be-coming-to-be*, but *would Be*. But now,

γίγνονται, ἂν οὐκ ἐτι γένοιτο, ἀλλ' εἴεν. δὲ νῦν

They are *becoming* both *older* and *younger* than Each other. On the one hand, **The One**

γίγνεται μὲν πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων: μὲν τὸ ἐν

becomes younger than **The Others**, because **It** came to **Light Being older**, and *would-have-*

γίγνεται νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι ἐφάνη ὄν πρεσβύτερον καὶ

come-to-Be before;

155B γεγονός πρότερον,

ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον ἐπιδίδωσιν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. τὸ δ' αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως. ἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου: γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἶω τε εἴτην. εἰ γὰρ γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἐτι γίγναιτο, ἀλλ' εἴεν ἂν. νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα: τὸ μὲν ἐν τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὄν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός,

[155b] and the others are becoming older than the one, because they came into being later. By the same reasoning the others stand in the same relation to the one, since they were seen to be older than the one and to have come into being earlier.”

“Yes, that is clear.”

becomes
- *becomes*

“Then from the point of view that no one thing becomes older or younger than another, inasmuch as they always differ by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but in so far as that which comes into being earlier must always differ by a different proportional part from that which comes into being later, [155c] and vice versa—

2.233

whereas on the other hand, **The Others** *have-come-to-be older* than
 δε τα αλλα πρεσβυτερα

The One since **They** *have-come-to-be later*. According to **The Self Logos**, **The Others**
 του ενος οτι γεγονε υστερα. κατα τον αυτον λογον ταλλα
 will also be *related* in the same way *in relation to The One*, inasmuch as **They** also *came-to-*
 και ισχει ουτω προς το εν, επειδηπερ και ε-

Light older than **Self**, and *to-have-come-to-be before*.
 -φανε πρεσβυτερα αυτου και γεγονοτα προτερα.

Ari: For It has thus come to **Light** in this way.

γαρ ουν φαίνεται ουτως.

Par: Is it not always the case that, on the one hand, insofar as **One Member** does not
 αι ουκουν μεν η ετερον ουδεν

become older nor *younger* than **Another**, *by differing from* Each Other by an **Equal Number**,
 γινεται πρεσβυτερον ουδε νεωτερον ετερου το διαφερειν αλληλων κατα ισω αριθμω,
 then neither **will The One become older** nor *younger* than **The Others**, nor **The Others** than
 ουτε αν το εν γιγνοιτ' πρεσβυτερον ουδε νεωτερον των αλλων, ουτε ταλλα

The One; but on the other hand, insofar as **Those** that are **Prior** must **Necessarily Always**
 του ενος: δε η τα προτερα αναγκη αι

differ by a different part *from Those* that *come-to-be later*, and **The Later from The Prior**.

155C διαφερειν αλλω μοριω των γενομενα υστερον, και τα υστερα των προτερων,

τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι ὕστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ
 ἐν ἴσχει, ἐπειδὴπερ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα.

φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων
 ἀεὶ διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὔτε τὰλλα τοῦ ἑνός: ἢ δὲ
 ἄλλῳ ἀεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ὕστερα τῶν προτέρων,

from this point of view the one and the others must necessarily
become both older and younger than one another, must they not?"

"Certainly."

"For all these reasons, then, the one both is and becomes both older
and younger than both itself and the others, and neither is nor
becomes either older or younger than either itself or the others."

is becomes
- is becomes
older younger
itself others

2.234

"Perfectly true."

Then, in this way, it is **Necessary** that They must **become older** and **younger** than Each Other;
 δη ταυτη αναγκη γινεσθαι πρεσβυτερα τε και νεωτερα αλληλων

both **The Others** than **The One** and **The One** than **The Others**?

τε τα αλλα του ενος και το εν των αλλων;

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

Par: Surely then, according to all these accounts, **The One Self**, both **Is**, and

δη κατα παντα ταυτα το εν αυτο τε εστι και

becomes older and **younger** than **Self** and **The Others**; and in turn, neither **Is**, nor

γινεται πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον αυτου και των αλλων, και ουτ' εστιν ουτε

becomes neither **older** nor **younger** than **Self** nor than **The Others**.

γινεται ουτε πρεσβυτερον ουτε νεωτερον αυτου ουτε των αλλων.

Ari: That is perfectly so. (μεν παντελως ουν.)

ταυτη δη αναγκη πρεσβυτερα τε και νεωτερα αλληλων γινεσθαι τα τε αλλα του ενος και το εν των
 αλλων;

πανυ μεν ουν.

κατα δη παντα ταυτα το εν αυτο τε αυτοδ και των αλλων πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον εστι τε και
 γινεται, και ουτε πρεσβυτερον ουτε νεωτερον ουτ' εστιν ουτε γινεται ουτε αυτοδ ουτε των αλλων.

παντελως μεν ουν.

| | | |
|--|--|-------|
| | “But since the one partakes of time and can become older and younger, [155d] must it not also partake of the past, the future, and the present?” | 2.235 |
|--|--|-------|

| | | |
|--|------------|--|
| | “It must.” | |
|--|------------|--|

| | | |
|--|---|-------|
| | “Then the one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.” | 2.236 |
|--|---|-------|

*was is will be
becoming become*

| | | |
|--|--------------|--|
| | “Certainly.” | |
|--|--------------|--|

relation

| | | |
|--|---|-------|
| | “And there would be and was and is and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?” | 2.237 |
|--|---|-------|

| | | |
|--|--------------|--|
| | “Certainly.” | |
|--|--------------|--|

Par: But since **The One Participates** of **Time**, and of **becoming older** and **younger**,
 155D δε επειδη το εν μετεχει χρονου και του γινεσθαι πρεσβυτερον τε και νεωτερον,
 is it not **Necessary** that **It** should also **Participate** of **The Past**, **The Future** and **The Present**,
 αρ' ουκ αναγκη και μετεχειν του ποτε και του επειτα και του νυν,
 if indeed **It Participates** of **Time**? (ειπερ μετεχει χρονου;)

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One Was**, and **Is**, and **Will be**; and **was-coming-into-Being**
 αρα το εν ην και εστι και εσται και εγγινετο
 and **Is-coming-into-Being**, and **will-come-into-Being**.
 και γινεται και γενησεται.

Ari: What follows then? (τι μην;)

Par: And there **Should/Can/Must/Will Be Something** (**Ousia**, 152a) in *relation to That*,
 και αν ειη τι εκεινω
 that also **Belongs** to **That**; which **Was**, and **Is**, and **Will be**.
 και και εκεινου ην και εστιν και εσται.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἐν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον γίνεσθαι, ἂρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει;

ἀνάγκη.

ἦν ἄρα τὸ ἐν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται.

τί μιν;

καὶ εἴη ἂν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται.

πάνυ γε.

| | | |
|--|---|-------|
| “And there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it; there must be, if we are now carrying on all this discussion about it.” | <i>knowledge
opinion
perception</i> | 2.238 |
| “You are right.” | | |
| “And it has a name and definition, is named and defined, [155e] and all the similar attributes which pertain to other things pertain also to the one.” | <i>name definition
named defined
attributes pertain</i> | 2.239 |
| “That is perfectly true.” | | |

Par: Surely then, there **Can/Must/Will Be Knowledge**, and **opinion**, and **perception**
δη αν ειη επιστημη και δοξα και αισθησις
of **Self**, since we have now dealt with all these aspects concerning **Self**.
αυτου, ειπερ ημεις νυν πραττομεν παντα ταυτα περι αυτου.

Ari: You speak rightly. (λεγεις ορθως.)

Par: Surely then, there **Is** a **Name** and a **Logos in relation to Self**, and so **It** is **Named**
δη και εστιν ονομα και λογος αυτω και ονομαζεται
and accounted for; and whatsoever happens to such aspects concerning **The Other Beings**,
155E και λεγεται: και οσαπερ τυγχανει των τοιουτων περι τα αλλα οντα,
is also the case concerning **The One**.

εστιν και περι το εν.

Ari: Therefore, it has to be entirely in this way.

ουν μεν εχει παντελως ουτως.

και επιστημη δη ειη αν αυτοδ και δοξα και αισθησις, ειπερ και νυν ημεις περι αυτοδ παντα ταυτα
πραττομεν.

ορθως λεγεις.

και ονομα δη και λογος εστιν αυτω, και ονομαζεται και λεγεται: και οσαπερ και περι τα αλλα των
τοιουτων τυγχανει οντα, και περι το εν εστιν.

παντελως μεν ουν εχει ουτως.

| | |
|---|------|
| <i>one many neither time</i> 2.6 2.186 | 3.1 |
| <i>one time another time</i> | 3.3 |
| <i>generated destroyed</i> | 3.7 |
| <i>separated combined</i> | 3.9 |
| <i>assimilated dissimulated</i> | 3.10 |
| <i>increased diminished equalized</i> | 3.11 |
| Theorem IV | 3.12 |
| <i>instant - time</i> | 3.18 |
| <i>- rest motion</i> | 3.19 |
| <i>- is is not comes into destroyed</i> | 3.20 |
| <i>- one many separation combination</i> | 3.21 |
| <i>- like unlike assimilation dissimulation</i> | |
| <i>- small great equal increase diminution equality</i> | |
| <i>one exists</i> | 3.22 |

THE SELF
THE ONE OUSIA
ETERNITY



The Eternal Yoked-Ideas
Perfection-imperfection-Equality-inequality


Like-Unlike ,
Great-Small , Rest-Motion

Time
Participates & *does not* Participate
of OUSIA

Past *The Gap* **The Now** *The Gap* *Future*
The Sudden

ETERNITY

The Eternal Ideas



3rd

2.6 2.186

“Let us discuss the matter once more and for the third time. If the one is such as we have described it, being both *one* and *many* and *neither* one nor many, and partakes of *time*, must it not, because one is, sometimes partake of being, and again because one is not, sometimes not partake of being?”

3.1

“Yes, it must.”

“And can one, when it partakes of being, not partake of it, or partake of it when it does not partake of it?”

3.2

“No, it cannot.”

The Third Hypothesis

Parmenides: 21 Surely then in the third place, let us still relate, that if **The One Is** such as
 δη το τρίτον ετι λεγωμεν. ει το εν εστιν οιον

we have described, is it not **Necessary** that **Self, Is One** and **Being** and **Many** (143b)

διεληλυθαμεν, αρ' ουκ αναγκη αυτο, εν τε ον και πολλα
 and **Neither One Nor Many** and **Participates** of **Time**, because on the one hand, **It Is One**,
 και μητε εν μητε πολλα και μετεχον χρονου, οτι μεν εστιν εν,

then at that **Time**, **It Participates** of **Ousia**; but on the other hand, because **It Is Not**,

ποτε μετεχειν ουσιας δ' οτι εστι ουκ,
 then in turn, **It does not**, at that **Time Participate** of **Ousia**?
 αυ μη ποτε μετεχειν ουσιας;

Aristotle: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Take notice then, is it possible, that **It will Participate** at the **Time** that **It does not**

αρ' ουν, οιον τε εσται μετεχει τοτε οτε μη
Participate; or that **It will not Participate** at the **Time** when **It does Participate**?
 μετεχειν, η μη μετεχει οτε μετεχειν;

Ari: It is not possible. (ουχ οιον τε.)

3rd

ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. τὸ ἐν εἰ ἔστιν οἶον διεληλύθαμεν, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἐν τε ὄν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ
 μήτε ἐν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἐν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ
 μετέχειν αὖ ποτε οὐσίας;

ἀνάγκη.

ἄρ' οὖν, ὅτε μετέχει, οἶόν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν;
 οὐχ οἶόν τε.

one time
another time

“Then it partakes at one time and does not partake at another; for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same thing.” [156a] 3.3

“True.”

“And is there not also a time when it assumes being and when it gives it up? How can it sometimes have and sometimes not have the same thing, unless it receives it at some time and again loses it?” 3.4

“There is no other way at all.”

“But would you not say that receiving existence is generation or becoming?” 3.5

“Yes.”

“And losing existence is destruction?” 3.6

“Certainly.”

Par: Accordingly then, **It Participates** at one **Time**, and *does not Participate* at another **Time**.
 αρα μετεχει εν αλλω χρονω και ου μετεχει εν αλλω;

For only thus, will it be possible for **It** to **Participate** and *not Participate* of **The Self**.

156A γαρ μονως ουτω αν μετεχοι τε και ου μετεχοι του αυτου.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: Is there not also such a **Time**, when **It Shares** of **That** which **Is** and when **It takes-leave**
 εστι ουκουν και ουτος χρονος, οτε μεταλαμβανει του ειναι και οτε απαλλαττεται

of **Self**? Or how can it be possible, that **It Will** on the one hand, **Possess The Self** at one
 αυτου; η πως οιον τε εσται μεν εχειν το αυτο

Time, but at another **Time** **Not Possess It**, unless if **It** both **Receives-and-loses Self**?
 τοτε δε τοτε μη εχειν εαν μη και λαμβανη και αφιη αυτο;

Ari: No other way. (ουδαμως.)

Par: Surely then, do you not call **The Receiving/Sharing** of **Ousia coming-to-Be**?
 γε δη αρα ου καλεις το μεταλαμβανειν ουσιας γιγνεσθαι;

Ari: I do at least. (εγωγε.)

Par: But accordingly then, is not **the loss** of **Ousia**, to **perish/to dissolve**?
 δε αρα ουκ το απαλλαττεσθαι ουσιας απολλυσθαι;

Ari: Entirely so. (και πανυ γε.)

εν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι.

ὀρθῶς.

οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἶόν τε ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μὴ ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀφίῃ;

οὐδαμῶς.

τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἄρα γε οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς;

ἔγωγε.

τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἄρα οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι;

καὶ πάνυ γε.

“The one, then, as it appears, since it receives and loses existence, is *generated destroyed* 3.7
generated and destroyed.” [156b]

“Inevitably.”

“And being one and many and being generated and destroyed, 3.8
when it becomes one its existence as many is destroyed, and when it
becomes many its existence as one is destroyed, is it not?”

“Certainly.”

*separated
combined*

“And in becoming one and many, must it not be separated and 3.9
combined?”

“Inevitably.”

*assimilated
dissimulated*

“And when it becomes like and unlike, it must be assimilated and 3.10
dissimulated?”

“Yes.”

Par: Surely then, **The One**, as it is **Reasonable**, *comes-to-Be* and **dissolves**,
 δη το εν, ως εοικε, γινεται τε και απολυται,
 by *receiving/grasping/taking/seizing* and by *letting-go/discharging/losing Ousia*,
 156B λαμβανον τε και αφιεν ουσιαν.

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Then by **Being One** and **Many** and by *coming-to-Be* and by *letting-go-of-Being*,
 δε ον εν και πολλα και γιγνομενον και απολλυμενον
 accordingly on the one hand, when **It comes-to-Be One**, does **It** not **cease** to **Be Many**,
 αρ' μεν οταν γιγνηται εν, το ουχ απολλυται ειναι πολλα,
 but on the other hand, when **It comes-to-Be Many**, does **It** not **cease** to **Be The One**?
 δε οταν πολλα, απολλυται ειναι το εν;

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: But accordingly then, by *coming-to-Be One* and **Many**,
 δε αρ' γιγνομενον εν και πολλα
 must **It** not **Necessarily Be** both **Dispersed/Scattered-apart** and **Collected-together**?
 ουκ αναγκη τε διακρινεσθαι και συγκρινεσθαι;

Ari: Very much so indeed. (πολλη γε.)

Par: And most certainly, when **It comes-to-Be Unlike** and **Like**,
 και γε μην οταν γιγνηται ανομοιον και ομοιον,

It then also *comes-to-Be Assimilated* and **Dissimilated**?
 τε ομοιουσθαι και ανομοιουσθαι;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

τὸ ἐν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφιέν οὐσίαν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται.
 ἀνάγκη.

Ἐν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὄν καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ἂρ' οὐχ, ὅταν μὲν γίγνηται ἔν, τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι
 ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ πολλὰ, τὸ ἐν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται;

πάνυ γε.

Ἐν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἂρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι;

πολλή γε.

καὶ μὴν ἀνόμοιόν γε καὶ ὅμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ὁμοιοῦσθαι τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι;

ναί.

increased
diminished
equalized

“And when it becomes greater and smaller and equal, it must be increased and diminished and equalized?” [156c] 3.11

“Yes.”

“And when being in motion it comes to rest, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it must itself be in no time at all.” Theorem IV 3.12

“How is that?”

“It is impossible for it to be previously at rest and afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without

“Of course.”

Par: And when **It comes-to-Be more, less, and Equal,**

και οταν μειζον και ελαττον και ισον,

then **It** also **Becomes-increased** and **Becomes-decreased** and also **Becomes-Equalized?**

156C τε αυξανεσθαι και φθινειν και ισουσθαι;

Ari: It becomes in this way. (ουτως.)

Par: But when **It Is Standing-Still, from-Being-in-the-state-of-motion,**

δε οταν ιστηται κινουμενον

and in turn when **It Is At-Rest, It Is** then **changed into That** which **Is In-Motion**, then surely

οταν εστος μεταβαλλη επι το κινεισθαι δη

it is necessary that **Self** must indeed not **Be** in **Any/Some Singular Period in Time**.

δει αυτο γε μηδ' ειναι που ενι εν χρονω.

Ari: How could it indeed? (πως δη;)

Par: But that which **was formerly At-Rest**, and **later-on Moves**, and that which

προτερον εστος τε υστερον κινεισθαι και

was-Moving before and **later-on Stands-still**; on the one hand, will not **Be Able** to **experience**

κινουμενον προτερον υστερον εσταναι, μεν εσται ουχ οιον τε πασχειν

these experiences without **Mutation/Alteration**.

ταυτα ανευ του μεταβαλλειν.

Ari: How could it? (πως γαρ;)

και οταν μειζον και ελαττον και ισον, αυξανεσθαι τε και φθινειν και ισοδσθαι;

ουτως.

οταν δε κινουμενον τε ιστηται και οταν εστος επι το κινεισθαι μεταβαλλη, δει δηπου αυτο γε μηδ' εν ενι χρονω ειναι.

πως δη;

εστος τε προτερον υστερον κινεισθαι και προτερον κινουμενον υστερον εσταναι, ανευ μεν του μεταβαλλειν ουχ οιον τε εσται ταυτα πασχειν.

πως γαρ;

“And there is no time in which anything can be at once neither in motion nor at rest.” 3.14

“No, there is none.”

“And certainly it cannot change without changing.” 3.15

“I should say not.”

“Then when does it change? For it does not change when it is at rest or when it is in motion or when it is in time.” [156d] 3.16

“No, it does not.”

Par: On the other hand, there **Is** indeed **No-Time** (**The Gap**), in which **Anything** can **change**
 δε εστιν γε ουδεις χρονος , εν ω τι οιον

At-That-Same-Time; that is, neither **when Moving** nor **when Standing-still**.
 τε αμα μητε κινεισθαι μητε εσταναι.

Aristotle: There is not. (γαρ ουν ου.)

Parmenides: Certainly then, **Nothing Can Be changed** without **Mutation**.

μην αλλ' ουδε μεταβαλλει ανευ του μεταβαλλειν.

Ari: It is not likely that it can. (ουκ εικος.)

Par: Then **at what Time** will **Anything Change/Mutate/Alter**? For **Nothing**

ουν ποτ' μεταβαλλει ; γαρ ουτε

Is Altered while Being At-Rest, nor **while Being In-Motion**, nor **while Being** in **Time**.

156D μεταβαλλει ον εστος ουτε κινουμενον, ουτε ον εν χρονω.

Ari: It will not. (ου γαρ ουν.)

χρόνος δέ γε ουδεις ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι οἶόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἐστάναι.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.

οὐκ εἰκός.

πότ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἐστὸς ὃν οὔτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

“Does this strange thing, then, exist, in which it would be at the moment when it changes?” 3.17

“What sort of thing is that?”

instant - time

“The instant. For the instant seems to indicate a something from which there is a change in one direction or the other. For it does not change from rest while it is still at rest, nor from motion while it is still moving; but there is this strange instantaneous nature, something interposed 3.18

Par: Take notice then, *Is This, That which Is Outside* of the ordinary,

ἀρ' οὖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀτοπὸν

In Which, It will *Be*, at the (*No*)-*Time* when *It Changes*?

ἐν ᾧ ἀνείη τότ' ὅτε μεταβάλλει;

Ari: What kind of state is that then? (τὸ ποῖον δὴ;)

Par: *The Sudden*. For *The Sudden Is Likely* to signify something *Like This*, such as

τὸ ἐξαίφνης. γὰρ τὸ ἐξαίφνης εἰκε σημαίνειν τι τοιόνδε, ὡς

That from which It changes into each of these conditions. For *while It Stands-still, It* will

ἐκείνου ἐξ μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐστάναι γε

not *Be changed from standing-still*, nor *while in motion* will *It Be* changed *out of the motion*:

οὐ μεταβάλλει ἐκ ἐστῶτος, οὐδ' ἐπὶ κινουμένης μεταβάλλει ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως:

but *That Nature which Is Outside* of the ordinary, *The Sudden Her-Self*, is *Something* situated

ἀλλὰ φύσις ἀτοπὸς ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη τις ἐγκάθεται

ἀρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἂν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει;

τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι εἰκε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ ἐστάναι ἐστῶτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει: ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθεται

between [156e] motion and rest, not existing in any time, and into this and out from this that which is in motion changes into rest and that which is at rest changes into motion.”

“Yes, that must be so.”

“Then the one, if it is at rest and in motion, must change in each direction; for that is the only way in which it can do both. But in changing, it changes instantaneously, and when it changes it can be in no time, and at that instant it will be neither in motion nor at rest.”

- *rest motion*

3.19

“No.”

“And will the case not be the same in relation to other changes?”

3.20

Between (The Gap) Motion and *The Stationary*, by *Being* in *No-Time*, and certainly *into This*

156E μεταξύ κινήσεως τε και της στάσεως, ούσα εν ουδενι χρόνω, και δη εις ταυτην και

and also *from This, That* which *moves, changes to That* which *Stands-Still*,

τε και εκ ταυτης το κινουμενον μεταβαλλει επι το εσταναι

and in turn *That* which is *At-Rest, changes to That* which is *Moved*.

και το εστος επι το κινεισθαι.

Ari: I dare say. (κινδυνευει.)

Par: And surely, if indeed *The One Stands-still* and *Is Moved*, *It* will *Be Changed*

και δη ειπερ το εν εστηκε τε και κινειται, αν μεταβαλλοι

into *Each*. For only in this way will *It* create both of these conditions. But *when It Is Changing*

εφ' εκατερα: γαρ μονως ουτως αν ποιοι αμφοτερα: δ' μεταβαλλον

It will *Be Changed* by *The Sudden Turn-About*; and *when It Changes, It Will Be* in

μεταβαλλει εξαιφνης, και οτε μεταβαλλει, αν ειη εν

No-Time, for *At That Time, It* will *neither* be *Moved, nor Stand-still*.

ουδενι χρόνω, τοτε αν ουδε κινοιτ, ουδ' αν σταιη.

Ari: For it will not.

γαρ ου.

Par: Take notice then, does *The One* also have to *Be* in this way, *in relation to the other*

αρ' ουν και εχει ουτω προς τας αλλας

mutations?

μεταβολας,

μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὔσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἐστάναι καὶ τὸ ἐστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι.

κινδυνεύει.

καὶ τὸ ἐν δὴ, εἴπερ ἔστηκε τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἂν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα—μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφοτέρα ποιοῖ—μεταβάλλον δ' ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ κινοῖτ' ἂν τότε, οὐδ' ἂν σταίη.

οὐ γάρ.

ἂρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει,

- *is is not*
 - *comes into*
 - *destroyed*

When it changes from being to destruction [157a] or from not being to becoming, does it not pass into an intermediate stage between certain forms of motion and rest, so that it neither is nor is not, neither comes into being nor is destroyed?”

“Yes, so it appears.”

- *one many*
 - *separation*
 - *combination*

“And on the same principle, when it passes from one to many or from many to one, it is neither one nor many, is neither in a process of separation nor in one of combination. And in passing from like to unlike or from unlike to like,

3.21

And when **It Is changed** from **That** which **Is**, into **that** which **dissolves**, or from
 όταν μεταβάλλη εκ του είναι εις το απολλυσθαι η εκ
that which **Is not**, to *that* which **comes-to-Be**; does **It Become at that Time, Between** (The Gap)

157A του είναι μη εις το γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται τότε μεταξύ
 certain states of **moving** and of **standing-still**? And **At That Time, It neither**
 τινων κινήσεων τε και στάσεων, και τότε ουτε

Exists, nor **does not Exist**, **nor Becomes nor dissolves**?
 εστι ουτε ουκ εστι, ουτε γίγνεται ουτε απολυτται;

Ari: It certainly does appear to be likely.

γουν εοικε.

Par: And surely according to **The Self/Same Logos (Rep 511B-C)**, **when It Passes from One**
 και δη κατα τον αυτον λογον ιον εξ ενος
into Many and **from Many into One**, **It is neither One nor Many, neither** is **It dispersed**
 επι πολλα και εκ πολλων εφ' εν εστιν ουτε εν ουτε πολλα, ουτε διακρινεται
nor gathered-together. And in **Passing from Like to Unlike**, and **from Unlike to Like**,
 ουτε συγκρινεται . και ιον εξ ομοιου επι ανομοιον και εξ ανομοιου επι ομοιον

ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε
 γίγνεται κινήσεων τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλυται;
 ἔοικε γοῦν.

κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ' ἓν οὔτε ἓν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλὰ, οὔτε
 διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὁμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὁμοιον οὔτε
 ἀνόμοιον,

- *like unlike*
 - *assimilation*
 - *dissimulation*
 - *small great equal*
 - *increase*
 - *diminution*
 - *equality*

it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a process of assimilation nor in one of dissimulation; [157b] and in passing from small to great and to equal and vice versa, it is neither small nor great nor equal, neither in a process of increase, nor of diminution, nor of equality.”

“Apparently not.”

“All this, then, would happen to the one, if the one exists.”

one exists

3.22

“Yes, certainly.”

Ω

It is neither Like nor Unlike, nor is Assimilated nor Dissimilated. And while *It Passes from* 157B οὐτε ὁμοιον οὐτε ἀνομοιον, οὐτε ὁμοιουμενον οὐτε ἀνομοιουμενον: καὶ ἰον ἐκ *Small into Big*, and *into Equal* and *into Its* contraries, *It* will *neither* be *Small nor Big*, σμικρου ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἰσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἂν οὐτε εἴη σμικρον οὐτε μέγα *nor Equal, nor increasing, nor decreasing, nor Equalized.* οὐτε ἰσον οὐτε αὐξανόμενον οὐτε φθινον οὐτε ἰσούμενον.

Ari: It does not appear that it can.

οὐκ ἔοικε.

Par: Certainly then, if *The One Is*, *It* will **undergo** all **these experiences**.

δὴ εἰ το ἐν ἐστὶν ἂν πάσχοι πάντ' ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα.

Ari: How could it not? (πῶς δ' οὐ;)

οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον: καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἂν.

οὐκ ἔοικε.

ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ' ἂν πάσχοι τὸ ἓν, εἰ ἔστιν.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

| | |
|---|------|
| <i>consider</i> 0.58 | 4.1 |
| <i>- one</i> | 4.3 |
| <div>Theorem I</div> | 4.4 |
| <i>perfect whole parts</i> | 4.11 |
| <i>whole part participate one</i> | 4.14 |
| <i>many</i> | 4.16 |
| <i>unlimited</i> | 4.21 |
| <i>limited</i> | 4.22 |
| <i>unlimited limitation</i> | 4.24 |
| <div>Theorem VI</div> | 4.25 |
| <i>like unlike</i> | 4.30 |
| <i>like unlike themselves another</i> | 4.31 |
| <i>same other motion rest opposite affections</i> | 4.32 |



4th

0.58

“Must we not *consider* what is likely to happen to the other things,
if the one exists?” 4.1

“We must.”

“Shall we tell, then, what must happen to the things other than one,
if one exists?” 4.2

“Let us do so.”

“Well, since they are other than the one, the other things are not the
one for if they were, they would not be other than the one.” - *one* 4.3

“True.”

The Fourth Hypothesis (*passively*)

Parmenides: 22 Then must we not consider what will likely *happen* to **The Others** if **One Is**?

δε αρα ου σκεπτεον Τι αν προσηκοι πασχειν τοις αλλοις ει εν

Aristotle: We must so consider. (σκεπτεον.)

Par: Then let us say, if **One Is**, what **Those Other** than **The One Must experience**?

δη λεγωμεν, ει εν εστι, τι ταλλα του ενος χρη πεπονθεναι;

Ari: Let us do so. (λεγωμεν.)

Par: Is it not the case then, if indeed **The Others Are Other** than **The One**,

ουκουν επειπερ ταλλα εστιν αλλα του ενος,

then **They Are not The One**; for otherwise they would *not* **Be Other** than **The One**?

εστι ουτε το εν: γαρ αν ου ην αλλα του ενος.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

τί δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἄρα οὐ σκεπτέον;

σκεπτέον.

λέγωμεν δὴ, ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς τί χρη πεπονθέναι;

λέγωμεν.

οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν ἔστι τὰλλα: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἦν.

ὀρθῶς.

| | | |
|--|-----------|-----|
| [157c] “And yet surely the others are not altogether deprived of the one, but they partake of it in a certain way.” | Theorem I | 4.4 |
| “In what way?” | | |
| “Because the others are other than the one by reason of having parts; for if they had no parts, they would be altogether one.” | | 4.5 |
| “True.” | | |
| “But parts, we affirm, belong to that which is a whole.” | | 4.6 |
| “Yes, we affirm that they do.” | | |
| “But the whole must be one composed of many and of this the parts are parts. For each of the parts must be a part, not of many, but of a whole.” | | 4.7 |
| “How is that?” | | |

Par: Yet certainly, **The Others Are not entirely deprived** of **The One**,

157C μην γε τὰλλα οὐδε πανταπάσι στερεται του ενος,

but **Participate** of **It**, in a **Certain (Definite) Way**.

ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῆ .

Ari: In a certain way then? (πῆ δῆ;)

Par: Since **The Others Are Other** than **The One in some (indefinite) way**

ὅτι τὰ ἀλλὰ ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ του ενος που

by **having Parts**, for if **They had no Parts**, **They** would **Be Entirely One**.

ἔχοντα μέρη: γὰρ εἰ ἔχοι μὴ μέρη, ἂν εἴη παντελῶς ἓν.

Ari: Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς.)

Par: But we said that since **They have Parts**, **They** will **Belong** to **That** which **Is Whole**.

δέ φαμέν γε, ἡ μέρη ἂν ἐστὶν τούτου ὁ ὅλον.

Ari: We have so affirmed. (γὰρ φαμέν.)

Par: But certainly, it is indeed **Necessary** that **The Whole** will **Be One** composed of

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶναι γε ἀνάγκη το ὅλον εἶναι ἐκ

Many, and of which **Whole**, **The Many Parts Are Parts**. For **Each One** of **Those Parts**

πολλῶν, οὐ τὰ μέρη μέρη. γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν μερίων

must **not be** a **piece/fragment** of **many**, but a **Part** of a **Whole**.

χρὴ οὐ εἶναι πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ μέρος ὅλου.

Ari: How is this so? (πῶς τοῦτο;)

οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεται γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῆ.

πῆ δῆ;

ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μέρη ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστὶν: εἰ γὰρ μέρη μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη.

ὀρθῶς.

μέρη δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὁ ἂν ὅλον ᾗ.

φαμέν γάρ.

ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὐ ἔσται μέρη τὰ μέρη: ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μερίων οὐ πολλῶν μέρος χρὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλου.

πῶς τοῦτο;

“If anything is a part of many, and is itself one of the many, it will be a part of itself, [157d] which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of some particular one, it will be a part of the rest, with the exception of that one, and thus it will not be a part of each one, and not being a part of each one, it will not be a part of any one of the many. But that which belongs to none cannot belong, whether as a part or as anything else, to all those things to none of which it belongs.”

4.8

“That is clear.”

Par: If *anything* would *be* a *piece of many*, among which *it* would *exist*, surely then *somehow*

157D ει τι ειη μοριον πολλων, εν οις ειη, δη που

Self would also *be* a *piece* of *it-self* and of *each one of the others*, which is surely *impossible*,

αυτο τε εσται μοριον εαυτου, και εκαστου ενος των αλλων, ο εστιν δη αδυνατον,

if indeed **It** *is* also a *piece of all*. For by *not being* a *piece of one* of *these*, **It** will *be* a *piece* of

ειπερ και παντων. γαρ μη ον μοριον ενος τουτου, εσται μοριον

the others, except of *this*, and thus it will not *be* a *piece of each one*. Then by *not being* a *piece*

των αλλων, πλην τουτου και ουτως ουκ εσται μοριον εκαστου ενος, δε μη ον μοριον

of *each*, **It** will not in any way *be piece of the many*. But *anything* that does *not-exist*-in-one,

εκαστου εσται ουδενος των πολλων. δε τι ον μηδενος αδυνατον

cannot exist in *all* of those *of which it belongs* to *none*, *neither as a piece* or *anything else at all*.

ειναι παντων τουτων, ων εστι ουδενος, ουδεν και μοριον και αλλο οτιουν.

Ari: Surely then it has indeed come to Light. (δη γε φαινεται.)

εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸ εἴη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δήπου μόριον ἔσται, ὃ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ἑνὸς ἐκάστου, εἴπερ καὶ πάντων. ἑνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὄν μόριον, πλην τούτου τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἑνὸς ἐκάστου οὐκ ἔσται μόριον, μὴ ὄν δὲ μόριον ἐκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὄν πάντων τούτων τι εἶναι, ὧν οὐδενὸς οὐδέν ἐστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

φαίνεται γὰρ δὴ.

“Then the part is a part, not of the many nor of all, but of a single form and a single concept [157e] which we call a whole, a perfect unity created out of all this it is of which the part is a part.” 4.9

“Certainly.”

“If, then, the others have parts, they will partake of the whole and of the one.” 4.10

“True.”

perfect whole parts “Then the things which are other than one must be a perfect whole which has parts.” 4.11

“Yes, they must.”

“And the same reasoning applies to each part for the part must partake of the one. For if each of the parts is a part, [158a] the word 'each' 4.12

Par: Accordingly then, **The Part Is not a piece of many** nor of all;

157E αρα το μοριον ουκ μοριον των πολλων ουδε παντων,

but of **One Undefined Idea**, and of **Some Unity**, which *we call Whole*, which *has-come-to-Be*
 αλλα μιας τινος ιδεας και τινος ενος, ο καλουμεν ολον, γεγονος

One Perfect Idea composed from **All**; *of That which The Part will Be a Part.*

εν τελειον εξ απαντων, τουτου το μοριον αν ειη μοριον.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)

Par: Accordingly then, if **The Others have Parts**, then they will also **Participate**

αρα ει ταλλα εχει μορια, καν μετεχοι

of **The Whole** and also of **One/Unity/Oneness**.

του ολου τε και ενος.

Ari: Very much so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, **Those** that **Are Other** than **The One**, **Must Be One Perfect**

αρα ταλλα του ενος αναγκη ειναι εν τελειον

Whole which **has Parts**. (ολον εχον μορια.)

Ari: They must be. (αναγκη.)

Par: And most certainly, **The Self/Same Logos**, also applies to each **Part**. For

και γε μην ο αυτος λογος και περι του εκαστου μοριου. γαρ

The Part Must Participate of **The One**. For if each of **These Parts Is a Part**, then “each”
 τουτου αναγκη μετεχειν του ενος. γαρ ει εκαστον αυτων εστι μοριον, το εκαστον

οὐκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μῶριον μῶριον, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ ἑνὸς τινος ὃ καλοῦμεν
 ὅλον, ἐξ ἀπάντων ἓν τέλειον γεγονός, τοῦτου μῶριον ἂν τὸ μῶριον εἴη.

παντάπασι μεν ουν.

εἰ ἄρα τᾶλλα μῶρια ἔχει, καὶ τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνὸς μετέχοι.

πάνυ γε.

ἐν ἄρα ὅλον τέλειον μῶρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τᾶλλα τοῦ ἑνός.

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ μὴν καὶ περι τοῦ μορίου γε ἐκάστου ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος; καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνός.

implies that it is one, separated from the rest, and existing by itself; otherwise it will not be 'each.'"

"True."

"But its participation in the one clearly implies that it is other than the one, for if not, it would not partake of the one, but would actually be one; but really it is impossible for anything except one itself to be one."

4.13

"Yes, it is impossible."

"And both the whole and the part must necessarily participate in the one; for the one will be a whole of which the parts are parts, and again each individual one which is a part of a whole will be a part of the whole."

*whole part
participate one*

4.14

"Yes."

without a doubt, indeed signifies to **Be** “**One**”; by first **Being Distinct** from the others,
 158A δηπου γε σημαινει ειναι εν, μεν αφωρισμενον των αλλων
 then by **Being** “**According to Self**”, if indeed **It** will **Be** that which **Is** called, “**Each Part**”.

δε ον καθ'αυτο, ειπερ εσται εκαστον.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: But **It** will indeed **Participate** of **The One**, since this **Is** clear by **Being another**

δε αν γε μετεχοι του ενος οτι δηλον ον αλλο
 than **One**; for otherwise **It** would **not Participate**, but **It would Be One Self**; but now
 η εν: γαρ ου μετειχεν, αλλ' αν ην εν αυτο: δε νυν
 on the one hand, it **Is Impossible** that **some Part** to **Be One**, except by **The One Self**.
 μεν αδυνατον που ειναι ενι πλην τω ενι αυτω.

Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

Par: But on the other hand, it is quite **Necessary** that both **The Whole** and **The Part Participate**

δε γε αναγκη τε τω ολω και τω μοριω μετεχειν
 of **The One**; for on the one hand, **The Whole** of which **The Parts Are Parts**, will **Be One**, but
 του ενος: γαρ μεν το ολον ου τα μορια μορια εσται εν: δ'
 then in turn, **Each Singular Part** of **The Whole**, **Is That** which will **Be** a **Part** of **The Whole**.
 αυ εκαστον εν μοριον του ολου, ο αν η μοριον το ολου.

Ari: It is so. (ουτως.)

ει γαρ εκαστον αυτων μориόν ἐστι, τό γε εκαστον εἶναι ἐν δήπου σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν
 ἄλλων, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ ὄν, εἴπερ εκαστον ἐσται.

ὀρθῶς.

μετέχοι δὲ γε ἂν τοῦ ἐνός δηλον ὅτι ἄλλο ὄν ἢ ἐν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετείχεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἂν αὐτὸ ἐν.

νῦν δὲ ἐνὶ μὲν εἶναι πλην αὐτῷ τῷ ἐνὶ ἀδύνατόν που.

ἀδύνατον.

μετέχειν δὲ γε τοῦ ἐνός ἀνάγκη τῷ τε ὅλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὅλον ἐσται, οὐ μὲν τὰ μέρη: τὸ
 δ' αὖ εκαστον ἐν μέρηον τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ ἂν ἢ μέρηον ὅλου.

οὕτως.

[158b] “And will not the things which participate in the one be other than the one while participating in it?” 4.15

“Of course.”

“But the things which are other than the one will be many; for if they were neither one nor more than one, they would not be anything.” *many* 4.16

“No.”

“But since the things which participate in the one as a part and the one as a whole are more than one, must not those participants in the one be infinite in number?” 4.17

“How so?”

“Let us look at the question in this way. Is it not true that at the moment when they begin to participate in the one they are not one and do not participate in one?” [158c] 4.18

“Clearly.”

Par: Is it not the case then, that **The Beings** which **Participate** of **The One**,

158B οὐκ οὖν τα ὄντα μεθεξεί του ενός

Participate of **Self**, by **Being Other** (as in 148b)?

μετεχόντα αὐτοῦ ἕτερα ;

Ari: How could they not? (πῶς δ' οὐ;)

Par: But **Those** that **Are Other** than **The One** will **Be Many in some indefinite way**.

δ' τα ἕτερα του ενός ἀνείη πολλά που .

For if **Those** that **Are Other** than **The One** **Were neither One nor More** than **One**, then **They**

γάρ εἰ τάλλα του ενός εἴη μήτε ἐν μήτε πλείω ενός,

would be nothing. (ἀνείη οὐδέν.)

Ari: They would be nothing then. (οὐ γὰρ οὖν.)

Par: Since **The Beings** that **Participate** both of a **Part** of **One**, and

Ἐπει τα μετεχόντα τε του μορίου ενός και

The Beings that **Participate** of **The One Whole**, **Are** indeed **More** than **One**, then **Must** not

τα του ενός ὅλου ἐστὶ γε πλείω ενός, δε ἀνάγκη οὐκ

These Beings which **Participate** of **The One** already **Be Unlimited Multitude**?

ἐκεῖνα τα μεταλαμβάνοντα του ενός ἤδη εἶναι ἀπειρα πληθῆ;

Ari: How? (πῶς;)

Par: Let us **See** in the following way. At the **Time** when **They Partake** of **Something other**

ἰδωμεν ὧδε. τότε ὅτε ὄντα μεταλαμβάνει τι ἄλλο

than **The One**, do **They Participate** of **Not-One**, and do not **Participate** of **Self**?

του ενός μετεχόντα οὐχ ἐν, οὐδε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ;

Ari: Clearly so. (δηλα δῆ.)

οὐκοῦν ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἑνὸς μεθεξεί τα μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ;

πῶς δ' οὐ;

τά δ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνὸς πολλά που ἂν εἴη: εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἐν μήτε ἑνὸς πλείω εἴη τάλλα τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ἐπεὶ δέ γε πλείω ἑνός ἐστὶ τά τε τοῦ ἑνός μορίου καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἑνός ὅλου μετέχοντα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη πληθῆ ἀπειρα εἶναι αὐτά γε ἐκεῖνα τα μεταλαμβάνοντα τοῦ ἑνός;

πῶς;

ὦδε ἰδωμεν. ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἐν ὄντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑνός τότε, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει;

δηλα δῆ.

“Then they are multitudes, in which the one is not, are they not?” 4.19

“Yes, they are multitudes.”

“Well, then, if we should subtract from them in thought the smallest possible quantity, must not that which is subtracted, if it has no participation in one, be also a multitude, and not one?” 4.20

“Whoah.”

unlimited

“And always when we consider the nature of the class, which makes it other than one, whatever we see of it at any time will be unlimited in number, will it not?” 4.21

“Certainly.”

Par: Is it not the case then, that **They** are **Multitudes**, in which **The One Is Not**?

158C ουκουν οντα πληθη εν οις το εν ενι ουκ;

Ari: Multitudes, certainly. (πληθη μεντοι.) (ενειμι)

Par: What then? If we would be willing to take away through our **Understanding**,

το ουν; ει εσμεν εθελοιμεν αφελειν(αφαιρεω) τη διανοια

the least possible **Quantity** from **These**, then is it not **Necessary** that **This Very Quantity**

ολιγιστον ως οιοι τε των τοιουτων ουκ αναγκη οτι το εκεινο

which is taken away, **Must Be** a **Multitude** and also **Not-One**,

αφαιρεθεν ειναι πληθος και ουχ εν,

if indeed, **It** does **Not Participate** of **The One**?

ειπερ μη μετεχοι του ενος;

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: By **Always** Considering **That Other (Ousia) Nature** of **The Ideas/Kinds/Genera**

αι σκοπουντες την ετεραν φυσιν του ειδους

in this way, as **Subsisting Her Self** by **Her Self**, will not then, such a **Quantity** of **Her Self**,

ουτως αυτην καθ' αυτην, αν ουκουν οσον αυτης

which we may behold, **Will Always Be, Unlimited Multitude**?

ορωμεν αι εσται απειρον πληθει;

Ari: Entirely so indeed. (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)

οὐκοῦν πλήθη ὄντα, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἔνι;

πλήθη μέντοι.

τί οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὥς οἱοί τε ἔσμεν ὅτι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ μετέχοι, πλήθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἓν;

ἀνάγκη.

οὐκοῦν οὕτως αἰεὶ σκοποῦντες αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἶδους ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς αἰεὶ ὀρώμεν ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει;

παντάπασι μεν οὖν.

limited

“And, further, when each part becomes a part, [158d] straightway the parts are limited in relation to each other and to the whole, and the whole in relation to the parts.”

4.22

“Undoubtedly.”

“The result, then, to the things which are other than one, that from the one and the union of themselves with it there arises, as it appears, something different within themselves which gives them a limitation in relation to one another; but their own nature, when they are left to themselves, gives them no limits.”

4.23

“So it appears.”

“Then the things which are other than one, both as wholes and as parts, are both unlimited and partake of limitation.”

*unlimited
limitation*

4.24

“Certainly.”

Par: And most certainly, whenever **Each Part becomes One, Each Part Will Already**

158D και γε μὴν ἐπειδὴν ἑκάστων μέρων γένηται ἐν, μέρος ἤδη

Possess Limit, in relation to Each Other, and in relation to The Whole, and

ἔχει πέρας πρὸς ἀλλήλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ

The Whole in relation to The Parts.

τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μέρη.

Ari: Exactly so then. (κομίδη μὲν οὖν.)

Par: Surely then, on the one hand, it then results for **Those Other** than **The One**, as it **Is**

δὴ μὲν συμβαίνει τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἑνός, ὥς

Reasonable, both from Their Sharing-a-Commonness with Each Other and from The One,

οἶκεν, ἐξ κοινωνησάντων ἑαυτῶν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός,

that **Something Other Will Come-to-Be** within **Them-Selves**; which certainly **Provides Them**

τι ἕτερον γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὴ παρέσχε

The Limit in relation to Each Other; but on the other hand, by **The Nature** of **Them-Selves**,

πέρας πρὸς ἀλλήλα: δ' ἡ φύσις ἑαυτῶν.

according to **Them-Selves (Other/Many), The Unlimited Comes-to-Be.**

καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειραν.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαίνεται.)

Par: Surely then in this way, **Those Other** than **The One**, according to both

δὴ οὕτω τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός κατὰ καὶ

Wholes and Parts, are Unlimited and also Participate of Limit.

ὅλα καὶ μέρη ἐστὶ ἀπειρά τε καὶ μετέχει πέρατος.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)

καὶ μὴν ἐπειδὴν γε ἐν ἑκάστων μέρων μέρος γένηται, πέρας ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς ἀλλήλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μέρη.

κομίδῃ μὲν οὖν.

τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῦ ἑνός συμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἑνός καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὥς οἶκεν, ἕτερόν τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἀλλήλα:

ἢ δ' ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν.

φαίνεται.

οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μέρη ἀπειρά τέ ἐστὶ καὶ πέρατος μετέχει.

πάνυ γε.

| | | |
|--|------------|------|
| [158e] “And are they also both like and unlike one another and themselves?” | Theorem VI | 4.25 |
| “How is that?” | | |
| “Inasmuch as they are all by their own nature unlimited, they are all in that respect affected in the same way.” | | 4.26 |
| “Certainly.” | | |
| “And surely inasmuch as they all partake of limitation, they are all affected in the same way in that respect also.” | | 4.27 |
| “Obviously.” | | |
| “And inasmuch as they are so affected as to be both limited and limitless, they are affected by affections which are the opposites of one another.” [159a] | | 4.28 |
| “Yes.” | | |

Par: Is it not the case then, that **They** are **Like** and **Unlike**, to **Each Other** and to **Themselves**?

158E Ουκουν και ομοια τε και ανομοια τε αλληλοις και εαυτοις;

Ari: in what way then? (πη δη;)

Par: Since on the one hand, according to **Their Own Nature**, **All** of **Them** will be,

η μεν κατα εαυτων την φυσιν παντα αν ειη

in some way Unlimited; and in **This Way**, **They are (passively) affected** by **The Same**.

που απειρα ταυτη εστι πεπονθοτα ταυτον.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: And certainly, insofar as **They All** indeed **Participate** of **Limit**,

και μην η απαντα γε μετεχει περατος,

and by **Experiencing in This Way**, **They** will **All** be **The Same**.

και πεπονθοτα ταυτη αν ειη ταυτον.

Ari: How could they not; (πως δ' ου.)

Par: But on the other hand, inasmuch as **They have been so affected** so as to be

δε η πεπονθεν γε ειναι

both **Limited** and **Unlimited**, they are **affected** by **experiences** that are **opposite** to one another.

τε πεπερασμενα και απειρα, πεπονθεν παθη εναντια αλληλοις.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

ουκοδν και ομοια τε και ανομοια αλληλοις τε και εαυτοις;

πη δη;

ηι μεν που απειρα εστι κατα την εαυτων φυσιν παντα, ταυτον πεπονθοτα αν ειη ταυτη.

πανυ γε.

και μην η γε απαντα περατος μετεχει, και ταυτη παντ αν ειη ταυτον πεπονθοτα.

πως δ' ου;

ηι δε γε πεπερασμενα τε ειναι και απειρα πεπονθεν, εναντια παθη αλληλοις οντα ταυτα τα παθη πεπονθεν.

ναι.

“But opposites are as unlike as possible.” 4.29

“To be sure.”

like unlike

“Then with regard to either one of their two affections they are like themselves and each other, but with regard to both of them together they are utterly opposed and unlike.” 4.30

“Yes, that must be true.”

“Therefore the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another.” 4.31

*like unlike
themselves another*

“So they are.”

*same other
motion rest
opposite affections*

“And they are the same as one another and also other than one another, they are both in motion and at rest, and since we have proved these cases, we can easily show that the things [159b] which are other than one experience all the opposite affections.” 4.32

“You are right.”

Ω

Par: But **opposites** are indeed as most **Unlike** as it is possible.

159A δ' τα εναντια γε ως ανομοιοτατα οιον τε.

Ari: Of course, what then? (τι μην;)

Par: Thus on the one hand, **each** of **these experiences**, will be both **Like them-selves**

αρα μεν εκατερον το παθος αν ειη τε ομοια αυτοις

and **Like each other**; but on the other hand, according to both **affections**,

και αλληλοις, δ' κατα αμφοτερα

they are in both ways, **most opposite** and **most Unlike**.

αυτα αμφοτερος εναντιωτατα τε και ανομοιοτατα.

Ari: I dare say so. (κινδυνευει.)

Par: Surely then, in this way, **The Other Beings** will **Themselves** be both

δη ουτω τα αλλα αν αυτα ειη τε

Like and **Unlike** with **Themselves** and with **Each Other**.

ομοια τε και ανομοια αυτοις και αλληλοις.

Ari: It is so. (ουτως.)

Par: Surely then, **They** will be both **The Same** and **Other** from **Each Other**, and

δη και ταυτα και ετερα αλληλων, και

will be **In-Motion** and **Standing-still**, and it will not in any way be difficult for us to discover

κινουμενα και εστωτα, και ουκετι χαλεπως ευρησομεν

that all kinds of contrary **experiences** are **undergone** by **Those** that are **Other** than **The One**,

159B παντα εναντια τα παθη πεπονθοτα ταλλα του ενος,

seeing that **They** appear **to have been so affected**.

επειπερ ταυτα εφανε πεπονθοτα.

Ari: You speak rightly. (λεγεις ορθως.)

τα δ' εναντια γε ως οϊον τε ανομοιότατα.

τί μην;

κατά μὲν ἄρα ἑκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὅμοια ἂν εἶη αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ' ἀμφοτέρα ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα.

κινδυνεύει.

οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτά τε αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἂν εἶη.

οὕτως.

καὶ ταῦτά δὴ καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἐστώτα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὐρήσομεν πεπονθότα τὰλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπειπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα.

ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

| | | |
|--|---|------|
| | | 5.3 |
| | - <i>in same</i> | 5.6 |
| | <i>separate</i> | 5.7 |
| | <i>one</i> 1.8 | 5.8 |
| | - <i>part whole</i> | 5.10 |
| | - <i>one</i> | 5.11 |
| | - <i>many</i> | 5.12 |
| | - <i>two three</i> | 5.13 |
| | | 5.14 |
| | - <i>like unlike</i> | 5.16 |
| | - <i>same other motion rest becoming destroyed greater less equal affections odd even</i> | 5.17 |
| | <i>all nothing itself others</i> | 5.18 |



Parallel / Non-Relational



5th

“Then what if we now drop these matters as evident and again
consider whether, if one is, the things other than one are as we have
said, and there is no alternative.” 5.1

“Certainly.”

“Let us then begin at the beginning and ask, if one is, what must
happen to the things which are other than one.” 5.2

“By all means.”

“Must not the one be separate from the others, and the others from
the one?” 5.3

“Why is that?”

The Fifth Hypothesis

Parmenides: 23 Is it not so then, that if on the one hand, we presently let these matters **Be**

Ουκουν ει μεν ηδη εωμεν ταυτα

as **Openly Clear**, so then in turn, we can consider, if **One Is**, whether **Those Other** than

ως φανερα, δε αρα παλιν επισκοποιμεν, ει εν εστιν, τα αλλα

The One, *do not Have* to **Be** in **This Way**, or if **they Have** to *be solely in the following way*?

του ενος ουχ χει ουτως η μονον ουτω ;

Aristotle: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

Par: Surely then, let us state from the beginning, if **One Is**,

δη λεγωμεν εξ αρχης, ει εν εστι,

what **those other** than **The One** must *undergo/experience/suffer*.

τι τα αλλα του ενος χρη πεπονθεναι.

Ari: Let us do so. (λεγωμεν γαρ.)

Par: Take notice then, on the one hand, is not **The One Separate/Apart/Distinct**

αρ' ουν μεν ειναι ου το εν χωρις

from **the others**, and on the other hand, **the others Separate/Distinct/Parallel** to **The One**?

των αλλων δε ταλλα χωρις του ενος;

Ari: Why do you ask? (τι δη;)

5th

ουκοδν, ει ταυτα μεν ηδη εωμεν ως φανερά, επισκοποιμεν δε παλιν εν ει εστιν, αρα και ουχ ουτως εχει
τα αλλα του ενος η ουτω μονον;

πανυ μεν ουν.

λεγωμεν δη εξ αρχης εν ει εστι, τι χρη τα αλλα του ενος πεπονθεναι.

λεγωμεν γαρ.

αρ' ουν ου χωρις μεν το εν των αλλων, χωρις δε ταλλα του ενος ειναι;

τι δη;

“Because there is nothing else besides these, [159c] which is 5.4
other than one and other than the others. For when we have said
'one and the others' we have included all things.”

“Yes, all things.”

“Then there is nothing other than these, in which both the one 5.5
and the others may be.”

“No.”

- *in same*

“Then the one and the others can never be in the same.” 5.6

“Apparently not.”

“Then they are separate?” *separate* 5.7

“Yes.”

1.8

“And surely we say that what is truly *one* has no parts.” 5.8

“How can it have parts?”

“Then the one cannot be in the others as a whole, nor can parts 5.9
of it, if it is separate from the others and has no parts.”

“Of course not.”

Par: Because nothing **exists** in **some** other way besides **these** ways. One which exists
 οτι ουκ εστι που ετερον παρα ταυτα, μεν ο εστι
 by **being other** than **The One**, then the other; which exists by **being other** than **the others**.

159C αλλο του ενος, δε αλλο των αλλων.

For that is all that can be specified, when we say, **The One** and **the others**.
 γαρ παντα ειρηται οταν ρηθη το εν τε και ταλλα.

Ari: All indeed. (παντα γαρ.)

Par: Accordingly then, there is **no other way** besides these, in which both **The One**
 αρα εστιν ουκ ετερον ετ' τουτων, εν ω τε το εν
 and **the others** can subsist in **The Self (Parallel) Existence**. (**Odyssey 602** on **Heracles**)
 και ταλλα αν ειη τω αυτω .

Ari: For there is none. (γαρ ου.) (Since **They are Parallel**)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One** and **the others**, never **subsist** in **The Same**.
 αρα το εν και ταλλα ουδεποτε εν ταυτω.

Ari: It does not appear that they do. (ουκ εοικεν.)

Par: Are They **Separate** then? (αρα χωρις;)

Ari: Yes, they are separate. (ναι.)

Par: We most certainly affirmed that **That** which Is **Truly One**, has no **Parts** (**137C**).
 γε μην φαμεν ως το αληθως εν εχειν ουδε μορια.

Ari: How could it? (πως γαρ;)

Par: Accordingly then, neither will **The Whole One** be in **the others**,
 αρα ουτ' αν το ολον εν ειη εν τοις αλλοις,
 nor **The Parts** of Self, if **It** is both **Separate** from **the others**, and also, if **It** has no **Parts**.
 ουτε μορια αυτου, ει εστι τε χωρις των αλλων και εχει μη μορια.

Ari: How could it not be so? (πως γαρ;)

ὅτι που οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, ὃ ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνός, ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἄλλων: πάντα γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅταν ῥηθῇ
 τό τε ἓν καὶ τὰλλα.

πάντα γάρ.

οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ' ἔστιν ἕτερον τούτων, ἐν ᾧ τό τε ἓν ἂν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τὰλλα.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν ταύτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰλλα.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

χωρὶς ἄρα;

ναί.

οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἓν.

πῶς γάρ;

οὐτ' ἄρα ὅλον εἴη ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρὶς τέ ἐστὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει.

πῶς γάρ;

[159d] “Then the others cannot partake of the one in any way; they - *part whole* 5.10
can neither partake of any part of it nor of the whole.”

“No, apparently not.”

“The others are, then, not one in any sense, nor have they in - *one* 5.11
themselves any unity.”

“No.”

“But neither are the others many; for if they were many, each of - *many* 5.12
them would be one part of the whole; but actually the things that
are other than one are not many nor a whole nor parts, since they
do not participate in the one in any way.”

“Right.”

Par: Accordingly then, *in no way* will *the others* **Participate** of **The One**, since *they*

159D αρα ουδενι τροπω αν ταλλα μετεχοι του ενος,

neither **Participate** according to a certain **Part** of **Self**, nor according to **The Whole**.

μητε μετεχοντα κατα τι μοριον αυτου μητε κατα ολον.

Ari: It does not appear to be likely.

ουκ εοικεν.

Par: Accordingly then, *in no way* are *the others* **One**, nor *have/maintain* any **One** in *themselves*.

αρα ουδαμη εστιν ταλλα εν, ουδ' εχει ουδεν εν εν εαυτοις.

Ari: For they have not then.

γαρ ου ουν.

Par: Accordingly then, neither are *the others* **Many**. For if *they* were **Many**, then **Each Self**

αρα ουδ' εστι ταλλα πολλα. γαρ ει ην πολλα εκαστον αυτων

would be **One** by being a **Part** of **The Whole**; but now, *those other* than **The One** are neither

αν ην εν μοριον του ολου: δε νυν ταλλα του ενος εστι ουτε

One nor **Many**, nor a **Whole**, nor **Parts**, since *they in no way Participate* of **Self**.

εν ουτε πολλα ουτε ολον ουτε μορια, επειδη ουδαμη μετεχει αυτου.

Ari: Rightly so.

ορθως.

οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν τᾶλλα τοῦ ἑνός, μήτε κατὰ μῶριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἐν τᾶλλά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐν οὐδέν.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

οὐδ' ἄρα πολλὰ ἐστι τᾶλλα: ἐν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μῶριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν: νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἐν οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μῶριά ἐστι τᾶλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει.

ὀρθῶς.

- two three

“Neither are the others two or three, nor are two or three in them,
if they are entirely deprived of unity.” [159e]

5.13

“True.”

“Nor are the others either themselves like and unlike the one, nor
are likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike
or had likeness and unlikeness in them, the things which are other
than the one would have in them two elements opposite to one
another.”

5.14

“That is clear.”

“But it is impossible for that to partake of two things which does not
even partake of one.”

5.15

“Impossible.”

Par: Accordingly then, **the others** are neither **Two** nor **Three**, nor are **These Numbers**

159E αρα τα αλλα ουδ' δυο ουδε τρια ουτε εστι αυτα

contained in **them**, since **they** are entirely deprived of **The One**.

ενεστιν εν αυτοις, ειπερ πανταχη στερεται του ενος.

Ari: So it is.

ουτως.

Par: Accordingly then, **the others** are neither **Like** nor **Unlike**,

αρα τα αλλα εστι Ουδε ομοια και ανομοια

nor **The Same/Selves** with **The One**, nor are **Likeness** and **Unlikeness** inherent in **them** selves.

ουτε αυτα τω ενι, ουτε ομοιοτης και ανομοιοτης ενεστιν εν αυτοις.

For if selves **were Like** and **Unlike**, or **Contained Likeness** and **Unlikeness** in **themselves**, then
 γαρ ει αυτα ειη ομοια και ανομοια η εχοι ομοιοτητα και ανομοιοτητα εν εαυτοις,

those other than **The One** would **somehow** **Contain in themselves**, **Two Opposite Ideas**.

τα αλλα του ενος αν που εχοι εν εαυτοις δυο εναντια ειδη.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

Par: But it is indeed impossible for anything to **Participate** of **Two Opposite Ideas**,

δε ην γε αδυνατον τινoin μετεχειν δυoin

which do **not in any way Participate** of **The One**.

ω μηδ' μετεχοι ενος.

Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

οὐδ' ἄρα δύο οὐδὲ τρία οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς πανταχῇ
 στέρεται.

οὕτως.

οὐδὲ ὅμοια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τῷ ἐνὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ
 ἀνομοιότης: εἰ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ εἴη ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που
 εἶδη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνός.

φαίνεται.

ἦν δέ γε ἀδύνατον δυοῖν τινοῖν μετέχειν ἢ μηδ' ἐνὸς μετέχοι.

ἀδύνατον.

“The others are, then, not like nor unlike nor both. [160a] For if *- like unlike* 5.16
they were like or unlike, they would partake of one of the two
elements, and if they were both, of the two opposites and that was
shown to be impossible.”

“True.”

- same other
- motion rest
- becoming
- destroyed
- greater less equal “They are, then, neither the same nor other, nor in motion nor at 5.17
rest, nor becoming nor being destroyed, nor greater nor less nor
equal, and they experience no similar affections;

Par: Accordingly then, **the others** are neither **Like** nor **Unlike**, nor **Both**.

160A αρα ταλλα εστιν ουτ' ομοια ουτ' ανομοια ουτ' αμφοτερα.

For on the one hand, if **they were Like** or **Unlike**, then **They would Participate**

γαρ μεν αν οντα ομοια η ανομοια αν μετεχοι

of **One Different Idea**; but on the other hand, if **they were Both Like** and **Unlike**, then

ενος ετερου ειδους, δε οντα αμφοτερα

They would Participate of **Two Opposite Ideas**; but this has been shown to be impossible.

τοιιν δυοιν εναντιοιν: δε ταυτα εφανη αδυνατον.

Ari: This is true. (αληθη.)

Par: Accordingly then, **they** are neither **themselves** nor **others**,

αρα τα Ουδ' αυτα ουδ' ετερα,

nor **In-motion** nor **Standing-still**, nor **generated** nor **dissolved**, nor are **greater** nor **less**,

ουδε κινουμενα ουδε εστωτα, ουδε γιγνεμενα ουδε απολλυμενα, ουδε μειζω ουδε ελαττω

nor **Equal**; nor do **they undergo** anything else of this kind.

ουδε ισα: ουδε πεπονθε ουδεν αλλο των τοιουτων.

οὐτ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὐτ' ἀνόμοιά ἐστιν οὐτ' ἀμφότερα τᾶλλα. ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ἂν ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἑνὸς ἂν τοῦ
ἐτέρου εἶδους μετέχοι, ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοις: ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐδ' ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἐστώτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ
μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα: οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων:

- *affections*
- *odd even*

for if the others are subject to such affections, they will participate in one and two and three and odd and even, [160b] in which we saw that they cannot participate, if they are in every way utterly deprived of unity.”

“Very true.”

“Therefore if one exists, the one is all things and nothing at all in relation both to itself and to all others.”

all nothing
itself others

5.18

“Perfectly true.”

Ω

For if **they** could **sustain undergoing**

γὰρ εἰ τὰ ἄλλα ὑπομένει πεπονθέναι

any such **experience**, then **They** would also **Participate** of **One** and **Two** and **Three**,

τι τοιούτον, καὶ μεθεξὶ ἐνός καὶ δυῶν καὶ τριῶν

and of **Even** and of **Odd**; all of which, have indeed been shown to be impossible for **themselves**

160B καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου, πάντῃ ὧς ἐφάνη ἀδύνατον αὐτοῖς

to **Participate**, by being entirely **deprived** of **The One**.

μετέχειν πάντως στερομένοις τοῦ ἐνός.

Ari: All this is most true. (ἀληθεστάτα.)

Par: Surely then in this way, if **One Is**, then **The One Is All**, and also, **nothing at all**;

οὕτω δὲ εἰ ἐν ἐστίν, τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ πάντα τε καὶ ἐστὶ οὐδὲ ἐν

and so also **in relation to It-Self** and in the (non) **relation** to **the other** selves.

καὶ ὡσαύτως πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα.

Ari: This is entirely so.

παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.


εἰ γὰρ τι τοιούτον πεπονθέναι ὑπομένει τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἐνός καὶ δυῶν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου μετέξει, ὧν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη μετέχειν τοῦ ἐνός ὧς πάντῃ πάντως στερομένοις.

ἀληθεστάτα.

οὕτω δὲ ἐν εἰ ἐστίν, πάντα τέ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως.

παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

| | |
|--|------|
| <i>consider</i> 0.58 | 6.1 |
| <i>known different</i> | 6.6 |
| <i>difference knowledge</i> | 6.9 |
| <i>attributes</i> | 6.11 |
| | 6.12 |
| <i>unlike unlike</i> | 6.15 |
| <i>unlikeness other</i> | 6.16 |
| <i>likeness itself</i> | 6.20 |
| | 6.21 |
| <i>inequality</i> | 6.25 |
| <i>constituents</i> 1.68 1.76 | 6.26 |
| <i>greatness smallness</i> | 6.27 |
| <i>equality</i> | 6.31 |
| <i>equality greatness smallness</i> | 6.32 |
| | 6.33 |
| <i>conditions</i> 6.11 | 6.34 |
| <i>existence non-existence</i> | 6.38 |
| <i>existence</i> | 6.39 |
| <i>non-existence</i> | 6.40 |
| | 6.41 |
| <i>change</i> | 6.42 |
| <i>change</i> 1.23 | 6.43 |
| <i>is is not</i> 6.39 6.40 | 6.44 |
| <i>motion</i> 6.43 6.45 | 6.46 |
| - <i>change place</i> | 6.48 |
| - <i>turn</i> | 6.50 |
| - <i>change other</i> | 6.51 |
| <i>rest motion</i> | 6.54 |
| <i>moves - move</i> | 6.58 |
| <i>changes - change</i> | 6.59 |
| | 6.60 |
| <i>comes in perish - comes in perish</i> | 6.61 |



Fanaticism

If X is not,

then X must be other

0.58

“Well, and ought we not next to *consider* what must happen if one does not exist?”

6.1

“Yes, we ought.”

“What, then, is the sense of this hypothesis—if one does not exist?
Is it different in any way from this—if not one does not exist?”

6.2

“Certainly it is different.”

The Sixth Hypothesis

Parmenides: 24 Very well. Surely then, after this, should we not consider,

Εἰεν: δὴ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀρ' οὐ σκεπτεόν,

what must be the result, if **The One** is *not*?

τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν εἰ τὸ ἐν ἐστὶ μὴ;

(The Word Hypothesis

Aristotle: We must so consider. (σκεπτεόν.)

has **The Feminine** Form)

Par: What then, will be the hypothesis herself, if **One** is *not*?

τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη ἡ ὑπόθεσις αὕτη, εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν μὴ;

Will it then **differ in any way** from the following hypothesis: If **Not-One** is *not*?

ἀρὰ διαφέρει τί τῆσδε , εἰ μὴ ἐν ἐστὶν μὴ;

[[**Pierre:** Consider 151E8:

“On the one hand, **To Be**, is in some way **Present** with **It**, if indeed **It Is One**. But what else is **To Be**, than **The Participation** of **Ousia** with **The Present**, **The Past** and **The Future**?]]

Ari: It will indeed differ. (μέντοι διαφέρει.)

εἰεν: εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν ἀρ' οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ τοῦτο;
σκεπτέον γάρ.

τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν; ἀρὰ τί διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν;
διαφέρει μέντοι.

“Is it merely different, [160c] or are the two expressions—if not one does not exist and if one does not exist—complete opposites?” 6.3

“They are complete opposites.”

“Now if a person should say 'if greatness does not exist', 'if smallness does not exist,' or anything of that sort, would he not make it clear that in each case the thing he speaks of as not existing is different?” 6.4

“Certainly.”

“And in our case does he not make it clear that he means, when he says 'if one is not,' that the thing which is not is different from other things, and do we not know what he means?” 6.5

“Yes, we do know.”

“In the first place, then, he speaks of something which is known, and secondly of something different from other things, when he says one,' whether he adds to it that it is or that it is not; 6.6

*known
different*

Par: Will it *merely differ*, or is the expression, if **Not-One Is not**,

160C μόνον διαφέρει, ἢ ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἐν ἐστὶ μὴ

Entirely Opposite to the hypothesis, if **One Is not**?

πάν τούναντίον τοῦ εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν μὴ;

Ari: Entirely opposite. (πάν τούναντίον.)

Par: But what if anyone were to say, ‘if **Greatness Is not**’ or ‘**Smallness Is not**’,

δ’ τί εἰ τις λέγοι, εἰ μέγεθος ἐστὶν μὴ ἡ σμικρότης ἐστὶν μὴ

or *anything else of this kind*, then they should make it clear in each of these cases,

ἡ τί ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἀρα ἂν ὧν ἐφ’ ἑκάστου

that they speak of **The Non-Being**, as *something Other*? (The Principle

ὅτι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν τί ἕτερον; of The 6th.PG)

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that now they also make it clear what they mean when they

οὐκοῦν νῦν καὶ ὧν λέγει ὅταν

say, if **One Is not**, that **The Non-Being Is Other** from **The Others**,

εἰπερ εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ μὴ, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων

and so we will **know**, **That which** they mean?

καὶ ἴσμεν ὅ λέγει;

Ari: We will know. (ἴσμεν [εἰδομαι].)

Par: On the one hand, when they say **One**, first of all, do they speak of *something*

μὲν ὅταν εἰπη ἐν, πρῶτον ἀρα λέγει τί

that **Is Knowable**, and secondly, of *something Other* from **The Others**, whether they add

γνώστον, ἐπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, εἴτε προσθεῖς

existence to **Self** or **non-existence**;

τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι:

διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πάν τούναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν εἰ μὴ ἐν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ εἰ ἐν μὴ ἔστιν;

πάν τούναντίον.

τί δ’ εἴ τις λέγοι εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἢ τί ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἄρα ἐφ’ ἑκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν;

πάνυ γε.

οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπη ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὅ λέγει;

ἴσμεν.

πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνώστον τι λέγει, ἐπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπη ἐν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεῖς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι:

[160d] for that which is said to be non-existent is known none the less, and is known to be different from other things, is it not?"

"Certainly."

"Then we should begin at the beginning by asking: if one is not, what must follow? In the first place this must be true of the one, that there is knowledge of it, or else not even the meaning of the words if the one does not exist' would be known.

6.7

"True."

And is it not also true that the others differ from the one, or it cannot be said to differ from the others?"

6.8

"Certainly."

for what they call **non-existence**, will **be** no less
 γαρ τι το λεγομενον μη ειναι, ουδεν ηττον

recognized/known, and that **non-existence** is **Different** from **The Others**; or is it not so?

160D γιγνωσκεται, και οτι διαφορον των αλλων. η ου ;

Ari: It is necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, we must affirm from the beginning, what **Must Be**, if **One Is not**,
 αρα λεκτεον εξ αρχης τι χρη ειναι, ει εν εστι μη,

in the following way. Thus on the one hand, as it is **Reasonable**, **This Must Belong** to **Self**;
 ωδε . ουν μεν , ως εοικεν, τουτο δει υπαρχειν αυτω,

first of all, there **Must Be Knowledge** of **Self**, or else, nothing which is said
 πρωτον ειναι επιστημην αυτου, η μηδε τι ο λεγεται

Will Be Recognized/Known, when anyone says, if **One Is not**.

γιγνωσκεσθαι , οταν τις ειπη ει εν εστιν μη.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: Is this not also the case then, that **The Others Must Be Other** from **Self**,
 ουκουν και τα αλλα ειναι ετερα αυτου,

or else **That** would not **Be** said to **Be Other** from **The Others**?

η εκεινο μηδε λεγεσθαι ετερον των αλλων;

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἥττον γινώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὐ;
 ἀνάγκη.

ὥδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί χρὴ εἶναι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὥς
 ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μὴδὲ ὅτι λέγεται γινώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν. πρῶτον
 μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὥς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μὴδὲ ὅτι λέγεται γινώσκεσθαι,
 ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.

ἀληθῆ.

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἕτερα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μὴδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι;
 πάνυ γε.

difference
knowledge

“Then a difference belongs to the one in addition to knowledge; for when we say that the one differs from the others, [160e] we speak of a difference in the one, not in the others.”

6.9

“That is clear.”

“And the non-existent one partakes of 'that' and 'some' and 'this' and 'relation to this' and 'these' and all notions of that sort; for the one could not be spoken of, nor could the things which are other than one, nor could anything in relation to the one or belonging to it be or be spoken of, if the one did not partake of the notion some or of those other notions.”

6.10

“True.”

Par: Accordingly then, **Difference-in-Kind**, besides **The Knowledge, Is Present** in **Self**.
 αρα ετεροιοτης προς τη επιστημη εστιν αυτω.

so that when it is said that **The One Is Other** than **The Others**, they will not speak of
 γαρ οταν λεγη το εν ετερον των αλλων, ου λεγει

the **Difference-in-Kind** of **The Others**, but of **The Difference** of **That**.

160E την ετεροιοτητα των αλλων, αλλα την εκεινου.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαινεται.)

Par: And certainly, **The Being** that **Is Not-One**, **Must Participate of That** and **of a Certain**
 και γε μην το ον μη εν μετεχει του εκεινου και τινος

One and **of This** and **in relation to This** and **of These** and **All such as These**. For then,
 του και τουτου και τουτω και τουτων και παντων των τοιουτων. γαρ

neither could **The One Be** spoken of, nor of **Those Other** than **The One**, nor would

ου αν το εν ελεγετο ουδ' του ετερα του ενος, ουδ' αν
 anything **of That Be Present with That**, nor could anything **Be** said about **Self**,

τι εκεινου ην εκεινω, ουδ' αν τι ελεγετο αυτω,

if **It** neither **Participated of Some** nor **of Those Others**.

ει μητε μετην του τινος μητε των τουτων αλλων.

Ari: Rightly said. (ορθως.)

καὶ ἑτεροιοτήης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἑτεροιοτήτα λέγει, ὅταν τὸ ἐν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγῃ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου.

φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τινός καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἐν ἐλέγετο οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἐνός ἕτερα, οὐδ' ἐκείνῳ ἂν τι ἦν οὐδ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινός αὐτῷ μετὴν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων.

ὀρθῶς.

“It is impossible for the one to be, if it does not exist, [161a] but nothing prevents its partaking of many things; indeed it must do so, if that one of which we are speaking, and not something else, is not. But if neither the one, nor 'that,' is not, but we are speaking of something else, there is no use in saying anything at all; but if non-existence is the property of that one, and not of something else, then the one must partake of 'that' and of many other attributes.”

attributes

6.11

“Yes, certainly.”

“And it will possess unlikeness in relation to other things for the things which are other than one, being different, will be of a different kind.”

6.12

“Yes.”

“And-are not things which are of a different kind also of another kind?”

6.13

“Of course.”

?

“And things which are of another kind are unlike, are they not?”

6.14

[161b] “Yes, they are unlike.”

Par: Surely then on the one hand, it **Is not Possible** for to be, to **be Present** with **The One**,
161A δη μεν τε ουχ οιον ειναι τω ενι,

if indeed **It does not exist**; but on the other hand, nothing prevents it to **Participate** of **many**,
ειπερ γε μη εστι, δε ουδεν κωλυει μετεχειν πολλων,

But it **Must** even do so, if indeed **The One Is not**, and **Is not something else** than *that*.
αλλα αναγκη και, ειπερ γε το εν εστιν μη και μη αλλο εκεινο.

Certainly then, if **neither The One nor that** exists, then **nothing** will **exist**. But if **The**
μεντοι ει μητε το εν μητ' εκεινο μη εσται, αλλα ο

Logos is about **something else**, then there is nothing that **can** be spoken of.
λογος περι του αλλου, ουδεν ουδε δει φθεγγεσθαι:

But if **non-existence underlies That One** and **Is not something else**, then it **Is** also **Necessary**
ει μη ειναι υποκειται εκεινο εν και μη το αλλο, και αναγκη

for **Self** to also have a **Share** of that non-existence and of **many others**.
αυτω μετειναι του εκεινο και πολλων αλλων.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, **Unlikeness Is** also **Present** with **Self in relation to the others**.
αρα αναομοιοτης εστιν Και αυτω προς τα αλλα.

For **the others**, by **being other** than **The One**, will also **be** of a **different kind/genus**.
γαρ τα αλλα οντα ετερα του ενος αν και ειη ετεροια.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But are not **those of another kind, various**?

δ' ουκ τα ετεροια αλλοια;

Ari: How then could they not be? (πως δ' ου ;)

Par: But are not **the various, Unlike**?

δ' ουκ τα αλλοια ανομοια;

Ari: They are indeed unlike. (μεν ουν ανομοια.)

ειναι μεν διη τῷ ἐνὶ οὐχ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτ' ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν: εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι.

καὶ πάνυ γε.

καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα: τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα ἑτεροῖα καὶ εἴη ἄν.

ναί.

τὰ δ' ἑτεροῖα οὐκ ἄλλοια;

πῶς δ' οὔ;

τὰ δ' ἄλλοια οὐκ ἀνόμοια;

ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν.

unlike unlike

“Then if they are unlike the one, the one is evidently unlike the things which are unlike it.”

6.15

“Evidently.”

“Then the one possesses unlikeness in relation to which the others are unlike.”

unlikeness other

6.16

“So it appears.”

“But if it possesses unlikeness to the others, must it not possess likeness to itself?”

6.17

“How is that?”

“If the one possesses unlikeness to the one, our argument will not be concerned with that which is of the nature of the one, and our hypothesis will not relate to the one, but to something other than one.” [161c]

6.18

“Certainly.”

Par: Is it not the case then, that if indeed **they** are **unlike The One**,

161B ουκουν ειπερ εστι ανομοια τω ενι,
it is evident that **they** will indeed **be unlike That** which **Is Unlike**.

δηλον οτι τα αν γε ειη ανομοια ανομοιω.

Ari: It is evident. (δηλον.)

Par: Certainly then, **Unlikeness** will also **Be** in **The One**,

δη ανομοιοτης αν και ειη τω ενι,

according to which, **The Others** will **Be Unlike in relation to Self**.

ην τα αλλα εστιν ανομοια προς αυτω.

Ari: So it is Reasonable. (εοικεν.)

Par: But certainly, if **It** is **Unlike The Others**,

δε δη ει αυτω εστιν ανομοιοτης των αλλων,

then must not **Self Be The Likeness** of **It-Self**?

αρ'αναγκη ουκ αυτω ειναι ομοιοτητα εαυτου;

Ari: How? (πως;)

Par: If **Unity** were **Unlike The One**, then **The Logos**, would somehow

ει ενος εστι ανομοιοτης τω ενι, ο λογος αν που

not Be Possible about **The One**, nor about **That** which is **Like It**; nor would there **Be**

ουκ οιου περι του ενος του τοιουτου, ουδ' αν ειη

the hypothesis about **One**, but about **something other** than **One**.

η υποθεσις περι ενος, αλλα περι αλλου η ενος.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

ουκοδν ειπερ τω ενι ανομοια εστι, δηλον οτι ανομοιω τα γε ανομοια ανομοια αν ειη.

δηλον.

ειη δη αν και τω ενι ανομοιότης, προς ην τα αλλα ανομοια αυτω εστιν.

εοικεν.

ει δε δη των αλλων ανομοιότης εστιν αυτω, αρ' ουκ αναγκη εαυτου ομοιότητα αυτω ειναι;

πως;

ει ενος ανομοιότης εστι τω ενι, ουκ αν που περι του τοιουτου ο λογος ειη οϊου του ενος, ουδ' αν η υποθεσις ειη περι ενος, αλλα περι αλλου η ενος.

πανυ γε.

“But that is inadmissible.” 6.19

“It certainly is.”

“Then the one must possess likeness to itself.” *likeness itself* 6.20

“It must.”

“And neither is the one equal to the others; for if it were equal, then 6.21
it would both be and be like them in respect to equality, both of
which are impossible, if one does not exist.”

“Yes, they are impossible.”

Par: But that must not indeed be the case.

161C δε δει ου γε.

Ari: Without a doubt. (ου δητα.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The Likeness** to **The One** to **It-Self Must Be** of Self.

αρ' ομοιοτητα τω ενι εαυτω δει ειναι αυτου.

Ari: It must. (δει.)

Par: And most certainly in turn, **The One Is not Equal** to **Others**. For if **It Were Equal**,

Και γε μην αυ ουδ' εστι ισον τοις αλλοις. γαρ ει ειηισον,

then **It** would already **Be** and **It** would also **Be Like Them-Selves**, according to **Equality**;

αν ηδη ειη τε αν και ειη ομοιον αυτοις κατα την ισοτητα;

but both of these conditions **Are Impossible**, if indeed **One Is not**.

δ' αμφοτερα ταυτα αδυνατα, ειπερ εν εστιν μη.

Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατα.)

οὐ δει δέ γε.

οὐ δητα.

δει ἄρα ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἐνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι.

δει.

καὶ μὴν οὐδ' αὖ ἴσον γ' ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις: εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἴσον, εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα. ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοτέρα ἀδύνατα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἓν.

ἀδύνατα.

“And since it is not equal to the others, they cannot be equal to it,
can they?” 6.22

“Certainly not.”

“And things which are not equal are unequal, are they not?” 6.23

“Yes.”

“And things which are unequal are unequal to something which is
unequal to them?” 6.24

“Of course.”

“Then the one partakes of inequality, in respect to which the others
are unequal to it?” [161d] *inequality* 6.25

“Yes, it does.”

Par: Then since, **The One Is not Equal** to **the others**, then must it not **Be Necessary**
 επειδη εστι ουκ ισον τοις αλλοις, δε αρα ουκ αναγκη

that **the others Must** also **not Be Equal** to **That (One)**?
 ταλλα και μη ειναι ισα εκεινω ;

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: But are not **those that Are not-Equal, unequal**?
 δε ουκ τα μη ισα ανισα;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But are not **those that are unequal, unequal** to **That** which **Is Unequal**?
 δε ου τα ανισα ανισα τω ανισω;

Ari: How could they not be? (πως ου δ’;)

Par: And surely then, **The One** will **Participate** of **Inequality**,
 και δη το εν μετεχει ανισοτητος,

because of which, **the others are unequal** to **Self**.
 προς ην ταλλα εστιν ανισα αυτω;

Ari: It will so participate. (μετεχει.)

επειδη δε ουκ εστι τοις αλλοις ισον, αρα ουκ αναγκη και ταλλα εκεινω μη ισα ειναι;
 αναγκη.

τα δε μη ισα ουκ ανισα;

ναί.

τα δε ανισα ου τω ανισω ανισα;

πως δ’ ού;

και ανισότητος δη μετέχει το έν, προς ην ταλλα αυτω εστιν ανισα;
 μετέχει.

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|------|
| 1.68 1.76 | “But greatness and smallness are <i>constituents</i> of inequality.” | 6.26 |
| | “Yes.” | |
| <i>greatness</i>
<i>smallness</i> | “Then the one, such as we are discussing, possesses greatness and smallness?” | 6.27 |
| | “So it appears.” | |
| | “Now surely greatness and smallness always keep apart from one another.” | 6.28 |
| | “Certainly.” | |
| | “Then there is always something between them.” | 6.29 |
| | “There is.” | |
| | “Can you think of anything between them except equality?” | 6.30 |
| | “No, only equality.” | |
| <i>equality</i> | “Then anything which has greatness and smallness has also equality, which is between the two.” | 6.31 |
| | “That is clear.” | |

Par: But certainly, **Bigness** and **Smallness** do indeed **belong** to **Inequality**.

161D ἀλλὰ μέντοι μέγεθος τε καὶ σμικρότης γ' ἐστὶ ἀνισότητος.

Ari: They do indeed. (γὰρ ἐστὶ.)

Par: Accordingly then, **Bigness** and **Smallness** and such as these, **belong** to **The One**?

ἀρα τε μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐστὶν ἐνί;

Ari: It appears likely. (κινδυνεύει.)

Par: Certainly then, **Bigness** and **Smallness** always **stand-apart** from each other.

μὴν μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης αἰ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, something always **exists** between **Them-Selves**.

ἀρα τι αἰ ἐστὶν μεταξύ αὐτοῖν.

Ari: It is so. (ἐστὶν.)

Par: Therefore, can you assign anything else between **Them-Selves**, except **Equality**?

οὐν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν τι ἄλλο μεταξύ αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα;

Ari: Nothing else but this. (οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.)

Par: Accordingly then, in whatsoever, there **Is Bigness** and **Smallness**,

ἀρα ὅτῳ ἐστὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης

Equality Is also **Present**, by **Being Between These**.

ἰσότης καὶ ἐστὶ, οὐσα μεταξύ τούτων.

Ari: So it has come to **Light**. (φαίνεται.)

ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητός γε ἐστὶ μέγεθος τε καὶ σμικρότης.

ἔστι γάρ.

ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθος τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐνί;

κινδυνεύει.

μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης αἰ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν.

πάνυ γε.

μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν αἰ ἐστὶν.

ἔστιν.

ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξύ αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα;

οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.

ὅτῳ ἄρα ἐστὶ μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ ἰσότης αὐτῷ μεταξύ τούτων οὐσα.

φαίνεται.

[161e] “Then the non-existent one, it appears, partakes of equality and ^{*equality greatness*}
greatness and smallness.” ^{*smallness*} 6.32

“So it appears.”

“And it must also, in a way, partake of existence.” 6.33

“How is that?”

“It must be in such *conditions* as we have been saying; for if it were not, 6.34
we should not be speaking the truth in saying that the one is not. And if
6.11 we speak the truth, it is clear that we say that which is. Am I not right?”

“You are.”

Par: Surely then, as it is **Reasonable**, **The One** that *does not Truly* exist,

161E δη, ὡς εοικε, τῷ ἐνι μὴ ὄντι,

will also have a **Share** of **Equality**, **Bigness** and **Smallness**.

ἀν καὶ μετρίῃ ἰσότητος καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικροτήτος.

Ari: So it is Reasonable. (εοικεν.)

Par: And certainly, **Self Must** also **Participate** of **Ousia in a Definite way**.

Καὶ γὰρ μὴν αὐτὸ δεῖ καὶ μετέχειν οὐσίας πῇ .

Ari: How so? (πῶς δῆ;))

Par: **Self Must Possess Ousia in This way** that we have described. For otherwise,

αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶχειν οὕτως ὥς λέγομεν . γὰρ

we shall not speak **Truly** when we say, **The One Is not**; but if we do speak **Truly**,

ἡμεῖς ἀν οὐκ λέγομεν ἀληθῆ λέγοντες, τὸ ἐν εἶναι μὴ: δὲ εἰ ἀληθῆ,

then it is clear that we have affirmed that **Selves Are Beings**: or is it not in this way?

δῆλον λέγομεν ὅτι αὐτὰ ὄντα, ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

Ari: It is indeed thus. (μεν ουν ουτω.)

τῷ δὲ ἐνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὥς εοικε, καὶ ἰσότητος ἂν μετρίῃ καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος.

εοικεν.

καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γὰρ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῇ.

πῶς δῆ;

ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὥς λέγομεν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἐν μὴ εἶναι: εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

“Then inasmuch as we assert that we are speaking the truth, [162a] 6.35
we necessarily assert that we say that which is.”

“Necessarily.”

“Then, as it appears, the non-existent one exists. For if it is not non- 6.36
existent, but gives up something of being to not-being, then it will
be existent.”

“Certainly.”

“Then if it does not exist and is to continue to be non-existent, it 6.37
must have the existence of not-being as a bond, just as being has the
non-existence of not-being, in order to attain its perfect existence.
For in this way the existence of the existent and the non-existence
of the non-existent would be best assured, when the existent
partakes of the existence of being existent and of the non-existence
of not being non-existent, [162b] thus assuring its own perfect
existence,

Par: Then since, we affirm that we speak **The Truth**, then it **Is** also **Necessary**

162A ἐπειδὴ φάμεν λέγειν ἀληθὴ δε καὶ ἀνάγκη
to affirm that we speak of **Beings**.
φάναι ἡμῖν λέγειν ὄντα.

Ari: It is necessary. (ἀνάγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, as it is **Reasonable**, **The One** which **Has no Being**, *exists*.

ἀρα, ὡς εἰκοίκε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν, ἐστίν.

For if it were not the case that there will **be non-Being**, then **That** which **Is** would

γὰρ εἰ μὴ ἐστὶ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἶναι

let something go to non-Being, and *it (non-Being)* would *immediately be Being*.

ἀνήσει(ἀνιήμι) τι πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθύς ἐστὶ ὄν.

Ari: Altogether so. (πανταπασι μὲν οὖν.)

Par: Accordingly then, **Self Must Possess The Bond** of **That** which **Is not**, in order *to be*

ἀρα αὐτὸ δεῖ ἔχειν τὸ δεσμὸν τοῦ εἶναι μὴ, εἶναι

non-Being, if **It** is *going to not Be*; just as, in a similar way, **The Being Must Possess**

μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ὁμοίως τὸ ὄν ἔχειν

The Bond to not Be non-Being, in order that **It** may in turn **Perfectly Be** such as **It Is**.

τὸ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, ἵνα αὐτὸ τελέως εἶναι(BT) ἦ.

For in this way, especially, both, **The Being** will **Be**, and *the non-Being will not Be*; on the

γὰρ οὕτως μάλιστα τὸ ὄν ἀνείη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀν οὐκ εἶη;

one hand, **The Being Participates** of **Ousia** in order that **The Being Be**; but on the other hand,

μὲν τὸ ὄν μετεχόντα οὐσίας τοῦ ὄν εἶναι, δε

The Being Participates of **non-Ousia**, in order that **It** may *be, non-Being*, (**The**

162B μὴ οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, **Patho-logos**)

if **It** is *going to Perfectly Be*.

εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι,

ἐπειδὴ δὲ φάμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι καὶ ὄντα λέγειν.

ἀνάγκη.

ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς εἰκοίκε, τὸ ἐν οὐκ ὄν: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ πῇ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθύς ἔσται ὄν.

παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὐτὸ εἶναι ᾗ: οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὄν μάλιστα ἂν εἶη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἂν εἶη, μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὄν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ

and the non-existent partakes of the non-existence of not being existent and the existence of being non-existent, and thus the non-existent also secures its perfect non-existence.”

“Very true.”

existence
non-existence

“Then since the existent partakes of non-existence and the non-existent of existence, the one, since it does not exist, necessarily partakes of existence to attain non-existence.”

6.38

“Yes, necessarily.”

“Clearly, then, the one, if it does not exist, has existence.”

existence

6.39

“Clearly.”

“And non-existence also, if it does not exist.”

non-existence

6.40

“Of course.”

“Well, can anything which is in a certain condition be not in that condition without changing from it?”

6.41

“No, it cannot.”

Furthermore, on the one hand, *the non-Being Participates*

δε μεν το μη ον

non-Ousia, in order that *it* may *be non-Being*; whereas on the other hand, *non-Being*

μη ουσιας του ειναι μη ον δε

Participates of *Ousia*, in order that *it* may *be, non-Being*, if in turn,

ουσιας του ειναι μη ον, ει αυ

it will also *Perfectly not Be, the non-Being*.

και τελεως μη εσται το μη ον.

Ari: Most truly. (αληθεστατα.)

Par: Is it not the case then, seeing that both *non-Being is present with Real-Being*,

ουκουν επειπερ τε του μη ειναι μετεστι τω οντι

and *That which Is, is present with non-Real-Being*, is it not also the case that *The One*,

και του ειναι μη τω οντι, και τω ενι,

since indeed *It Is not, Must Necessarily Share* of *existence*, in order that *It may not Be*.

επειδη εστι ουκ αναγκη μετειναι του ειναι εις το μη ειναι.

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Certainly then, *Ousia* will also *Manifestly Be* with *The One*, if *It Is not*.

δη ουσια και φαινεται τω ενι, ει εστιν μη.

Ari: It will so *appear*.

φαινεται.

Par: Accordingly then, so also *the non-Ousia*, if indeed *She Is not*.

αρα και μη ουσια, ειπερ εστιν μη.

Ari: How could it not? (πως δ' ου;)

Par: Therefore, is it also *Possible* that *that which is maintained/kept in some way*,

ουν τε οιον το εχον πως

is not so maintained, when it *is not changed* from this condition (*passive*) by habit?

μη ουτω εχειν, μη μεταβαλλον εκ ταυτης της εξεως;

Ari: It cannot. (τε οιον ουχ.)

ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν αὐτὸ τελέως μὴ ἔσται.

ἀληθέστατα.

οὐκοῦν ἐπειπερ τῷ τε ὄντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ ἐνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι.

ἀνάγκη.

καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῷ ἐνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.

φαίνεται.

καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν.

πως δ' οὐ;

οἶόν τε ὄν τὸ ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἑξεως;

οὐχ οἶόν τε.

| | | |
|---------------|---|------|
| <i>change</i> | “Then everything of that sort—if a thing is and is not in a given condition—signifies a change.” [162c] | 6.42 |
| | “Of course.” | |
| 1.23 | “But <i>change</i> is motion; we agree to that?” | 6.43 |
| | “It is motion.” | |
| 6.39 6.40 | “And did we not see that the one <i>is</i> and <i>is not</i> ?” | 6.44 |
| | “Yes.” | |
| | “Then we see that it both is and is not in a given condition.” | 6.45 |
| | “So it appears.” | |

Par: Accordingly then, everything which *can be kept in this way*, and in turn

162C αρα παν ο αν εχη ουτω τε και
not kept in this (indefinite) way, signifies, *that* which *can be changed in such a way*.
 μη ουτως , σημαίνει το μεταβολην τοιουτον.

Ari: How could it not? (πως δ' ου;)

Par: But *is Alteration* a **Motion**; or what else should we call **It**?

 δε μεταβολη κινήσις: η τι φησομεν;

Ari: It is a motion. (κινήσις.)

Par: Is it not the case, that **The One has been shown to be** both **Being** and **non-Being**?

 ουκουν το εν εφανε τε ον και ουκ ον;

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

Par: Accordingly then, **It has been shown to be kept in this way** and *not kept in this way*.

 αρα φαίνεται εχον ουτως και ουχ ουτως.

Ari: It has so appeared. (εοικεν.)

πάν ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχη.

πῶς δ' οὐ;

μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις: ἢ τί φήσομεν;

κίνησις.

οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὄν ἐφάνη;

ναί.

οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται.

ἔοικεν.

- 6.43 6.45 “And we have seen that the non-existent one has *motion*, since it changes from being to not-being.” 6.46
- “There is not much doubt of that.”
- “But if it is nowhere among existing things—and it is nowhere, if it does not exist—it cannot move from any place to another.” 6.47
- “Of course not.”
- *change place* “Then its motion cannot be change of place.” 6.48
- “No, it cannot.”

Par: Accordingly then, *has* not **The One Being** also *been shown to be* in **Motion**,
 αρα ουκ το εν ον και πεφανται κινουμενον,

seeing that **It** also *has to be* altered from **Being** into *non-Being*.

επειπερ και εχον μεταβολην εκ του ειναι επι το μη ειναι.

Ari: I dare say. (κινδυνευει.)

Par: But certainly, if indeed **It in no way Is** among **The Real Beings**, since **It Is not**,
 αλλα μην ει γε μηδαμου εστι των οντων, ως εστιν ουκ,

then if indeed **It Is not**, **It** will *not* alternate from one place to another.

ειπερ εστιν μη, αν ουδ' μεθισταιτο(μεθιστημι) ποθεν ποι.

Ari: How is that the case? (πως γαρ;)

Par: Accordingly then, **It** will indeed not *be moved* by **Alteration**.

αρα αν γε ουκ κινοιτ' τω μεταβαινειν.

Ari: It will not. (γαρ ου.)

καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα τὸ οὐκ ὄν ἐν πέφανται, ἐπείπερ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον.
 κινδυνεύει.

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν μεθίσταιτό ποθέν ποι.
 πῶς γάρ;

οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινοῖτ' ἄν.

οὐ γάρ.

[162d] “Nor surely can it turn in the same spot, for it nowhere touches
the same for the same is existent, and the non-existent cannot be in any
existent thing.” 6.49

“No, it is impossible.”

- *turn* “Then the one, being non-existent, cannot turn in that in which it is not.” 6.50

“No.”

- *change other* “And the one, whether existent or non-existent, cannot change into
something other than itself; for if it changed into something other
than itself, our talk would no longer be about the one, but about
something else.” 6.51

“Quite right.”

Par: Certainly then, neither will **It Turn-about** in **The Self**;

162D μὴν οὐδὲ ἂν στρεφοίτο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ

for **It** will *not Grasp The Self/Same in any way*. For **The Being Is The Self/Same**.

γὰρ ἀπτεται ταύτου οὐδαμοῦ. γὰρ τὸ ὄν ἐστὶ ταυτόν:

Therefore it **Is Impossible** for *non-Being* to **Reside** in any of **The Real Beings**.

δὲ εἶναι ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν τῷ τῶν ὄντων.

Ari: For it is impossible. (γὰρ ἀδύνατον.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One** which **Is not**, cannot **Turn-about** in **That** in which **It Is not**.

ἀρα τὸ ἐν ὄν μὴ, ἂν δύναίτο οὐκ στρεφῆσθαι ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν μὴ.

Ari: It cannot. (γὰρ οὐκ οὐ.)

Par: Certainly then, **The One**, whether **The One** that **Is**, or **The One** that **Is not**,

μὴν τὸ ἐν οὔτε τὸ ὄν οὔτε τὸ ὄν μὴ

cannot in any way **be altered** into something **other** than **It-Self**. For then **The Logos** would

οὐδὲ πού αλλοιοῦνται ἑαυτοῦ. γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἂν

no longer be about **The One**, but about something else, if indeed **It** was **altered** from **It-Self**.

οὐ ἐτι ἦν περὶ τοῦ ἐνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινός αλλοῦ. εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἡλλοιοῦτο ἑαυτοῦ.

Ari: Rightly so. (ὀρθῶς.)

οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν στρέφοιτο: ταύτου γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ ἄπτεται. ὄν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ταυτόν: τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν ἔν τῷ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

ἀδύνατον γάρ.

οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἔν γε μὴ ὄν στρέφῃσθαι ἂν δύναίτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν.

οὐ γὰρ οὐκ.

οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦνται πού τὸ ἐν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὄν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴπερ ἡλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τινός.

ὀρθῶς.

“But if it neither changes into something else, [162e] nor turns in the same spot, nor changes its place, can it still move in any way?” 6.52

“No how can it?”

“But surely that which is without motion must keep still, and that which keeps still must be at rest.” 6.53

“Yes, it must.”

“Then the non-existent one is both at rest and in motion.” *rest motion* 6.54

“So it appears.”

Par: But if **It** does not **alter**, nor **turn-about** in **The Same**, nor undergoes **transition**,

162E δε ει μητ' αλλοιονται μητε στρεφεται εν ταυτω μητε μεταβαινει

is there any way in which **It** can still **be moved**?

αρ αν πη ετι κινουτο;

Ari: How could there be? (πως γαρ;)

Par: Most certainly then, **That** which is **Immovable** must necessarily be **kept** at **Rest**;

γε μην το ακινητον αναγκη αγειν ησυχιαν,

but **That** which is at **Rest/Peace/Quiet** must **Abide/Stand-still**.

δε το ησυχάζον εσταναι.

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then **The One** that **Is not, as it was shown**, both **stands-still** and **is moved**.

αρα το εν ον ουκ, ως εοικεν, τε εστηκε και κινεται.

Ari: as it is Reasonable. (εοικεν.)

ει δὲ μήτ' αλλοιοῦνται μήτε ἐν ταύτῳ στρέφεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἄρ' ἂν πη ἔτι κινῶτο;

πῶς γάρ;

τὸ γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἐστάναι.

ἀνάγκη.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὄν ἔστηκε τε καὶ κινεῖται.

ἔοικεν.

“And if it is in motion, it certainly must change in its nature; [163a] 6.55
for if anything is moved in any way, in so far as it is moved it is no
longer in its former condition, but in a different one.”

“True.”

“Then in moving, the one changes in nature.” 6.56

“Yes.”

“And yet when it does not move in any way, it will not change its 6.57
nature in any way.”

“No.”

moves - move “Then in so far as the non-existent one moves, it changes, and in so 6.58
far as it does not move, it does not change.”

“True.”

“Then the non-existent one both changes and does not change.” *changes - change* 6.59

“So it appears.”

Par: And most certainly, if indeed **It were moved**, there **is** a **Great Necessity** that **Self**

163A και γε μὴν εἴπερ κινεῖται μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ
must **be altered**. For in so far as **anything** may **be moved**, **it** is no longer **kept in the same way**
ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. γὰρ ὅπῃ τι ἀν κινήθῃ, οὐκέθ' ἔχει ὡσαύτως τοσούτον
such as it **was before**, but **in another way**.

κατὰ ὡς εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἑτέρως.

Ari: In this way. (οὕτως.)

Par: Surely then, since **The One moves**, **It is** also **altered**.

δὴ τὸ ἐν κινούμενον καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται.

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

Par: And most certainly, by **Being** in no way **moved**, **It** will **Be** in no way **altered**.

καὶ γε μὴν μηδαμῇ κινούμενον ἀν οὐδαμῇ ἀλλοιοίτο.

Ari: It will not. (γὰρ οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly then on the one hand, in so far as **The One** that **Is not** **moves**,

ἀρα μὲν ἡ τὸ ἐν ὃν οὐκ κινεῖται,

It is altered, but on the other hand, in so far as **It Is not** **moved**, **It Is not** **altered**.

ἀλλοιοῦται, δὲ ἡ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.

Ari: It is not. (γὰρ οὐ.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One** which **Is not**, **is** both **altered** and **not altered**.

ἀρα τὸ ἐν ὃν μὴ τε ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.

Ari: Apparently. (φαίνεται.)

καὶ μὴν εἴπερ γε κινεῖται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι: ὅπῃ γὰρ ἂν τι κινήθῃ, κατὰ τοσούτον
οὐκέθ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὡς εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἑτέρως.

οὕτως.

κινούμενον δὴ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται.

ναί.

καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῇ ἂν ἀλλοιοίτο.

οὐ γάρ.

ἢ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὃν ἔν, ἀλλοιοῦται: ἢ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.

οὐ γάρ.

τὸ ἐν ἄρα μὴ ὃν ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται.

φαίνεται.

“And must not that which changes come into a state of being other than its previous one, and perish, so far as its previous state is concerned; [163b] whereas that which does not change neither comes into being nor perishes?” 6.60

“That is inevitable.”

“Then the non-existent one, when it is changed, comes into being and perishes, and when it is not changed, neither comes into being nor perishes and thus the non-existent one both comes into being and perishes and neither comes into being nor perishes.” 6.61

comes in perish
- *comes in perish*

“Quite true.”

Ω

Par: Thus on the one hand, is it not **Necessary** that **That** which is **altered** must **become**
 δ' μὲν ἀρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον γίνεσθαι
other than **before**, and on the other hand, that **It Must** undergo a **dissolution** from **Its former**
 ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον, δε ἀπολλύσθαι ἐκ τῆς προτέρας
 habit/condition; but **That** which **Is not altered**, can neither **come-to-be generated** nor **dissolved**?
163B ἕξως: δε τὸ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μήτε γίνεσθαι μήτε ἀπολλύσθαι;

Ari: It is necessary. (ἀνάγκη.)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, **The One** which **Is not**, by **being altered**,
 ἀρα καὶ μὲν τὸ ἐν ὃν μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον
will be generated and **dissolved**; but on the other hand, **by not** undergoing **alteration**,
 γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, δε μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον
It will **not be** subject to either **generation** nor **dissolution**. And thus, **The One** that **Is not**,
 οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται: καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν ὃν μὴ
will be generated and **dissolved**, and will **not be generated** nor **dissolved**.
 γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίγνεται οὐτ' ἀπόλλυται.


Ari: For thus it will not.

γὰρ οὐν οὐ.

τὸ δ' ἀλλοιούμενον ἂρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας
 ἕξως: τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μήτε γίνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι;
 ἀνάγκη.

καὶ τὸ ἐν ἅρα μὴ ὃν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε
 ἀπόλλυται: καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐν μὴ ὃν γίγνεται τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ' ἀπόλλυται.
 οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

| | | | |
|---------------------|------|---|------|
| <i>consequences</i> | 0.61 | | 7.2 |
| | | - <i>be existence</i> | 7.5 |
| | | - <i>possess lose share</i> | 7.8 |
| | | - <i>perish come in</i> | 7.9 |
| <hr/> | | | 7.10 |
| | | - <i>rest motion</i> | 7.13 |
| <hr/> | | | |
| | | - <i>pertain</i> | 7.14 |
| | | - <i>greatness smallness equality</i> | 7.15 |
| | | - <i>likeness unlikeness</i> | 7.16 |
| | | - <i>other things</i> | 7.17 |
| | | - <i>like unlike same different</i> | 7.18 |
| | | - <i>notions past future present</i> | 7.19 |
| | | - <i>knowledge opinion perception definition name</i> | |
| | | - <i>state condition</i> | 7.20 |



The Absence of Ousia

| | | | | |
|--|---|--|---|--|
| | X | | X | |
|--|---|--|---|--|

7th

“Let us now go back again to the beginning and see whether the conclusions we reach will be the same as at present, or different.”

7.1

“Yes, we should do that.”

The Seventh Hypothesis

Parmenides: 25 Surely then, let us again return to **The Beginning**, to **See** if
 δη ἰωμεν Αὐθις πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁψομενοὶ εἰ
 these conclusions will come to **Light** for us just as they do now, or otherwise.
 ταῦτα φαίνεται ἡμῖν ἀπὸρ καὶ νῦν, ἢ ἕτερα.

Ari: Then we must do so. (αλλὰ χρη.)

αὐθις δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν πάλιν ὁφόμενοι εἰ ταῦτά ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἄπερ καὶ νῦν ἢ ἕτερα.
ἀλλὰ χρή.

- 0.61 “We ask, then, if the one is not, [163c] what will be the *consequences* in regard to it?” 7.2
- “Yes.”
- “Does the expression 'is not' denote anything else than the absence of existence in that of which we say that it is not?” 7.3
- “No, nothing else.”
- “And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is in a way and is not in a way? Or does the expression 'is not' mean without any qualifications that the non-existent is not in any way, shape, or manner, and does not participate in being in any way?” 7.4
- “Without any qualifications whatsoever.”

Par: Is it not the case then, that we have already said,

163C οὐκ οὖν, φάμεν,

what must result in relation to **Self**, if **One Is not**?

τι χρη συμβαίνειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ μὴ;

Ari: Yes. (ναί)

Par: But when we say **That** which **Is not**, do we not then signify anything else,

δε ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸ ἐστὶν μὴ, ἀν μὴ ἀρὰ σημαίνει τι ἄλλο

than **the absence** of **Ousia** from **That** which we say, **Is not**? (The Principle of The 7th)

ἡ ἀπουσίαν οὐσίας τούτῳ ὃν φάμεν εἶναι μὴ;

Ari: Nothing else. (οὐδὲν ἄλλο.)

Par: Therefore, when we say that *anything is not*, do we say that **Self is not**

οὖν ὅταν φάμεν τι εἶναι μὴ, ποτερον φάμεν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὐκ

in some way, but that *in some way It is*? Or does the term '**is not**', simply signify this;

πῶς, δε πῶς εἶναι; ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐστὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς σημαίνει τούτο

that **It is in no way, anywhere**, since **It does not Participate in a certain definite way**

ὅτι ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς οὐδαῖ, οὐδε μετέχει πῃ

of **Ousia** since indeed **It is, the non Being (162A-B)**?

οὐσίας γε τὸ μὴ ὄν ;

Ari: It signifies this, most simply. (μέν οὖν ἀπλουστάτα.)

οὐκοῦν ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, φάμεν, τί χρη περὶ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν;

ναί.

τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν, ἀρὰ μὴ τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ὃν φάμεν μὴ εἶναι;

οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

πότερον οὖν, ὅταν φάμεν μὴ εἶναι τι, πῶς οὐκ εἶναί φάμεν αὐτό, πῶς δὲ εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἀπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὐδέ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ ὄν;

ἀπλούστατα μὲν οὖν.

“Then the non-existent cannot be and cannot in any other way
partake of existence.” [163d] - *be existence* 7.5

“No.”

“But were coming into being and perishing anything else than
receiving and losing existence.” 7.6

“No, nothing else.”

“But that which has no participation in it can neither receive it nor
lose it.” 7.7

“Of course not.”

- *possess lose*
- *share* “Then the one, since it does not exist in any way, cannot possess or
lose or share in existence at all.” 7.8

“That is reasonable.”

“Then the non-existent one neither perishes nor comes into being,
since it participates in no way in existence.” - *perish come in* 7.9

“No; that is clear.”

Par: Accordingly then, neither will *the non Being, Be Able to Be*,
163D αρα ουτε αν το μη ον δυναιτο ειναι
 nor ever **Participate** in any other way of **Ousia**.
 ουτε μετεχειν ουδαμως αλλως ουσιας.

Ari: For it cannot. (γαρ ου.)

Par: But *that which becomes* and *that which dissolves*, **are not** anything else than
 δε το γινεσθαι και το απολλυσθαι ην μη τι αλλο η
the one to have a Share of **Ousia**, but *the other to lose Ousia*?

το μεν μεταλαμβανειν ουσιας, το δ' απολλυναι ουσιαν;

Ari: Nothing else. (ουδεν αλλο.)

Par: Then *that which has* indeed **no Share** of **This**, **can neither receive nor lose Self**.
 δε ω γε μηδεν μετεστιν τουτου, αν ουτ' λαμβανοι ουτ' απολλυοι αυτο.

Ari: How could it? (πως γαρ;)

Par: Accordingly then, seeing that **The One in no way Is**,
 αρα επειδη τω ενι ουδαμη εστιν,
It can neither possess, nor lose, nor Partake of **Ousia**, **in any way whatsoever**.
 ουτε εκτεον ουτε απαλλακτεον ουτε μεταληπτεον ουσιας ουδαμως.

Ari: That is reasonable. (εικος.)

Par: Accordingly then, **The One** which **Is not**, **can neither** be **dissolved nor generated**,
 αρα το εν ον μη ουτε απολλυται ουτε γινεται,
 if indeed **It in no way Participates** of **Ousia**.
 επειπερ ουδαμη μετεχει ουσιας.

Ari: It does not appear that it will. (ου φαινεται.)

οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύναιτο ἂν τὸ μὴ ὄν οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν.

οὐ γάρ.

τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μὴ τι ἄλλο ἢν ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, τὸ δ' ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν;

οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ὦι δέ γε μηδὲν τούτου μέτεστιν, οὔτ' ἂν λαμβάνοι οὔτ' ἀπολλύοι αὐτό.

πῶς γάρ;

τῷ ἐνὶ ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὔτε ἐκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς. εἰκός.

οὔτε ἄρα ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐν οὔτε γίνεται, ἐπεὶπερ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας.

οὐ φαίνεται.

| | | |
|------------------|--|------|
| | “Then it is not changed in nature at all; [163e] for such change involves coming into being and perishing.” | 7.10 |
| | “True.” | |
| | “And if it is not changed, it cannot move, either, can it?” | 7.11 |
| | “Certainly not.” | |
| | “And we cannot say that that which is nowhere is at rest; for that which is at rest must always be in some place which is the same.” | 7.12 |
| | “Yes, of course, the same place.” | |
| 1.43 3.19 | “Thus we shall say again that the non-existent one is neither at <i>rest</i> nor in <i>motion</i> .” | 7.13 |
| | “No, neither.” | |
| - <i>pertain</i> | “Nor can anything which exists pertain to it for the moment it partook of anything which exists it would partake of existence.” [164a] | 7.14 |
| | “That is plain.” | |

Par: Accordingly then, **It can not** be **altered in any way**; for if **It were**

163E αρ' ουδ' αλλοιούνται ουδαμῃ: γὰρ αν
to **experience This Participation**, then **It** would already **Be generated** and **dissolved**.
πάσχον τούτο ἤδη γίγνοιτο τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο.

Ari: This is true. (ἀληθῆ.)

Par: But if **It is not altered**, then **Is** it not **Necessary** that **It can not be moved**?
δε εἰ μὴ αλλοιούνται, μὴδε ἀνάγκη οὐκ κινεῖσθαι;

Ari: It is necessary. (ἀνάγκη.)

Par: Certainly then, **The Being** which **exists in no way at all**, we shall say, **can not**
μὴν τὸ ὄν μὴδαμοῦ φησομεν οὐδε

Stand-still. For **That** which **Is-At-Rest**, **must Always Be, in a Certain way** in **The Self**.
ἐστάναι. γὰρ τὸ ἐστός δεῖ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἐν τινι τῷ αὐτῷ.

Ari: In the self; how could it not?

τῷ αὐτῷ: πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Par: Surely then, we must say in turn, that **in this way, the non Being**,
δὴ λέγωμεν αὐ οὕτω τὸ μὴ ὄν

Can Never, stand-still nor be moved.
μητε ποτε ἐστάναι μητε κινεῖσθαι.

Ari: For it cannot do so. (γὰρ μὴ οὐν.)

Par: But clearly, **nothing** of **The Real Beings Is** indeed **Present** with **Self**;

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' τι τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ γε αὐτῷ.

for **this**, by **Participating** of **Being**, would **Already Participate** of **Ousia**.
γὰρ τοῦ μετέχον ὄντος ἀν ἤδη μετέχου οὐσίας.

Ari: Clearly. (δηλον.)

οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῇ: ἤδη γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο τοῦτο πᾶσχον.

ἀληθῆ.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὴδὲ κινεῖσθαι;

ἀνάγκη.

οὐδὲ μὴν ἐστάναι φήσομεν τὸ μὴδαμοῦ ὄν: τὸ γὰρ ἐστός ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινι δεῖ αἰεὶ εἶναι.

τῷ αὐτῷ: πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

οὕτω δὲ αὖ τὸ μὴ ὄν μήτε ποτε ἐστάναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν.

μὴ γὰρ οὐν.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐστὶ γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὄντων: ἤδη γὰρ ἂν τούτου μετέχον ὄντος οὐσίας μετέχου.
δηλον.

| | | |
|---|--|------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>greatness</i> - <i>smallness</i> - <i>equality</i> | <p>“Then neither greatness nor smallness nor equality pertains to it.”</p> <p>“No.”</p> | 7.15 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>likeness</i> - <i>unlikeness</i> | <p>“Nor likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to other things.”</p> <p>“Clearly not.”</p> | 7.16 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>other things</i> | <p>“And can other things pertain to it, if nothing pertains to it?”</p> <p>“Impossible.”</p> | 7.17 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>like unlike</i> - <i>same different</i> | <p>“Then the other things are neither like it nor unlike it, nor the same nor different.”</p> <p>“No.”</p> | 7.18 |

Par: Accordingly then, neither **Bigness** nor **Smallness**, nor **Equality**, **Belongs** to **Self**.

164A αρα ουτε μεγεθος ουτε σμικροτης ουτε ισοτης εστιν αυτω.

Ari: It does not. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Most certainly then, neither **Likeness** nor **Unlikeness**,

 γε μην ουδε ομοιοτης ουδε ετεροιοτης
neither in relation to Self nor in relation to the others, will **Be** with **Self**.
ουτε προς αυτο ουτε προς ταλλα αν ειη αυτω.

Ari: It does not appear that it will. (ου φαίνεται.)

Par: What follows then? **Can The Other Beings Be in any way Present** with **Self**,

 τι δε; αν ταλλα ειη οπως εσθ' αυτω,
if **None Can Be Present** with **Self**?
ει μηδεν δει ειναι αυτω;

Ari: They cannot. (εστιν ουκ.)

Par: Accordingly then, **the others** are neither **Like** nor **Unlike**,

 αρα τα αλλα ουτε ομοια ουτε ανομοια
nor **The Same/Selves** nor **Other**, from **Self**.
ουτε ταυτα ουθ' ετερα αυτω.

Ari: They are not. (γαρ ου.)

οὔτε ἄρα μέγεθος οὔτε σμικρότης οὔτε ἰσότης αὐτῷ ἔστιν.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοιότης γε οὐδὲ ἑτεροιοτης οὔτε πρὸς αὐτὸ οὔτε πρὸς τᾶλλα εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ.

οὐ φαίνεται.

τί δέ; τᾶλλα ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι;

οὐκ ἔστιν.

οὔτε ἄρα ὁμοια οὔτε ἀνόμοια οὔτε ταῦτά οὔθ' ἕτερα ἔστιν αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα.

οὐ γάρ.

- *notions*
 - *past future*
 - *present*
 - *knowledge*
 - *opinion*
 - *perception*
 - *definition*
 - *name*

“Well, then, will the notions 'of that' or 'to that' or 'some,' or 'this' or 'of this' [164b] or 'of another' or 'to another' or past or future or present or knowledge or opinion or perception or definition or name or anything else which exists pertain to the non-existent?”

7.19

“No.”

“Then the non-existent one has no state or condition whatsoever.”

- *state condition*

7.20

“It appears to have none whatsoever.”

Ω

Par: What then? **Can anything be** of *That*, or with *That*, or with *anything*, or *of another*,
τι δε; το εσται εκεινου η το εκεινω η το τι η αλλου

or *with another*, or *at some time Past*, or *at some time* in the **Future**, or **Now**.

164B η αλλω η ποτε η επειτα η νυν

Or **Can** there **be** knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or **Logos**, or name,
η επιστημη η δοξα η αισθησις η λογος η ονομα

or *anything else whatsoever* of **The Real Beings**, where *the non Being* is concerned?

η αλλο οτιουν των οντων το μη ον περι;

Ari: There can not. (εσται ουκ.)

Par: Surely then, in this way, **One Being Is not, not can exist in any way at all**.

δη ουτω εν ον ουκ ουκ εχει πως ουδαμη.

Ari: Surely then, it is indeed **not** likely to be the case, that it can exist anywhere.


δη γε ουκουν εοικεν εχειν ουδαμη.

τί δέ; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνω ἢ τὸ τί ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τούτου ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλω ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν ἢ
ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται;
οὐκ ἔσται.

οὕτω δὲ ἓν οὐκ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ.

οὐκουν δὲ ἔοικέν γε οὐδαμῇ ἔχειν.

| | | |
|--|---|------|
| | <i>different other</i> _____ | 8.4 |
| | <i>others</i> | 8.5 |
| | <i>others other</i> | 8.7 |
| | <i>appears one</i> | 8.10 |
| | Theorem I | 8.15 |
| | <i>minute fractions</i> | 8.17 |
| | <i>appear unlimited limited one many</i> | 8.19 |
| | Theorem VI | 8.20 |
| | <i>like unlike themselves other</i> | 8.23 |
| | <i>same different contact separated motion rest coming perishing - coming perishing</i> | 8.24 |



8th

“Let us then discuss further what happens to the other things, if the one does not exist.” 8.1

“Let us do so.”

“Well, they must exist; for if others do not even exist, there could be no talking about the others.” 8.2

“True.”

“But if we talk about the others, the others are different. Or do you not regard the words other and different as synonymous?” [164c] 8.3

“Yes, I do.”

The Eighth Hypothesis

Parmenides: 26 Now then, let us yet declare, what must happen to **the others**, if **One Is not**.

δη Ετι λεγωμεν τι χρη πεπονθεναι ταλλα ει εν εστι μη,

Aristotle: For we say so. (γαρ λεγωμεν.)

Par: Then, on the one hand, **selves** must **exist** in some (indefinite) way; (The Principle

αλλα μεν αυτα δει ειναι που : of The 8th PG)

for if **others do not at all exist**, we could not discourse about **the others**.

γαρ ει αλλα μηδε εστιν, αν ουκ λεγοιτο περι των αλλων.

Ari: So it is. (ουτω.).

Par: But if **The Logos is** about **the others**, then **the others are** indeed **other**.

δε ει ο λογος περι των αλλων, τα αλλα εστιν γε ετερα.

Or do you not require that both **another** and **the other be** applied to **the self**?

η ουκ καλεις τε το αλλο και το ετερον επι τω αυτω;

Ari: I do at least. (εγωγε.)

τί δέ; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνω ἢ τὸ τί ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τούτου ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλω ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται;

οὐκ ἔσται.

οὕτω δὴ ἓν οὐκ ὄν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ.

οὐκ οὖν δὴ ἔοικέν γε οὐδαμῇ ἔχειν.

ἔτι δὴ λέγωμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τὰλλα τί χρη πεπονθέναι.

λέγωμεν γάρ.

ἄλλα μέν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι: εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο.

οὕτω.

εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, τά γε ἄλλα ἕτερα ἐστίν. ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἕτερον;

ἔγωγε.

“And we say that the *different* is different from the different, and the *other* is other than the other?” 8.4

“Yes.”

others “Then if the others are to be others, there must be something of which they will be others.” 8.5

“Yes, there must be.”

“Now what can that be? For they cannot be others of the one, if it does not exist.” 8.6

“No.”

“Then they are others of each other; for they have no alternative, except to be others of nothing.” *others other* 8.7

“True.”

“They are each, then, others of each other, in groups; for they cannot be so one at a time, if one does not exist.” 8.8

Par: But do we indeed say that **the other is in some (indefinite) way other** from **the other**,
 164C δε γε φαμεν το ετερον ειναι που ετερον ετερου,
 and certainly that which **is other is other** than **another**?
 και δη το αλλο ειναι αλλο αλλου;

Ari: Yes. (ναί.)

Par: Accordingly then, if **they are** also **about to be other**, to **the others**,
 αρα , ει και μελλει ειναι αλλα, τοις αλλοις
 then there **is something from which they will be other**.
 εστι τι ου εσται αλλα.

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)

Par: Certainly then, what will **this be**? For **they** will indeed not **be other**
 δη ουν τι αν ειη; μεν γε ουκ εσται αλλα
 than **The One**, by **non Being**.
 του ενος, μη οντος.

Ari: They will not. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Accordingly then, they **are other from each other**; for this still remains for **selves**;
 αρα εστι αλληλων : γαρ τουτο ετι λειπεται αυτοις,
 or else to **be other** from nothing. (η ειναι αλλοις μηδενος.)

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: Accordingly then, **each is other from the others**, according to **multitude**.
 αρα εκαστα εστι αλλα αλληλων κατα πληθη.

For **they** cannot **be so** according to **One**, and by the **non Being** of **One**.
 γαρ αν ουκ ειη οια κατα εν, τε ενος μη οντος:

ἕτερον δὲ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου;
 ναί.

καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι τι οὗ ἄλλα ἔσται.

ἀνάγκη.

τί δὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε.

οὐ γάρ.

ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἐστί: τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις.

ὀρθῶς.

κατὰ πλήθη ἄρα ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἐστί: κατὰ ἓν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν οἶά τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἑνός.

[164d] But each mass of them is unlimited in number, and even if you take what seems to be the smallest bit, it suddenly changes, like something in a dream that which seemed to be one is seen to be many, and instead of very small it is seen to be very great in comparison with the minute fractions of it.”

“Very true.”

“Such masses of others would be others of each other, if others exist and one does not exist.” 8.9

“Certainly.”

“There will, then, be many masses, each of which appears to be one, but is not one, if one does not exist?” *appears one* 8.10

“Yes.”

But each mass of selves,
 ἀλλ' ἕκαστος ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ὡς
as it appears, is infinite multitude; and even if anyone should take *that which appears to be*
 164D εἰκεν ἐστὶ ἀπειρος πληθεῖ, καὶ τις λαβὴ δοκοῦν
the smallest piece, just as a dream in sleep, it then suddenly appears to be opposite to that
 τὸ σμικροτάτον ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ ἐξαίφνης φαίνεται ἀντι
which appeared to be one, and instead of that which appeared to be the smallest, it would now
 δοξάντος ἑνός, καὶ ἀντι σμικροτάτου εἶναι
be many; that is, an immensely great mass, in relation to the minute fragments of self.
 εἶναι πολλὰ, παμμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ.

Ari: Most rightly. (ὀρθοτάτα.)

Par: Surely then, among such masses, the others will be other from one another,
 δη τοιούτων ὄγκων τάλλα ἂν εἴη ἄλλα ἀλλήλων,
 if One has no Being and others exist.
 εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν.

Ari: Perfectly so. (μέν κομίδη οὖν.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that there will be many masses/heaps,
 οὐκοῦν ἔσονται πολλοὶ ὄγκοι
each of which, *will appear to be one*, but which is not so, if indeed One will not be at all?
 ἕκαστος φαινόμενος εἰς, δὲ ὧν οὐ, εἴπερ ἐν ἐστὶ μὴ;

Ari: It will be so. (οὕτω.)

ἀλλ' ἕκαστος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἄπειρός ἐστι πλήθει, καὶ τὸ σμικροτάτον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβη τις,
 ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀντὶ ἑνὸς δόξαντος εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου
 παμμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ.

ὀρθότατα.

τοιούτων δὲ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἴη τᾶλλα, εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν.

κομίδῃ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἰς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὧν δὲ οὐ, εἴπερ ἐν μὴ ἔσται;

οὕτω.

[164e] “And they will seem to possess, number, if each seems to be one and they are many.” 8.11

“Certainly.”

“And some will seem to be even and others odd, but all that will be unreal, if the one does not exist.” 8.12

“True.”

“And there will, we assert, seem to be a smallest among them but this proves to be many and great in comparison with each of the many minute fractions.” [165a] 8.13

“Of course.”

Par: Thus, there will also *appear to be a number* of *elves*,
 164E δε και δοξει ειναι αριθμος αυτων,
 if indeed *each* of these *heaps*, *being many*, *also appear to be one*.
 ειπερ εκαστο ν, οντων πολλων, και εν

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: And certainly, *some* which are among *the elves* *will appear to be even*
 και δη μεν οντα εν αυτοις φαινεται τα αρτια
 and *others odd*, although *not truly*, if indeed *One will not exist at all*.
 δε τα περιττα ουκ αληθως, ειπερ εν εσται μη.

Ari: They will not be so. (γαρ ου ουν.)

Par: And most certainly, that which is smallest, as we have said,
 και γε μην σμικροτατον, φαμεν,
 will also *appear to be* in *elves*, but this will *appear to be many* and *big*,
 και δοξει ειναι εν αυτοις, δε τουτο φαινεται πολλα και μεγαλα
in relation to each of the *many*, since *they are small*.

165A προς εκαστον των πολλων ως οντων σμικρων.

Ari: How could it not? (πως δ' ου;)

καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον, πολλῶν ὄντων.

πάνυ γε.

καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι: φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων.

πῶς δ' οὔ;

“And each mass will be considered equal to the many minute fractions for it could not appear to pass from greater to smaller, without seeming to enter that which is between them; hence the appearance of equality.” 8.14

“That is reasonable.”

“And although it has a limit in relation to another mass, it has neither beginning nor limit nor middle in relation to itself?” 8.15

Theorem I

“Why is that?”

Par: And certainly **each mass** *will seem to the eye of opinion* to **be equal** to **the many**
 και μην εκαστος ογκος δοξασθησεται ειναι ισος τοις πολλοις
 and **small masses**. For it will not *appear* to **change** from a **more** into a **lesser quantity**,
 και σμικροις. γαρ αν ου φαινομενος μετεβαινειν εκ μειζονος εις ελαττον,
 before it *appears* to arrive at **something between**; but *this will be a phantasm* of **equality**.
 πριν δοξειεν ελθειν εις το μεταξυ; δ' τουτο αν ειη φαντασμα ισοτητος.
Ari: It is likely. (εικος.)

Par: Is it not the case, that although **it appears to have a limit**, in relation to
 ουκουν και εχων περας προς
another mass, and **self** in relation to **self**, **it neither has a**
 αλλον ογκον, τε αυτος προς αυτον ουτε εχων
Beginning nor **End** nor **Middle**?
 αρχην ουτε περας ουτε μεσον;
Ari: In what way then? (πη δη.)

καὶ ἴσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται εἶναι: οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαινεν ἐκ
 μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειεν ἐλθεῖν, τοῦτο δ' εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος.
 εἰκός.
 οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτός γε πρὸς αὐτὸν οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον
 ἔχων;
 πῇ δὴ;

“Because whenever the mind conceives of any of these as belonging to the masses, another beginning appears before the beginning, [165b] another end remains after the end, and in the middle are other more central middles than the middle, but smaller, because it is impossible to conceive of each one of them, since the one does not exist.”

8.16

“Very true.”

minute fractions

“So all being which is conceived by any mind must, it seems to me, be broken up into minute fractions; for it would always be conceived as a mass devoid of one.”

8.17

“Certainly.”

Par: For when anyone grasps *something* of **These** through *the empirical mind*, as if
 οτι οταν τις λαβη τι τούτων τη διανοια ως
it were existing, then **another** “beginning” will also always *appear to be* prior to ‘the beginning’,
 165B ον , αλλη αρχη τε αι φαινεται προ της αρχης,
 and after the end, **another** “end” *will always still remain*; and in “the middle” *there will*
 τε μετα την τελευτην τε ετερα τελευτη υπολειπομενη, τε εν τω μεσω τε
always be, **others** *more inward than “the middle”*; *but smaller*, because **each** of **the selves**
 αλλα μεσαιτερα του μεσου, δε μικροτερα, δια εκαστου αυτων
is not Capable of receiving The One, and inasmuch as by *The One not Being*.
 μη δυνασθαι λαμβανεσθαι το ενος, ατε του ενος ουκ οντος.

Ari: This is most true.

αληθεστατα.

Par: Surely then, all **The Being**, which anyone may grasp through *the empirical mind*,
 δη παν το ον, ο τις αν λαβη τη διανοια,

I think, must necessarily be broken-up into **minute pieces**. For the **masses** will, *in some way*
 οιμαι, αναγκη θρυπτεσθαι κερματιζομενον. γαρ ογκος αν που
always be apprehended without One/Unity.
 αιει λαμβανοιτο ανευ ενος.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)

ὅτι αἰ ἀυτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὥς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη αἰ φαίνεται ἀρχή,
 μετά τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἔν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου,
 μικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἐκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνός.

ἀληθέστατα.

θρύπτεσθαι δὴ οἶμαι κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἂν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ: ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ
 ἑνὸς αἰ λαμβάνοιτ’ ἄν.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

“Now anything of that sort, if seen from a distance and dimly, must appear to be one, [165c] but if seen from close at hand and with keen vision, each apparent one must prove to be unlimited in number, if it is really devoid of one, and one does not exist. Am I right?” 8.18

“That is perfectly conclusive.”

“Therefore the other things must each and all appear to be unlimited and limited and one and many, if the things other than one exist and one does not.” *appear unlimited* 8.19
limited one many

“Yes, they must.”

“And will they not also appear to be like and unlike?” Theorem VII 8.20

“Why?”

“Just as things in a picture, when viewed from a distance, appear to be all in one and the same condition and alike.” [165d] 8.21

“Certainly.”

Par: Is it not indeed the case then, that such a **mass**, on the one hand, *to those who*

γε οὐκ οὖν τοιούτου μεν το

behold it from afar and with a dull eye, **it** will necessarily *appear to be one*; whereas on the

165C ορῶντι πόρρωθεν καὶ ἀμβλῦ, ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι ἐν,

other hand, to **those** who **See it with an Intellectual Eye**, closely and **acutely**, then in that case

δε νοοῦντι ἐγγύθεν καὶ ὁξὺ

will not each “one” *be revealed to be* infinite in **multitude**, if indeed each “one” **is** deprived of

ἐκαστον ἐν φανῆναι ἀπειρον πληθει, εἴπερ στερεται

The One, by **not Being**?

τοῦ ἐνός μὴ ὄντος;

Ari: Most necessarily so. (μεν αναγκαιοτατον ουν.)

Par: Surely then, in this way **each** of **the others** *must appear to be* **Unlimited** and

δη οὕτω ἐκαστα τὰλλα δε φαίνεσθαι ἀπειρα τε καὶ

Limited, and **One** and **many**, if **One** is not at all, but **those other** than **The One** *exist*.

πέρας καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ, εἰ ἐν μὴ, δε τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἐστίν.

Ari: It must be so. (γὰρ δεί.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that they will *appear to be* both **like** and **unlike**?

οὐκ οὖν δοξει εἶναι καὶ ὁμοία τε καὶ ἀνόμοια;

Ari: In what way, then? (πῇ δή;)

Par: On the one hand, in such a way as, *to those who behold others from afar*,

μεν οἷον ἀποστάντι

everything appears to be one, as in a shadow painting, by appearing to have experienced

πάντα φαίνεσθαι ἐν ἐσκιαγραφημένα φαινόμενα πεπονθέναι

The Same and *by appearing to be like*.

ταῦτον καὶ εἶναι ὁμοία.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)

οὐκοῦν τό γε τοιοῦτον πόρρωθεν μὲν ὁρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλὺ ἐν φαίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὁξὺ νοοῦντι πλήθει ἄπειρον ἐν ἑκαστον φανῆναι, εἴπερ στέρεται τοῦ ἐνός μὴ ὄντος;

ἀναγκαιοτάτον μὲν οὖν.

οὕτω δὲ ἄπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἑκαστα τὰλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τὰλλα δὲ τοῦ ἐνός.

δεῖ γάρ.

οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁμοία τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι;

πῇ δή;

οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἐν πάντα φαινόμενα ταῦτόν φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὁμοία εἶναι.

πάνυ γε.

“But when you come close to them they appear to be many and
different, and, because of their difference in appearance, different in
kind and unlike each other.” 8.22

“Yes.”

“And so the groups of the other things must appear to be like and
unlike themselves and each other.” 8.23

*like unlike
themselves other*

“Certainly.”

*same different
contact separated
motion rest
coming perishing
- coming perishing*

“And also the same and different, and in contact with one another
and separated, and in all kinds of motion and in every sort of rest,
and coming into being and perishing, and neither of the two, and
all that sort of thing, which we can easily mention in detail, [165e]
if the many exist and the one does not.” 8.24

“Very true.”

Ω

Par: But on the other hand, as they approach closely, *they will appear to be* many and
 165D δε προσελθοντι γε πολλά και
other, and *diverse from* and *unlike themselves*, through *the phantom appearance of the other*.
 ετερα και ετεροια και ανομοια εαυτοις τω φαντασματο του ετερου.

Ari: It is so. (οὕτω.)

Par: Certainly then, *the massive selves* will necessarily *appear to be*
 δη τους ογκους αυτους αναγκη φαινεσθαι

both *like* and *unlike themselves*, and to *each other*.
 και ομοιους και ανομοιους εαυτοις τε και αλληλοις.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ μὲν οὖν.)

Par: Is it not so then, that *these are* both *selves* and *others* from *each other*,
 ουκουν τους και αυτους και ετερους αλληλων,
 and *have contact* and *are separate* from *themselves*, and *are moved* with every possible motion,
 και απομενους και χωρις εαυτων, και κινουμενους πασας κινήσεις
 and *are stationary* in every way, and *are generated* and *dissolved*, and *are* neither of these,
 και εστώτας παντη, και γιγνομενους και απολλυμενους και μηδετερα,
 and all such things possible, which we can at this time easily go through in detail, that is
 και παντα τα τοιαυτα που, α ημιν ηδη ευπετες διελθειν,
 of course, if *One has no Being* and *many exist*?

165E ει ενος μη οντος πολλά εστιν.

Ari: Most true then. (ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.)


προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλά και ἕτερα και τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα και ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς.
 οὕτω.

και ὁμοίους δὴ και ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτοὺς τε αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι και ἀλλήλοις.
 πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οὐκοῦν και τοὺς αὐτοὺς και ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, και ἀποτομένους και χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, και κινουμένους πάσας
 κινήσεις και ἐστώτας πάντη, και γιγνομένους και ἀπολλυμένους και μηδέτερα, και πάντα που τὰ
 τοιαῦτα, ἃ διελθεῖν εὐπετές ἤδη ἡμῖν, εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλά ἔστιν.

ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

| | |
|--|------|
| | 9.2 |
| - <i>many one</i> | 9.4 |
| Theorem VIII | 9.5 |
| - <i>conceived</i> | 9.8 |
| - <i>are conceived one many</i> | 9.9 |
| - <i>like unlike</i> | 9.10 |
| - <i>same different contact separate</i> | 9.11 |
| - <i>nothing is</i> | 9.12 |



Nothing

9th

“Let us, then, go back once more to the beginning and tell the consequences, if the others exist and the one does not.” 9.1

“Let us do so.”

“Well, the others will not be one?” 9.2

“Of course not.”

“Nor will they be many for if they were many, one would be contained in them. And if none of them is one, they are all nothing, so that they cannot be many.” 9.3

“True.”

“If one is not contained in the others, the others are neither many nor one.” [166a] - *many one* 9.4

“No.”

The Ninth Hypothesis

Parmenides: 27 Surely then, let us return again to **The Beginning** one more time,

δη Ἐτι παλιν ἐλθόντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπαξ,

and relate what must then **be**, to **those other** than **The One**, if **One Is not**.

εἰπόμεν, τι χρὴ δε εἶναι, τὰλλα τοῦ ἑνός, εἰ ἐν ἐστὶ μὴ.

Aristotle: Let us so relate. (γὰρ εἰπόμεν οὖν.)

Par: Is it **not** the case then, that on the one hand, **the others** will **not be one**.

οὐκοῦν μὲν τὰλλα οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐν.

Ari: How could they? (πῶς γάρ;)

Par: **Nor** indeed will **they be many**; for **one** would also **be present** in **many**.

οὐδε μὴν γε πολλὰ: γὰρ ἐν ἂν καὶ οὐσὶν ἐνείη ἐν πολλοῖς.

For if **none** of **them are one**, then **all** of **them are nothing**; so that **neither can many exist**.

γὰρ εἰ μὴδὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐν, ἀπαντα ἐστὶν οὐδέν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν πολλὰ εἴη.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ.)

Par: Then, by **One not being present** in **the others**, **neither are others many nor one**.

δε ἑνός μὴ ἐνόντος ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὔτε ἐστὶ τὰλλα πολλὰ οὔτε ἐν.

Ari: They are not. (γὰρ οὐ.)

ἔτι δὴ ἀπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰπόμεν, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τὰλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός, τί χρὴ εἶναι.

εἰπόμεν γὰρ οὖν.

οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τὰλλα.

πῶς γάρ;

οὐδὲ μὴν πολλὰ γε: ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὐσὶν ἐνείη ἂν καὶ ἓν. εἰ γὰρ μὴδὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἓν, ἀπαντα οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν πολλὰ εἴη.

ἀληθῆ.

μὴ ἐνόντος δὲ ἑνός ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ἓν ἐστὶ τὰλλα.

οὐ γάρ.

| | | |
|---|--------------|-----|
| “And they do not even appear to be one or many.” | Theorem VIII | 9.5 |
| “Why is that?” | | |
| “Because the others have no communion in any way whatsoever with anything which is non-existent, and nothing that is non-existent pertains to any of the others, for things that are non-existent have no parts.” | | 9.6 |
| “True.” | | |
| “Nor is there any opinion or appearance of the non-existent in connection with the others, nor is the non-existent conceived of in any way whatsoever as related to the others.” | | 9.7 |
| “No.” | | |

Par: *Nor* will **they** indeed *appear to be one nor many*.

166A ουδε γε φαινεται εν ουδε πολλα.

Ari: Why then? (τι δη;)

Par: Since **the others cannot in any way ever have any Communion** with **The Real Beings**,

οτι ταλλα μη ουδαμη ουδαμως εχει ουδενι κοινωνιαν των οντων

nor can any Part of The Beings be Present with the **others**; for *no Part exists* with *non-Beings*.

ουδε μη τι τω των οντων εστιν παρα των αλλων γαρ ουδεν μερος εστι μη τοις ουσιν.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: So then, *neither is there* any opinion about **that** which *is not present* in **others**, nor

αρα ουδ' εστιν δοξα του οντος μη παρα τοις αλλοις ουδε

any *phantasm*; *nor can that* which *is not in any way whatsoever be* opined about **the others**.

τι φαντασμα, ουδε το ον μη ουδαμως ουδαμη δοξάζεται επι των αλλων.

Ari: It cannot. (γαρ ουν ου.)

οὐδέ γε φαίνεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλά.

τί δή;

ὅτι τὰλλα τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει,

οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν.

ἀληθῇ.

οὐδ' ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστὶν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

- *conceived* “Then if one does not exist, [166b] none of the others will be
 conceived of as being one or as being many, either; for it is
 impossible to conceive of many without one.” 9.8
- “True, it is impossible.”
- “Then if one does not exist, the others neither are nor are
 conceived to be either one or many.” 9.9
 - *are conceived*
 - *one many*
- “No so it seems.”
- *like unlike* “Nor like nor unlike.” 9.10
- “No.”
- *same different* “Nor the same nor different, nor in contact nor separate, nor any of 9.11
 - *contact separate* the other things which we were saying they appeared to be. The
 others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if the one does not
 exist.” [166c]
 “True.”

Par: Accordingly then, if **One Is not**, then **It cannot be** opined to **be any one** particular aspect

166B αρα ει εν εστιν μη, ουδε δοξαζεται ειναι τι εν

of **the others**, **nor** yet of **many**; for it **is Impossible** to form an opinion of **many** without **One**.

των αλλων ουδε πολλα: γαρ αδυνατον δοξασαι πολλα ανευ ενος.

Ari: It is impossible. (γαρ αδυνατον.)

Par: Accordingly then, If **One Is not**, then **neither** will **the others exist**;

αρα ει εν εστι μη, ουτε ταλλα εστιν

nor can one, **nor many**, **be** opined.

ουτε εν ουδε πολλα δοξαζεται.

Ari: It is not likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, **neither** do **like nor unlike exist**.

αρα ουδ' ομοια ουδε ανομοια.

Ari: They do not. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Most certainly then, nor **the same** nor **the other**, nor those who grasp, nor those

γε μην ουδε τα αυτα ουδ' ετερα, ουδε απομενα ουδε

that **are separate**, nor **others** such as those we have before described in detail as having an

χωρις, ουδε αλλα οσα τοις αυτα προσθεν εν διηλθομεν ως

appearance of existing; for no **particular** of these will **exist**, nor will **the others appear to be**

φαινομενα, ουτε τι τουτων εστιν ουτε ταλλα φαινεται

if **One Is not**.

ει εν εστιν μη.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

ἐν ἅρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται τι τῶν ἄλλων ἐν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλὰ: ἄνευ γὰρ ἑνὸς πολλὰ δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον.

ἀδύνατον γάρ.

ἐν ἅρα εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τὰλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἐν οὐδὲ πολλὰ.

οὐκ ἔοικεν.

οὐδ' ἅρα ὅμοια οὐδὲ ἀνόμοια.

οὐ γάρ.

οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτὰ γε οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τὰλλα, ἐν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν.

ἀληθῆ.

“Then if we were to say in a word, 'if the one is not, nothing is,' *nothing is* 9.12
should we be right?”

“Most assuredly.”

“Then let us say that, and we may add, as it appears, that whether 9.13
the one is or is not, the one and the others in relation to themselves
and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and
do not appear.”

“Very true.”

Ω

Par: Is it *not* the case then, if we must summarily say, that

166C ουκουν ει συλληβδην ειποιμεν

if **One Is not**, and *nothing exists*; then will our assertion **be Correctly** stated?

ει εν εστιν μη, και ουδεν εστιν, αν ειποιμεν ορθως ;

Ari: Altogether so. (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)

Par: Now then, let this then be affirmed by you and me; and we may add this also:

τοιουν ειρησθω τε τουτο και

That if **One Is**, or **Is not**, then as it **is** likely/reasonable, both in relation to **Self**

ειτ' εν εστιν ειτε εστιν μη, ως εοικεν , τε αυτο

and in relation to **the others**, and also in relation to **them-selves** and to **each other**,

και ταλλα και προς αυτα και προς αλληλα

that **All exist** in every way, and also, **All** do not **exist** in every way,

παντα εστι παντως τε και ουκ εστι

and *appear to be*, and also, *do not appear to be*.

και φαινεται τε και ου φαινεται.

Ari: Most true. (αληθεστατα.)

ουκοουν και συλλήβδην ει είποιμεν, εν ει μη έστιν, ουδέν έστιν, όρθώς αν είποιμεν;

παντάπασι μεν ουν.

είρήσθω τοίουν τουτό τε και ότι, ως έοικεν, εν ειτ' έστιν ειτε μη έστιν, αυτό τε και τάλλα και προς αυτά και προς άλληλα πάντα πάντως έστί τε και ουκ έστι και φαίνεται τε και ου φαίνεται.

άληθέστατα.

1 Aug 2006

Revised 1 Nov 2012

Revised 29 Nov 2016

Revised 9 Feb 2017

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
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Posted to the NS Archive 18 May 2018